

2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan

Annex to the FEMA Region IX All-Hazards Plan

February 15, 2018



FEMA

Message from the Governor of CNMI and the FEMA RIX Regional Administrator

Dear Emergency Management Partner:

It is with great satisfaction that the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) present this *2018 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*. The completion of this plan is the product of nearly 2 years of work with Whole Community partners and stakeholders to define strategies for a response to a catastrophic typhoon affecting CNMI.

Developed in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) – National Preparedness, this joint commonwealth/federal plan outlines a process for activation and deployment of resources and capabilities to save and sustain lives and restore the region’s critical infrastructure. The goal of the plan is to quickly re-establish operational capability to the commonwealth and facilitate a Whole Community response to the disaster that sets the conditions for recovery.

This executable plan represents the combined capabilities of the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and commonwealth and federal response partners. This approach has helped foster public-private partnerships and has led to the development of a comprehensive plan that will help make CNMI better prepared to respond to and recover from a catastrophic typhoon.



Honorable Ralph DLG Torres
Governor
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands



Robert Fenton
Regional Administrator
FEMA Region IX

Handling Instructions

Questions pertaining to the dissemination, transmission, or destruction of this plan or to obtain a copy of DHS Management Directive 11042.1 should be submitted to the FEMA Regional Planning Branch, 500 C Street SW, Washington, D.C., 20472. Questions or requests may also be submitted to the Response Division Director, FEMA, Region IX, 1100 Broadway, Suite 1200, Oakland, California, 94607-4052.

Executive Summary

This *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan* is a capabilities-based plan that follows National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System (ICS) principles and will facilitate effective and efficient response and recovery operations in the response to a catastrophic typhoon strike within CNMI.

This plan was developed collaboratively with local, commonwealth, federal, non-governmental, and private sector partners consistent with the Whole Community doctrine. This plan presents actions that key Core Capability stakeholders may take to save and sustain lives and protect property in the response to a catastrophic typhoon in CNMI.

While this executable plan was developed with CNMI stakeholder input, the execution concepts detailed herein are similar to those in the *2017 Guam Catastrophic Typhoon Plan* and thus may facilitate efforts between CNMI and Guam with FEMA Region IX for achieving a coordinated regional response, should the situation require it.

The plan was developed as a deliberate plan using a specific Category 4 typhoon scenario to guide its development. Under a credible threat, this deliberate plan will be used as a guide and then modified, based on the actual situation, in developing a storm-specific crisis action plan that addresses deployment, employment, and sustainment of federal resources in support of the commonwealth.

This plan will undergo periodic reviews to incorporate policy updates, new guidance, and lessons learned from exercises and actual incidents in order to best protect the lives, property, and environment of the communities and jurisdictions within CNMI.

Robert Fenton
Regional Administrator
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1 Situation

The 2017 Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) Catastrophic Typhoon Plan is an annex to the FEMA Region IX All-Hazards Plan and is CNMI’s first joint deliberate catastrophic plan. This plan was developed in accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) – National Preparedness, and is in alignment with the Federal Interagency Operations Plan (FIOP). Critical stakeholder actions (activation and deployment of resources and capabilities) to save and sustain lives and restore the region’s critical infrastructure presented here informs a Whole Community response to the physical and operational impacts of a catastrophic typhoon in CNMI while setting the conditions for a successful recovery.

1.1 Threat

A Category 4 typhoon (Major) was developed for this plan by the National Weather Service (NWS) Weather Field Office Guam (WFO Guam) (see Figure 1 below) based on Typhoon Soudelor, which struck CNMI in 2015. For detailed information on this scenario storm and its physical effects and operational impacts, refer to Annex B: Intelligence.




Figure 1: Storm Track

2 Mission

The mission of the joint territory/federal response organization is to save and sustain lives, support the restoration of critical lifeline infrastructure, and assist in re-establishing the commercial supply chain, leveraging organic capabilities and cooperation in both CNMI and Guam.

3 Execution

3.1 Senior Leaders' Intent

Commonwealth and federal emergency managers ensure unity of effort when establishing a joint commonwealth/federal Unified Coordination Group (UCG) to coordinate disaster response activities consistent with the priorities set by the Governor of CNMI.

3.2 Concept of Operations

3.2.1 Joint Catastrophic Typhoon Planning

This operational response plan addresses the physical effects and operational impacts from a Category 4 typhoon impacting CNMI. Whole Community partners were engaged in the development of this plan and are its intended audience. Consistent with principles in the National Response Framework (NRF), National Preparedness Goal (NPG), and the FIOP, this plan analyzed relevant Core Capabilities in the development of response strategies that increase collaboration, coordination, and information-sharing prior to (in preparedness), during (in response) and after (in recovery) a catastrophic typhoon impacting CNMI and will ultimately result in a more secure and resilient nation when executed.

The greatest challenges to disaster response in the western Pacific region are time and distance. Between CNMI and Washington D.C., there are eight different time zones and 7,800 miles over which resource movement by air must be coordinated. Support packages (federal initial response resources and commodities) may originate from or near FEMA Distribution Centers (DCs) in Honolulu, Hawaii; Fort Worth, Texas; Atlanta, Georgia; or Washington D.C. Given the time and distance to CNMI from the mainland and the limited space availability on aircraft, critical response resources “pushed” to the area must be timely and necessary or pose a risk of higher costs and increased delays for the response.

Critical resources must not only include equipment and materials but also skilled labor; following a catastrophic typhoon, truck drivers, cargo handlers, and heavy equipment operators in CNMI will likely be affected by the disaster and unavailable to assist. Commodities distribution—not a common area for federal assistance—will also likely require supplemental federal assistance.

Sustainment of all supplemental resources pushed into CNMI must also be considered as part of the federal response footprint in CNMI. The largest island in CNMI is Saipan, with a total land area of just 45 square miles and a population of about 50,000. After a typhoon strike in CNMI, surging response capabilities and resources into a geographically small area such as Saipan will be a challenge. Transitioning to a “pull” system, where resources are ordered by field operations personnel, will occur as soon as practicable. Transitioning resource operations to a pull system depends on getting and maintaining good situational awareness and operational control in the field.

For this overarching concept of operations and associated concept of support to be successful, timely activation; critical assessment of the situation; development of relevant and narrowly tailored packages of supplemental resources; integration of the private sector into response priorities, strategies, and execution; and the deployment and sustainment of resources is necessary.

3.2.2 *Critical Planning Assumptions*

A typhoon typically takes 3-5 days to form and gains in strength the longer it remains over warm water, such as those of the western Pacific. This plan assumes that a Category 4 typhoon will take at least five days to form prior to making landfall in CNMI. Storms forming within a 5-day distance of making landfall are likely to rate a lower storm category than a Category 4.

- The Government of CNMI will activate their Emergency Operations Center (EOC), declare a commonwealth State of Emergency, take pre-landfall actions to safeguard the population and resources, and prepare for post-landfall tasks and actions, to include the reception of federal resources.
- The Governor will declare a State of Emergency.
- The Governor will first request and will be granted an emergency Presidential declaration for Category B – Emergency Protective Measures.
- The Governor will request a Presidential Emergency or Major Disaster Declaration upon evaluating initial damage assessments and determining the severity of the typhoon’s impact.
- A Presidential Disaster Declaration will be requested by the commonwealth and granted.
- A Category 4 typhoon in CNMI will overwhelm commonwealth resources used in typhoon response operations and require supplemental federal resources and capabilities under the NRF and Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act).
- A catastrophic typhoon will require the positioning of resources or capabilities as early as Phase 1b and no later than Phase 1c.
- Given the time-distance factor of CNMI from the continental United States (CONUS), response resources may be mobilized early and staged off-island until post-landfall.
- CNMI response personnel will be personally affected by the disaster and may be unable to perform their response duties.
- Vulnerable populations may have difficulty accessing available services, such as emergency shelters and medical care, and require assistance post-landfall.
- Whole Community organizations, including private sector and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as disaster survivors will be involved in response efforts.
- The typhoon is not expected to have catastrophic impact on another U.S. commonwealth or territory requiring a federal response. Considering the proximity of CNMI to the Territory of Guam, there is a risk of this occurring, however, and Guam should be included in coordination and collaboration for an effective response throughout the Marianas island chain.
- There are no competing events for federal resources, allowing the full complement of response actions and resources to be applied, as available.

3.2.3 Critical Operational Considerations

- Storm track predictions do not provide sufficient accuracy to predict landfall in CNMI in time to allow for the staging of resources; response resources must be pre-positioned in a facility capable of surviving a Category 4 typhoon or stored in a geographic location off-island for movement to CNMI upon request, post-storm.
- CNMI has limited capability and little capacity to support large responder populations.
- While the most populated islands are Rota, Tinian, and Saipan, there are families within CNMI that live on the remote outer islands.
- Time and distance may require significant pre-impact federal support.
- CNMI’s most southern island, Rota, is located only 45 miles from Guam, presenting a likely scenario that two independent jurisdictions may be impacted by the same Category 4 typhoon.
- There is limited communication with outer island residents.
- A large population of temporary, non-citizen workers resides on the islands in “Contract Worker” visa status.
- Federal agencies administer a number of infrastructure projects currently.

3.2.4 Using the Plan and Core Capability Analyses

In Table 1, the 15 Response Core Capabilities applicable to this plan are listed in Column 1, the preliminary targets for those Core Capabilities are listed in Column 2, and references to areas within this plan that can assist operators and planners in finding relevant information for the response are listed in Column 3.

The first three Core Capabilities are considered global Core Capabilities in that apply across all mission areas of the NPG and are “enablers,” meaning they are necessary to the success of the remaining Core Capabilities. Operational Communications has been added to these three “enabler” core capabilities because Operational Communications is especially critical to this outside the continental United States (OCONUS) response and should be reviewed by Whole Community partners responding to this catastrophic event.

The next five core capabilities are the drivers of this response plan and are critically relevant in the threat of a catastrophic typhoon impacting CNMI. These provide a reference for the Whole Community response, as they define resources and strategies for responding to this event. (At CNMI’s request, eight operational objectives were further developed for this plan in alignment with these critical five Core Capabilities.)

The remaining Core Capabilities may be considered to varying degree in response in crisis action planning.

For more information on CNMI’s specific strategies for meeting Core Capability requirements, refer to CNMI’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA).

Table 1: Core Capability Targets and Plan References

Core Capability	Preliminary Target	Reference
Planning	Conduct a systematic process engaging the Whole Community, as appropriate, in the development of executable strategic-, operational-, and/or tactical-level approaches to meet defined objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FEMA Operational Planning Manual ▪ Base Plan
Public Information and Warning	Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the Whole Community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance being made available.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Appendix F – Public Information and Warning
Operational Coordination	Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of Core Capabilities.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Appendix A – Task Organization
Operational Communications	Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Appendix E – Emergency Communications / Operational Communications
Critical Transportation	Provide transportation (including infrastructure access and accessible transportation services) for response priority objectives, including the evacuation of people and animals and the delivery of vital response personnel, equipment, and services into the affected areas.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-6 and Appendix C-7 ▪ Appendix D – Logistics
Infrastructure Systems	Stabilize critical infrastructure functions, minimize health and safety threats, and efficiently restore and revitalize systems and services to support a viable, resilient community.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-1, Appendix C-2, Appendix C-3, and Appendix C-6 ▪ Appendix D – Logistics
Logistics and Supply Chain Management	Deliver essential commodities, equipment, and services in support of impacted communities and survivors, to include emergency power and fuel support as well as the coordination of access to community staples; synchronize logistics capabilities and enable the restoration of impacted supply chain.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-4 and Appendix C-6 ▪ Appendix D – Logistics

<p>Mass Care Services</p>	<p>Provide life-sustaining human services to the affected population, to include hydration, feeding, sheltering, temporary housing, evacuee support, reunification, and distribution of emergency supplies.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-5 ▪ Appendix D – Logistics
<p>Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services</p>	<p>Provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical, and behavioral health support and products to all affected populations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-8 ▪ Appendix D – Logistics
<p>Environmental Response/Health and Safety</p>	<p>Conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and workers as well as the environment from all hazards in support of responder operations and affected communities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-9
<p>Fatality Management Services</p>	<p>Provide fatality management services, including decedent remains recovery and victim identification, working with local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal authorities to provide mortuary processes, temporary storage or permanent internment solutions, information-sharing with Mass Care Services for the purpose of reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons/remains, and providing counseling to the bereaved.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-8 ▪ Appendix D – Logistics
<p>Fire Management and Suppression</p>	<p>Provide structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities to manage and suppress fires of all types, kinds, and complexities while protecting the lives, property, and the environment in the affected area.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-10 ▪ Appendix D – Logistics
<p>Mass Search and Rescue Operations</p>	<p>Deliver traditional and atypical search and rescue capabilities, including personnel, services, animals, and assets, to survivors in need, with the goal of saving the greatest number of endangered lives in the shortest time possible.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-11 ▪ Appendix D – Logistics
<p>On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement</p>	<p>Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas and also for response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Base Plan ▪ Appendix C – Operations: Appendix C-12 ▪ Appendix D – Logistics

3.2.5 Operational Objectives

In accordance with the Governor of CNMI's specific objectives for response and recovery, accomplishing the following eight operational objectives are required:

1. Provide emergency power to maintain continuity of essential operations.
2. Restore the power infrastructure.
3. Stabilize the water distribution and wastewater systems.
4. Deliver fuel to maintain continuity of essential operations and services.
5. Conduct mass care services and sheltering of survivors.
6. Facilitate recovery of the marine transportation system.
7. Distribute essential commodities and immediate response resources.
8. Re-establish public health and medical services at critical emergency medical facilities.

For a crosswalk of each objective against the appropriate Core Capabilities, see Table 2 below.

Table 2: 2017 Core Capabilities and Operational Objectives – CNMI

2017 Operational Objectives									
		Provide emergency power to maintain continuity of essential operations	Restore the power Infrastructure	Stabilize the water distribution and wastewater systems	Conduct mass care services and sheltering of survivors	Re-establish public health and medical services at critical emergency medical facilities	Deliver fuel to maintain continuity of essential operations and services	Facilitate recovery of the Marine Transportation System	Support commodity distribution
Mission Area	Core Capabilities	Infrastructure Systems			Mass Care Services		Logistics / Supply Chain Management		
	Planning	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
	Public Information and Warning	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
	Operational Coordination	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Response	Infrastructure Systems	•	•	•			•	•	•
	Critical Transportation	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
	Environmental Response/Health and Safety	•	•	•	•		•	•	
	Fatality Management Services					•			
	Fire Management and Suppression						•	•	
	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	•	•	•	•		•	•	•
	Mass Care Services	•	•	•	•			•	•
	Mass Search and Rescue Operations								
	On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement				•		•		
	Operational Communications	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services				•	•			
Situational Assessment	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
Recovery	Infrastructure Systems	•	•	•				•	
	Economic Recovery		•	•			•	•	•
	Health and Social Services		•	•		•			
	Housing				•				
	Natural and Cultural Resources	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Mitigation	Community Resilience	•	•	•	•				
	Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
	Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	
	Threat and Hazard Identification	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	

3.3 Phased Approach to Response

The tropical storm/tropical cyclone threat condition (TC) scale is predicated on the incidence of damaging winds impacting CNMI, which are defined as “sustained winds greater than or equal to 39 mph (34 kt).” TCs are set by CNMI Homeland Security Emergency Management (HSEM), in coordination with the WFO Guam. Additional discussion of CNMI’s TC system is presented in the CNMI Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).

Organizing operations into phases allows tasks to be grouped into common operating periods. It also allows multiple commonwealth and federal agencies to task organize in support of incident objectives, which is critical in a successful unified response. In alignment with CNMI’s TC scale, the three distinct operational phases for the federal response and recovery effort are outlined in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2: Operational Phases and Threat Condition Levels

Phase 1 (Pre-Incident): Where there is a major typhoon heading towards CNMI, this phase is used to gain situational awareness of existing resource and logistics capabilities, activate coordination/operations centers, alert/activate resources in preparation for response activities, and implement protective measures, as needed.

Phase 1 includes the following subphases:

- **Phase 1a (Normal Operations)** – Activities during this phase include the day-to-day operations of departments and agencies that may be involved in a unified response to a catastrophic typhoon. These activities include training, planning, exercising and maintaining situational awareness.
- **Phase 1b (Elevated Threat)** – Activities during this phase focus on posturing resources in such a way as to set the conditions for their immediate deployment for the response as the storm passes. These activities include alerting personnel, activating and deploying incident management teams, deploying personnel to gain situational awareness, and beginning joint planning.
 - Deploy Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) with selected Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to CNMI EOC.

- Activate the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) and National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) as necessary.
- Alert, activate and deploy select resource packages (see Annex C: Operations) to CNMI to shelter and stage for immediate deployment post-storm.
- Alert logistics support elements and teams.
- Alert Movement Coordination Center in the NRCC.
- **Phase 1c (Credible Threat)** – Activities during this phase focus on joint efforts in preparing to respond to the impacts of the impending storm. CNMI and federal leadership convene to form the UCG, receive response priorities from the Governor of CNMI, and potentially request and execute additional pre-positioning or transportation from Honolulu, Hawaii, or CONUS of critical resources or commodities. The NRCC may push federal resources to CNMI, and CNMI leadership must develop an initial deployment and reception strategy. Critical tasks for this phase are—
 - A regional or national federal IMAT with a federal lead will develop joint situational awareness in coordination with key stakeholders to inform UCG decisions regarding the response.
 - Operational coordination will be established between the NRCC and RRCC and the EOC.
 - Federal staging area (FSA) assets will be activated and positioned for immediate deployment.
 - Incident Support Bases (ISBs) will fully activate and push required resources from CONUS and/or Honolulu forward.
 - Appendix C: Operations has been reviewed and will be actively considered in planning response activities.

End State: The desired end state pre-impact is to effectively alert, activate, and deploy select commodities, teams, and other resources to CNMI and safely stage and/or shelter those resources before impact. Those resources will become available for employment immediately following impact, as directed by the joint organization.

Phase 2 (Response): Once the typhoon has passed, immediate activities in this phase will focus on lifesaving and rescue operations (if there is a requirement) and will transition through activation, deployment, and employment of specialized resources and capabilities, as identified through joint planning efforts at the UCG level and the execution of this plan’s appendices (see Appendix C: Operations).

Phase 2 includes the following subphases:

- **Phase 2a (Immediate Response)** – Activities in this phase will focus on stabilization of the situation and developing adequate situational awareness. Critical tasks for this sub-phase are—
 - Establish operational control and communication between CNMI, federal, and private sector response personnel.

- Employ supplemental resources that were safely staged or sheltered pre-storm.
- Establish effective communications among the coordinated joint information organizations.
- The priorities of this phase are to—
 - Support lifesaving and life-sustaining missions.
 - Support search and rescue operations.
 - Support provision of emergency medical care to survivors.
 - Support debris clearance needed for access to critical facilities and lifesaving missions.
 - Support the emergency power mission for critical facilities.
 - Support the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Port Authority of CNMI in critical port assessment activities.
- **Phase 2b (Deployment)** – The IMAT is fully mission capable and ready to assume management responsibilities and transfer functions to a Joint Field Office (JFO).
 - Priorities during this phase are—
 - Support efforts to stabilize the water distribution and wastewater systems.
 - Facilitate the recovery of the marine transportation system.
 - Support the provision of mass care services, including the sheltering of survivors.
 - Support the distribution of essential commodities and immediate response resources.
 - Support the restoration of the power infrastructure.
- **Phase 2c (Employment, Sustained Operations)** – Activities in these phases focus on transitioning federal support through programmatic recovery operations, guided by appropriate functional plans developed by the joint operation and in accordance with national doctrine.

End State: All lifesaving and life-sustaining resources are in place and missions are being successfully completed.

Using the phase construct outlined above, incident support and incident management across the Whole Community will be coordinated. The physical distance between CNMI (located almost 6,000 miles from Oakland, California) and other response facilities (Honolulu, Hawaii; Fort Worth, Texas; Atlanta, Georgia; Washington D.C.) highlights the importance of establishing good situational awareness to inform key decision making, including transportation management, as part of incident support.

3.4 Key Federal Decisions

Time and distance considerations require that decision making regarding the placement of resources on or near CNMI must be conducted well in advance of the storm’s forecasted impact.

Some key federal decisions associated with a catastrophic typhoon response include but are not limited to—

- Determine level of response.
- Deploy IMAT and select ESFs in advance of the storm.
- Determine “battle rhythm,” considering time zone differences between FEMA HQ and CNMI.
- Activate RRCC and Regional Response Coordination Staff (RRCS) to appropriate levels.

3.5 Key Federal Responsibilities and Tasks

- Conduct timely notification, activation, and deployment of federal resources and capabilities given time and distance considerations for a CNMI response. Develop Regional Response Plan.
- Execute Execution Checklist (see Appendix X).
- Execute all response missions in accordance with law and regulation.
- Integrate the Whole Community partners in response and recovery efforts.
- Require deployed resources and capabilities to be self-sustaining for 72-96 hours.
- Consider the smallest federal footprint required, as housing for response personnel is limited.

Given time and distance considerations, incident management relies on sound preparedness activities, robust information-sharing and a common understanding of priorities, objectives, tasks, and constraints across the response. These incident management goals are met by the joint execution of this plan.

3.6 Concept of Support

3.6.1 Air Transportation

CONUS to CNMI

Federal capabilities and resources will originate from the continental United States (CONUS) or Hawaii. FEMA will establish and staff its primary ISB(s) at Travis Air Force Base (AFB) in California. As a trans-loading stop, FEMA will mission assign the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in support of response operations in Hawaii and stand up an appropriately sized organization to manage trans-loading and other supply/resource requirements in Honolulu, Hawaii. In Saipan, the CNMI International Airport serves as the primary airfield for operations response. In the unlikely event that the CNMI International Airport suffers extreme damage, a secondary airport will be considered.




Figure 3: Air Transportation Architecture for a CNMI Response

The time and distance from CONUS requires targeted specific and limited resources be pre-positioned during phases 1b and 1c. This initial support and much of the immediate response support will rely on air transportation into CNMI.

Should multiple islands within the commonwealth be impacted, additional FSAs will be needed. The figure below details additional staging areas, identified by island, to support response operations.




Figure 4: CNMI Airfield Locations

CNMI Interisland Air Capabilities

Transporting cargo and personnel between the CNMI islands is subject to limited interisland air capabilities and limited flights, which is a critical shortfall.




Figure 5: CNMI Interisland Air Carriers and Routes

3.6.2 Marine Transportation

Only crane-capable barges call on the ports of CNMI with commercial cargo, as vessels require their own cargo-handling capability for off-loading shipping containers. There are no gantry cranes in use within CNMI. Therefore, most commercial cargo originating from CONUS is initially received in Guam and then trans-loaded onto smaller cargo barges destined for CNMI. One U.S.-flagged shipping company, American President’s Line (APL), has a weekly “milk run” from Asia to Saipan.




Figure 6: Marine Transportation to CNMI (CONUS to OCONUS)

CONUS to CNMI (Westbound)

All intermodal traffic from CONUS (Port of Long Beach, Port of Oakland) is received in the Port of Guam, the “Gateway to the Marianas.” Cargo destined for CNMI is loaded onto smaller barges that are crane capable. The primary transporter is Matson. Matson has crane-capable barges, or shipping agents may contract service from other shippers for the movement between Guam and CNMI’s three main islands: Saipan, Rota, and Tinian.

Asia to CNMI (Eastbound)

The U.S.-flagged vessels operated by APL on their Guam Saipan Express (GSX) service are crane-capable vessels originating in Busan, Korea, or Yokohama, Japan, once every 14 days. GSX vessels (APL Saipan and APL Guam) have a capacity of 1,000 and 1,600 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU), respectively, capable of managing a large increase in intermodal service, if necessary, from Asia.

Interisland Service

Each of the three main islands in CNMI have regularly scheduled barge services.




Figure 7: CNMI Interisland Marine Transportation Carriers and Routes

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

4.1 Administration

See CNMI’s Emergency Operations Plan, appropriate commonwealth law and administrative rules, and the *FEMA Region IX All-Hazards Plan*.

4.2 Resources

4.2.1 Personnel/Administrative Management Responsibilities

Department and agencies will—

- Follow established agency policies for personnel augmentation in accordance with statutes, regulations, and authorities; Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs); the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC); and mutual aid agreements; and
- Ensure employee compliance with parent organization travel policies and procedures for travel and travel reimbursement.

4.3 Funding

The requirements and procedures for disaster response funding are described in the Base Plan of the *FEMA Region IX All-Hazards Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

5.1 Oversight

The UCG, using Unified Command principles, is responsible for the overall direction and control of joint commonwealth/federal operations in support of field-level operations, subject to the oversight of the leaders identified below.

5.1.1 Commonwealth Leadership

CNMI leadership roles are described in the *CNMI Emergency Operations Plan*. Roles for commonwealth leaders, in addition to senior officials who participate in the UCG, are summarized below.

Governor of CNMI

The Governor leads the commonwealth response to the incident. The Governor sets the priorities for response and recovery in the commonwealth and provides direction to the UCG with regard to those priorities.

Cabinet Officials

The Governor's cabinet includes directors representing various agencies. These agencies and departments, while operating under their respective authorities, take action in accordance with the objectives identified in the Incident Action Plan (IAP) approved by the UCG. They may participate as members of the UCG, depending on their respective roles in responding to the incident. Agencies and departments with response responsibilities are represented in the EOC by a Response Activity Coordinator (RAC).

Governor's Chief of Staff

The Governor's Chief of Staff serves as counsel to the Governor on homeland security issues and serves as a liaison between the Governor's office, CNMI HSEM, DHS, and other organizations both within and outside of CNMI. The Chief of Staff coordinates with representatives of relevant commonwealth agencies, including public safety entities, as well as

emergency management and public health officials and others charged with developing preparedness and response strategies.

Special Assistant to Homeland Security

The Special Assistant to Homeland Security ensures that the commonwealth is prepared to deal with large-scale emergencies and is responsible for coordinating the commonwealth response in any major emergency or disaster. This includes supporting local governments as needed or requested and coordinating assistance with the Federal Government.

5.1.2 Federal Leadership

Federal leadership is described in the NRF. Roles for federal leaders, in addition to federal senior officials who participate in the UCG, are summarized below.

The President

The President leads the federal response effort and ensures that the necessary coordinating structures, leadership, and resources are applied quickly and efficiently.

President’s Homeland Security Council (HSC)

The HSC brings together Cabinet officers and other department or agency heads, as necessary, to provide national strategic and policy advice to the President.

Secretary of Homeland Security

The Secretary of Homeland Security is the Principal Federal Official (PFO) for domestic incident management. The Secretary is responsible for providing the President with an overall architecture for domestic incident management and coordinating the federal response, when required, while relying upon the support of other federal partners.

FEMA Administrator

The FEMA Administrator is the principal advisor to the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the HSC regarding emergency management. The FEMA Administrator’s duties include operation of the NRCC, effective support of all ESFs, and leadership of FEMA for the response to and recovery from all-hazards incidents.

FEMA Regional Administrator

The Regional Administrator (RA) provides oversight for response and recovery within Region IX, which includes CNMI. The RA oversees the initial response within the Region, including direction of the RRCC when it is activated and coordination of the initial deployment of liaisons and the IMAT to the HSEM EOC. If appointed as the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) or designated as the State (Commonwealth) Coordinating Officer (SCO), the RA may be a part of the UCG.

5.2 Communications

Communications between commonwealth and federal agencies and with other organizations engaged in the response will follow protocols and procedures established for existing commonwealth and federal systems, with any modifications necessary to accommodate the

disruptions caused by the typhoon. A detailed analysis regarding communications infrastructure, communications capabilities, and system-specific information can be found in Annex E.

6 Authorities

6.1 Federal Statutes

- Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act)
- Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Domestic Incident Management (February 28, 2005)
- Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8, National Preparedness (March 30, 2011)
- National Preparedness Goal (September 2011)
- National Incident Management System (NIMS) (December 2008)
- National Response Framework (NRF) (January 2008)
- Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) (2006)
- Rehabilitation Act of 1973
- Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (1990)
- Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified predominantly at 6 United States Code (U.S.C.) §§ 101-557), as amended, with respect to the organization and mission of the FEMA in the DHS Appropriations Act of 2007 (Pub. Law 109-295, 120 Stat. § 1355 [2006])
- Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA 2000) (Pub. Law 106-390)
- Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385)
- Public Health Service Act, (42 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.) (2007)
- Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Oil and Pollution Action of 1990 (OPA-90)
- Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (Pub. Law 109-417)
- Americans with Disabilities Act (Pub. Law 101-336)
- Defense Production Act (Pub. Law 81-774)
- Department of Veterans Affairs Emergency Preparedness Act of 2002 (Pub. Law 107-287)
- Disaster Mitigation Act
- Draft Disaster Assistance Policy
- Economy Act (Pub. Law 97-258 and Pub. Law 98-216, as amended)
- Executive Guide to Domestic Incident Management and Support
- Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Pub. Law 91-596, as amended)

- Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 2006 (Pub. Law 109–308)
- Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Pub. Law 107-71 and 49 U.S.C. § 114)
- Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (codified in 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, et. seq.)
- Social Security Act (codified in Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, et. seq.)
- Title 32 of the U.S.C.

6.2 Commonwealth References

- CNMI Homeland Security and Emergency Management Act of 2013 (CNMI Pub. Law 18-04)
- Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands Disaster Relief Act of 1979. Public Law 1-40 (repealed)
- Homeland Security Act of 2004 (Pub. Law 14-63)
- CNMI Governor Executive Order 94-3
- CNMI All-Hazards Emergency Operations Plan (Draft 2015)
- CNMI Emergency Operations Plan (2000)
- Administrative Leave for Disaster Volunteers Act of 1994 (Pub. Law 9-63)

6.3 Other Related References

- FEMA Incident Management Handbook (November 2017)
- HSPD-5 (Management of Domestic Incidents) (February 28, 2003)
- HSPD-7 (Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection) (December 17, 2003)
- HSPD-8 (National Preparedness) (December 17, 2003)
- HSPD-20/National Security Presidential Directive-51 (National Continuity Policy) (May 9, 2007)
- HSPD-21 (Public Health and Medical Preparedness) (October 18, 2007)
- National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (2007/2008 Update) (August 2008)
- National Preparedness Guidelines (September 2007)
- Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG)
- Regional Planning Guide (March 2010)
- DHS Response FIOP (2nd Ed., August 2016)
- DHS Recovery FIOP (2nd Ed., August 2016)

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Appendix A: Task Organization

1 *Situation*

This Task Organization Appendix describes commonwealth and federal response structures by phase. Through joint task organization, unity of effort and efficient resourcing in support of incident objectives is accomplished.

2 *Mission*

The mission of task organization is to establish a National Incident Management System (NIMS)-compliant joint commonwealth/federal response structure.

3 *Execution*

3.1 *Senior Leaders' Intent*

A joint response organization ensures unity of effort in coordinating disaster response consistent with the priorities set by the Governor of the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands (CNMI).

3.2 *Concept of Operations*

Coordination, command, and control are provided by the Unified Coordination Group (UCG), which includes senior officials from both CNMI and the Federal Government that have jurisdictional or functional authority for catastrophic typhoon response operations. Response activities under the UCG's direction are executed by the joint Unified Coordination Staff (UCS) to ensure unity of effort and command.

All responses are local to begin with. The local emergency management official in CNMI is the mayor, who has responsibility for individuals and operations at the village level. When the mayors are overwhelmed or a resource allocation may be an issue, the commonwealth government, through the CNMI Homeland Security Emergency Management (HSEM), will manage the response at their multi-agency coordination center, the CNMI Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

In a catastrophic event, the Federal Government, under the Stafford Act, will coordinate response activities on behalf of the Federal Government jointly with CNMI. The facilities and staff used to accomplish this task organization should be scalable. For more information, see the FEMA Incident Management Handbook (November 2017).

3.3 *Structures and Staffing*

3.3.1 *Multiagency Coordination Centers and Staff*

CNMI EOC

To activate the CNMI EOC, the Governor of CNMI or the Special Assistant of CNMI HSEM issues an activation message indicating activation level to the appropriate staff. The EOC is capable of operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week but staffing varies based on activation requirements. Capabilities include phone conferencing.

EOC responsibilities and products include:

- Coordinating operational communications and resource requests/allocation/tracking.
- Information collection, analysis, and dissemination related to the event.
- Developing a common operating picture, sharing operational information, and providing subject matter experts (SMEs).
- Activating the Joint Information Center (JIC).

The CNMI Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) details role, relationships, and responsibilities of emergency managers serving in the EOC.

Regional Response Coordination Center

The Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) is located in Oakland, California. The RRCC provides primary situational awareness and supports FEMA field operations. The RRCC, as a standing multiagency response center, is staffed by FEMA personnel, activated Emergency Support Function (ESF) representatives, SMEs, nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives, and private sector representatives (e.g., critical infrastructure liaisons) that are providing information and resources and can provide policy guidance and waivers.

This staff is referred to collectively as the Regional Response Coordination Staff (RRCS) and will coordinate with the National Response Coordination Staff (NRCS) activated at the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), as appropriate.

National Response Coordination Center

Activated by the Agency Administrator, the NRCC is a Washington D.C.–based multiagency coordination center (MACC) that supports field operations from a national level. Movement coordination, resource allocation, and critical information sharing are key responsibilities and tasks for NRCS emergency management personnel staffing the NRCC.

3.3.2 Field-level Operational Facilities and Staff

FEMA Incident Management Assistance Team

FEMA deploys its Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT), pre-impact, to the location of a likely catastrophic event. FEMA does not have to wait for a request from the local government to do so. For a catastrophic typhoon affecting CNMI, the IMAT integrates with CNMI's emergency management structure at the CNMI EOC upon its arrival to provide planning support.

Once a federal emergency or major disaster declaration is received, the IMAT along with CNMI emergency management staff form the UCS, led by the UCG. Many times, the initial operating facility (IOF) will continue to be the CNMI EOC until such time as a temporary federal facility, the Joint Field Office (JFO), can be established.

Joint Field Office

The JFO is the incident management facility located in close proximity to the disaster area. It is a temporary federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination of federal,

commonwealth, private sector, and NGO organizations and has the primary responsibility for the response to and recovery from a catastrophic incident.

The JFO is scalable and expands as necessary to accommodate the context of a particular threat or incident. Personnel from federal and commonwealth departments and agencies, other jurisdictional entities, the private sector, and NGOs may be requested to staff various positions in the JFO, depending on requirements.

Unified Coordination Group

In a catastrophic event, commonwealth and federal emergency management officials with jurisdictional or function authority and other senior officials will join together to form the UCG. The UCG is responsible for translating the priorities of the Governor of CNMI into actionable incident objectives and managing the incident through unity of effort. Other staff within the UCG may include “command staff” such as those supporting safety, external affairs, legal, and liaison efforts. The State Coordinating Officer (SCO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) lead the UCG.

- **State Coordinating Officer** – The SCO is appointed by the Governor of CNMI and is the Special Assistant of CNMI HSEM. As the commonwealth official responsible for supervising all response activities when there is a Presidential emergency or major disaster declaration, the SCO will coordinate all federal support.
- **Federal Coordinating Officer** – The President appoints an FCO to manage any federal response, recovery, or mitigation operations under the authority of the Stafford Act. The FCO is responsible for all government coordination, managing the federal response, establishing the JFO, and program delivery.
- **Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)** – The DCO is the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) single point of contact within the UCG, providing support under the Defense Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA). Any request for a DOD capability is routed through the DCO for validation.

Unified Coordination Staff

Personnel from CNMI and federal departments and agencies, other jurisdictional entities, the private sector, and NGOs may be assigned to the UCS at various incident facilities (e.g., JFO, staging areas, and other field offices). Staff within this structure are known collectively as the “general staff.”

- **Planning Section** – The joint Planning Section is responsible for the collection, evaluation, dissemination, and communication of information about the incident and status of resources. Timely and focused planning in coordination with the Operations Section provides the foundation for effective incident management. The UCS Planning Section develops the Incident Action Plan (IAP) and other functional or future plans on behalf of the joint operation (e.g., transition plans, concept of operations plans, demobilization plans)
- **Operations Section** – The joint Operations Section validates the requirements, tasks, and resources necessary for field operations. It issues capability-based mission assignments to other federal agencies (OFAs) involved as federal ESFs during a Stafford Act response.

- **Logistics Section** – The joint Logistics Section provides resource support and logistics management during an incident. UCS Logistics Section activities support field requirements. Movement coordination will occur at the national level (through the Movement Coordination Center) until it can be executed at the field level by the UCS.
- **Finance and Administration Section** – The Finance and Administration sections are responsible for the financial management, monitoring, and tracking of all costs relating to the incident. Due to the nature of cost systems and regulatory requirements, the federal and commonwealth organizations will maintain separate finance and administration sections. However, for the purposes of the UCS, there will be one joint Finance and Administration Section supporting the response. The federal Finance and Administration Section Chief tracks incident expenditures and funding.




Figure A-1: Joint Response Organization

3.3.3 Whole Community Organizations

Nongovernmental and Voluntary Organization Coordination

NGOs are integrated into the UCS Operations Section. They work alongside ESF/Recovery Support Functions (RSFs) and are critical to task force operations. Some key NGOs and their roles are listed below.

- **American Red Cross (Red Cross)**: The Red Cross (national and local chapters) provides disaster assistance, including food, shelter, bulk distribution of relief items, and emergency first aid care for responders and earthquake survivors. The Red Cross also provides blood products and supports family reunification effort using both direct and indirect methods. (<https://safeandwell.communityos.org/cms/>)

- **Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs):** As a local resource, CERT members may be used in a number of support roles to augment emergency operations. Local jurisdictions maintain a listing of certified CERT members and provide training and equipment, where possible, to ensure operational readiness. CERTs activate within their respective neighborhoods to assist with assessments and surveillance, light search and rescue, basic first aid, and road/debris clearance, as needed. They provide some limited assistance and mental health support to affected individuals.
- **National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD):** NVOAD is the forum where voluntary organizations share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cycle—preparedness, response, and recovery—to help disaster survivors and their communities. One role taken by members following a disaster is to help coordinate, receive, manage, and distribute donated goods and services. NVOAD also works with its member organizations to coordinate volunteer efforts. (<http://www.nvoad.org>)
- **Southern Baptist Disaster Relief and The Salvation Army:** These organizations provide assistance (staff and food) with the feeding of displaced individuals.

Private Sector Partnerships

Private sector liaisons may be included within the UCS Operations Section and are critical to task force operations. Including private sector partners in response and recovery efforts supports the following:

- Enhanced situational awareness.
- Access to more resources.
- Improved decision making.

3.4 Phased Approach

Activation, deployment, and employment of the facilities and staff noted below are considered in the phased response. For additional details on incident management positions and functions, refer to the *FEMA Incident Management Handbook*, dated November 2017.

Table A-1: Response Facility/Staff Operational Focus, by Phase

Phase	Task Organization Focus	Execution and Responsible Parties
Phase 1a: Normal Operations	Develop and maintain situational awareness	Steady state operations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Watch Centers/EOC duty officers ▪ Critical Infrastructure/Key resources (CIKR) Operations Centers
Phase 1b/1c: Credible Threat	Provide incident support	Activate facilities/coordinate initial actions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EOC ▪ RRCC ▪ NRCC ▪ IMAT
Phase 2: Response	Execute incident management	Establish: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ UCG/UCS ▪ JFO

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

Appendix B: Intelligence

1 *Situation*

This plan is based on actual response strategies, mitigation measures, and after-action reports generated during and post-Typhoon Soudelor, which struck the CNMI region in 2015. Typhoon Soudelor was the smallest, yet most destructive, typhoon to have impacted CNMI, specifically, the island of Saipan, in over 20 years.

2 *Mission*

The intelligence mission is to provide operators and planners tools that may be used by the joint response organization to develop and maintain situational awareness and increase reliability of information sharing internally and externally to stakeholders and the public and provide an understanding of the following:

- CNMI typhoon history and the development of this planning scenario
- CNMI geography, demographics, and critical infrastructure
- Weather products and reports used by CNMI in typhoon warning and reporting
- Physical and operational impacts of a catastrophic typhoon
- CNMI infrastructure maps

3 *Execution*

3.1 *Senior Leaders' Intent*

The joint organization must develop, report, and share critical information in a structured manner to produce intelligence that informs response operation decision making.

3.2 *Concept of Operations*

Using information and tools presented in this appendix, incident support and management personnel collect, analyze, and report critical information in support of decision making for this outside-the-continental United States (OCONUS) response. The historical information presented below should be considered in the typhoon response decision-making process.

3.2.1 *Typhoon History*

From 1990 to 2015, 128 named storms affected CNMI, at an average of 3.6 per year. Major storms affecting the Marianas typically originate southeast of CNMI. While storms may form in the Marianas, they move west prior to building in intensity. Figure B-1 shows the various tracks those named storms have followed.




Figure B-1: Commonwealth of the Marianas Typhoon History, 1990–2015

3.2.2 Typhoon Threat

According to the *Typhoon Vulnerability Study for Guam* (1999), the Marianas have a higher risk of being hit by a typhoon than any state in the United States. Due to the high annual probability of typhoon occurrence in the Marianas Island chain, the risk for catastrophic damage to infrastructure and essential services is high. Typhoons do not have to make “landfall” (the eyewall of the storm passes onto the island) in order to pose a serious threat and to cause significant damage to CNMI.

The National Weather Service (NWS) Weather Field Office Guam (WFO Guam) modeled the storm track in Figure B-2 for this planning effort.




Figure B-2: Storm Track

3.2.3 Physical Impacts and Damage Estimates

HAZUS Multi-Hazards (HAZUS-MH) loss estimates are normally used to estimate impact damage (wind field impact and inundation) specifically to population and critical infrastructure. However, in the Pacific, HAZUS is unable to adequately model the physical impacts of a Category 4 typhoon within CNMI.

For estimates of physical effects and their operational impacts, experiential data generated through NWS damage assessments, surveys, and Typhoon Soudelor data and response planning assumptions were used.

Storm Surge

Considerable storm surge and wave run-up causes coastal inundation/flooding on the eastern shores of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota. The northern and northwestern facing shore of Saipan experiences significant wave run-up from the seaport at Puerto Rico to the southern community of San Antonio, impacting the visitor district severely. The combination of a strong storm surge and rough wave action cause beach erosion and severe coastal damage. Elevated seas prevent river discharge and run-off from leaving the island, causing water to accumulate on coastal plains, exacerbating coastal and inland flooding.

Inundation

Using Typhoon Soudelor 2015 as a reference, the maximum storm surge and inundation (height of run-up) is 15 feet. During Typhoon Soudelor, while the waves were not as high on western shores due to the lower near-shore elevations and flatter terrain, the inundation and impact to the islands was greater. Overall, the height of the storm surge and waves on western windward coastlines ranged from 3 feet to 8 feet. The wave action heavily damaged several sea walls and a

few stretches of coastal roadways. In this scenario, inundation is about 2 feet higher and damage to sea walls and coastal highways is significant.

Critical infrastructure inundated includes the ports, water and wastewater systems, and power generation and transmission/distribution systems, which are located primarily in coastal inundation zones.

Rain and Flooding

The expected rainfall is also based on the levels of rain seen in Typhoon Soudelor. Rainfall from the typhoon is heavy across central parts of the islands, with some locations receiving nearly 20 inches of rain. Heavy precipitation causes inland lakes and reservoirs such as Lake Susepe to overflow, causing damage to roads and bridges.

Wind

Sustained winds are 131-155 mph, based on Typhoon Soudelor.

3.2.4 Operational Impacts and Planning Factors

Baseline Data

Quantifiable operational impacts to the population were determined by applying the estimated physical impacts against actual data from sources that include:

- U.S. Census data
- CNMI’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)
- Historical data from WFO Guam

The impacts derived serve as the planning factors against which this plan is built.

Table B-1: Baseline Population Data for CNMI

Baseline Population Data for CNMI				
	Totals	Saipan	Tinian	Rota
Total population <i>(Source: 2010 CNMI Census Data)</i>	53,883	48,220	3,136	2,527
Average daily visitor census <i>(Source: CNMI Visitors Bureau, average stay 3 days, 2016)</i>	4,239	4,095	117	27
Total population and daily visitors	58,122	52,315	3,253	2,554

Table B-2: CNMI Population Impacts

CNMI Population Impacts	
Islands impacted	3
Total population affected	58,122
Fatalities	< 5
Injuries (minor/severe)	<10/<5

CNMI Population Impacts	
Residents seeking shelter pre-typhoon (emergency shelters) <i>(Source: 2017 Mass Care Fact Sheet in Appendix W)</i>	1,500
Total population displaced <i>(Source: 2017 Mass Care Fact Sheet in Appendix W)</i>	14,223
Population seeking shelter post-typhoon <i>(Source: Planning assumption of at least 10% of total displaced population)</i>	1,422

Table B-3: CNMI Infrastructure Impacts

CNMI Infrastructure Impacts				
	Totals	Saipan	Tinian	Rota
Power facilities inundated <i>(Source: 2014 CNMI Hazardous Mitigation Plan)</i>	3 of 5	2 of 3	0 of 1	1 of 1
Fuel facilities inundated <i>(Source: 2014 Hazard Mitigation Plan and DOD)</i>	2 of 3	1 of 1	0 of 1	1 of 1
Wastewater facilities inundated <i>(Source: 2014 CNMI Hazardous Mitigation Plan)</i>	1 of 3	1 of 3	N/A	N/A
Debris tonnage generated <i>(Source: USACE Soudelor debris report, 2015)</i>	30,000 cy	17,000 cy	7,000 cy	5,000 cy

Table B-4: CNMI Critical Services Impacts

CNMI Critical Services Impacts	
Description	Summary of Impact
Days without power <i>(Source: Commonwealth Utility Company)</i>	100% of power generation restored within 30-90 days
Days without water/sewer services <i>(Source: Commonwealth Utility Company)</i>	7 days of boil water orders, post-typhoon
Days without seaport services	3-5 days without basic services, post-typhoon
Days without airport services <i>(Source: Commonwealth Ports Authority)</i>	12-24 hours without passenger service (initially emergency operations via military transport only; estimate for restoration of commercial traffic is 48 hours)
Days required for debris clearance <i>(Source: CNMI Department of Public Works [DPW])</i>	24-48 hours for primary roadways

3.2.5 Using Typhoon Weather Products

The Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC) is the agency of the DOD responsible for issuing tropical cyclone warnings for the Pacific and Indian oceans. JTWC products are used by the NWS WFO Guam in forecasting typhoon development and issuing advisories and warnings and WFO Guam is the joint organization’s official source of weather information.

Tropical Cyclone Labels

Wind speed	Label
< 34 knots (nautical miles per hour)	Tropical Depression
34-63 knots	Tropical Storm
64-129 knots	Typhoon
≥ 130 knots	Super Typhoon

Tracking and Reporting Tropical Cyclones

Level of Cyclone Activity	JTWC Actions	WFO Guam Actions	Time Conducted
No storm activity		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFO Guam issues Routine Public Weather Products (ZFPMY) 	0400 1600
No storm activity forecasted for ocean around Guam		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Routine Marine Weather Products 	
Area of interest where winds may develop >34 knots within 12-24 hours	JTWC issues a Tropical Cyclone Area Formation Alert Bulletin (for invest areas that may develop into a tropical cyclone within 12-24 hours)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFO Guam places graphic on its website showing the forecasted track (up to 5 days out) for Guam WFO Guam issues Special Weather Statement (SPSMY) 	
Storm with winds >34 knots within 5-day track of Guam	JTWC issues a Tropical Cyclone Bulletin (and assigns a Tropical Cyclone Number, e.g., 23W)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFO Guam issues Scheduled Public Advisories (TCPPQ1-5) Discusses storm behavior for next 48 hours 	0800 and 0200 1400 and 2000
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> WFO Guam issues Intermediate Public Advisories 	1100 and 1700 2300 and 0500
Tropical storm			

Products

WFO Guam, in conjunction with the JTWC, develops and publishes a number of graphics and text products that provide up-to-date information and analyses of tropical weather/systems that have the potential to affect the Territory of Guam, the Commonwealth of the CNMI, the

Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of Palau, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). Several products key to the implementation of this plan are briefly discussed below.

Forecast Advisories

Forecast advisories contain lists of storm latitude and longitude coordinates, intensity, and system motion. The advisory contains position, intensity, and wind field forecasts for 12, 24, 36, 48, 72, 96, and 120 hours from the current synoptic time. All wind speeds in the forecast advisory are given in knots (nautical miles per hour).

Public Advisory

The WFO Guam Public Advisory is a plain language product based on the JTWC forecast bulletin. It provides the latest information on tropical storm/typhoon watches and warnings at least every 6 hours when a tropical cyclone is expected to affect the WFO Guam area of responsibility within 48 hours.

Hurricane Local Statement

The Hurricane Local Statement is a specific impact forecast for islands under a watch or warning and includes rainfall potential, wind, surf, and storm surge levels as well as recommended preparations.

Tropical Cyclone Update

Tropical Cyclone Updates notify users of significant changes outside of the regularly scheduled public advisories. These are usually based on Doppler radar reports.

Forecast Discussions

The JTWC Prognostic Reasoning message describes the rationale for the forecaster's analysis, observations justifying the analyzed intensity of the cyclone, and a description of the environmental factors expected to influence the cyclone's future activity. The NWS Guam Area Forecast Discussion further elaborates on local impacts, reasoning, and confidence levels related to watches and warnings.

Typhoon Watches and Warnings

WFO Guam issues a Typhoon Watch when tropical storm force winds—winds that exceed 38 mph—from an observed cyclone are forecasted to be possible within 48 hours. A Typhoon Warning is issued when tropical storm force winds from an observed cyclone are forecasted to be possible within 24 hours.

Tropical Cyclone Forecast Cone

The JTWC Forecast Cone is also known as the Area of Potential Gale Force Winds. The area is produced by adding the 34 kt wind radii to the 5-year running mean official forecast track error at each corresponding forecast time. The cone represents the possible track/projection of the center of the tropical cyclone, including the impacts of the 34-knot winds. The cone will naturally be larger than the NWS-produced cone that only focuses on the average 5-year JTWC error measured from the cyclone center location.

Table B-5: Saffir-Simpson Tropical Cyclone Scale

Saffir-Simpson Tropical Cyclone Scale		
Tropical Storm Category	Wind Speed (mph)	Damage at Impact
A	30-49	Damage only to the flimsiest lean-to type structures. Minor damage to banana, papaya, and fleshy trees.
B	50-73	Major damage to huts made of thatch or loosely attached corrugated sheet metal or plywood; sheet metal and plywood may become airborne. Minor damage to structures made of light materials. Moderate damage to banana, papaya, and fleshy trees.
Typhoon Category	Wind Speed (mph)	Damage at Impact
1	74-95	Corrugated metal and plywood stripped from poorly constructed or termite-infested structures and may become airborne. A few wooden, non-reinforced power poles tilt and some rotten power poles break. Less than 10 percent defoliation of trees/shrubs. Green palm fronds begin to crimp or torn from crowns.
2	96-110	Damage to wooden and tin roofs and other structures of termite-infested or rotted wood. Considerable damage to structures made of light materials. Several rotten wooden power poles snap and many non-reinforced poles tilt. Some secondary power lines down. 10-30% defoliation of trees/shrubs.
3	111-130	Extensive damage to wooden structures weakened by termite infestation, wet and dry wood rot, and corroded roof straps and nails. Structures made of light materials may be destroyed. Some roof, window, and door damage to well-built wooden and metal buildings. Air full of small flying debris. A few hollow-spun concrete power poles break or tilt and many non-reinforced power poles are blown down or broken. Many secondary power lines down. Palm trees begin to lose crowns; 30-50 percent defoliation of trees/shrubs.
4	131-155	Many well-built wooden and tin structures damaged or destroyed and complete destruction of buildings made of light materials. Extensive damage to non-concrete roofs. Some reinforced hollow-spun concrete power poles and numerous reinforced wooden power poles are blown down; numerous secondary and some primary power lines are downed; extensive damage to weatherheads. Trees/shrubs 50-90 percent defoliated; trees begin to lose bark.
5	Over 155	Total failure of non-concrete reinforced roofs. Extensive or total destruction to non-concrete residences and industrial buildings. Severe damage to some solid concrete poles, numerous reinforced hollow-spun concrete power poles, many steel towers, and virtually all wooden poles. All secondary power lines and most primary power lines are downed. Considerable glass failure due to flying debris and explosive pressure caused by extreme wind gusts; well-constructed storm shutters fail. Trees devoid of all but largest stubby and sandblasted branches; up to 100 percent defoliation. Large airborne debris.

Incident support and management both rely on developing, maintaining, and sharing sound information for critical decision making.

3.2.6 *Situational Assessment*

The Situational Assessment Core Capability requires, within 4 hours of an incident, delivery of information sufficient to inform decision and/or policy making regarding immediate lifesaving and life-sustaining activities and engage CNMI government and private sector resources within

and outside of the affected area in meeting basic human needs, stabilizing the incident, and facilitating a transition to recovery.

The Situational Assessment Core Capability requires:

- Coordinating information collection/analysis processes with identified stakeholders.
- Collecting and analyzing incoming information from available sources.
- Developing, validating, and accurately disseminating information.

Information Collection Plan (ICP)

An example of an ICP that may be used across the response organization is found in Tab 1 to Appendix B.

Critical Information Requirements (CIRs)

CIRs are critical facts and data decision makers need about capabilities, activities, impacts, accomplishments, or challenges.

Table B-6: CNMI Typhoon Response CIRs

Critical Information Requirements	
Number of casualties (deaths, serious injuries, hospitalizations) of all residents/non-residents resulting from the disaster/emergency	
Information on any degradation to information technology (IT) or communications systems critical to the joint response effort and the resulting requirements for restoring those systems	
Lists of activated/deactivated agency EOCs	
Information on open/closed airports, seaports, primary road networks, and major lines of communication	
Information on damage and restoration requirements for critical infrastructure capabilities (power, water, transportation, resource distribution, cyber, and communications networks)	
Lists of opened/closed shelters (emergency and short-term)	
Details on evacuation orders for hospitals, nursing homes, and other critical facilities	
Information on other events/impacts not captured above that could hinder effective response and recovery operations for CNMI	

Essential Elements of Information (EEI)

EEI are operationally relevant statements or measures used in supporting decision making. Using precise EEI and CIRs, incident support and management personnel will be better able to discern and provide relevant and accurate information to decisions makers (for decisions), the response operation (for operations), and the public (for awareness and support).

Table B-7: Essential Elements of Information

Essential Elements of Information		Pre-Impact (Phases 1b-1c)	Post-Impact (Phases 2a-2c)
1.0	Hazard-related Information		
1.1	Boundaries of primary and secondary disaster areas		✓
1.2	Hazardous, toxic, and radiological issues		✓

Essential Elements of Information		Pre-Impact (Phases 1b-1c)	Post-Impact (Phases 2a-2c)
1.3	Hazard-specific information	✓	✓
1.4	Historical information		✓
1.5	Typhoon forecasts and related information	✓	
1.6	Jurisdictional boundaries		✓
1.7	National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) impacts		✓
1.8	Predictive impact projections	✓	
1.9	Pre-impact information	✓	
1.10	River forecast and flooding information	✓	✓
1.11	Weather	✓	✓
2.0	Response-related Information		
2.1	Status of declarations	✓	
2.2	Status of ESF activations	✓	✓
2.3	Priorities for response	✓	✓
2.4	Major issues/activities/mission assignments of ESFs/Other Federal Agencies (OFAs)	✓	✓
2.5	Resource shortfalls	✓	✓
2.6	Status of key personnel	✓	✓
2.7	Status of reconnaissance operations	✓	✓
2.8	Safety hazards	✓	✓
2.9	Donations/voluntary agency activities	✓	✓
2.10	Upcoming activities	✓	✓
3.0	Population Impacts		
3.1	Socio-economic impacts (people)	✓	✓
3.2	Demographics	✓	✓
3.3	Socio-economic impacts (businesses)	✓	✓
4.0	Infrastructure Impacts		
4.1	Security and safety – Status of commonwealth and local operations	✓	✓
4.2	Water and wastewater	✓	✓
4.3	Energy	✓	✓
4.4	Accessibility – Status of transportation	✓	✓
4.5	Accessibility – Status of facilities (schools, shelters, etc.)	✓	✓
4.6	Telecommunications	✓	✓
4.7	Medical	✓	✓
5.0	Critical Services Impacts		
5.1	Political impacts		✓
5.2	Status of EOCs	✓	✓
	✓ = Need to gather data for Information Collection Plan (ICP)		

SWEAT-M

Used primarily as a graphical representation of the status of critical infrastructure during incident management activities, the Sewer, Water, Energy, Accessibility, Telecommunications and

Medical (SWEAT-M) tool should be well-socialized among Whole Community stakeholders for their assistance in providing or understanding joint response information requirements.

Services					Water & Sewage		Energy & Fuel		Access – Transport/Transit				Telecommunication
Police	Fire & EMS	Medical	Schools	Stores	Water	Sewage	Energy	Fuel	Air	Sea	Road	Rails	Telecommunication

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

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Tab 1 to Appendix B: Information Collection Plan

1 Essential Elements of Information

EEI#	EEI Topic	Specific Information Required	Proposed Methodology /Sources	Deliverables	Distribution*
Hazard-related Information					
1.1	Boundaries of Primary and Secondary Disaster Areas (inland flooding, etc.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Geographic locations sustaining damage • Description of extent of damage sustained • Boundaries of areas evacuated • Estimated percent of population evacuated • Estimated percent of population unable to return 	Homeland Security Emergency Management (HSEM); predictive modeling; Geographic Information Systems (GIS); HAZUS; U.S. Geological Survey (USGS); remote sensing/aerial reconnaissance; assessment teams; Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) reports; Media/Social Media Virtual Operations Support Team (VOST); drones	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Situation Reports (SitReps) • Status briefings • GIS products 	
1.2	Hazardous, toxic and radiological issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are there reported or suspected hazardous material/toxic release incidents? • What follow-up actions are planned or underway? Are there actual or potential radiological incidents? 	Villages; CSA/FCO; ESF #10; remote sensing; predictive modeling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products 	
1.3	Hazard-specific Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential/actual coastal erosion • Extent of storm surge • Potential for (or extent of) flooding • Number/estimate of collapsed structures potentially requiring Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) • Potential for other hazards 	USGS; NWS; ESF #3; ESF #9; ESF#10; U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Sector Guam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products 	

EEI#	EEI Topic	Specific Information Required	Proposed Methodology /Sources	Deliverables	Distribution*
1.4	Historical information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have previous typhoons of similar magnitude affected the area? • What were the results? • What resources were provided by the federal Government? • What were the major operational issues? • What were other critical issues? 	After-Action Reports ; SitReps; Status briefings; Incident Action Plans (IAPs); GIS products; Government Accountability Office (GAO)/Inspector General (IG) reports; Congressional testimony; media coverage	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefing • GIS products • Special reports/analyses 	
1.5	Typhoon Forecasts and Related Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Storm track and intensity • Storm surge • Pre-impact imagery • Forecasted wind buffer 	Typhoon Liaison Team (TLT)/Central Pacific Typhoon Center (CPHC); GIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Text and graphics via fax, email, or posted to TLT website • Update of storm track/other information • Text and graphics of typhoon data 	
1.6	Village Boundaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political jurisdictions of affected area 	GIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GIS products • Jurisdictional profiles 	
1.7	NFIP Impacts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are there Coastal Barrier Resource System units in the affected area? • Are National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) non-participating communities in the affected area? • Are repair costs likely to be substantial (exceed 50% of structural value)? 	NFIP Communities List; Community Information System and model projections; Existing Flood Insurance Rate maps; Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) and/or inspection teams	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Model derived boundaries • GIS products 	

EEI#	EEI Topic	Specific Information Required	Proposed Methodology /Sources	Deliverables	Distribution*
1.9	Pre-Impact Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demographics of severe wind/storm surge area • Boundaries of area evacuated • Estimated percent of evacuated population 	GIS product; remote sensing; existing recent photo imagery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Photographs/maps • Interpretive text reports 	
1.10	River Forecast & Flooding Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forecasted flooding information 	NWS River Forecast Center; Station Guam web pages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flood forecasts in non-technical format • GIS products (maps of areas in which flooding is anticipated along with housing/structure data, inundation areas, and projected road closures/maps of inundation areas with critical facilities) 	
1.11	Weather	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weather forecasts pre- and post-impact 	NWS Station Guam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products • Weather reports 	

EEI#	EEI Topic	Specific Information Required	Proposed Methodology /Sources	Deliverables	Distribution*
Response-related Information					
2.1	Status of Declarations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has the Governor declared a HSEM emergency? • Is the Governor’s request normal or expedited? • Status of Regional Disaster Summary and Regional Analysis and Recommendation? • Is there a Presidential Declaration and, if so, what type? • What types of assistance are authorized? • Are there special cost-share provisions for Direct Federal Assistance (DFA)? 	Governor’s Request Letter; Regional Disaster Summary; Regional Analysis and Recommendation; National Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) entries; Notice of Disaster Declaration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products (showing declared villages and types of assistance) • Disaster Fact Sheet 	
2.2	Status of ESF Activations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Which ESFs are activated and where are they located? 	Mission Assignment Logs; Operations Section	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • MA lists 	
2.3	Priorities for Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the CNMI/federal operational priorities? 	Governor; Unified Coordination Group (UCG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • IAP • Regional Support Plan 	
2.4	Major Issues/Activities/ Mission Assignments (MA) of ESFs/OFAs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What operations and assessments are agencies conducting under their own authorities? • What MAs have been issued? • What is the status of Mas? 	Mission Assignment logs; ESF/agency SitReps; functional plans; Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC); National Response Coordination Center (NRCC); Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Displays • IAP 	

EEI#	EEI Topic	Specific Information Required	Proposed Methodology /Sources	Deliverables	Distribution*
2.5	Resource Shortfalls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are actual or potential resource shortfalls? • What are the anticipated requirements for federal resources? • What are potential or actual federal shortfalls? • What are potential sources for resource shortfalls? • What resources are available and where are they located? • Information priorities - status of the following: SWEAT-M, water and food supplies 	HSEM; UCG; EOC; Logistics reports; assessment team reports; ESF reports; SWEAT-M; Media/Social Media VOST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • IAP • Time-Phased Force Deployment Lists (TPFDL) • Agency/ESF reports • SWEAT-M 	
2.6	Status of Key Personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who and where are the following personnel: Governor; Mayors; Regional Administrator; TAG; GAR; CSA; FCO; IMAT Team Leader; Regional Response Coordination Staff (RRCS) Chief; UCS section chiefs; key support staff 	Initial Operating Reports; IAP; FCO; CSA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • IAP • Initial Operating Report • Disaster Fact Sheet 	

EEI#	EEI Topic	Specific Information Required	Proposed Methodology /Sources	Deliverables	Distribution*
2.7	Status of Reconnaissance Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What remote sensing missions have ESFs undertaken under their own authorities? • What aerial reconnaissance missions are being performed at HSEM’s direction? • How is information being shared? • What remote sensing missions have been already tasked by the Regional Response Coordination Staff (RRCS)? • What are the available assets to provide remote sensing data? • What format and when will information be available? • Who is providing interpretation of incoming data? 	HSEM, IAP; Operations Section and ESF reports; SitReps; Civil Air Patrol (CAP) reports; Mission Assignment logs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • IAP • Remote sensing imagery derived products • Text interpretive reports 	
2.8	Safety Hazards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is there a need for personal protection equipment? • What are the safety hazards in conducting operations? 	HSEM, IAP; assessment team reports; predictive modeling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IAP • Safety briefings/safety messages 	
2.9	Donations/Voluntary Agency Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has a Donations Hotline been established or is there a need for a hotline? • Which voluntary agencies are actively involved in operations? 	HSEM; Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD); Agency/ESF/Voluntary Agency Liaison (VAL) reports; Media/Social Media VOST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings 	
2.10	Upcoming Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the schedule of daily meetings and briefings? • What other significant events or activities are planned or scheduled? 	HSEM; FCO/CSA; IMAT Team Leader; RRCS Chief; Planning Section Chief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IAP • Daily meeting schedule 	

EEI#	EEI Topic	Specific Information Required	Proposed Methodology /Sources	Deliverables	Distribution*
Population Information					
3.1	Socio-economic Impacts (People)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of residences affected • Potential/estimated population affected • Number of shelters open/shelter population • Potential shelter requirements • Unmet sheltering needs • Unmet community needs 	Villages; predictive modeling; GIS modeling; remote sensing/aerial reconnaissance; assessment teams; CSA/FCO reports; Media/Social Media VOST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products • VOAD reports 	
3.2	Demographics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Population of impacted areas • Demographic breakdown of population, including income levels • Number/type of housing units in impacted areas • Levels of insurance coverage 	Villages; GIS; predictive modeling; Federal Insurance Administration; hazard mitigation plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jurisdiction profiles • GIS analyses 	
3.3	Socio-economic Impacts (Business)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number and type of businesses affected 	Villages; predictive modeling; GIS; remote sensing/aerial reconnaissance; assessment teams; Media/Social Media VOST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • GIS products • Small Business Association (SBA) reports and text items 	
Infrastructure Information					
4.1	Security & Safety - Status of HSEM and Local Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of police, fire, and EMS • What are the HSEM and local priorities for security and safety? 	EOC; CSA; FCO; RRCS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products 	
4.2	Water and Wastewater	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of water supply systems • Status of wastewater systems • Status of water control systems (dams, levee, drainage systems, storm water systems) 	ESF #8 reports; ESF #3 reports; Media/Social Media (VOST)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products 	

EEI#	EEI Topic	Specific Information Required	Proposed Methodology /Sources	Deliverables	Distribution*
4.3	Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of electrical power generation and distribution facilities • Status of petroleum storage and distribution facilities 	DBDET; ESF# 3 Reports; ESF #12 reports; Media/Social Media (VOST)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products 	
4.4	Accessibility - Status of Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of all modal systems Status of major/primary roads • Status of critical and non-critical bridges Status of evacuation routes • Status of public transit systems Debris issues 	CSA; FCO; ESF #1 reports; ESF# 3 reports; assessment team reports; remote sensing/aerial reconnaissance; predictive modeling; Media/Social Media VOST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products 	
4.5	Accessibility - Status of Critical Infrastructure and Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of local government facilities and systems, public buildings; government services, schools, and shelters 	SitReps; PDA; Media/Social Media VOST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products 	
4.6	Telecommunications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of telecommunications services (including Internet) and infrastructure (including towers) • Reliability of cellular service in affected areas • Potential requirements for radio/satellite communications capability • Status of emergency broadcast (TV, radio, cable) system and ability to disseminate information 	CSA; FCO; ESF #2; private sector reports; Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)/Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES); Media/Social Media VOST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products 	
4.7	Medical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of medical facilities • Status of home health agencies • Status of EMS systems • Status of Veterans Administration facilities • Unmet needs 	ESF #8 reports; Media/Social Media VOST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products 	

EEI#	EEI Topic	Specific Information Required	Proposed Methodology /Sources	Deliverables	Distribution*
Critical Services Information					
5.1	Political Impacts	• Status of HSEM and village political situation	Governor; villages; Legislative branch	• SitReps • Status briefings	
5.2	Status of EOCs	• Status of EOCs/Department Operating Centers (DOCs)	Villages; EOC; ESFs/Other Federal Agencies (OFAs); Regional offices	• SitReps • Status briefings • GIS products	

*Distribution Code: 1 = Governor; 2 = Villages; 3 = HSEM agencies; 4 = UCG; 5 = Ops; 6 = Planning; 7 = Logistics; 8 = Finance/Admin.; 9 = ESFs; 10 = JIC; 11 = RRCC; 12 = NRCC; 13 = Other

2 Pre- and Post-Impact Assignments/Information Collection Suspense

Table B-8: Pre-Impact Assignments/Information Collection Suspense

EEI #	Description	Responsible Elements				Collection Suspense				
		Primary	Support	Support	Support	Within 3 hours of activation	Every O-Period	Within 1 hour following disaster declaration	12 hours prior to impact	24 hours prior to impact
Hazard-related Information										
1.3	Hazard-specific Information	ESF #3	ESF #9	ESF #10	ESF #5		✓			
1.5	Typhoon Forecasts and Related Information	NWS	ESF #5				✓			
1.8	Predictive Modeling Impact Projections	N/A	ESF #5	NOAA	MAC		✓			
1.9	Pre-Impact Information	HSEM	ESF #5				✓		✓	✓
1.10	River Forecast & Flooding Information	NWS	ESF #5				✓			
1.11	Weather	NWS	ESF #5				✓			
Response-related Information										
2.1	Status of Declarations	HSEM	HSEM/JFO	RRCS			✓	✓		
2.2	Status of ESF Activations	HSEM	RRCS			✓	✓			
2.3	Priorities for Response	HSEM	UCG	RRCS			✓			
2.4	Major Issues/Activities/MAs of ESFs/OFAs	HSEM	RRCS	NRCC			✓			
2.5	Resource Shortfalls	HSEM	UCG	ESF #5			✓			
2.6	Status of Key Personnel	HSEM	RRCS	Villages		✓	✓	✓		
2.7	Status of Reconnaissance Operations	HSEM	RRCS	MAC			✓			
2.8	Safety Hazards	HSEM	ESF #5				✓			
2.9	Donations/Voluntary Agency Activities	HSEM	ESF #5	VOAD			✓			
2.10	Upcoming Activities	HSEM	ESF #5				✓			

EEI #	Description Pre-Impact (Phases 1b & 1c)	Responsible Elements				Collection Suspense				
		Primary	Support	Support	Support	Within 3 hours of activation	Every O-Period	Within 1 hour following disaster declaration	12 hours prior to impact	24 hours prior to impact
Population Information										
3.1	Socio-economic Impacts (People)	HSEM	ESF #5	ESF #15			✓			
3.2	Demographics	HSEM	ESF #5				✓			
3.3	Socio-economic Impacts (Business)	HSEM	DBEDT	SBA			✓			
Infrastructure Information										
4.1	Security & Safety - Status of HSEM and Local Operations	HSEM	ESF #5	ESF #13			✓			
4.2	Water and Wastewater	HSEM	ESF #3	ESF #5	ESF #12		✓			
4.3	Energy	HSEM	ESF #3	ESF #5	ESF #12		✓			
4.4	Accessibility - Status of Transportation	HSEM	ESF #1				✓			
4.5	Accessibility - Status of Facilities (e.g., schools, shelters)	HSEM	ESF #5	ESF #6	ESF #8		✓			
4.6	Telecommunications	HSEM	ESF #2	ESF #7	ESF #9		✓			
4.7	Medical	HSEM	ESF #8				✓			
✓ = Need to collect data for Information Collection Plan (ICP)										


Table B-9: Post-Impact Assignments/Information Collection Suspense

EEI #	Description Post-Impact (Phases 2a-2c)	Responsible Elements				Collection Suspense
		Primary	Support	Support	Support	Every O-Period
Hazard-related Information						
1.1	Boundaries of Primary and Secondary Disaster Areas	ESF #5	ESF #3	NWS	USGS	✓
1.2	Hazardous, Toxic and Radiological Issues	ESF #10	ESF #8	ESF #5		✓
1.3	Hazard-specific Information	ESF #3	ESF #9	ESF #10	ESF #5	✓
1.4	Historical Information	HSEM	ESF #5	NWS	RRCC	✓
1.6	Jurisdictional Boundaries	HSEM	ESF #5			✓
1.7	National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Impacts	ESF #5	HSEM	ESF #3	NWS	✓
1.10	River Forecast & Flooding Information	NWS	NWS	ESF #5		✓
1.11	Weather	NWS	ESF #5			✓
Response-related Information						
2.2	Status of ESF Activations	ESF #5	RRCS			✓
2.3	Priorities for Response	HSEM	UCG	RRCS		✓
2.4	Major Issues/Activities/Mission Assignments of ESFs/Other Federal Agencies (OFAs)	ESF #5	RRCS	NRCC		✓
2.5	Resource Shortfalls	HSEM	UCG	ESF #5		✓
2.6	Status of Key Personnel	ESF #5	RRCS	HSEM		✓
2.7	Status of Reconnaissance Operations	ESF #5	RRCS	MAC		✓
2.8	Safety Hazards	HSEM	ESF #5			✓
2.9	Donations/Voluntary Agency Activities	HSEM	ESF #5	VOAD		✓
2.10	Upcoming Activities	HSEM	ESF #5			✓

EEI #	Description Post-Impact (Phases 2a-2c)	Responsible Elements				Collection Suspense
		Primary	Support	Support	Support	Every O-Period
Population Information						
3.1	Socio-economic Impacts (People)	HSEM	ESF #5	ESF #15		✓
3.2	Demographics	HSEM	ESF #5			✓
3.3	Socio-economic Impacts (Business)	HSEM	HSEM	SBA		✓
Infrastructure Information						
4.1	Security & Safety - Status of HSEM and Local Operations	HSEM	ESF #5	ESF #13		✓
4.2	Water and Wastewater	HSEM	ESF #3	ESF #5	ESF #12	✓
4.3	Energy	HSEM	ESF #3	ESF #5	ESF #12	✓
4.4	Accessibility - Status of Transportation	HSEM	ESF #1			✓
4.5	Accessibility - Status of Critical Infrastructure and Facilities	HSEM	ESF #5	ESF #6	ESF#8	✓
4.6	Telecommunications	HSEM	ESF #2	ESF #7	ESF#9	✓
4.7	Medical	HSEM	ESF #8			✓
Critical Services Information						
5.1	Political Impacts - Status of Local/CNMI Legislative Branch	HSEM	ESF #5			✓
5.2	Status of EOCs	HSEM	ESF #5	HSEM Agencies	Federal Agencies	✓
✓ = Need to collect data for Information Collection Plan (ICP); NOTE: Initial report/estimates are due within 1 to 6 hours following announcement of "All Clear."						


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Appendix B-1: Maps



Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Typhoon Annex

Saipan Population Density [2010 US Census Bureau]




Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Typhoon Annex

FOUO



CNMI Critical Infrastructure Facilities May 2016 - Saipan

UNCLASSIFIED



Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Typhoon Annex


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


FEMA

CNMI Water Facilities May 2016 - Saipan

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


SAIPAN WATER SYSTEM
SAIPAN, CNMI



Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Typhoon Annex

Tinian Population Density [2010 US Census Bureau]




Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Typhoon Annex

FOUO



CNMI Critical Infrastructure Facilities May 2016 - Tinian

UNCLASSIFIED





Created by: Matthew Massel | IEM

Date: 2017-06-14


Coordinate system: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 55N

Grid: USNG



Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Typhoon Annex

Rota Population Density [2010 US Census Bureau]



Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Typhoon Annex


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FEMA

CNMI Critical Infrastructure Facilities May 2016 - Rota

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



Created by: Matthew Massel | IEM

Date: 2017-06-14

Coordinate system: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 55N

Grid: USNG



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Appendix C: Operations

1 Situation

This annex describes actions for planning, mitigation, response, and recovery from the effects of a catastrophic typhoon impacting CNMI. Specific strategies and planning assumptions to accomplish the objectives are provided. The concepts and response requirements are scalable to address typhoons of lesser severity and outline tasks and activities required to support and enable a coordinated response.

2 Mission

The mission of the joint commonwealth/federal response organization is to save and sustain lives, support the restoration of critical lifeline infrastructure, and assist in re-establishing the commercial supply chain leveraging organic capabilities and cooperation in Guam and CNMI.

3 Execution

3.1 Concept of Operations

CNMI Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) and FEMA form a Unified Coordination Group to provide direction and guidance to the Unified Coordination Staff in its execution of incident management tasks and activities to through focusing on specific objectives.

3.1.1 Phased Response

Organizing operations into distinct time phases allows tasks to be grouped into common operating periods. It also facilitates multiple commonwealth and federal agencies task organizing in support of incident objectives. The operational phases for this response are:




Figure C-1: Operational Phases and Threat Condition Levels

For a review of the phase structure, see the Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

3.1.2 Analyze Core Capabilities Against Impacts

Preliminary targets for all Response Core Capabilities are presented in the Base Plan. Resourcing those Core Capabilities in the context of a catastrophic typhoon response cuts across all phases of the response and is a Whole Community responsibility. For more discussion on Core Capabilities, refer to the *Region IX All-Hazards Plan* and the National Preparedness Goal Core Capabilities.

3.1.3 Review Response Objectives Strategies

As detailed in the Base Plan, eight response objectives were developed to guide preparedness, the initial response, and sustained response operations:

1. Provide emergency power to maintain continuity of essential operations. (Appendix C-1)
2. Restore the power infrastructure. (Appendix C-2)
3. Stabilize the water distribution and wastewater systems. (Appendix C-3)
4. Deliver fuel to maintain continuity of essential operations and services. (Appendix C-4)
5. Conduct mass care services and sheltering of survivors. (Appendix C-5)
6. Facilitate recovery of the marine transportation system. (Appendix C-6)
7. Distribute essential commodities and immediate response resources. (Appendix C-7)
8. Re-establish public health and medical services at critical emergency medical facilities. (Appendix C-8)

3.2 Concept of Support

The support strategy is to alert and deploy select response resources and capabilities during Phase 1b at the direction of the Regional Administrator (RA). These resources include at a minimum, the Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT), selected Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), and strike teams or other pre-defined force packages.

Critical transportation strategies will be developed in Phase 1b, as part of the Regional Response Plan. While airlift support is vital and will be used to the extent practicable, sustained response operations require sea lift to maintain essential services and support survivors.




Figure C-2: Federal Response Architecture

More specific detail on transportation and logistics requirements are provided in Appendix D.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

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Appendix C-1: Provide Emergency Power to Maintain Continuity of Essential Operations

1 *Situation*

In a catastrophic typhoon strike within CNMI, it is anticipated that there will be a 100 percent loss of island power. Critical infrastructure such as hospitals, government facilities, emergency shelters, and police and fire departments will require the use of temporary power generation in a prolonged coordinated response. A strategy for restoring island power is addressed in Appendix C-2. A fueling strategy is presented in Appendix C-4.

1.1 **Background**

In 2015, Typhoon Soudelor impacted CNMI as a Category 4 storm, significantly damaging CNMI power infrastructure. Much of CNMI's facilities were already hardened, with many residences and businesses having individual generators for power. During Soudelor, generators that serviced critical infrastructure failed.

In the response and mitigation efforts that followed Typhoon Soudelor, the Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (CUC) focused on strengthening the island power infrastructure and ensuring that critical infrastructure had emergency power generators.

Critical infrastructure relevant to essential operations are: hospitals, water and wastewater systems, ports, and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). A critical observation from Typhoon Soudelor was that hotels are extremely resilient, having both their own water supplies as well as emergency power generators with fuel contracts in place.

2 *Mission*

The mission is to provide emergency power that sustains essential services immediately following a catastrophic typhoon, utilizing on-island resources first then supplementing with federal capabilities phased in over the response.

3 *Execution*

3.1 **Concept of Operations**

The purpose of the concept of operations is to protect and maximize on-island power restoration capabilities and facilitate rapid assessment and restoration of emergency power at priority sites through a Power Restoration Task Force (PRTF) co-led by CUC and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).

USACE/ESF #3 will deploy with the IMAT in Phase 1b, activate the PRTF along with the CUC, and establish situational awareness. The initial ESF #3 deployment will include select Prime Power capabilities that will be further augmented in Phase 1c. CNMI's Office of HSEM maintains a list of critical infrastructures requiring emergency backup power along with information on all available generators in service and available for service.

3.1.1 Critical Considerations

- USACE has done many assessments and has data in the Emergency Power Facility Assessment Tool (EPFAT).
- 14 FEMA generators have been transferred to CNMI following Typhoon Soudelor.
- Wells are a priority for restoration.

3.1.2 Assumptions

- 100 percent loss of power island-wide is anticipated due to high winds, flooding, and inundation.
- 60-day estimated restoration timeline for island power, therefore long-term emergency power support is required.
- Generators currently out of service on Saipan will require service prior to installs.

3.1.3 Requirements

Table C-1-1: Resource Requirements

Resource (Type)	Amount Available	Resource Owner	Amount Required	Difference
Personnel – field	12-hour operations	Utility company	24-hour operations	12 hours
Vehicles – field	12-hour operations	Utility company	24-hour operations	12 hours
Repair parts	Maintenance level	Utility company	Overhaul / restart	Significant
Fuel	14 days	Utility company	60 days	30 days

3.1.4 Applicable Core Capabilities

- Infrastructure Systems
- Planning
- Operational Communications
- Situational Assessment
- Operational Coordination
- Critical Transportation
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety

3.2 Tasks by Phase

Each phase of operations has an end state, as shown in Table C-1-2.

Table C-1-2: Operational Phases and End States

Phase	End State
Phase 1a	Agencies have completed their preparedness activities.
Phase 1b	Joint planning has begun by the activated PRTF, co-led by Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (CUC) and USACE/ESF#3.
Phase 1c	Priorities for emergency power have been identified and validated.
Phase 2a	Initial assessments have been completed, all on-island resources have been deployed, and the PRTF actively executes priority actions set by the UCG.
Phase 2b	All supplemental federal capabilities and resources are ordered and deployed.
Phase 2c	PRTF operations transition to CUC/ESF#12 co-leads; maintenance plan in place with less than 10 percent "new" installs.
Phase 3	PRTF operations transition to CUC and ESF#12 recovery activities.

3.2.1 Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Operational Focus

- Situational awareness and preparedness: Identify, collect, analyze, and maintain data that supports decision making in the response to the impacts of a Category 4 typhoon impacting CNMI.
- Establish awareness, operational coordination, and communications among critical response partners during preparedness activities.

Critical Considerations

- CUC has two divisions within its organization: Power and Water.
- CUC has its own fueling contract.

Primary Actions

- HSEM and CUC validate existing prioritized list of critical facilities for emergency power requirements.
- CUC assesses the capabilities of CUC generators at designated essential facilities and ensures that all inoperative generators are repaired and returned and are maintained in an operational status.
- HSEM develops an emergency power fuel and maintenance prioritization plan based on initial assessments and adjusts the plan accordingly as island power is restored.
- HSEM will conduct an assessment of any identified critical facility without backup power, determine the requirements and priority for emergency power generation post-storm, and coordinate findings with USACE/ESF #3 and FEMA Operations.
- CUC will assess power infrastructure requirements and capabilities and report the status and any shortfalls to HSEM monthly.
- USACE will provide for CUC use and awareness assessment data from previous temporary emergency power missions executed in CNMI through EPFAT.

- CUC and the CNMI Department of Public Works (CNMI DPW) conduct regular vegetation control in and around vulnerable critical infrastructure.

3.2.2 Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus

- ESF #3 and select resources deploy with the IMAT and initiate joint planning activities.
- Deploy sufficient emergency power personnel and resources pre-storm to conduct priority emergency power assessments (10 to 15 assessments per day) and installations.

Critical Considerations

- Planning by PRTF must be coordinated and include logistics support.

Primary Actions

- CUC conducts power-generation tests and fuel assessments.
- ESF #3, with Prime Power elements, deploys to the CNMI EOC with FEMA IMAT
- CUC and USACE/ESF #3 activate the PRTF.
- CUC coordinates with CNMI Public School System (PSS) on the installation of generators at shelter locations.
- PRTF establishes situational awareness to report status of all HSEM facilities identified as critical infrastructure.
- CUC executes its typhoon standard operating procedures and preparedness checklist.
- CUC activates and recalls essential personnel (by position) in order to perform preparedness activities.
- CUC increases the number of crews performing tree-trimming operations around power lines.
- CUC conducts pre-landfall tasks to include generator fuel top-off at facilities equipped with emergency backup power generation maintained by CUC.

3.2.3 Phase 1c (Near Certainty)

Operational Focus

- Complete preparation for immediate response activities, focusing on communications and situational awareness and the safeguarding of necessary resources in anticipation of the storm.

Critical Considerations

- Bucket trucks and other field resources have no protected parking area and could be subject to storm damage (e.g., flying debris, inundation, flooding).

Primary Actions

- CUC management activates the CUC Operations Center.
- ESF #3 and the PRTF initiate coordination calls for support from the continental United States (CONUS).
- CUC validates that all emergency power generator fuel requirements are met.
- PRTF coordinates and expedites the mobilization of generator repair parts or replacements at critical facilities that meet generator type, kind, and capability requirements.
- PRTF identifies additional generator needs and provides this information to the Operations Section for validation.
- Transition water pumps at well locations from the power grid to emergency generators to support water supply post-landfall and preserve water pressure in holding tanks.
- ESF #3 Emergency Prime Power Planning and Response Team (PRT) provides technical advice and conducts pre-installation inspections.
- All deployed teams and resources shelter in place.
- Additional PRT and contractor resources begin staging at CONUS Incident Support Base.

3.2.4 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)**Operational Focus**

- Install, operate, and maintain emergency power generators at essential service locations and critical facilities.

Critical Considerations

- All emergency power generator fuel requirements vary and range from 48 hours to 5 days.
- Ground transportation of emergency power generator sets may require federal assistance.
- Operations and maintenance of various types and kinds of generators requires tailored support packages that should be communicated for a resource push.
- Hotels/restaurants have priority emergency fuel contracts.
- There are limited fuel delivery vehicles commercially available.

Primary Actions

- Collect and maintain situational awareness of emergency power requirements at priority locations.
- Coordinate, monitor and report the status of CUC power assessment operations through the PRTF.

- Refine and maintain CUC priority restoration efforts and any federal request for assistance.
- Coordinate with ESF #7 to source transportation resources.

3.2.5 Phase 2a (Activation, Situational Assessment, and Movement)

Primary Actions

- HSEM develops an emergency power fuel and maintenance prioritization plan based on initial assessments and adjusts the plan accordingly as island power is restored.
- PRTF and CUC coordinate a priority of power restoration utilizing the HSEM critical infrastructure list.
- PRTF develops a power restoration plan based on initial assessments to the power grid during Phase 1a.
- DPW conducts priority route debris clearance operations to ensure deployment of resources and capabilities to critical facilities.
- CUC initiates a memorandum of understanding with the American Public Power Association for technical support.
- PRTF sources transformers, wire/lines, power meters, and poles.
- PRTF and FEMA coordinate the deployment of ESF #3, ESF #12, and FEMA Operations staff to assist in technical assessments of generator requirements and to assist in the installation of emergency generators, as needed.
- PRTF coordinates with the CUC Operations Center to ascertain the status of ongoing CUC power restoration operations and to establish power restoration priorities with the Unified Coordination Group (UCG).
- PRTF integrate ESF #12.
- PRTF begin development of long-term restoration plan for approval by UCG.
- ESF #7 coordinates with the PRTF to source transportation resources and provide logistical support for moving off-island assets to CNMI.

3.2.6 Phase 2b (Employment of Resources and Stabilization)

Primary Actions

- PRTF executes fuel plan.
- PRTF coordinates emergency power generation installations as required and/or directed.
- PRTF supports CUC's execution of emergency services/support contracts with on-island vendors to provide equipment and personnel to repair storm-damaged equipment as needed.

3.2.7 Phase 2c (Intermediate Operations)

Primary Actions

- As island power is restored, the PRTF coordinates maintenance and services on equipment and conducts de-installations as required.

3.2.8 Phase 3 (Sustained Operations)

Primary Actions

- Transition focus to island power restoration efforts, also coordinated by PRTF.
- PRTF supports CUC coordination of the demobilization and transport of any FEMA-owned or FEMA-leased generators back to their points of origin.
- PRTF supports CUC coordination of the demobilization and transport of any off-island power restoration personnel and equipment back to their points of origin.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

5.1 Primary Agencies

5.1.1 Federal

- ESF #12 (deploys as members of the IMAT and/or Rapid Needs Assessment Team and integrates into the UCG/Joint Field Office Operations Section)
- FEMA
- General Services Administration (GSA)
- U.S. Department of Energy
- USACE

5.1.2 Commonwealth

- HSEM
- CNMI GSA
- CUC
- PSS
- CNMI DPW
- Bureau of Environment and Coastal Quality

5.2 Support Agencies

5.2.1 Federal

- Department of Defense

5.2.2 Commonwealth

- PSS
- Commonwealth Healthcare Corporation
- CNMI Department of Public Safety

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Appendix C-2: Restore the Power Infrastructure

1 *Situation*

1.1 *Purpose*

After a Category 4 typhoon strike, CNMI will sustain significant damage to the power grid resulting from the destruction of the transmission and distribution system. The system loss is anticipated to be 100 percent. The effective restoration of CNMI's permanent electrical power is the focus of recovery and marks the return to normal activity for the people of CNMI.

1.2 *Background*

The Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (CUC) provides power and potable water to the citizens of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota. The CUC operates and maintains the power generation, transmission, and distribution systems on all three islands as well as the water systems.

Distribution lines are more vulnerable to damage than transmission lines because they are generally not as highly engineered as transmission systems. Extensive failures to distribution networks in heavily vegetated and rural areas are expected. Components for restoration of these networks are in limited supply in Tinian and Rota, with the majority of repair items maintained in Saipan.

The CNMI Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) and the CUC have identified and prioritized key critical infrastructure sites to ensure power is available should the power grid shut down. These key life-sustaining facilities are: hospitals and clinics, water wells, the HSEM Emergency Operations Center, Saipan International Airport, the seaport, and emergency storm shelters. Though all of these facilities have been assessed for power generation requirements, not all are equipped with emergency power generators. With limited resources on the island, to set conditions of success in recovery, the response efforts must consider strategically supporting long-term infrastructure restoration, while recognizing the priority of these critical facilities and their essential services.

2 *Mission*

The mission is to support long-term restoration of CNMI's power infrastructure.

3 *Execution*

3.1 *Concept of Operations*

The goal of the concept of operations is to protect and maximize on-island power restoration capabilities and facilitate rapid assessment and restoration of the power system through a Power Restoration Task Force (PRTF) co-led by the CUC and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE, ESF #3).

The PRTF has two critical missions: the supply of emergency power and the restoration of the power infrastructure. The PRTF will ensure any response actions will complement the longer-term strategy for power infrastructure restoration.

The PRTF will integrate ESF #12 and develop future plan for long-term restoration and submit to the Unified Coordination Group (UCG) for approval. Some critical challenges the PRTF may

face here will be regulatory requirements or limitations that may impact shipping of various equipment and materials. ESF #1 should be engaged, along with ESF #7, in developing the strategy for the purchase and transportation of critical restoration hardware and equipment.

3.1.1 Critical Considerations

- Generation (none with backup)
 - Power Plants 1 and 2 are in same location
 - Power Plants 1, 2, and 4 are main power-generating facilities
 - Power Plant 3 services water facilities
- CUC restoration target is 90 percent of the power grid within 90 days.
- Saipan power poles – 11,494
 - 10,345 – wood
 - 1,149 – concrete

3.1.2 Assumptions

- 5-10 days for assessment of the infrastructure system immediately post-impact.
- There are insufficient repair parts available on the island to complete repairs of the system.
- Post-storm, 90% restoration of the power system will require a minimum of 90 days.
- There are insufficient repair parts available on the island to complete repairs of the system post-storm.

3.1.3 Requirements

Table C-2-1: Resource Requirements

Resource (Type)	Amount Available	Resource Owner	Amount Required	Difference
Personnel – field	12-hour operations 32 linemen	Utility company	24-hour operations 64 linemen	32 linemen
Vehicles – field	12-hour operations	Utility company	24-hour operations	12 hours
Repair parts	Maintenance level	Utility company	Overhaul / restart	Significant
Fuel	7 days	Utility company	4 months	113 days

3.1.4 Applicable Core Capabilities

- Infrastructure Systems
- Planning
- Operational Communications
- Situational Assessment
- Operational Coordination

- Critical Transportation
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety

3.2 Tasks by Phase

Each phase of operations has an end state, as shown in Table C-2-2.

Table C-2-2: Operational Phases and End States

Phase	End State
Phase 1a	Agencies have completed their preparedness activities.
Phase 1b	Joint planning has begun by the activated PRTF, which is co-led by the CUC and USACE/ESF #3.
Phase 1c	Critical operational resources have been protected.
Phase 2a	Initial assessments have been completed, all on-island resources have been deployed, and the PRTF actively executes priority actions set by the UCG.
Phase 2b	All supplemental federal capabilities and resources are ordered and deployed to CNMI.
Phase 2c	PRTF operations transition to CUC/ESF #12 co-leads; maintenance plan in place with less than 10 percent “new” installs.
Phase 3	PRTF operations transition to CUC and ESF #12 recovery activities.

3.2.1 Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Operational Focus – Situational awareness and preparedness:

- Identify, collect, analyze, and maintain data that supports decision making in the response to the impacts of a Category 4 typhoon impacting CNMI.
- Establish awareness, operational coordination, and communications among critical response partners during preparedness activities.

Critical Considerations

- Repair of specialized equipment will be limited by the availability of technicians.
- CNMI’s energy infrastructure is publicly owned and eligible for federal funding sources. Future planning efforts aimed at the installation of below-ground transmission systems should be explored to meet long-term commonwealth objectives.

Primary Actions

- HSEM and CUC coordinate on the development of a consolidated and prioritized list of critical facilities for power restoration.
- Prioritize completion of mitigation projects related to power infrastructure.
- CUC assesses and monitors CUC typhoon stock levels to ensure the required asset inventory is maintained as necessary for the timely restoration of the electrical power infrastructure once the storm has passed.

- CUC assesses and maintains power restoration memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with off-island agencies to ensure that the anticipated resource capabilities needed for recovery are available.
- USACE provides for CUC use and awareness assessment data from previous emergency power missions executed in CNMI.

3.2.2 Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus

- ESF #3 and ESF #12 deploy with the Incident Management Assistance Team and initiate joint planning activities.

Critical Considerations

- High-voltage transmission and distribution of electrical equipment often requires custom builds and substantial lead times for the manufacture and transport of equipment to CNMI. Once on-island, specialized installation equipment and labor will be required to restore power grids.
- Federal resources and capabilities deployed to CNMI prior to the storm require safe support facilities for sheltering.
- Limited rolling stock equipment, on the island, used for infrastructure repair needs to be safely secured to minimize damage.
- Initial staff deployed in support of PRTF planning efforts require logistical support on-island.

Primary Actions

- CUC executes its typhoon standard operating procedures and preparedness checklist.
- CUC activates and recalls essential personnel (by position) in order to perform preparedness activities.
- CUC increases the number of crews performing tree-trimming operations around power lines.
- CUC management activates the CUC Operations Center.
- HSEM, CUC, the Public School System (PSS), the Commonwealth Healthcare Corporation (CHCC), and FEMA coordinate with non-HSEM agencies whose facilities are listed as critical infrastructure to ascertain the operability of emergency power generation.

3.2.3 Phase 1c (Near Certainty)

Operational Focus

- Shelter critical equipment and stage personnel for immediate response activities.

Critical Considerations

- Consistent messaging to the public is critical.

Primary Actions

- CUC and HSEM activate the PRTF.
- Establish CUC Operations Center as PRTF's main operational location.
- Establish communications and assessment capability with Rota and Tinian.
- PRTF, in coordination with ESF #7 and FEMA Logistics, begins sourcing transportation resources for the movement of power restoration assets from off-island to CNMI as needed.
- PRTF coordinates with ESF #15 and the Joint Information Center to create and issue public service announcements concerning the dangers associated with downed power lines and the procedures for reporting them.
- CUC conducts inventory and equipment assessments.

3.2.4 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)**Operational Focus**

- Assess system restoration requirements, prepare restoration plan that includes public messaging output for UCG approval, and execute restoration plan.
- Actions taken during Phase 2 must align with a long-term recovery plan led by the PRTF.

3.2.5 Phase 2a (Activation, Situational Assessment, and Movement)**Critical Considerations**

- Critical personnel may be impacted by the disaster and unable to perform their emergency functions immediately.

Primary Actions

- CUC conducts system assessments.
- PRTF supports CUC, ESF #3, and ESF #10 on the development of hazardous material (HAZMAT) staging sites and the disposal of HAZMAT debris resulting from storm damage.
- PRTF identifies additional capabilities necessary to support CUC on assessment activities.
- PRTF activates and coordinates MOU with Pacific island power supply companies to augment CUC resources.
- ESF #7 coordinates with the PRTF to source transportation resources and provide the logistical support necessary to move off-island assets to CNMI.

- PRTF develop recommendations for UCG consideration on power infrastructure restoration.
- PRTF monitors and supports CUC deployment of assessment teams for conducting damage assessments of the overall electrical power infrastructure and electric power availability/capabilities at critical facilities.
- PRTF coordinates with the CUC Operations Center to ascertain the status of immediate power restoration operations and coordinates power restoration priorities with the UCG, as needed.
- PRTF supports CUC asset replacement ordering to facilitate the timely repair and restoration of electrical power, as needed.
- PRTF supports CUC's execution of emergency services/support contracts with on-island vendors to provide equipment and personnel to repair storm damage, as needed.

3.2.6 Phase 2b (Employment of Resources and Stabilization)

Primary Actions

- CUC executes existing MOUs with American Public Power Association to gain additional restoration capabilities within CNMI. MOU execution is based on assessments from both the CUC and PRTF.

3.2.7 Phase 2c (Intermediate Operations)

3.2.8 Phase 3 (Sustained Operations)

Critical Considerations

- The management of recovery operations will occur under a management plan developed and approved by the UCG, which includes the Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator.

Primary Actions

- UCG implements demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.
- Once normal operation of the electrical power infrastructure is restored, PRTF and CUC Operations Center stand down and all agencies resume normal operations.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Annex*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

5.1 Primary Agencies

5.1.1 Federal

- FEMA

- General Services Administration
- U.S. Department of Energy
- USACE
- U.S. Department of Justice

5.1.2 *Commonwealth*

- HSEM
- CUC
- CNMI Department of Public Works

5.2 Support Agencies

5.2.1 *Federal*

- U.S. Department of Defense

5.2.2 *Commonwealth*

- PSS
- CHCC
- CNMI Department of Public Safety

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Appendix C-3: Stabilize the Water Distribution and Wastewater Systems

1 *Situation*

The municipal water distribution and wastewater systems of CNMI are managed by the Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (CUC). The Bureau of Environmental and Coastal Quality (BECQ) is the oversight regulatory agency. Fourteen (14) private water bottlers on Saipan lift and produce bottled drinking water for the island population. The islands of Rota and Tinian produce and distribute groundwater from wells and springs. There are no municipal wastewater systems on these islands.

As a result of CNMI's experience in 2015 with Typhoon Soudelor, mitigation projects to provide emergency power to more wells was approved. Post-Soudelor, CNMI submitted a Hazard Mitigation Grant Program project proposal to procure and install 12 pad-mounted generators at 11 strategic sites in support of the water system in Saipan. Ninety-one water wells that provide water for 70 percent of Saipan's population on the water system will be provided reliable emergency power under this project. Bottled drinking water is produced by and will continue to be produced and distributed by the private sector.

The CUC has equipped some primary water wells, water treatment plants, and lift stations with emergency backup power generators to ensure systems remain operational in the event of a massive island-wide power loss. Depending on the severity of the storm, the CUC will make a determination as to whether emergency generators are put into operation pre-or post-landfall.

1.1 *Background*

The CUC has a water system on Saipan that consists of 113 operational underground wells. The water is considered potable, but due to the high saline content, the majority of residents on Saipan use bottled water for drinking purposes. Water systems on Tinian and Rota do not have any taste/odor issues and residents drink from the tap there.

During Typhoon Soudelor, FEMA coordinated federal resources to deploy and install temporary power generators at 84 different locations to maintain essential services.

There are 2 wastewater treatment plants and 36 lift stations on Saipan. Of the 36 lift stations, 32 are equipped with emergency power generation. During Typhoon Soudelor, there were no catastrophic releases from the wastewater plants on Saipan. Also, a majority of residential properties are on septic systems.

2 *Mission*

The mission for water distribution and waste water system entities is to coordinate water production support, coordinate identification of isolated areas, provide resource support to local and CUC water operations, and, if necessary, source alternative water production and support water distribution operations.

3 Execution

3.1 Concept of Operations

The focus of the concept of operations is collaboration with the Power Restoration Task Force (PRTF) to develop and execute a pre-storm assessment needs plan and a post-storm assessment/repair/install plan to ensure emergency power is provided to critical wells, pumps, and lift stations for essential services.

CNMI's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) agency and FEMA form a Water and Wastewater Task Force (WWTF) along with USACE/Emergency Support Function (ESF) #3 in Phase 1c to maximize economy of effort and synchronize priorities and resourcing tactics for emergency power in support of the water and wastewater systems. All activities in the response should be coordinated with the PRTF.

The WWTF consists of core representation from HSEM, FEMA, CUC, and the CNMI BECQ, with supporting federal representation from ESF #3, ESF #7, ESF #8, ESF #10, and ESF #13.

Post-storm, the WWTF will provide teams to assess damage to the water and wastewater systems, to include water wells, booster pump sites, water distribution lines, and reservoirs and will assess overall system capability and water quality. The CUC will maintain the functionality of its designated and installed generators. ESF #3 will support CUC operations by providing any requested technical assistance. As needed, the CUC will deploy or coordinate generator installs at water wells and booster pump sites.

3.1.1 Critical Considerations

- Drinking water is commercially produced on Saipan.
- There are many properties with private wells (hotels and restaurants) that produce and bottle their own water.

3.1.2 Assumptions

- The potable water distribution system will not suffer significant damage. Fuel for emergency generators being used in water production and distribution will be required.
- Damage assessments post-storm assume road clearance will occur either concurrently or will have already been completed. Utility and public service organizations will require at least 1-3 days for a complete assessment of damage to their systems.

3.1.3 Applicable Core Capabilities

- Infrastructure Systems
- Planning
 - Permit waiver for WWTP discharge
- Operational Communications
- Situational Assessment
- Operational Coordination

- Critical Transportation
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety
 - “Boil water” notice and communications
 - Sampling and water quality coordination
 - Hazardous materials storage

3.2 Tasks by Phase

Each operational phase has an end state, as noted in Table C-3-1.

Table C-3-1: Operational Phases and End States

Phase	End State
Phase 1a	Agencies have completed their preparedness activities.
Phase 1b	Joint planning and coordinated messaging have begun.
Phase 1c	All wells have switched to 100 percent generator power, all reservoirs are filled, and ESF #10 is coordinating wastewater waiver for emergency discharge permit.
Phase 2a	Initial assessments have been completed, all on-island resources have been deployed, and the WWTF actively executes priority actions set by the UCG.
Phase 2b	All supplemental federal capabilities and resources are ordered and deployed.
Phase 2c	Demobilization begins.
Phase 3	WWTF operations transition to recovery.

3.2.1 Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Operational Focus – Situational awareness and preparedness:

- Identify, collect, analyze, and maintain data that supports decision making in the response to the impacts of a Category 4 typhoon impacting CNMI.
- Establish awareness, operational coordination, and communications among critical response partners during preparedness activities.

Critical Considerations

- Storm debris makes roads impassable post-landfall, hampering assessment teams.
- With an expected loss of the power grid for up to 90 days, homeowners may have intermittent reliable water for the same amount of time.
- Utility and public service organizations will require at least 1-3 days for a complete assessment of system damage.
- Assessment strategies begin at treatment plants and work outward from the nearest to the farthest pumping stations.
- System operators will place a priority on the segments of the system that will restore services to the largest number of customers, taking into account the requirements of critical facilities and essential services.
- Loss of power to wastewater facilities will result in significant amounts of “bypass,” or spillage, of raw sewage.

Primary Actions

- HSEM identifies, assesses, and coordinates with partner agencies on any on-island commercial water distribution and transportation assets capable of providing potable water to designated locations pre- and post-landfall.
- CUC monitors its overall inventory of needed water supply and distribution materials maintained in the CUC warehouse.
- CUC coordinates with the CNMI Department of Public Safety to acquire communications/public safety assets to increase overall emergency communications and coordination capabilities.

3.2.2 Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus

- Deploy select resources to multi-agency coordination centers (Regional Response Coordination Center [RRCC], National Response Coordination Center, and CNMI Emergency Operations Center); develop situational awareness and begin joint planning.
- Deploy water and wastewater experts (ESF #10).
- Support development of the Regional Support Plan.

Critical Considerations

- Planning by the WWTF must be coordinated with the PRTF and must consider logistics support.

Primary Actions

- HSEM and FEMA form the WWTF, consisting of core representation from HSEM, FEMA, CUC, BECQ, ESF #3, ESF #7, ESF #8, ESF #10, and ESF #13.
- WWTF coordinates with ESF #15 to ensure that public messaging relating to water storage preparations is coordinated and issued in conjunction with the appropriate typhoon Threat Condition (TC) level.
- HSEM also confirms that the CUC conducts pre-landfall generator maintenance checks and reports operational status of generators to HSEM.
- WWTF coordinates and communicates water quality assessments at all surface storage and well locations.
- WWTF will encourage all CUC customers through public messaging to create an ad hoc water storage supply prior to typhoon landfall through the filling of bathtubs and household containers.
- CUC coordinates with HSEM and ESF #15 for the issuance of public service announcements that encourage pre-storm water storage and provide advice on in-home water storage requirements, capabilities, techniques, and usage.
- Incident Management Assistance Team co-initiates planning with HSEM.

- RRCC activates ESF #10.
- CUC executes its typhoon checklist and standards of procedure.
- CUC coordinates on the fueling and testing of all designated emergency generators.
- All generators that are nonoperational at the end of Phase 1b will be reported to HSEM through the WWTF.
- CUC continues to monitor the overall inventory of needed water supply and distribution materials maintained in the CUC warehouse and shares any significant shortfalls with HSEM to inform pre- and post-storm contingency planning.
- CUC installs emergency generator at its main office building to support dispatch operations.
- WWTF develops situational awareness on production status and capabilities from commercial potable water bottlers, including storage/transportation, refueling, and emergency power generation assets.

3.2.3 *Phase 1c (Near Certainty)*

Operational Focus: Implement protective measures and increase public messaging.

Critical Considerations

- Report and coordinate generator status with PRTF for immediate assessments post-storm.
- Engage with Fuels Task Force (FTF) to ensure priority well locations are on fuel plan.
- WWTF supports Joint Information enter (JIC) public messaging for household water storage pre-storm.

Primary Actions

- WWTF and ESF #15 issue public messaging encouraging the public to store and conserve water.
- WWTF communicates fuel priorities with the FTF.
- RRCC coordinates an emergency discharge waiver through ESF #10 to relieve pressure on the wastewater system in Saipan and informs HSEM and BECQ.
- CUC monitors its overall inventory of needed water supply and distribution materials maintained in the CUC warehouse.
- CUC starts all designated emergency generators at water wells, booster pump sites, and wastewater facilities and disconnects those locations from the main power grid.
- WWTF conducts pre-landfall planning for personnel and equipment at designated staging locations post-landfall for the conduct of damage assessments.
- CUC takes protective measures to ensure the availability of chlorine for the disinfection of water wells and booster pump sites post-landfall.

- CUC and WWTF ensure equipment and trucks required for post-landfall assessments are refueled and positioned for post-storm response.

3.2.4 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)

Operational Focus

- Assess water system and re-establish communications and situational awareness with commercial water production companies.
- WWTF assesses whether any customers are/will be isolated from the water supply for more than 3 days and prepares a plan for community water delivery.

Critical Considerations

- The water at Capitol Hill on Saipan is drinkable from the tap.

Primary Actions

- CUC and WWTF deploy damage assessment teams made up of CUC rovers and engineers.
- WWTF coordinates with HSEM, FEMA, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to source, acquire, and transport generators to augment any inoperative generators at critical water wells or booster pump sites.
- CUC and WWTF coordinate with ESF #6 and ESF #8 to prioritize water supplies for the hospital and for designated emergency shelters, which are pre-established priority locations.
- HSEM contracts with on-island commercial water bottlers, as needed, to provide bottled water.
- HSEM, ESF #1, ESF #3, and ESF #7 contract for the transportation of bottled water to designated areas.
- HSEM coordinates with the CUC, ESF #3, and FEMA on prioritizing the re-establishment of the water supply and distribution system based on damage assessment results.

3.2.5 Phase 2a (Activation, Situational Assessment, and Movement)

Primary Actions

- CUC and WWTF coordinate with HSEM, FEMA, the JIC, and ESF #15 to issue a “boil water” order if water contamination dictates.
- WWTF coordinates directly with the FTF to ensure generator fuel delivery priorities are communicated and accomplished.
- CUC deploys damage assessment teams made up of CUC rovers and engineers.
- Based on damage assessments, the CUC and WWTF coordinate with HSEM, FEMA, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to source, acquire, and transport generators to augment any inoperative generators at critical water wells or booster pump sites.

- WWTF coordinates with ESF #6 and ESF #8 to prioritize water supplies for the hospital and designated emergency shelters, which are pre-established priority locations.
- WWTF defines additional resources required to meet restoration needs.
- WWTF and HSEM coordinate with ESF #7 to execute established contracts with commercial potable water transportation vendors.

3.2.6 Phase 2b (Employment of Resources and Stabilization)

Primary Actions

- Determine whether there is a requirement for water production assets.
- Request water production and storage capability from the Department of Defense (DOD).
- WWTF executes future operations plan for restoration and presents it to the Federal Coordinating Officer and Unified Coordination Group (UCG) for approval.

3.2.7 Phase 2c (Intermediate Operations)

Primary actions:

- WWTF develops a strategy to replenish the inventory of needed water supply and distribution materials maintained in the CUC warehouse and coordinates with HSEM, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to source, acquire, and transport supplies required for response and recovery actions.
- When appropriate, the WWTF recommends lifting the “boil water” order.

3.2.8 Phase 3 (Sustained Operations)

Primary Actions

- WWTF reports water and wastewater distribution status and makes recommendations to downgrade response efforts as systems are restored.
- WWTF makes recommendations on the redeployment of ESF #10 and off-island resources as systems are restored.
- UCG conducts demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.
- CUC and WWTF coordinate with ESF #3 to return water wells and booster pump sites to the main electrical power grid and terminate use of emergency generators.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5.1 Primary Agencies

5.1.1 Federal

- ESF #10
- WWTF participants
- FEMA
- USACE
- General Services Administration
- U.S. Department of Justice

5.1.2 Commonwealth

- HSEM
- WWTF participants
- CUC

5.2 Support Agencies

5.2.1 Federal

- DOD

Appendix C-4: Deliver Fuel to Maintain Continuity of Essential Operations and Services

1 *Situation*

Emergency generators will be installed across CNMI to ensure continuity of essential services at various facilities. The fuel “burn rate” of any one generator is dependent on use and may vary greatly. Critical facilities that have emergency generators require continuous fuel feed and planning support—a critical task for Phases 1b and 1c.

1.1 **Background**

CNMI imports all of its fuel products refined and finished. No petroleum refinery is located within CNMI. The fuel holding capacity within CNMI is less than 30 days of supply for diesel and regular gasoline. With widespread generator usage post-storm, CNMI’s fuel stores may be stressed.

2 *Mission*

Source, deploy, and employ supplemental capabilities to decentralize the distribution of fuel to maintain essential operations. The decentralization of fuel delivery should result in each agency/department maintaining responsibility for their own refueling schedule.

3 *Execution*

3.1 **Concept of Operations**

The concept of operations is to develop and execute a fueling strategy that considers requirements for first responders, other critical response and recovery activities, and critical facilities and essential services and also provides fuel for commercial consumption that is sustainable and executable given the scarcity of fueling resources on the islands.

Fueling hundreds of generators at various essential services or critical facility locations operating at different burn rates across all areas of CNMI increases operational risk. Decentralization of this task through a process where generator owners/operators become responsible for their own fuel operations pushes the responsibility of the task to the tactical, operational end-user level, instead of being managed at the higher coordination, strategic commonwealth/federal level. The criticality of this task, however, and the limited availability of any organic fuel distribution resources require federal support for success.

Immediately after Typhoon Soudelor, only one of two retail gas providers were operational. That greatly impacted the community at large, resulting in long lines at the few retail stations that were operational. At the request of the Governor, one commercial gas station, near the airport, was identified for first responder use only. That station was located outside of main business or residential corridors, allowing for response vehicles to fuel outside of high-visibility (business district) and high-impact areas. This is a best practice that should be continued.

Task organizing for fuel delivery to ensure continued essential services requires significant labor and equipment. While CNMI islands are physically small, CNMI’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) has the sole responsibility of fueling many generators

using fuel at different burn rates across the islands, making refueling a challenge for CNMI's small labor pool.

Addressing this labor and equipment shortfall, the FEMA Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) and others will focus on the sourcing, purchasing, and transporting of supplemental fuel storage/delivery capability that can be truck-mounted into regular passenger/cargo vehicles owned by individual agencies and used without special licensing to be delivered to CNMI. This places the responsibility into the hands of the generator-operators (individual agencies or operators of those essential services) and relieves the small HSEM staff to focus on incident management activities.

3.1.1 Critical Considerations

- Due to limited availability of retail fuel distribution assets on-island and the anticipated loss of the power distribution system due to damage to transmission lines, HSEM and FEMA Region IX must coordinate for additional retail delivery assets prior to landfall.
- CNMI fuel distribution capabilities cannot meet the generator refuel requirements post-landfall and will need federal assistance.
- CNMI has secure fuel storage facilities built to withstand Category 4 typhoon effects.

3.1.2 Assumptions

- Industrial facilities have emergency power at all commercial fuel stations and will reopen them as soon as commercially feasible.
- Critical transportation routes will be disrupted.
- Commercial fuel distributors with limited equipment have priority contracts to large commercial clients and will be unable to meet the surge requirements associated with hundreds of emergency generators operating at different burn rates throughout the course of the response.
- Retail fuel stations will be closed to the public.

3.1.3 Applicable Core Capabilities

- Infrastructure Systems
- Planning
- Public Information and Warning
- Fire Management and Suppression
- Logistics and Supply Chain Management
- On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
- Operational Communications
- Situational Assessment
- Operational Coordination

- Critical Transportation
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety

3.2 Tasks by Phase

Each operational phase has an end state, as shown in Table C-4-1.

Table C-4-1: Operational Phases and End States

Phase	End State
Phase 1a	Agencies have completed their preparedness activities.
Phase 1b	HSEM executes fuel distribution strategy.
Phase 1c	Priorities for placing generators have been identified and validated by HSEM and a fueling plan has been started.
Phase 2a	Initial assessments have been completed and all on-island resources are deployed.
Phase 2b	All supplemental federal capabilities and resources are ordered and deployed.
Phase 2c	Transition to individual agencies to conduct fueling.
Phase 3	Restoration of commercial fuel operations.

In Phase 1c, with the arrival of the Incident Management Assistance Team, the Fuel Task Force (FTF) will be activated at the CNMI Emergency Operations Center and will begin planning against fueling requirements. Also in Phase 1c, FEMA LMD will forward deploy purchased portable fuel tanks with fueling capability to mount on individual agency and department vehicles.

3.2.1 Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Operational Focus – Situational awareness and preparedness:

- Develop and share with response stakeholders an inventory of generators and their fuel requirements and establish a standard operating procedure for receiving, mounting, using, and returning portable fuel capability to departments and agencies.

Critical Considerations

- Coordination with industry partners to participate on or have representation to the FTF is critical. Industry sensitivity to confidential business information may restrict their engagement.

Primary Actions

- HSEM develops an inventory of critical facilities and their power generation requirements.
- HSEM assesses refueling requirements for designated critical facility generators and emergency/disaster response vehicles.
- HSEM sources temporary fuel storage containers and identifies and prioritizes possible locations for deployment.
- HSEM assesses the operational readiness of critical fuel and distribution assets.

- HSEM assesses and modifies any existing fuel contracts to ensure a prioritization clause is added to give CNMI facilities and emergency/disaster response assets refueling priority.
- HSEM, in coordination with neighboring islands, establishes Emergency Management Assistance Compact agreements to augment current CNMI fuel distribution capabilities through mutual aid.

3.2.2 Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus

- HSEM validates operational status and fuel emergency generators for essential services and critical facilities.

Critical Considerations

- CNMI does not have a government fuel depot.
- CNMI does not have emergency fuel contracts in place.

Primary Actions

- HSEM and FEMA activate the FTF.
- CNMI agencies assess and conduct immediate repairs of all temporary power generators at critical facilities.
- HSEM conducts fuel delivery to pre-identified critical infrastructure not maintained by the Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (CUC).
- As required, the National Response Coordination Center initiates fuel purchase and delivery in support of the FTF and fuel delivery operations post-landfall.
- U.S. Coast Guard District 14 and the Commonwealth Ports Authority contact bulk fuel suppliers to validate on-hand stocks and assess days of supply with the FTF.
- HSEM initiates the Fuel Prioritization Plan (FPP) and assesses the current availability and operational readiness of CNMI's fuel supply and distribution assets, including private sector capabilities.

3.2.3 Phase 1c (Near Certainty)

Operational Focus

- Purchase, transport, receive, and install portable fuel storage/delivery capability onto appropriate Government of CNMI vehicles.

Primary Actions

- FTF executes Unified Coordination Group (UCG)-approved FPP.
- HSEM safeguards fuel delivery assets in pre-identified hardened structures to ensure survivability post-landfall.

- As required, the Federal Staging Area receives and issues fuel cubes to HSEM pre-landfall.

3.2.4 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)

Operational Focus

- The focus is on the immediate analysis of whether a response fuel depot must be constructed or if fueling can be accomplished through a retail station identified for responders.

Critical Considerations

- Using a retail service station for responder fueling exclusively may cause disruption in the community and require additional law enforcement /security personnel.

Primary Actions

- HSEM, through the FTF, monitors fuel consumption at emergency generators.
- All CNMI agencies and stakeholders with fuel storage capability as well as those agencies utilizing emergency power generators assess and report status of assets to the FTF for input into the fuel utilization report.
- Salvage dive teams conduct assessments of fuel docking areas.
- ESF #10 and ESF #12 determine additional storage and distribution capability requirements and coordinate resourcing.
- FTF assesses post-storm infrastructure damage to fuel supplies and distribution capabilities, determines fuel prioritization for the response, and makes a recommendation to the UCG whether there is a need to institute fuel rationing.
- FTF coordinates with ESF #7 to activate contracts to provide additional commercial fuel assets.
- FTF coordinates with ESF #7 to provide additional neighbor-island commercial fuel supply and distribution assets.
- FTF coordinates with ESF #7 to activate contracts with tug/barge operators to transport fuel supply and distribution assets from neighboring islands to CNMI.
- FTF coordinates with ESF #7 to assess on-island fuel supplies and provide additional on-island bulk fuel to meet response requirements.
- FTF and ESF #3 identify and deliver additional fuel to emergency generator locations at water wells.
- FTF, ESF #1, and ESF #3 maintain the operational readiness of fuel response assets and adjust operations as necessary.
- FTF and ESF #12 coordinate on waiver request from the CNMI Bureau of Environmental and Coastal Quality to utilize high-sulfur fuel in CUC's baseline generator.

3.2.5 Phase 3 (Sustained Operations)

Operational Focus

- Demobilize resources as required.

Primary Actions

- UCG conducts demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.
- HSEM restores normal fuel supply and distribution operations when normal electrical power is restored; debris clearance/removal operations are minimized; and emergency fuel requirements no longer exist.
- HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 to terminate contracts with private bulk fuel vendors.
- HSEM terminates fuel rationing operations and ends private fuel station restrictions.
- HSEM and FEMA coordinate with the Defense Coordinating Officer to deactivate U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) fuel assets.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5.1 Primary Agencies

5.1.1 Federal

- FEMA
- General Services Administration

5.1.2 Commonwealth

- HSEM
- CUC
- CNMI Department of Public Works
- CNMI Public School System
- Commonwealth Healthcare Center
- CNMI Department of Public Safety
- CNMI Fire Department

5.2 Support Agencies

5.2.1 *Federal*

- DOD

5.2.2 *Commonwealth*

- HSEM

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Appendix C-5: Conduct Mass Care Services and Sheltering of Survivors

1 *Situation*

As a catastrophic typhoon bears down on CNMI, residents will seek emergency shelter. After the storm has passed, it is anticipated that up to 4,310 homes and multi-family structures within CNMI could be rendered uninhabitable, resulting in a displaced population of just more than 14,000 individuals. The majority of survivors will choose to shelter on their properties or with extended family. However, an estimated 1,500 individuals will seek congregate care shelters, and long-term housing support will be required for 1,422 individuals.

1.1 **Background**

Mass care and sheltering is the direct provisioning of food, shelter, and emergency relief supplies during a major disaster. This is a core responsibility of CNMI, with support from Whole Community stakeholders and the Federal Government, to provide such resources for CNMI residents and visitors following a catastrophic typhoon affecting the commonwealth.

CNMI is particularly resilient, as many homes are made of concrete. However, the commonwealth also has a number of temporary residents that hold “Contract Worker” (CW) visas, primarily living on Saipan. These CW visa holders are not U.S. citizens and therefore may not be eligible for federal assistance. In addition to this special population, there are a number of alien residents in CNMI from the Compact of Freely Associated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Marshall Islands that may also not qualify for federal assistance. These two groups are known to live in substandard housing and may be particularly susceptible to typhoon impacts.

2 *Mission*

The mission for mass care and sheltering is to provide Tier 2 sheltering and mass care services through a combination of fixed facilities and the provision of tents to survivors, giving them the option to shelter in place post-impact.

3 *Execution*

3.1 **Concept of Operations**

Providing good situational awareness of shelter locations and staffing operations prior to storm impact will assist the transition of individuals to Tier 2 shelters. Building on lessons learned during Typhoon Soudelor, the management and installation of CNMI Public School System (PSS) generators will be supported by the CNMI Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) in identified shelter locations.

During Typhoon Soudelor, a Mass Care Task Force (MCTF) was activated in Phase 1b and was able to execute its mission efficiently due to significant planning prior to Phase 2a.

An MCTF will be formed and activated in Phase 1b at the CNMI Emergency Operations Center. FEMA Individual Assistance (IA) subject matter experts will travel with the Incident Management Assistance Team as essential personnel and ensure their integration into the MCTF

in Phase 1b. In Phase 1c, HSEM will open emergency shelters and HSEM will assist with critical transportation requirements.

3.1.1 Critical Considerations

- There are 15 designated emergency shelters in CNMI, with a total capacity of 1,829 persons: Saipan – 10 shelters (1,429 spaces), Tinian – 3 shelters (225 spaces), Rota – 2 shelters (175 spaces).
- Commercial vendors in CNMI will have approximately a 14-day supply of food on hand within the commonwealth pre-landfall and another 14-day supply in transit.
- Residents are encouraged to have a supply of at least 14 days of non-perishable food at all times.
- The majority of the displaced population (90 percent) will shelter with family members or shelter in place, leaving an estimated 1,500 persons seeking emergency shelter.
- With a high visitor population of non-U.S. citizens, the State Department’s Office of Emergency Management and Office of Foreign Missions will integrate into the response organization and coordinate with consulate staff as required.
- The CNMI government has no emergency food stored and relies on the private sector, volunteer organizations, and the Federal Government to feed citizens.

3.1.2 Assumptions

- People entering shelters are expected to bring 7-10 days of supplies with them to the shelter, and this requirement will be emphasized by ESF #15.
- The majority of visitors to CNMI will leave pre-landfall.
- Post-landfall movements will be limited to emergency/critical care needs. Hotel and tourism agencies will handle coordination directly with airlines and foreign countries to relocate or return visitors, as needed, post-storm.
- Visitors remaining in CNMI at landfall will be sheltered and cared for by their hotels for not less than 7 days.

3.1.3 Requirements

- Total sheltering capacity is largely unknown. While PSS has provided some estimates, they do not include all facilities. As learned in Typhoon Soudelor, various PSS facilities will be used as shelters. Department of Community and Cultural Affairs (DCCA) Tier 2 shelter capacity is unclear at this time. Several DCCA facilities that are designated as Tier 2 locations are in need of repair and currently cannot be operated as shelters. The timeline for these repairs or for identifying alternative shelter locations is unknown.
- For feeding operations on Tinian and Rota, the American Red Cross (Red Cross) will likely establish contracts with local vendors or transport meals to shelters via air.

- The Red Cross’s feeding capacity is based on numerous local vendors that have varying capabilities. Therefore, an exact feeding capacity is difficult to determine and currently unknown.
- The Salvation Army within CNMI operates a soup kitchen capable of serving 1,000 meals per day (lunch only) for 1 month following a disaster. The greatest shortfall identified by The Salvation Army is manpower. Immediately following Typhoon Soudelor, The Salvation Army recruited approximately 100 volunteers to assist feeding operations. Roughly 200 to 300 volunteers are optimal.
- The Southern Baptists also conducted feeding operations immediately following Typhoon Soudelor, serving approximately 1,000 to 1,300 meals per day.
- The Commonwealth Office of Transit Authority has approximately four to five vans capable of providing transportation to and from shelters. PSS has approximately 20 buses that can be used to support shelter transportation.

3.1.4 *Applicable Core Capabilities*

- Planning
- Public Information and Warning
- Operational Coordination
- Critical Transportation
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety
- Logistics and Supply Chain Management
- Mass Care Services
- On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement
- Operational Communications
- Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services
- Situational Assessment

3.2 **Tasks by Phase**

Each operational phase has an end state, as shown in Table C-5-1.

Table C-5-1: Operational Phases and End States

Phase	End State
Phase 1a	Agencies have completed their preparedness activities.
Phase 1b	A Joint Information Center (JIC) has been established and is coordinating all messaging.
Phase 1c	Emergency Shelters have been established with ground transportation provided by the CNMI Department of Public Works (CNMI DPW).
Phase 2a	Persons seeking emergency shelter are transitioned to congregate care shelters without injury or incident.

Phase	End State
Phase 2b	All supplemental federal capabilities and resources are ordered and deployed with community feeding services well established by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Phase 2c	Closure of all congregate care facilities and restoration to prior use of facilities can occur.
Phase 3	Transition of the shelter population to transitional and/or permanent housing has occurred.

3.2.1 Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Operational Focus – Situational awareness and preparedness:

- During this time, CNMI HSEM and FEMA should review existing logistics and resource capabilities, develop deliberate plans and procedures, and conduct training and exercises to validate existing mass care plans.

Critical Considerations

- The Red Cross and The Salvation Army will be the primary agencies for feeding and, while mass feeding is not anticipated, there is no current plan in place to feed the number of individuals identified as displaced.

Primary Actions

- HSEM and PSS coordinate with the Red Cross for shelter management team training.
- HSEM, in coordination with CNMI PSS, develops a shelter prioritization plan.
- HSEM creates a prioritized list of alternate shelter sites (hotels, field houses, etc.) for additional general population shelter capacity.
- HSEM creates and prioritizes a list of possible transitional shelter sites (hotels, vacant houses/apartments, soft-sided shelter sites, etc.) and develops memorandums of understanding (MOUs)/contracts to utilize these facilities as needed.
- HSEM, PSS, and the CNMI DPS coordinate a security plan to ensure law enforcement response to an incident while emergency shelters are operational.

3.2.2 Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus: Coordinate public messaging and establish a JIC.

Primary Actions

- HSEM and FEMA form the MCTF, with civil leaders and representatives from PSS, CNMI DPW, ESF #6, ESF #7, ESF #8, ESF #11, and ESF #15.
- HSEM alerts PSS of the approaching storm, and PSS executes pre-storm checks in accordance with the emergency shelter plan. PSS reports operability to HSEM in terms of locations and personnel supporting situational awareness.

- ESF #15, through the JIC and in coordination with ESF #6 and ESF #11, develops and broadcasts public service announcements (PSAs) regarding shelter locations (and their status)—including those for the general population, individuals with access and functional needs or medical needs, and pets—and the resources/commodities individuals should bring with them to shelters.
- Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs) assess on-island inventories, identify potential shortfalls, submit requests to parent agencies for delivery, and alert and notify volunteer staff.
- PSS and CNMI DPW ensure that a sufficient number of buses and bus drivers are rostered and available to transport persons seeking shelter from village mayor offices to designated emergency shelter locations, using assigned buses.

3.2.3 *Phase 1c (Near Certainty)*

Operational Focus

- Activate/open emergency shelters supported by transportation, where needed.

Primary Actions

- HSEM and FEMA activate the MCTF.
- MCTF receives reports from PSS on shelter operability and coordinates delivery of required resources to bring all locations to 100 percent operational capacity.
- PSS, with assistance from HSEM, installs PSS generators at shelter locations.
- MCTF reports operability of opened emergency shelter locations and the number of persons each shelter is supporting pre-landfall.
- VOADs identify and coordinate the delivery of off-island resources. If delivery of resources is requested pre-landfall, VOADs ensure that they have the proper facilities to protect resource delivery from typhoon impacts.
- ESF #15, through the JIC and in coordination with ESF #6 and ESF #11, develops and broadcasts PSA information on shelter locations (and their status)—including those for the general population, individuals with access and functional needs or medical needs, and pets—and the resources/commodities individuals should bring with them to shelters.
- FEMA and ESF #6 coordinate with ESF #15 to establish procedures for communications with foreign consulates and the tourist population to provide information concerning tourists.
- PSS and CNMI DPW begin transporting persons seeking shelter from village mayor offices to designated emergency shelter locations using assigned buses.
- VOADs assess on-island inventories, identify potential shortfalls, submit requests to parent agencies for delivery, and alert and notify volunteer staff.
- HSEM ensures that PSS conducts shelter opening procedures in accordance with the shelter plan. The procedures include emergency power generation final testing and fuel top-off procedures at all emergency shelter locations.

- HSEM coordinates with ESF #15 to inform the public of shelter locations and their status.
- HSEM coordinates with ESF #6 to implement the plan developed in Phase 1a to accommodate individuals with access and functional needs and those with medical needs.
- HSEM coordinates with PSS, ESF #6, and ESF #11 to activate shelters, as needed, and initiate reception procedures for the general population and household pets. Service animals will shelter with their owners.
- HSEM coordinates with ESF #6 and ESF #7 to execute contracts for additional mass shelter locations as needed (hotel ballrooms, community centers, shopping malls, field houses, etc.).
- HSEM determines availability and maintains accountability of designated Point of Distribution (POD) personnel and alerts POD teams to prepare for possible deployment to POD sites post-landfall.
- HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 to alert the Federal Staging Area for possible deployment of select resources to shelter sites.

3.2.4 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)

Primary Actions

- MCTF and ESF #6 coordinate mass care and temporary housing support for an estimated population of roughly 1,400 people.
- MCTF receives damage assessments and reports from emergency shelter locations.
- Civic leaders report damage assessments of their facilities and assess their abilities to provide Tier 2 sheltering.
- VOADs conduct donations management.
- The Red Cross begins case management and direct assistance to survivors.
- MCTF coordinates with ESF #8 to provide behavioral health/emotional/spiritual support, as needed.
- MCTF coordinates with ESF #8 to provide triage/first aid at community health centers, as needed.
- MCTF will gain and maintain situational awareness of displaced populations.
- Conduct joint (federal, commonwealth, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) damage assessments, including assessments of shelter functionality.
- MCTF coordinates with ESF #11 to implement (under the Food and Nutrition Service) an emergency feeding program support to sustain the displaced population.
- ESF #6 coordinates with ESF #11 and ESF #7 for the delivery of bulk commodities to PODs, as required.

- ESF #6 coordinates with ESF #7 for the delivery of response resources to support shelters, PODs, and shelter-in-place populations.
- ESF #6 coordinates with ESF #7 on the activation of MOUs and contracts for water distribution to PODs.
- FEMA Operations coordinates Small Business Administration (SBA) program support in CNMI.
- HSEM and ESF #6 develop a transitional sheltering strategy.
- HSEM and ESF #6 coordinate on-island non-essential Government of CNMI Community Emergency Response Team (CERT), Community Assisted Policing Effort (CAPE), and/or off-island personnel to augment existing shelter staff.
- ESF #7 provides relief supplies to PODs.
- ESF #7 ensures the continued delivery of emergency relief supplies (to include fuel for generators) to PODs, as required.
- ESF #6 coordinates with ESF #1, ESF #7, and ESF #8 for the relocation of access and functional needs/medical needs individuals to designated alternate care facilities (ACFs).
- FEMA and ESF #6 coordinate with ESF #7 to ensure that individuals at ACFs and access and functional needs/medical needs shelter site(s) receive appropriate commodities, hygiene items, and durable medical equipment (e.g., wheelchairs, scooters, hospital beds, walkers, canes).
- FEMA and ESF #6, together with ESF #1, ESF #7, and ESF #11, coordinate the delivery of essential supplies (food, water, first aid kits) to isolated populations.
- FEMA Operations and ESF #6 provide for the immediate needs of individuals and families beyond the scope of traditional mass care services (food, water, and shelter), as needed. These activities include but are not limited to the following:
 - Reunification of families
 - Registration and tracking of evacuees
 - Provision of services to access and functional needs/medical needs populations
- ESF #15, through the JIC, develops and broadcasts PSAs to manage expectations and reassure the public regarding mass care and emergency assistance operations.

3.2.5 Phase 2a (Activation, Situational Assessment, and Movement)

Operational Focus

- While first responders are conducting lifesaving and life-sustaining actions in this phase, the MCTF participates in damage assessments and develops a distribution strategy to supplement identified fixed-facility long-term shelter spaces with tents, providing displaced persons the option to shelter-in-place on their own properties post-impact.

Critical Considerations

- The medically fragile or others with access and functional needs will likely have been transported to mayor's offices. Once post-storm damage assessments have begun, such individuals must be integrated into the planning for long-term sheltering. The MCTF will be critical to that task.

Primary Actions

- Gain situational awareness.
- Assess mayors' facilities for Tier 2 sheltering.
- Validate POD locations.
- Begin ESF #6 case management and direct assistance to survivors.
- MCTF coordinates with ESF #8 to provide triage/first aid at community health centers as needed.
- HSEM coordinates with PSS bus drivers for transport of persons seeking shelter from village mayor' offices to shelter locations.
- The Unified Coordination Group and ESF #6 coordinate mass care and temporary housing support.
- MCTF coordinates the movement of initial federal push of tents, tent kits, and tarps for distribution directly to PODs, as required.
- MCTF gains and maintains situational awareness of displaced populations and conducts joint (federal, commonwealth, private sector, and NGO) damage assessments, including assessments of the functionality of shelters.
- Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOADs) conduct donations management.
- Red Cross begins case management and direct assistance to survivors.
- MCTF coordinates with ESF #8 to provide behavioral health/emotional/spiritual support, as needed.
- MCTF begins developing transitional sheltering strategy.
- MCTF coordinates on-island non-essential CNMI, community CERT, CAPE, and/or off-island personnel to augment existing shelter staff.

3.2.6 Phase 2b (Employment of Resources and Stabilization)

Operational Focus

- The operational focus for phase 2b is for program personnel (FEMA IA and other case management staff) to be integrated into operations under the MCTF and establish a Disaster Recovery Center (DRC).

Critical Considerations

- FEMA coordinates the following IA program support to survivors:

- Financial assistance for home repairs
- Personal property loss assistance
- Disaster loans
- Disaster-Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program support when requested by the Territory of Guam and in coordination with ESF #11
- Crisis counseling
- Disaster unemployment assistance
- Disaster legal services
- Support and services to access and functional needs/medical needs populations
- Other federal and state agency disaster benefits

Primary Actions

- MCTF, Operations Section, and safety personnel identify and survey DRC locations.
- Logistics coordinates the transport of supplies to points of distribution (PODs), with MCTF assistance.
- ESF #7 ensures the continued delivery of emergency relief supplies (to include fuel for generators) to Tier 2 shelters and PODs.
- MCTF assists with tent distribution.
- MCTF and VOADs coordinate tent install teams to assist residents who have chosen to shelter in place.
- Maintain situational awareness.

3.2.7 Phase 2c (Intermediate Operations)

Operational Focus

- The focus is to develop and approve a housing plan as well as a plan for long-term planning and community recovery support.

Critical Considerations

- Recovery Support Function (RSF) agency representatives have not been identified by the government of CNMI, and there is no formal organizational structure for recovery planning currently in place.

Primary Actions

- MCTF deactivates when it confirms essential services on CNMI islands are restored to adequate levels of support and mass care services are no longer required.
- The RSF leads activate its organizations for recovery planning and engages under the leadership of the Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator.

3.2.8 Phase 3 (Sustained Operations)

Operational Focus

- The focus in this phase is community recovery.

Primary Actions

- ESF #6 coordinates with ESF #11, and ESF #14 to support long-term recovery efforts for the residents and businesses of CNMI.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

5.1 Primary Agencies

5.1.1 Federal

- FEMA
- General Services Administration
- SBA
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
- U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)

5.1.2 Commonwealth

- HSEM
- PSS

5.2 Support Agencies

5.2.1 Federal

- U.S. Department of Agriculture
- DOJ
- Department of Defense

5.2.2 Commonwealth

- CNMI DPS
- CNMI Housing and Urban Renewal Authority

5.2.3 *Non-Governmental Organizations and Private Sector*

- Red Cross
- The Salvation Army
- CERT
- CAPE

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Appendix C-6: Facilitate Recovery of the Marine Transportation System

1 *Situation*

There are three seaports in CNMI that fall under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ports Authority (CPA). Cargo from the U.S. mainland is shipped to the port of Guam and then trans-shipped onto smaller vessels from Guam to Saipan. Cargo destined for Tinian is trans-shipped at the port of Saipan and arrives via barge. The port of Rota receives cargo directly from the port of Guam via barge shipment.

1.1 **Background**

The seaports of CNMI could sustain damage in a catastrophic typhoon, causing them to operate at a degraded level for 2-3 days following a catastrophic typhoon. Cargo ships that call in CNMI ports are crane capable and will off load their cargo as long as pier-side facilities are available.

There are no gantry cranes in operation at any of the seaports in CNMI and all cargo handling equipment and materials handling equipment (MHE) is able to be moved inland, secured, and safeguarded prior to impact.

In a Category 4 typhoon, the largest danger to port throughput capability is damage to the fuel storage tanks from winds or airborne debris strikes, resulting in a release of oil to the waters of the United States.

2 *Mission*

The mission is to focus on the priorities set by the Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit (MTSRU) and support the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) as the federal lead agency responsible in recovery of the marine transportation system (MTS), which includes ports, waterways, channels, and intermodal connections, post-impact.

3 *Execution*

3.1 **Concept of Operations**

While the USCG is the federal authority responsible for oversight of MTS recovery, establishing a Port Task Force (Port TF) facilitates greater coordination and communication between response priorities and activities and those that are managed by the Captain of the Port (COTP) under his authority. In support of active port restoration activities, the Port TF will be activated, led by the USCG COTP or designee. The MTSRU will be assigned a Port TF liaison to ensure collaboration and information sharing is transparent to both maritime operations and response operations that are aligned with or impacted by the need for rapid assessment and restoration of port infrastructure (waterways, cargo handling, and bulk petroleum handling).

During Phase 1b, the USCG and CPA activate the Port TF. The Port TF is an operational entity responsible for coordination, collaboration, and communications pre- and post-impact and for providing situational awareness to the joint response operation at the CNMI Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) Emergency Operations Center. The physical and/or virtual collaboration of Port TF participants facilitates on-island resources, informs

federal mission assignments, and creates transparency in the response process at the local and federal levels. The transparency of operations between the USCG and CPA also leads to the transparency of essential elements of information across the response effort. Under the task force construct, MTSRU activities inform port restoration efforts and are prioritized by the COTP.

3.1.1 Critical Considerations

- Loss of port operations capability and trans-shipment services is expected to occur due to waterborne debris and damaged infrastructure.
- Port of Saipan has its own Prime Power plants.
- The Northern Marianas Islands and Guam are “just in time” economies, with minimal food stocks or commodity stocks warehoused on-island.
- There are commercial on-island resources for salvage operations.

3.1.2 Assumptions

- As the federal lead for port response efforts, the USCG COTP will designate a COTP representative to the Port TF.
- Industry partners have contingency plans in place to continue cargo service to CNMI in the event Guam’s port is closed.
- There are approximately 14 days of food on the island at any time.

3.1.3 Operational Requirements

Task	Requirements	Resources
Clear Waterways	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Survey waterways ▪ Conduct pier assessments ▪ Clear debris 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ USCG ▪ U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) ▪ Commercial
Cargo Handling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Supplement using “ship’s gear” ▪ Prime Emergency Power available 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CNMI Port Authority ▪ Industry partnership
Fuel Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Survey fuel facilities ▪ Establish alternate fuel depot 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CNMI Port Authority

3.1.4 Resource Requirements

Resource Requirements	
Fuel Requirements	
Diesel Fuel Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To be determined
Gasoline Fuel Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To be determined
Container Yard Heavy Equipment Diesel Fuel Requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All equipment (top lifters, fork lifts, tractors) with burn rate of 7,000 gallons per week
Backup Generators for Port Generators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To be determined

Resource Requirements	
Equipment Requirements	
Heavy Equipment with Operators: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Materials handling ▪ Wheeled stock ▪ Track equipment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Top lifters, bulldozer, backhoe, dump trucks, excavator

3.1.5 Applicable Core Capabilities

- Planning
- Public Information and Warning
- Operational Coordination
- Infrastructure Systems
- Fire Management and Suppression
- Critical Transportation
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety
- Logistics and Supply Chain Management
- Mass Care Services
- Operational Communications
- Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services
- Situational Assessment

3.2 Tasks by Phase

Each operational phase has an end state, as shown in Table C-6-1.

Table C-6-1: Operational Phases and End States

Phase	End State
Phase 1a	Agencies have completed their preparedness activities.
Phase 1b	Joint planning has begun by the activated Port TF led by USCG.
Phase 1c	The USCG <i>Heavy Weather Plan</i> has been executed and a liaison has been embedded in the MTSRU to communicate actions and priorities back to the UCG through the Operations Section.
Phase 2a	Initial assessments have been completed, all on-island resources have been deployed, and the Port TF actively executes priority actions set by the UCG.
Phase 2b	All supplemental federal capabilities and resources are ordered and deployed to CNMI.
Phase 2c	Long-term recovery plans have been developed and are executed, with oversight from the USCG and CPA.
Phase 3	CNMI HSEM and CPA execute recovery activities.

3.2.1 Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Operational Focus

- Situational awareness and preparedness.

Critical Considerations

- Cargo originating from Asia is transported via barges directly to Saipan.
- CPA tenants are critical partners to any planning or operation on the port.
- USCG COTP will restrict inbound/outbound port traffic pre-landfall.
- Seaport and airport operations will be disrupted while assessments and repairs are made. Estimates for reopening of CNMI seaports is approximately 3-5 days. Estimates for reopening of CNMI airports are as follows: Saipan International – approximately 12-24 hours (minimum); Tinian and Rota – 24 hours.
- Port clearance and re-opening is a stated priority and resources will be prioritized for this effort.
- Ports will have an adequate supply of fuel for vessels to conduct initial response operations.
- Disruption to the fuel and cargo distribution systems in CNMI will negatively affect response efforts.
- The USCG COTP will coordinate restoration priorities aligned with MTSRU priorities.
- Port operators will evacuate and safeguard refrigerated (reefer) vans and excess containers to locations outside of inundation zones.
- Port operators will safeguard and secure MHE.

Primary Actions

- HSEM, CPA, and the CNMI Department of Public Works (CNMI DPW) establish Route 30 and Middle Road on Saipan as priority routes for debris clearance.
- HSEM, CNMI DPW, and CPA establish Route 35, from Isla Drive to Saipan International Airport, as a priority route for debris clearance.
- The COTP and Harbor Master review typhoon evacuation plans and maintain constant situational awareness on vessels berthed/moored in seaports in order to effectively direct evacuations, if necessary.
- CPA coordinates with the CNMI Bureau of Environmental and Coastal Quality and assesses hazardous materials (HAZMAT) requirements, protective measures, and response capabilities.
- The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) maintains a list of personnel that possess Transportation Workers Identity Cards.
- USCG and the Saipan International Airport Operations Division update and maintain their respective response plans.

3.2.2 Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus

- Prepare ports for storm impacts and increase coordination activities.

Critical Considerations

- Port operations to begin preparedness per the USCG *Heavy Weather Plan*.

Primary Actions

- Port tenants move HAZMAT from seaports to approved pre-determined storage site(s).
- Port tenants and CPA top off equipment, generators, and fuel tanks.
- All vessels under 200 feet in length will be instructed to get underway as soon as possible.
- No vessel will be allowed to stay in port without authorization from the COTP and Harbor Master.
- Shipping agents with special requirements, such as container securing or shifting to other areas, will consult with the Port General Manager.
- Port Police and Harbor Master personnel will test and prepare all hand-held radios and other communications equipment for emergency use.
- The General Manager, or designee, will prepare situation status reports.
- CPA reduces containers remaining in port to no more than two high and lashes all containers together to minimize effects of damaging winds and inundation.
- USCG initiates harbor patrols to determine the state of readiness and progress of seaport typhoon preparatory activity.

3.2.3 Phase 1c (Near Certainty)

Primary Actions

- Activate Port TF.
- The Harbor Master, in consultation with the COTP, begins to sortie vessels greater than 200 gross tons out of CNMI waters.
- The Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) coordinates the alert of the USCG District 14 (D14) District Response Advisory team (DRAT) and Pacific Strike Team (PST) for potential deployment to CNMI in support of the Port TF. The D14 DRAT and PST would deploy in Phase 2a, with Operations Section approval.
- Port TF plans for pier-side assessments and underwater surveys.
- HSEM continues to monitor all ongoing typhoon preparatory activity at the ports and coordinates any actions, as required/requested.
- The COTP directs the closure of the seaport to all non-essential vessel movement and broadcasts a Broadcast Notice to Mariners (BNTM) stipulating the seaport closure.

- USCG continues to conduct harbor patrols to establish the state of readiness of the seaport.
- USCG, CPA, CNMI Department of Public Safety, CNMI Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DFEMS), and the Department of Customs move small emergency response craft to designated shelter locations.
- USCG COTP closes CNMI seaports.

3.2.4 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)

3.2.5 Phase 2a (Activation, Situational Assessment, and Movement)

Operational Focus:

- Damage assessments, waterway assessments, HAZMAT/Oil assessments, and structural assessments.

Critical Considerations

- USCG leads all assessment activities but does not have the mission to salvage. The salvage mission is situation dependent.
- ESF #3 subject matter experts are integrated into the Port TF.

Primary Actions

- HSEM monitors all ongoing port restoration activity and coordinates any necessary actions, as required/requested.
- USCG coordinates underwater surveys of channels, ship berthing/mooring areas, and harbors in order to identify hazards to navigation and determine port accessibility based on post-storm damage assessments.
- USCG and CPA conduct assessments of port facilities to determine shore-side damage and capabilities.
- CNMI DPW conducts Route 30 and 35 clearance operations on Saipan.
- In the event port access is restricted or destroyed, the Port TF coordinates the resourcing of on-island assets.
- RRCC coordinates additional resources in support of the Port TF pre-landfall using Federal Operations Support funds. Once a Presidential Disaster Declaration is formalized, these assets are mission assigned and funded under the disaster response.
- COTP assesses reopening of seaports based on operational capabilities.
- USCG and CPA conduct HAZMAT surveys of seaports to determine the ability operations to continue in and around the seaport environment.
- HSEM, CNMI DPW, and CPA coordinate on the clearing of debris from Route 30 and Route 35 to ensure that access to Saipan's seaport is available.

- HSEM, CPA, and the DFEMS coordinate with the TSA for issuance of temporary Transportation Workers Identity Cards to augment seaport workforce personnel.
- USCG coordinates and provides oversight for the restoration of seaport aids to navigation, channel markers, etc. and requests deployment of the USCG Aids to Navigation Team.
- USCG broadcasts a BNTM stipulating seaport status and any operational restrictions.
- COTP establishes a priority for ships returning to ports, if necessary.

3.2.6 Phase 2b (Employment of Resources and Stabilization)

Primary Actions

- COTP directs the reopening of the seaports based on operational capability.
- COTP establishes a priority for ships returning to ports.

3.2.7 Phase 2c (Intermediate Operations)

3.2.8 Phase 3 (Sustained Operations)

Operational Focus

- Long-term restoration projects, including mitigation.

Primary Actions

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Typhoon Annex*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

5.1 Primary Agencies

5.1.1 Federal

- FEMA
- USCG
- General Services Administration
- Federal Aviation Administration
- U.S. Department of Transportation
- U.S. Maritime Administration

5.1.2 Commonwealth

- HSEM

- CPA

5.2 Support Agencies

5.2.1 *Federal*

- U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- DOD

Appendix C-7: Distribute Essential Commodities and Immediate Response Resources

1 *Situation*

The on-island distribution of commodities and other response resources is dependent on cleared roadways and is the responsibility of CNMI's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM). Federal support will likely be required, however.

A Category 4 storm will generate a lot of debris, of which downed electrical power lines are of great concern. This hazard requires specialized labor to ensure public safety. The Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (CUC) must work with first responders in the immediate aftermath of the storm to assess downed poles and lines and ensure that damaged power infrastructure is de-energized prior to being cleared from roadways.

1.1 **Background**

1.1.1 *Power Availability*

CNMI is very resilient, with most retailers having emergency generators for power on site. Island power is susceptible to great fluctuations in reliability on a regular basis, providing CNMI residents with ample experience with typhoon-impact-type conditions. The residents of Saipan expect the retail sector to be operational in at least a limited capacity almost immediately post-impact.

1.1.2 *Debris Removal*

Thirty days after Typhoon Soudelor struck Saipan, the total amount of debris cleared was just over 12,000 cubic yards. As expected for a tropical island environment, much green waste was generated and downed power poles were recovered for reuse.

The CNMI Department of Public Works (CNMI DPW) has identified primary roads for post-impact debris removal. These primary roads will likely be affected by the loss of power infrastructure (poles, transformers, wires) and will require response support from electric utility crews for road clearing. The CNMI DPW and CUC will coordinate to enable access for utility restoration and to also provide access to emergency facilities, shelter sites, and government facilities. Secondary route clearance and clearance of debris from private property adversely affecting the public's welfare will be accomplished once primary routes are cleared. Low-lying areas are subject to wave run-up, causing sand and coastal debris to accumulate once waters recede and to block primary and secondary roads. Heavy rains and damaging winds will also dislodge trees and power poles, which will require clearing and removal.

2 *Mission*

The mission is to support movement of immediate response resources (IRR) into and around CNMI pre- and post-impact to ensure essential commodities are available to disaster survivors and for response operations.

3 Execution

3.1 Concept of Operations

To facilitate distribution of essential commodities and IRR, two activities must be prioritized: (1) timely decision making to deploy the necessary resources to CNMI pre-storm and safely house them until deployed at CNMI's request and (2) clearing critical transportation corridors for access once the typhoon has struck.

Immediate Response Resources

At the discretion of the Regional Administrator, select critical resources and capabilities will be deployed to CNMI in Phases 1b and 1c to ensure execution of the strategies in this plan. Under specific objectives and referenced in Appendix X (Execution Checklist), resources and capabilities have been quantified and agreed upon as being so critical to immediate response needs (assessment, emergency power generation, providing mass care services) that they should be pre-deployed to CNMI in support of immediate response efforts post-impact.

Essential Commodities

Commodities such as prepackaged meals-ready-to-eat or water necessary for meeting basic human needs are available from OCONUS and CONUS FEMA DCs. A limited amount of commodities will be "pushed" to CNMI in Phase 1c for meeting immediate response needs. A thorough assessment of needs post-impact will inform future commodity packages sent to CNMI. There are limited facilities available in CNMI for storing large quantities of commodities due to the nature of the islands' just-in-time-economies.

Debris Clearance

Debris clearance is the pushing aside of debris in order to provide unimpeded access for emergency vehicles. Debris removal will be managed by the joint Operations Section during the response. Clearance activities are prioritized in Phase 2a. CUC crews will accompany or lead CNMI DPW crews, who have the responsibility for conducting debris clearance.

Critical Considerations

- FEMA Headquarters manages the FEMA distribution centers and will determine which physical facilities will support commodities distribution operations.
- Time and distance considerations will dictate the IRR and commodities being "pushed" to CNMI in Phases 1b and 1c.
- There is limited capability within CNMI for commodities storage, due to the few warehouses capable of withstanding Category 4 storm impacts.
- See Concept of Support in the Base Plan for more information on the continental United States (CONUS)/Asia to CNMI logistics and transportation considerations.

3.1.1 Assumptions

- The Regional Response Coordination Staff (RRCS) will provide sufficient situational awareness for the FEMA Region IX Regional Administrator to approve the deployment of commodities and IRR in Phases 1b and 1c.

3.1.2 *Applicable Core Capabilities*

- Planning
- Public Information and Warning
- Operational Coordination
- Infrastructure Systems
- Critical Transportation
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety
- Logistics and Supply Chain Management
- Operational Communications
- Situational Assessment

3.2 **Tasks by Phase**

Each operational phase has an end state, as shown in Table C-7-1.

Table C-7-1: Operational Phases and End States

Phase	End State
Phase 1a	Agencies have completed their preparedness activities.
Phase 1b	Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) and critical Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) deploy to CNMI.
Phase 1c	IRR and essential commodities “push” package approved by RIX RA and deployed.
Phase 2a	All primary routes assessed by the CNMI DPW/CUC for first responders and emergency vehicles.
Phase 2b	All supplemental federal capabilities and resources ordered and deployed to CNMI are employed.
Phase 2c	Select teams demobilize.
Phase 3	Transition to recovery and mitigation operations.

3.2.1 *Phase 1a (Normal Operations)*

Operational Focus

- Situational awareness and preparedness.

Critical Considerations

- There is no published plan in place for fixed points of distribution (PODs) where commodities and other resources may be distributed to the public. A POD plan should be developed.

Primary Actions

- HSEM/FEMA Logistics, in coordination with HSEM partner agencies, assesses commodity supply requirements for supporting populations affected by the typhoon as well as IRR needs for conducting response and recovery operations.

- HSEM/FEMA Logistics and the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) coordinate with partner agencies and private vendors to source available on-island commodity supplies and IRR and to identify and prioritize possible locations for distribution and deployment.
- HSEM/FEMA Logistics, in coordination with GSA, sources and establishes contracts with private vendors for available on-island commercial commodity supplies and IRR as well as distribution assets. Contracts must be de-conflicted to minimize resource competition.
- HSEM/FEMA Logistics, in coordination with GSA, assesses and modifies any existing commodity supply/IRR resource or distribution contracts to ensure a clause is added to prioritize HSEM and emergency/disaster response operations.
- HSEM/FEMA Logistics, in coordination with other HSEM partner agencies, maintains awareness of any established Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreement to augment current CNMI commodity supplies/IRR or distribution capabilities.

Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus

- Timely decision making in the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) and deployment of the IMAT and critical ESFs.

Critical Considerations

- Hardened support facility is required for FEMA IMAT and ESF personnel and should be considered prior to deployment.

Primary Actions

- ESF #7, including FEMA Logistics, in coordination with HSEM and partner agencies, continues to assess on- and off-island public and private commodity supplies and IRR as well as distribution and storage capabilities.
- ESF #7 initiates and coordinates preparatory commodity and IRR distribution and storage activities to ensure the conduct of effective response and recovery operations and the continuation of essential services for the population of CNMI.
- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 establish awareness on the current availability and operational readiness of on- and off-island public and private commodity supplies, IRR, and storage and distribution assets that can augment existing capabilities.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, attempts to establish “first priority” use of private vendor distribution and storage assets for commodities and IRR post-landfall.

Phase 1c (Near Certainty)

Operational Focus

- Successfully receive resources “pushed” to CNMI in Phase 1b and provide appropriate support facilities for those resources.

Primary Actions

- HSEM ensures transportation and distribution asset protection measures are taken to ensure asset survivability once a typhoon strikes.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, HSEM partner agencies, private vendors, EMAC partners, and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) (through the Defense Coordinating Officer), finalizes the availability and operational status of on- and off-island public and private commodity supplies/IRR as well as distribution and storage capabilities.
- ESF #7 confirms that the Federal Staging Area (FSA) location in CNMI is activated on a limited basis to ensure that sufficient assets are staged and the appropriate number of personnel are able to staff the FSA post-landfall.
- HSEM and FEMA Logistics ensure that the FSA in CNMI is stocked with an initial 96-hour supply of commodities to enable 4 days of distribution of emergency supplies to roughly 1,500 citizens per day.
- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 ensure that sufficient storage exists to safeguard resources at the FSA(s) during a Category 4 typhoon.
- HSEM confirms that the POD location(s) on each island is prepared to activate post-landfall and the appropriate number of personnel are able to staff the POD once activated.

Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)

Operational Focus

- Providing adequate support for distribution of IRR and essential commodities without overwhelming CNMI by too large a federal footprint.

Critical Considerations

- Saipan residents drink bottled water.
- Production rates vary at individual bottling facilities (15) and should be verified.
- Resources and commodity requirements will be set by field personnel and communicated back to the Regional Response Coordination Center/National Response Coordination Center for support.

Primary Actions

- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs required on each island.
- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and the Unified Coordination Group (UCG) ensure that the FSA(s) remains stocked with a pre-landfall quantity of commodities to allow for distribution to 1,500 affected citizens on multiple islands per day for 4 days.

- HSEM and the UCG confirm that the FSA location in CNMI is resourced with sufficient equipment and personnel to meet the demands of receiving, storing, and issuing enough commodities to distribute to 1,500 affected citizens per day for 4 days.
- HSEM and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs activated post-landfall and anticipate differing commodity demands at each POD based on damage assessments.
- HSEM confirms that the POD location(s) identified on each island remains suitable post-landfall.
- HSEM ensures that activated PODs submit and validate 48-hour needs forecasts on a daily basis.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM partner agencies, establishes awareness of post-storm commodity and IRR requirements, commodity supply and IRR availability, and available distribution capabilities to support operational PODs.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, establishes awareness of any mission-assigned DOD distribution assets and integrates them into the overall distribution and storage effort.
- As needed, ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, executes contracts with private vendors to augment existing capabilities through the use of commercial commodities, IRR, and distribution assets.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, establishes awareness of any EMAC agreement executed with a neighboring island for additional commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets/capabilities.
- ESF #7, as directed by HSEM and FEMA Logistics, sources and contracts for additional neighbor-island commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets/capabilities.
- ESF #7, as directed by HSEM and FEMA Logistics, sources and contracts with private on-island commodity vendors for additional commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets to meet commodity and response resource requirements.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM agencies, maintains awareness of the operational readiness of potential on- or off-island distribution assets in order to augment existing capabilities if response requirements exceed initial capabilities.
- ESF #7 and HSEM maintain visibility of all off-island and contract assets performing distribution missions and prepare to release assets as demand decreases.

Phase 2a (Activation, Situational Assessment, and Movement)

Primary Actions

- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs required on each island.

- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and the UCG ensure that the FSA(s) remains stocked with a pre-landfall quantity of commodities to allow for distribution to 1,500 affected citizens on multiple islands per day for 4 days.
- HSEM and the UCG confirm that the FSA location(s) in CNMI is resourced with sufficient equipment and personnel to meet the demands of receiving, storing, and issuing enough commodities to distribute to 1,500 affected citizens per day for 4 days.
- HSEM and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs activated post-landfall and anticipate differing commodity demands at each POD based on damage assessments.
- HSEM confirms that the POD location(s) identified on each island remains suitable post landfall.
- HSEM ensures that activated PODs submit and validate 48-hour needs forecasts on a daily basis.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM partner agencies, establishes awareness of post-storm commodity and IRR requirements, commodity supply and IRR availability, and available distribution capabilities to support operational PODs.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, establishes awareness of any mission-assigned DOD distribution assets and integrates them into the overall distribution and storage effort.
- As needed, ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, executes contracts with private vendors to augment existing capabilities through the use of commercial commodities, IRR, and distribution assets.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, establishes awareness of any EMAC agreement executed with a neighboring island for additional commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets/capabilities.
- ESF #7, as directed by HSEM and FEMA Logistics, sources and contracts for additional neighbor-island commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets/capabilities.
- ESF #7, as directed by HSEM and FEMA Logistics, sources and contracts with private on-island commodity vendors for additional commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets to meet commodity and response resource requirements.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM agencies, maintains awareness of the operational readiness of potential on- or off-island distribution assets in order to augment existing capabilities if response requirements exceed initial capabilities.

Phase 2b (Employment of Resources and Stabilization)

Primary Actions

- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs required on each island.

- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and the UCG ensure that the FSA remains stocked with a pre-landfall quantity of commodities to allow for distribution to 1,500 affected citizens on multiple islands per day for 4 days.
- HSEM and the UCG confirm that the FSA location in CNMI is resourced with sufficient equipment and personnel to meet the demands of receiving, storing, and issuing enough commodities to distribute to 1,500 affected citizens per day for 4 days.
- HSEM and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs activated post-landfall and anticipate differing commodity demands at each POD based on damage assessments.
- HSEM confirms that the POD location(s) identified on each island remains suitable post landfall.
- HSEM ensures that activated PODs submit and validate 48-hour needs forecasts on a daily basis.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM partner agencies, establishes awareness of post-storm commodity and IRR requirements, commodity supply and IRR availability, and available distribution capabilities to support operational PODs.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, establishes awareness of any mission-assigned DOD distribution assets and integrates them into the overall distribution and storage effort.
- As needed, ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, executes contracts with private vendors to augment existing capabilities through the use of commercial commodities, IRR, and distribution assets.
- ESF #7, as directed by HSEM and FEMA Logistics, sources and contracts for additional neighbor-island commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets/capabilities.
- ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM agencies, maintains awareness of the operational readiness of potential on- or off-island distribution assets in order to augment existing capabilities if response requirements exceed initial capabilities.
- ESF #7 and HSEM maintain visibility of all off-island and contract assets performing distribution missions and prepare to release assets as demand decreases.

Phase 2c (Intermediate Operations)

Primary Actions

- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs required on each island.
- HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and the UCG ensure that the FSA(s) remains stocked using demand analysis and anticipates steady decline in requests as the situation stabilizes.

- HSEM and ESF #7 maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs activated post-landfall and anticipate reductions or increases in demand based on response efforts on each island.
- HSEM validates the need for remaining PODs as the response stabilizes.
- ESF #7 and HSEM maintain visibility of all off-island and contract assets performing distribution missions and prepare to release assets as demand decreases.
- As required, ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, ends contracts with private vendors providing support to distribution operations.
- As required, ESF #7 and HSEM release off-island and contract assets performing distribution missions as demand decreases.

Phase 3 (Sustained Operations)

Operational Focus: Transition to recovery.

- Commodity distribution support is no longer required. All retail supply chains are restored.

Primary Actions

- Close out.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5.1 Primary Agencies

5.1.1 Federal

- FEMA
- GSA

5.2 Support Agencies

5.2.1 Federal

- DOD
- Department of Justice

5.2.2 Commonwealth

- Civic leaders

Appendix C-8: Re-establish Public Health and Medical Services at Critical Emergency Medical Facilities

1 *Situation*

Prior to the landfall of a catastrophic typhoon, the healthcare system in CNMI will experience a surge of patients.

1.1 **Background**

Saipan is served by one hospital—the Commonwealth Health Center (CHC). CHC was built in 1986 to support a population of 20,000. The hospital operates at 90 percent capacity on a daily basis and will not be able to support the anticipated surge of patients due to the typhoon. Medical surge augmentation will be required for the CHC, two clinics on Saipan, and clinics on Tinian and Rota.

2 *Mission*

The mission of public health and medical services is to provide supplemental medical and public health capabilities to continue essential health services to CNMI residents following a catastrophic typhoon.

3 *Execution*

3.1 **Concept of Operations**

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and their partners in CNMI have identified the critical shortfalls and necessary resources for support prior to, during and after a Category 4 typhoon strike within CNMI. Those resources, at the discretion of the FEMA Region IX Regional Administrator (RA), will be deployed in Phase 1b, received in CNMI, and staged at the hospital. These resources are tailored to provide decompression, support chronic care services, and augment hospital staff. An increase in acute care cases due to the typhoon is not anticipated. Mass fatalities due to the typhoon are also not anticipated; however, both fatalities and acute care cases will be assessed immediately post-impact and resources will be requested to meet any requirements.

Additional resources will be phased in by alerting or activating by HHS in Phase 1b and 1c, following the initial “push” of resources. HHS will maintain movement coordination control of all of their resources, preserving their ability to contract/use commercial carrier as required. This allows HHS to manage movement of critical equipment and teams more efficiently, as mobilization for these resources are both from within the continental United States (CONUS) and outside the continental United States.

HHS moves specific resources, Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) and their equipment, plus management teams along with FEMAs Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) in Phase 1b. The anticipated federal level of response consists of one (1) Type 1 DMAT and two (2) Type 3 DMATs.

In Phase 1c, additional resources are alerted/activated and deployed to arrive to support the immediate response (Phase 2a).

Post-impact, the aeromedical evacuation of sick and injured patients will be assessed and carried out on a case-by-case basis, based on medical need. There is no anticipated requirement for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) of existing patients at this time under a catastrophic typhoon scenario. Planning will be done with FEMA and Homeland Security Emergency Management (HSEM) to address any requirement for MEDEVAC of response personnel in Phase 2a.

3.1.1 CNMI Healthcare Information

- CHC is an 86-bed hospital with the ability to surge up to 110 beds.
- CHC operates at 90 percent of its bed capacity on a daily basis.
- CHC experiences a consistent shortage of doctors and nurses.
- CHC is not staffed with a sufficient number of providers to handle the expected surge of patients pre-landfall.
- CHC is equipped with emergency power generation and is capable of operating 72-96 hours without fuel resupply.
- CHC is equipped with potable water storage and is a designated priority facility for potable water delivery.
- Five shelters have been identified that can serve a maximum of 500-600 individuals (Garapan & Cagman are the largest).
- Shelter/assessment/surveillance needs are fulfilled by World Health Organization epidemiologist.
- There is no blood bank in CNMI but no daily shortfall concerning blood supply exists. The CHC has an excellent relationship with Guam for requesting additional blood supply for CNMI.
- CHC has a dialysis center and there is one private clinic on-island. This clinic requested water supplies during Typhoon Soudelor. Excellent coordination/communications exist between CHC and the private dialysis clinic, and dialysis patients would be scheduled for services pre-impact.
- Pharmaceutical supplies were not interrupted during Typhoon Soudelor. McKesson provided additional supplies to CNMI.
- CHC medical staff can be augmented by clinical staff from Tinian and Rota (Americorps provided a physician's assistant and five nurses during Typhoon Soudelor).
- CHC has emergency procurement for fuel for the hospital boiler and has three fuel tanks (18,000 gallons each) that can independently operate for 72 hours. During Typhoon Soudelor, the fuel tanks were refilled every 2-3 days.
- CHC has an off-grid water well that has approximately a 175,000-gallon capacity. The potable, purified water is enough for 5 days of operation. A backup pump to pull raw water from the wellhead onsite is a 5hp 220-volt/3.73-kw well pump. A contractor is on standby for water purification if CHC purchases the water from an outside source as a result of disruption of the water supply from the main Commonwealth Utilities Corporation waterline grid.

- CHC has satellite phones and two-way radios with the capability of communicating directly with acute care clinics in Tinian and Rota. No shortfalls in communications were noted during typhoon Soudelor.
- CHC has a contract in place for off-island MEDEVAC services via a private on-island helicopter and can contact U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) resources in Guam for additional MEDEVAC support.
- The Medical Supply Office is located in the lower basement of the hospital. During Typhoon Soudelor, CHC experienced no interruption of pharmaceutical supplies.
- CNMI has six public ambulances but only three are operational. CNMI has one private Emergency Medical Services (EMS) company, which has two additional operational ambulances.
- The CHC morgue has capacity for six deceased and has a contract for a reefer truck that can provides a total capacity of 176 onsite. CNMI requires the services of a certified medical examiner (CME) from Guam to perform autopsies. The CME can process 1-2 individuals per day. This is a potential shortfall, as the CME from Guam would prioritize Guam's needs during a response.
- There are two mortuaries on-island and one facility has cremation capability.
- CNMI has one veterinary resource on-island, a Lands and Natural Resources veterinary.
- The Mayor of Saipan has a stray dog program and has identified sites for housing pets during emergencies and anticipated needs for veterinary support.

3.1.2 Assumptions

- CHC is a hardened facility and is expected to be intact and functional post-storm.
- Two clinics in northern and southern Saipan will also be intact and will have limited capability.
- Power and water services will be affected and limited services maybe available.
- Backup generators at the hospital will be functional and able to provide power for essential services at the hospital.
- A water well will provide emergency water supplies for essential services at the hospital. It is a gravity-flow system. Once purified, water resides in a 275,000-gallon storage tank.
- EMS services will be available on a limited basis.
- The five identified shelters will be at maximum capacity.
- Behavioral health assets will be quickly overwhelmed.
- Limited on-island veterinary support will be quickly overwhelmed and need support.
- On-island blood supplies will be sufficient for post-impact demand.
- Little to no impact to the pharmaceutical supply chain is expected.
- The CME from Guam will be quickly overwhelmed and will need support in Saipan.

3.1.3 Requirements

Table C-8-1: Resource Requirements

Capacity/Resource	County and State Resources/Owner	Resource Shortfalls
Medical surge capacity	Medical surge capacity of 110	Doctors/nurses
Medical supplies	No shortfalls with pharmaceutical supplies	None
EMS units	Potential shortfall	8 total ambulances in CNMI
Mortuary surge capacity	Surge capacity of 176 on site	CME will need assistance with processing

3.1.4 Applicable Core Capabilities

- Planning
- Public Information and Warning
- Operational Coordination
- Critical Transportation
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety
- Operational Communications
- Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services
- Situational Assessment

3.2 Tasks by Phase

Each operational phase has an end state, as shown in Table C-8-2.

Table C-8-2: Operational Phases and End States

Phase	End State
Phase 1a	Agencies have completed their preparedness activities.
Phase 1b	ESF #8 assessment/management capability deployed with IMAT to CNMI.
Phase 1c	Strike teams and caches are deployed and safely sheltered at appropriate facilities.
Phase 2a	ESF #8 has determined additional requirements as a result of detailed assessments and CNMI has submitted Requests for Assistance.
Phase 2b	All supplemental federal capabilities and resources are ordered and deployed to CNMI are employed.
Phase 2c	Demobilize select teams.
Phase 3	Transition to recovery and mitigation operations.

3.2.1 Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Operational Focus: Situational awareness and preparedness.

- During the normal course of business, the Commonwealth Healthcare Corporation does not have sufficient medical staff on-island.

Primary Actions

- HSEM coordinates with other territorial agencies and private organizations to identify viable hardened facilities to support the safe sheltering of IMATs, medical teams, and their assets prior to landfall.
- HSEM identifies possible locations to be utilized as alternate care facilities (ACFs).
- HSEM develops and maintains a list of hardened facilities that can be used to shelter emergency personnel and assets arriving from Hawaii and CONUS.

3.2.2 Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus

- ESF #8 activates and deploys initial critical medical resources and management team with the IMAT.

Primary Actions

- Activate/deploy ESF #8 to Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC).
- Activate three Regional Emergency Coordinators to deploy with FEMA IMAT in Phase 1b.
- Deploy Incident Response Coordination Team – Advance (IRCT-A) cache from California to the CNMI Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) Emergency Operations Center.
- Deploy very small aperture terminal communications capability.
- Deploy required hospital staff augmentation to CNMI.
- ESF #15, through the Joint Information Center (JIC), disseminates public service announcements (PSAs), informing CNMI residents and tourists about emergency procedures.
- FEMA deploys the IMAT.
- HHS alerts/activates the Hawaii DMAT, Incident Support Team (IST), and IRCT.
- HHS alerts/activates one CONUS Type 1 DMAT for deployment to Hawaii.

3.2.3 Phase 1c (Near Certainty)

Operational Focus

- Receipt of modified teams and medical caches in CNMI and safe sheltering of those teams and caches at hospitals and clinics across CNMI.

Primary Actions

- Deploy two (2) HHS Medical Task Forces to support community health clinics located in Rota and Tinian.
- Deploy two (2) Logistics Response Assistance Teams (LRATs) from Hawaii to CNMI.
- Vulnerable populations surge to the hospital or clinics in Saipan and to clinics in Tinian and Rota for sheltering and care pre-landfall.
- HSEM coordinates transportation and shelter for pre-positioned teams and assets.
- CHC transfers non-critical patients to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) to create capacity.
- HSEM, in coordination with ESF #7, sources hardened facilities in CNMI to receive one Type 1 DMAT, an IST, and an IRCT from Hawaii.
- HSEM and ESF #8 verify the availability of Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Team personnel to assist in the response.
- CHCC coordinates with HSEM and the DOD to notify/alert medical staff identified for possible recall.
- CHCC and ESF #8 coordinate with HSEM to alert and coordinate with Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) to determine availability of resources and to deploy ESAR-VHP personnel
- ESF #8 deploys an IST and an IRCT to a hardened facility in CNMI prior to typhoon landfall.
- ESF #8 deploys Hawaii DMAT to a hardened facility in CNMI prior to typhoon landfall.
- ESF #8 alerts CONUS DMATs and issues alert for a Federal Medical Station (FMS) for deployment.
- A 35-person DMAT (U.S. West Coast team preferred) will be activated/moved by the HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR). FEMA support will not be needed for personnel transport, but will be requested for DMAT cache transport.
- The DMAT cache makeup will be determined by ASPR Logistics. The closest cache is based in FEMA's Hawaii Distribution Center (DC). The FEMA movement request will be for cache transport from the Hawaii DC to Saipan International Airport.
- Two Mobile Lifesaving Kits plus augmentation will need to be deployed to CNMI. Movement of these resources will be handled either by FEMA from the Hawaii DC or by ASPR from the Rancho Cordova, California, Airport of Embarkation (APOE) via either San Francisco International Airport or Oakland International Airport to Saipan International Airport.
- Two HHS Medical Task Forces (total of 14 persons) will be requested to support to two community health clinics on Saipan. (Team movement and billeting will be handled by HHS ASPR.)

- One IRCT-A element (personnel) will be deployed to Hawaii. (Movement and billeting handled by HHS ASPR.)
- One IRCT-A cache (2 pallets from Rancho Cordova) will be deployed. Movement is recommended via box truck by HHS ASPR to APOE CONUS to Hawaii.
- ESF #11 provides animal medical services and support to household pets/service animals.

3.2.4 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)

Operational Focus

- Provide surge capability, decompress the singular hospital, and provide supplemental chronic care. No mass fatalities are expected.

Primary Actions

- CHC transfers or releases non-critical patients to SNFs to create capacity.
- CHCC and ESF #8 utilize the ESAR-VHP to activate regional medical personnel for deployment, as required.
- HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 and ESF #13 to acquire additional security personnel to provide security for additional shelters, as required.
- HSEM coordinates with ESF #8 to request Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) and mortuary support assets, as needed.
- ESF #8 coordinates with ESF #6 to provide medical support at designated shelters.
- ESF #8 deploys alerted DMATs and FMSs, as needed.
- ESF #8 alerts and deploys medical needs shelter teams, additional medical staff, veterinary support, surgical support, radiological support, and dialysis support, as needed.
- ESF #8 increases casualty care space, as needed, through the use of a DMAT/FMS and/or additional ACFs for patients requiring acute medical treatment and 24-hour care.
- ESF #8 assesses and initiates procurement of additional medical supplies and pharmacological support, as needed.
- ESF #8 deploys the National Veterinary Response Team (NVRT) to provide medical services and support to pets/service animals in designated shelters.
- ESF #11 deploys pet care supplies from the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) cache.
- ESF #15, through the JIC, disseminates PSAs to residents and tourists regarding ongoing and planned medical response activities.

3.2.5 Phase 2a (Activation, Situational Assessment, and Movement)

Operational Focus: Assessment and triage.

Primary Actions

- As appropriate, CHC transfers or releases non-critical patients to SNFs or has patients return to their homes post-landfall to preserve capacity.

- CHCC and ESF #8 utilize the ESAR-VHP to activate regional medical personnel for deployment, as required.
- ESF #8 coordinates with ESF #6 to provide medical support to shelters upon request.
- ESF #8 deploys alerted DMATs and FMSs, as needed.
- Based on initial assessments post-landfall, ESF #8 alerts and deploys additional medical needs shelter teams, additional medical staff, and veterinary, surgical, radiological, and dialysis support, as needed.
- Based on initial assessments post-landfall, ESF #8 increases, as needed, casualty care space through the use of a DMAT/FMS and/or additional ACFs for patients requiring acute medical treatment and 24-hour care.
- ESF #8 assesses and initiates resource procurement of additional medical supplies and pharmacological support.
- Based on initial assessments post-landfall, ESF #8 deploys the NVRT to provide medical services and support to pets/service animals in designated shelters.
- Based on initial assessments post-landfall, ESF #11 deploys pet care supplies from the NVS cache.
- ESF #15, through the JIC, disseminates PSAs to residents and visitors regarding ongoing and planned medical response activities.
- The DOD, through the Defense Coordinating Officer, provides support to response and medical teams as mission assigned and as defined in National Response Framework or through Inter-Agency Agreements. This effort may include rotary- and fixed-wing support.
- HSEM coordinates with ESF #8 to request DMORT and mortuary support assets, as needed.

3.2.6 Phase 2b (Employment of Resources and Stabilization)

Operational Focus:

Sustained decompression of the healthcare system for its return to normal operations.

Primary Actions

- CNMI healthcare system discharges non-critical patients from hospitals and SNFs to restore capacity.
- CNMI healthcare system returns to pre-storm staffing levels.
- HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 and ESF #13 to demobilize additional security personnel providing oversight at healthcare facilities.
- ESF #8 prepares to redeploy DMATs and FMSs, deployed medical needs shelter teams, additional medical staff, and veterinary, surgical, radiological, and dialysis support, as needs decrease.

- ESF #15, through the JIC, disseminates PSAs to residents and visitors regarding ongoing and planned medical response activities.

3.2.7 Phase 2c (Intermediate Operations)

Operational Focus: Transition to recovery.

Primary Actions

- CNMI healthcare system returns to pre-storm staffing levels.
- ESF #8 redeploys all federal surge resources from CNMI back to their home stations.
- Unified Coordination Group (UCG) demobilizes DMAT(s), the IST, and the IRCT.
- UCG demobilizes any regional medical personnel brought in for the medical response.
- UCG demobilizes and redeploys the FMS(s) back to its place of origin.
- UCG coordinates the return of any patients and patient support personnel evacuated from CNMI pre-landfall.
- UCG stands down security personnel at ACF(s)/medical needs shelter(s).
- UCG conducts demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.
- ESF #15, through the JIC, disseminates PSAs to residents and tourists regarding the standing down of all ACFs.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

5.1 Primary Agencies

5.1.1 Federal

- FEMA
- HHS
- General Services Administration

5.1.2 Commonwealth

- CHCC
- HSEM
- CNMI Department of Public Health

5.2 Support Agencies

5.2.1 *Federal*

- Department of Defense
- Department of Justice

5.2.2 *Commonwealth*

- CHCC

Appendix C-9: Environmental Response/Health and Safety

1 *Situation*

A catastrophic typhoon strike in CNMI has the potential to create widespread hazardous materials (HAZMAT) spills requiring assessment, response, and disposal. Oil is not a hazardous material; however, it is regulated as a pollutant under the National Contingency Plan. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is the federal agency responsible for a release of oil or HAZMAT to the navigable waters of the United States; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has responsibility for releases of oil or HAZMAT to the inland areas of CNMI. The efforts of the USCG and EPA may occur concurrently with disaster response efforts and should be coordinated so both chains of command have visibility on resources, capabilities, and requirements.

2 *Mission*

The environmental response/health and safety mission supporting a catastrophic response, sees appropriate measures taken that protect the health and safety of the public and responders, as well as the environment, from all hazards.

The purpose of this appendix is to present information on capabilities and resources in Guam for hazardous materials response efforts.

3 *Execution*

3.1 *Concept of Operations*

The USCG, EPA, and CNMI Bureau of Environmental and Coastal Quality (BECQ) serve as the lead agencies for ESF #10. Marine responses will be led and coordinated by the USCG under its emergency response authorities. The EPA will coordinate its inland emergency responses with the USCG and CNMI BECQ, under its authorities. All organizations will provide an ESF #10 liaison to the joint operation to share information, provide status of efforts, and define requirements and capabilities that are deployed, employed, or required. Federal coordination will be initiated in Phase 1c at the Regional Response Coordination Center, unless a specific request for deployment with the Incident Management Assistance Team to CNMI is approved by the Regional Administrator in Phase 1b.

The lead federal agencies will inform and coordinate with the joint response operation and—

- Conduct assessments;
- Deploy HAZMAT teams that support environmental health and safety actions; and
- Assess, monitor, and perform environmental cleanup.

3.1.1 *Critical Considerations*

- BECQ is a regulatory agency with the primary roles of inspection and enforcement.
- BECQ initiates the suspension of permit requirements by administrative action directly with the Office of The Governor. This action would result in the issuance of “Blanket Emergency Response Permits.”

- Waivers for land clearing (grubbing, tree removal) and erosion control measures will be suspended at the discretion of BECQ during an emergency response.
- Inspectors are uniformed but are not sworn law enforcement officers. Inspectors have the authority to leverage enforcement actions up to and including administrative orders and may issue notices of violation.
- While there is a HAZMAT Response Team, there is no Level B or Level A capability resident in CNMI. BECQ Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response-trained personnel can serve at the perimeter of any exclusion zone.
- CNMI leverages BECQ uniformed enforcement officers, who can conduct post-storm damage assessments.
- BECQ staff inspect facilities in remote areas as well as facilities that are difficult to access.

3.1.2 Assumptions

- Activities that require a permit will be suspended for a limited duration of time; however, permit requirements must be substantively met in the recovery phase of the response.
- Marine Monitoring Teams have unique capabilities as waterborne assessment teams. However, non-BECQ personnel cannot be regularly transported for that assignment.
- BECQ has the authority to conduct aerial surveillance using electronic devices such as drones over public facilities as well as private facilities that permit such surveillance.
- Drones, with photographic capability, will be purchased and available by the end of 2017.
- BECQ capabilities can be accessed by CNMI’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management via a request by the Special Assistant.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

4.1 BECQ Resources and Capabilities

- BECQ comprises the branches listed in Table C-9-1

Table C-9-1: BECQ Branches

BECQ Mission Sets and Resources	
Environmental Surveillance Laboratory	Wastewater, Earthmoving and Erosion
Water Quality Surveillance	Pesticides and Storage Tank
Water and Air Quality Management	Marine Monitoring Team
Safe Drinking Water	Site Assessment and Remediation

4.2 CNMI Environmental/Health and Safety Resources and Capabilities

Table C-9-2: CNMI Environmental/Health and Safety Resources and Capabilities

CNMI Environmental/Health and Safety Resources and Capabilities				
Resource (Type)	# Available/ Shifts	Primary mission/ Mission in Disaster Response	Amount Required	Amount on Hand
Personnel – uniformed	12-hour operations	Utility company	24-hour operations	12 hours
Personnel – marine monitoring	12-hour operations	Utility company	24-hour operations	12 hours
Personnel – boat captains	Maintenance level	Utility company	Overhaul/ restart	Significant
Personnel – hazardous materials response-capable	20-30 days	Utility company	60 days	30 days
Boats – 27' Boston Whalers	3	Water quality assessment team transport/debris and damage assessment capabilities		

Federal Environmental Response/Health and Safety capabilities and assets are described in the National Response Framework ESF #10 Annex.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

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Appendix C-10: Fire Management and Suppression

1 *Situation*

The Fire Management and Suppression Core Capability provides structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities to manage and suppress fires of all types, kinds, and complexities while protecting the lives, property, and the environment of the affected area. A Category 4 typhoon strike in CNMI may require fire management and suppression actions to protect lives, property and the environment.

2 *Mission*

Management or suppression of fires of all types, kinds and complexities, whether structure, wildland or fires which require specialized firefighting capabilities will protect the lives, property, and the environment during the response and recovery following a catastrophic typhoon.

3 *Execution*

3.1 *Concept of Operations*

For ESF #4 (Firefighting), the CNMI Department of Fire and Medical Services (DFEMS) is the lead ESF #4 Coordinating Agency. ESF #4 will be alerted during Phase 1b, consistent with the CNMI Emergency Operations Plan, and will deploy to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) as is required in Phase 1c.

DFEMS coordinates support for the detection and suppression of fires in wildland, urban, and rural settings and maintains sufficient capability to conduct search and rescue (SAR) missions with the CNMI Department of Public Safety (DPS).

3.1.1 *Critical Considerations*

- There are no firefighters on the northern islands of CNMI.
- There are six fire stations on Saipan (Station 6 is out of service due to Typhoon Soudelor damage) and one fire station each on Tinian and Rota.
- DFEMS is the primary SAR coordinator in CNMI.
- There is a mutual aid agreement among the islands. The requesting island's Deputy Fire Commissioner submits a request for support to the Mayor, who forwards the request to the EOC for approval.
- During normal operations, there are two DFEMS personnel assigned per station.
- Upon onset of typhoon Threat Condition 2, an additional Emergency Medical Technician is assigned to each station and the following special units are activated:
 - SAR
 - Logistics
 - Administration

○ Fire Prevention

- DFEMS maintains an EOC in the Capitol Hill area of Saipan.
- DFEMS maintains a Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) team on Saipan, which is a collateral duty. The HAZMAT team is activated upon request.
- DFEMS has a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Saipan International Airport's Airport Rescue & Firefighting (ARFF) Department; ARFF typically provides a water tanker and personnel to assist with structure fires.
- The Saipan International Airport ARFF runs two 24-hour shifts (A and B), with about 15 personnel assigned to each shift and an average of 8 personnel on duty per shift daily. A Fire Captain is in charge of each shift.
- Saipan's ARFF administration consists of a Fire Chief, two Assistant Fire Chiefs, a Pacific Region ARFF Training Center Coordinator, a Fire Inspector/Logistics, and two ARFF mechanics.
- The Fire Chief reports to the Executive Director of the Commonwealth Ports Authority.
- The Tinian International Airport ARFF Department consist of approximately 10 personnel. Personnel have dual roles as both ARFF and Port Police officers. ARFF Operations runs three 8-hour shifts daily (day, swing, and mid) with an average of 2-3 personnel on-duty per shift.
- A Fire/Police Captain runs daily operations for both law enforcement and ARFF protection for the airport.
- The Saipan Airport Fire Chief assists the Tinian Ports Manager in ensuring that all ARFF personnel are current in their training, operational, and technical requirements.
- The Rota Airport ARFF department consists of approximately 10 personnel. Personnel have dual roles as both ARFF and Port Police officers. ARFF Operations runs three 8-hour shifts daily (day, swing, and mid) with an average of 2-3 personnel on-duty per shift.
- A Fire/Police Captain runs daily operations for both law enforcement and ARFF protection for the airport.
- The Saipan Airport Fire Chief assists the Rota Ports Manager in ensuring that all ARFF personnel are current in their training, operational, and technical requirements.
- HAZMAT and SAR personnel serve in these functions as collateral duties; their primary duties are as firefighters.
- On Tinian and Rota, Port Authority Police also serve as a part of the ARFF.
- There are no interisland radio communications between public safety agencies on Saipan, Tinian, or Rota; they rely upon telephone and digital communications. Agencies co-located on an island can communicate with each other via radio.
- Approximately 10 percent of DPS personnel are unavailable at any given time due to disability leave, annual leave, etc.
- Mutual aid agreements between agencies and islands are not codified in writing; agreements are worked out at the EOC on an as-needed basis. Interagency mutual aid is provided internally, as agencies on both Tinian and Rota fall under the authority of the

applicable parent agency on Saipan (e.g., DPS on Tinian and DPS on Saipan are the same agency).

3.1.2 Assumptions

- The DFEMS Chief will serve as a member of the multi-agency coordination team.
- DFEMS will provide EOC staffing for ESF #4.
- The fire station at San Roque will be relocated and rebuilt in another location in San Roque.
- The dispatch center at Station 2 in Garapan will be operational no later than May 2017.
- The Guam National Guard's Civil Support Team will support the DFEMS HAZMAT team upon request.

3.1.3 Requirements

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

Table C-10-1: CNMI Firefighting Resources

CNMI Firefighting Resources		
Agency	Island	Resource
Department of Fire and Emergency Services	Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 6 fire stations ▪ 93 firefighters ▪ 5 EMTs ▪ 6-passenger SAR unit (vehicle extrication, rope rescue) ▪ 1 4x4 dually quad cab truck ▪ 1 4x4 Nissan pickup truck ▪ 3 ambulances ▪ 3 pumper trucks ▪ 1 SAFE boat ▪ 9 rescue divers (collateral duty)
	Tinian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1 fire station ▪ 16 firefighters ▪ 1 pumper truck ▪ 2 ambulances ▪ 1 rescue truck (Ford F450)
	Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1 fire station ▪ 13 firefighters ▪ 1 pumper truck ▪ 2 ambulances ▪ 1 HAZMAT representative (collateral duty)
Commonwealth Port Authority – Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting	Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 35 firefighters ▪ 4 fire apparatus ▪ 1 command vehicle ▪ 1 tanker ▪ 1 air compressor

CNMI Firefighting Resources		
Agency	Island	Resource
	Tinian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10 firefighters ▪ 2 fire apparatus
	Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10 firefighters ▪ 2 fire apparatus
Commonwealth Port Authority – Police	Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 40 sworn staff ▪ 6 SUVs ▪ 3 pickup trucks ▪ 2 Boston Whalers (27' and 18') ▪ 6 jet skis ▪ 8 certified divers ▪ SWAT team (16-passenger, collateral duty)
	Tinian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 12 sworn staff ▪ 1 SUV ▪ 1 pickup truck (Ford F150) ▪ 1 Boston Whaler, 18'
	Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10 sworn staff ▪ 1 SUV ▪ 1 pickup truck (Ford F150)

Table C-10-2: Joint Region Marianas Firefighting Resources

Joint Region Marianas Firefighting Resources Available via MOU	
Andersen AFB Fire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 20 civilian firefighters ▪ 48 military firefighters ▪ 4 fire stations ▪ 3 750-gal pump trucks ▪ 1 2,000-gal tanker truck ▪ 1 4,000-gal tanker truck ▪ 4 crash trucks, 3,000 gal ▪ 1 crash truck, 1,500 gal ▪ 4 ambulances ▪ 1 40' HAZMAT trailer ▪ 2 command vehicles ▪ 5 pairs of jet skis w/trailers ▪ 12,000 gal of water on-hand
Naval Base CNMI Fire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1 ladder truck ▪ 5 engine companies * ▪ 2 spare engine companies ▪ 1 special operations unit (heavy rescue) ▪ 1 Dually pickup truck (forestry) ▪ 1 ATV w/pump ▪ *1 engine company (consists of 4 firefighters and 1 pump truck with 750 gal of water)

Joint Region Marianas Firefighting Resources Available via MOU	
Homeland Security Council-25	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ 2 MH-60S Seahawk helicopters w/ fire buckets

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

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Appendix C-11: Mass Search and Rescue Operations

1 *Situation*

Typhoons impacting CNMI have not historically resulted in any requirements for Mass Search and Rescue Operations Core Capability support. This can partially be attributed to the hardening of the residential infrastructure there as well as the small population.

2 *Mission*

3 *Flooding, inundation or collapse of buildings or other structures may require mass search and rescue operations to save the greatest number of endangered lives in the shortest time possible using traditional or atypical search and rescue capabilities including personnel, services, animals or other assets to survivors in need.*
Execution

3.1 **Concept of Operations**

The CNMI Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DFEMS) is the primary search and rescue (SAR) coordinator on land and within three nautical miles of the high-water mark. Public safety agencies within CNMI, including DFEMS, become fully activated and operate in 12-hour shifts when Threat Condition 2 is declared by the Governor.

Federal support at FEMA Headquarters activates ESF #9 when supplemental SAR capabilities are required. ESF #9 coordinates federal Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) assets to support SAR activities in the response, which may include maritime, coastal, waterborne, and land SAR.

3.1.1 *CNMI*

DFEMS will activate in Phase 1b and will provide staffing for ESF #9 in Phase 1c, if activated by CNMI's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM). In Phase 2a, DFEMS will assess whether there is any requirement for supplemental federal support for mass search and rescue operations. Should there be a requirement identified, CNMI HSEM will request federal support through the joint operation and this support will be prioritized for activation, deployment, and employment in CNMI.

3.1.2 *Federal Support*

FEMA HQ will alert ESF #9 and the National US&R Response System when a significant incident has occurred or may occur. ESF #9 makes an assessment of the situation and then makes a recommendation to leadership on activation and deployment. Based on historical data, there is not currently any anticipated requirement for supplemental federal resources.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

C-11-1: CNMI SAR Resources

CNMI SAR Resources	
Agency	Resource List
DFEMS	6-passenger deployable SAR team Rope rescue Confined space rescue Heavy lifting/moving Structural collapse rescue 1 SAFE boat (Saipan)
DPS Boating Safety Unit	2 22' Zodiac (1 on Saipan and 1 on Rota) 2 23' Zodiac (1 on Saipan and 1 on Tinian) 1 30' Zodiac (Saipan only)
Commonwealth Port Authority	1 27' Boston Whaler (Saipan) 1 18' Boston Whaler (Saipan) 6 pairs of jet skis (Saipan) 8 certified divers (Saipan) 1 18' Boston Whaler (Tinian)

For more information, see Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

Appendix C-12: On-scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

1 *Situation*

Public safety is a local issue. In the CNMI, there are three main islands and many more smaller islands within the commonwealth boundaries. A critical concern for public safety is the lack of interisland communications between public safety officials; they rely upon telephone and digital communications systems. Agencies co-located on an island can communicate with each other via radio.

Public safety agencies in CNMI are activated to 100-percent fully available staffing levels when typhoon Threat Condition 2 is set. Saipan, Tinian, and Rota each have a dispatch center, and public safety staff work in 12-hour shifts during incident response.

However, approximately 10 percent of CNMI Department of Public Safety (DPS) staffing is unavailable at any time due to disability leave, annual leave, etc. Mutual aid agreements between agencies and islands are not codified in writing; mutual aid is established through the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) when an incident occurs and on an as-needed basis. Interagency mutual aid is provided internally, as agencies on both Tinian and Rota fall under the authority of the applicable parent agency on Saipan (e.g., DPS on Tinian and DPS on Saipan are the same agency.)

2 *Mission*

Provide law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities impacted by a catastrophic typhoon, as well as those response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations in response.

3 *Execution*

3.1 *Concept of Operations*

ESF #13 agencies in CNMI maintain a presence on Saipan, Tinian, and Rota only. Support to the northern islands comes from Saipan on an as-needed basis. There is one correctional facility in CNMI, which is located on Saipan; any detainees on the other islands are temporarily held at the CNMI DPS facility on islands other than Saipan until transportation and escort back to Saipan can be arranged.

ESF #13 facilitates the coordination of public safety and security operations among federal, CNMI, and local agencies as well as among other ESFs to ensure that communications and coordination processes are consistent with stated incident management missions and objectives. Additionally, ESF#13 may be tasked with force protection during response and recovery activities.

ESF #13 is activated in situations where public safety and security efforts are required by the joint operation. If CNMI and local capabilities are exceeded, federal-to-federal support is requested, or specific capabilities unique to the Federal Government are deemed essential, ESF #13 is the coordinator for those resource requests.

Department of Defense (DOD) assets cannot be used for law enforcement activities response and recovery activities on domestic soil but may be used to accomplish the movement of law enforcement personnel and equipment. A federal statute known as the Posse Comitatus Act forbids the use of Title 10 DOD resources in law enforcement activities. No such limitation exists on National Guard or the U.S. Coast Guard assets, which can support law enforcement activities.

3.1.1 Critical Considerations

- Marshalls from the CNMI Judicial Office are tasked with providing EOC security during disaster operations.
- The Commonwealth Port Authority (CPA) has jurisdiction over air- and seaports on Saipan, Tinian, and Rota; sworn officers in CPA have arrest powers island-wide.
- During disaster operations, CPA is tasked with providing a security detail consisting of four officers to the American Red Cross facility located across from CPA headquarters at Saipan International Airport.
- CPA provides convoy security for logistics vehicles delivering supplies to points of distribution.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

C-12-1: CNMI Law Enforcement Resources

Agency	Island	Resources
Department of Public Safety	Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 127 Sworn staff ▪ 3 ea. Zodiac boats (22', 23', 30') ▪ 1 Police Station (Susie) ▪ 1 Police Substation (Koban) ▪ Dispatch Center ▪ 3 dispatchers
	Tinian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 1 ea. Zodiac, 23'
	Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 22 Sworn staff ▪ 1 Police Station ▪ 1 Dispatch Center
Commonwealth Port Authority	Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 40 sworn staff ▪ 6 ea. SUV ▪ 3 ea. Pickup trucks ▪ 2 ea. Boston Whalers (27' and 18') ▪ 6 ea. Jet skis ▪ 8 ea. Certified divers ▪ SWAT team (16-passenger, collateral duty)
	Tinian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 12 sworn staff ▪ 1 ea. SUV ▪ 1 ea. Pickup truck (Ford F150) ▪ 1 ea. Boston Whaler, 18'
	Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10 sworn staff ▪ 1 ea. SUV ▪ 1 ea. Pickup truck (Ford F150)
Federal Resources		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Quick Response Teams (25-member Federal Law Enforcement Officer Strike Teams for Force Protection/Security and general law enforcement support) ▪ Tactical Teams ▪ Crisis Negotiators ▪ Limited Uniformed Officers ▪ Mobile Command Posts ▪ Aviation/Waterborne Assets ▪ Communications Specialists

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

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Appendix D: Logistics

1 *Situation*

CNMI is almost entirely dependent upon the flow of commodities through sea- and airports to sustain its population. A catastrophic typhoon in CNMI will significantly affect the movement of resources and any necessary evacuations due to transportation infrastructure damage. Re-establishment of the flow of goods to CNMI will be critical to recovery throughout the islands.

The response to a catastrophic typhoon in CNMI will require specific logistical activities that are outside of normal daily activities of responders. Due to the geographic isolation of CNMI, significant pre-landfall preparation will also be required to ensure a timely response.

This annex describes the concept of logistics for a joint CNMI Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) and federal logistics response. Logistics support is provided by HSEM and federal and private sources and in accordance with the defined response phases. This annex describes the facilities and transportation routes that will be used to accomplish the logistics response mission and the requirements for establishing Incident Support Bases (ISBs), Federal Staging Areas (FSAs), HSEM staging areas, and the points of distribution (PODs) necessary to support the deployment of response teams and the distribution of commodities to the affected populace.

1.1 **Critical Considerations/Planning Assumptions**

1.1.1 *Airport Operations*

- The Commonwealth Ports Authority is the controlling agency for the airports on Saipan, Tinian, and Rota.
- Saipan International Airport is the primary airfield in CNMI and the only airfield on Saipan. Saipan International Airport is capable of receiving and servicing multiple aircraft and has a working maximum on ground (MOG) rating for aircraft of 3. The MOG can be increased with the repositioning of specialized materials handling equipment (MHE).
- Tinian and Rota both have airfields capable of receiving large aircraft but are not capable of servicing them. Tinian and Rota have no working MOGs..
- Saipan International Airport has built in a redundant capability for airfield operations, and it is anticipated that the airfield will be operational within 24 hours.
- The nearest useable airports outside of CNMI are A.B. Won Pat International Airport and Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), both located on Guam.
- After cargo loading, air shipment times are approximately 13 hours from the West Coast of the United States (if direct without stopping to refuel), approximately 8 hours from Hawaii, and 3-5 hours from Asia.
- Inbound and outbound flights will be restricted or cancelled at airline discretion.
- The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will close airspace pre-landfall.

- Perimeter security will be necessary to resume commercial air operations.
- Routine commercial airline operations will cease during post-landfall response operations.
- Twenty-four to 48 hours of restricted commercial traffic will occur post-landfall.
- Following a catastrophic typhoon, it is estimated that the port will be closed to marine traffic for 3 to 5 days, allowing sufficient time to conduct infrastructure damage assessments, clear debris from berthing spaces and channels, and ensure trafficability.

1.1.2 Seaport Operations

- The port of Saipan has limited cargo handling capability.
- Vessels delivering containers to the port of Saipan are equipped with gear to handle off-loading.
- The major shipping companies that service CNMI are Matson (U.S. West Coast/Hawaii), American Presidents Line (APL) (Asia and U.S. West Coast), Horizon (U.S. West Coast/Hawaii), and Kyowa (Asia). The major tug/barge shipping companies that service CNMI and neighbor islands are Seabridge Micronesia, Cabras Marine, and APL.
- Eighty-five percent of cargo coming to the area is destined for Saipan and Tinian and comes through the port of Saipan. Ten percent of the cargo is destined for Rota and is delivered by barge direct from Saipan. The remaining five percent of cargo to CNMI arrives via air. Cargo originates from the U.S. mainland and from Asian markets such as China, South Korea, and Japan.
- The port of Saipan has a 22-acre container staging area.
- After cargo loading, sea shipment times are approximately 15 days from the West Coast of the United States, approximately 8 days from Hawaii, and approximately 4 to 6 days from Asian ports.
- The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Captain of the Port (COTP) will restrict inbound/outbound port traffic pre-landfall.
- Port closures will delay delivery of resources from CNMI and Asian ports due to delivery schedule disruptions.
- Port clearance and re-opening is a stated priority and resources will be prioritized for this effort.
- Ports will have an adequate supply of fuel for vessels to conduct initial response operations.
- The majority of port infrastructure and equipment lies in or near inundation zones.
- Disruption to the fuel and cargo distribution systems in CNMI will negatively affect response efforts.
- The USCG COTP will coordinate restoration priorities aligned with Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit priorities.

- The Unified Coordination Group (UCG) will establish priorities, but technical requirements may result in restoration priority adjustments.
- CNMI can expect 3 to 5 days without seaport services, post-landfall.
- Port operators will evacuate and safeguard refrigerated (reefer) vans and excess containers to locations outside of inundation zones.
- Port operators will safeguard and secure MHE.

1.1.3 Base Yards

- CNMI agencies and other government organizations will relocate their critical resources normally situated in coastal areas to protected sites inland.
- CNMI HSEM agencies will maximize the use of their existing facilities and accommodate the storage and relocation of critical resources in the pre-landfall phase of operations.
- CNMI HSEM can expect requests for assistance from CNMI departments to relocate critical resources to areas that fall under CNMI control.
- Relocation of industrial maritime assets will be coordinated through the Department of Transportation (DOT) and USCG to the extent possible during the pre-landfall phase.

1.1.4 Transportation (Mobility along Road Networks)

- The combined effects of debris, flooding, and debris clearance operations will temporarily restrict mobility of response resources and personnel.
- Debris clearance priorities focus on the primary routes that connect the population centers to lifesaving and life-sustaining facilities.
- Debris removal will be considered secondary to debris clearing.
- HSEM has a shortfall in the number of personnel and equipment that may be utilized for debris clearance. Current plans call for utilizing the few debris clearance assets owned by HSEM and contracting with private contractors for additional debris clearance assets. Available on-island contracted assets will then be used to meet shortfalls.
- The activation of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) will allow HSEM to utilize debris clearance assets from neighboring islands.
- Disruption to the fuel and cargo distribution systems and access to critical facilities will negatively impact the mobility of citizens and responders.
- The removal of debris (curbside and roadway) will be affected by the number of dump trucks available and haul distances to temporary debris staging areas.
- Limited road clearance and lack of alternate routes will make rural areas vulnerable to geographic isolation.
- Debris may be contaminated with toxic substances, creating hazards that limit responder access to affected areas and require segregated areas for hazardous waste/debris storage.

1.1.5 Points of Distribution

- HSEM logistics will designate PODs, which will be in the vicinity of population clusters, have sufficient concrete or asphalt, facilitate one-way traffic flow, and be known to the public as a POD.
- Primary on-island grocery stores have approximately a 2-week supply of food in stores. Another 2 weeks' worth of supplies is typically in container ships en route to CNMI at any given time.
- HSEM does not have its own stockpile of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) or Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDRs). The only known significant quantities of MREs/HDRs in the region are located at the federal distribution center (DC) on Guam and in a U.S. Navy warehouses on Guam.
- Due to time and distance limitations for resource transportation to CNMI, any significant federal support for mass feeding (other than MREs/HDRs currently located at DC Guam and U.S. Navy warehouses) may not begin until 3 to 4 days post-storm.
- Staffing requirements for PODs will be resourced and organized by HSEM.

1.2 Purpose

In the joint response organization, the Logistics Section supports HSEM and federal response and recovery operations, resource planning, management, and sustainment. This appendix provides information on the planning and coordination actions required to ensure acquisition/delivery of resources and support for survivor needs until the private sector can engage and sustain the daily requirements of the population of CNMI.

1.3 Scope

Disaster operations resource support consists of emergency relief supplies, equipment, personnel, temporary facilities, and contracting services for emergency response and recovery efforts.

Response assets will be provided from current inventories, commercial capabilities, and/or via mission assignments (MAs) of multiple agencies both on and off the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota within CNMI. Federal support of the movement of goods and personnel is aligned with movement priorities established by the UCG.

1.4 Policies and References

Logistics actions will be conducted in accordance with the authorities provided under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) (Pub. Law 93-288, as amended), Homeland Security Act of 2002, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, and Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.

Emergency Support Function (ESF) #7 (Logistics Management and Resource Support) assists the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as follows:

- DHS/FEMA Logistics provides a comprehensive, national disaster logistics planning, management, and sustainment capability that harnesses the resources of federal logistics

partners, key public and private stakeholders, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to meet the needs of disaster victims and responders; and

- The General Services Administration (GSA) supports federal agencies, CNMI, and local governments that need resource support prior to, during, and/or after incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.

Acquisition of resources will be supported by pre-existing memorandums of understanding (MOUs)/memorandums of agreement and interagency agreements or through the execution of MAs.

2 *Mission*

The mission of the joint CNMI and federal logistics response organization is to effectively plan, manage, and sustain the overall response and recovery logistical effort in order to save and sustain human lives, minimize suffering, stabilize and restore critical infrastructure, and set the conditions to return CNMI to normal operations following a major typhoon.

2.1 *Objectives*

This appendix provides a description of coordinated logistics activities and support to accomplish the following objectives:

- Deliver fuel to maintain continuity of essential operations and services.
- Distribute essential commodities and immediate response resources (IRR).

Due to the insular nature of CNMI, a Presidential Disaster Declaration must be requested by the Governor of CNMI as soon as practicable in order to offset time and distance delays in the movement of people, equipment, and commodities from the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, neighboring islands, and/or Asia, as required, to reduce associated post-storm impacts.

3 *Execution*

The overarching logistics strategy is to activate staging areas in the continental United States (CONUS) and Hawaii and push resources to Saipan during Phases 1b and 1c. These staging areas remain open, and, on demand, CNMI will “pull” resources during Phases 2a and 2b. During Phase 2c, the use of air assets as a means of resupply will decrease as the seaports on Saipan, Tinian, and Rota regain operability and the response becomes stabilized.

3.1 *Tasks by Phase*

3.1.1 *Phase 1a (Normal Operations)*

Operational Focus: Residents and government agencies adequately prepare.

Primary Actions

- FEMA, based on this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan* and in collaboration with CNMI agencies, identifies logistics requirements and resources, balances logistics resources against logistics requirements, and establishes and communicates logistics plans, policies, and procedures.

- ESF #7, as the National Logistics Coordinator (NLC) and including the FEMA Logistics Management Directorate (LMD), employs strategic sourcing for any supplies and services sourced nationally.
- FEMA LMD determines whether the services or commodities required by this appendix will be provided by FEMA or outsourced. The source of supply could be other federal agencies (OOFAs), NGOs, and/or the private sector.

3.1.2 Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus: CMMI authorities gain situational awareness, identify available resources and capabilities, and alert deployable resources. Actions are taken to heighten situational awareness, anticipate requirements, and prepare for deployment of specific resources. The Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) deploys to CNMI and forms a joint management team with HSEM that is capable of supporting the incident and transitioning to a UCG.

End State: The end state for Phase 1b occurs when an assigned IMAT is operational on Saipan, has formed partnerships with HSEM, and is conducting joint planning in preparation for potential response operations.

Primary Actions

- FEMA maintains an inventory and accountability of commodities at federal DCs on Guam and Hawaii for utilization as Immediate Response Resources (IRR).
- HSEM advises FEMA Logistics, through Region IX, of shortfalls in HSEM capabilities.
- Region IX activates the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC).
- Region IX deploys an IMAT to Saipan to help establish logistics field activities.
- RRCC designates Saipan International Airport as the primary FSA.
- RRCC issues an MA to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for use of Travis AFB and Hickam AFB as ISBs/Aerial Ports of Embarkation (APOEs) and Saipan International as the primary Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD).
- RRCC receives commodity on-hand inventories from DC Moffett, DC Hawaii, and DC Guam and builds push requirements for Phase 1c.
- NLC monitors the situation and prepares partners for the response.
- Logistics Management and Resource Support stages resources only with the concurrence of the NLC.
- Resource Management Group determines best sourcing of resources and transportation to meet requirements.
- FEMA LMD alerts and prepares staging area management teams for possible employment at Saipan International Airport, Andersen AFB, Hickam AFB, and Travis AFB.

3.1.3 Phase 1c (Near Certainty)

Operational Focus: The focus is to gain and maintain situational awareness, deploy resources (teams, equipment, and supplies) to CNMI, and increase operational readiness.

During Phase 1c, the Governor of CNMI declares state of emergency and requests a Presidential Disaster Declaration that, when approved, will designate a Federal Coordinating Officer and enable a coordinated federal response under the authority of the Stafford Act.

End State: The end state for Phase 1c occurs when the UCG is staffed and adequate resources are staged to accomplish key objectives. When preparatory actions are accomplished, the operational readiness of the response organization is increased by staging resources, positioning generators with fuel capabilities, and forming a UCG and other response and coordination organizations. Public safety is enhanced through a coordinated and aggressive public information campaign in advance of the storm.

Actions during this phase focus on deploying incident management assistance, assessment, and lifesaving response teams to CNMI; protecting critical resources; and increasing operational readiness. Assessment and response teams deploy to hardened staging areas designated by CNMI. FEMA Logistics will employ a “push/pull” concept for resource response. Initially, critical response assets will be “pushed” to ISBs and FSAs in order to establish initial capability. Once operational control in the field is established, the “push” concept will transition to a “pull” concept. During the “pull” execution, in order to maintain effective resource oversight and handling, the RRCC, UCG, and/or Joint Field Office (JFO) will communicate resource requirements through the Logistics Management Center based on actual commodity “burn rates.”

Primary Actions

- Activate CNMI ESFs, as required.
- HSEM directs the CNMI Public School System to open emergency shelters.
- Transition water pumps at well locations from the power grid to emergency generators to support water production and sustain water pressure in towers post-landfall.
- Provide support to fuel distribution operations for first responders, debris clearance teams, and emergency generators.
- All CNMI task forces review priorities and conduct coordination with partner agencies.
- Protect and safeguard critical resources prior to typhoon landfall in order to ensure operability and accessibility post-landfall.
- ESF #7, including FEMA LMD, coordinates movement of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers temporary power resources from CONUS to CNMI and fills all requests to push commodities and resources from DC Moffett and DC Hawaii to the CNMI FSA.
- HSEM and private industry ensure critical equipment and transportation assets, cargo, and warehoused goods are safeguarded from typhoon-damaging winds, flooding, and storm surge.
- HSEM and private industry deploy response teams to pre-designated hardened areas in order to provide timely restoration of critical infrastructure.

- Private industry or private organizations (e.g., churches, community groups) may activate shelters for their members or employees and their families.
- CNMI HSEM and the CNMI Department of Public Works road clearance assets are pre-positioned in base yards and safeguarded from storm effects to ensure operability post-landfall.

3.1.4 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)

Operational Focus: The focus is to supply the necessary commodities to staging area(s) and PODs in support of shelters and other critical facilities; employ resources to save lives, protect property and the environment; and preserve the social, economic, and political systems within the impacted area.

End State: The end state for Phase 2 occurs when emergency shelters are closed, temporary sheltering has transitioned to temporary housing, and response activities have set the conditions for recovery. Power generation and fuel distribution to essential infrastructure enables communications, water distribution, and basic sanitation.

To support the distribution of basic commodities to the affected population, HSEM establishes PODs. PODs will be used to distribute items such as food, water, tarps, tents, personal care items, and basic medical supplies. The actual locations for and resources positioned at PODs in CNMI will be determined by the UCG, based on specific conditions after the typhoon (area damage, debris clearance capabilities, road structure viability, security, etc.).

Primary Actions

- Perform lifesaving and life-sustaining measures.
- Conduct mass care and sheltering.
- Minimize risks to visitors.
- Maintain functionality of water distribution systems.
- Deliver fuel to maintain essential services.
- Conduct debris clearance/debris removal operations.
- Re-establish transportation systems.
- Maintain continuity of port operations.
- Provide emergency power.
- Maintain situational awareness.
- Conduct joint (federal, CNMI, private sector, and NGO) damage assessments, including assessments of the functionality of key infrastructure systems (seaport, airport, water, and power).
- Create an environment conducive to recovery and mitigation.
- Deploy and receive off-island response teams and resources.
- Maintain the FEMA Region IX RRCC at Level 1.

- Develop demobilization and transition plans.
- FEMA coordinates the acquisition and movement of response resources, including response personnel, from the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and/or neighboring islands, if required.
- FEMA, HSEM, and private industry coordinate intra- and interisland movement of resources to affected populations.
- As required, FEMA Logistics coordinates with ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources) source and deliver food commodities based on an established U.S. Department of Agriculture menu.

3.1.5 Phase 3 (Recovery)

Operational Focus: The focus is to restore services, continue government operations, and promote economic recovery following the typhoon.

End State: The end state for Phase 3 occurs when recovery activities have set the conditions for long-term community recovery, temporary housing has transitioned to rebuilt homes or other permanent housing, schools are reopened, tourism is re-established, and critical facilities and infrastructure are self-sustaining through normal transactions.

The National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) will not have yet been implemented in CNMI. Efficient, post-disaster recovery relies on understanding the complex, slow-moving nature of the recovery process, even 5 to 10 years post-landfall. As such, the NDRF's focus is to enhance recovery understanding and establish relationships prior to the development of strategies.

Primary Actions

- Once sustainable supply-chain activities have been restored and HSEM and private industry have begun to return to normal operations, FEMA recovers issued non-consumable items and coordinates for the return, reallocation, and disposition of materials as well as their replenishment and refurbishment (based on cost-effectiveness and resource criticality).
- FEMA executes the logistics demobilization plan for a transition to recovery operations.
- FEMA coordinates with HSEM to provide long-term logistics support for impacted communities.
- FEMA coordinates with HSEM to identify gaps in available resources and support the implementation of comprehensive long-term community planning efforts.
- FEMA LMD acts as the clearinghouse for return and reallocation of materials among DCs, based on anticipated requirements. FEMA LMD also coordinates any vendor returns and ensures that credits are properly issued as required.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this 2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan.

4.1 Logistics Management and Resource Support

See National Logistics System Concept of Support:

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

5.1 Roles and Responsibilities

5.1.1 FEMA Logistics Management Directorate

FEMA LMD is the primary office for directing and overseeing disaster support for all logistics functions during all incident phases. FEMA LMD responsibilities for the incident include:

- Establishing; maintaining; and executing agency-wide logistics plans, policies, procedures, doctrines, standards, and governance.
- Developing and maintaining national logistics support requirements, capabilities, and visibility of resources.
- Providing agency-wide funding, budget, and resource management for logistics operations.
- Providing FEMA Headquarters (HQ) and Region IX logistics with functional command, coordination, and oversight of all logistics activities (including national resource management at JFOs and DCs).
- Coordinating the agency logistics response through the FEMA HQ Logistics Operations Center.
- Providing agency-wide logistics information management and communications capabilities.

5.1.2 FEMA Region IX

FEMA Region IX will direct, oversee, and execute regional support for all logistics functions during all incident phases. FEMA Region IX responsibilities for the incident include:

- Establishing, maintaining, and executing supplemental regional plans, policies, and procedures that implement FEMA HQ plans, policies, and procedures.
- Staffing the JFO(s), FSAs, and ISBs and coordinating the agency logistics response among field units.
- Developing and coordinating regional requirements and capabilities with HSEM responders and linking with HSEM to coordinate logistics interface.
- Providing regional funding and resource management.

- Providing accountability for FEMA property and equipment assigned to Region IX.
- Executing IAAs with OFAs and NGOs and procuring support from local sources.

Resource Synchronization and Integration

HSEM and FEMA will lead the synchronization and integration of resource support capabilities from CNMI, Federal, NGO, and private sector responders. Operational control and execution of logistics functions is delegated to the effective level of execution.

5.1.3 FEMA Field Units

Field units (primarily JFOs and FSAs) are responsible for FEMA field logistics execution during all incident phases. Field unit responsibilities for the incident include:

- Executing field unit logistics plans, policies, and procedures.
- Executing field logistics funding, budget, and resource management.
- Executing IAAs and MOUs with OFAs and NGOs at the field level.
- Executing field logistics contracts with the private sector.
- Coordinating the agency logistics response at field unit locations.

5.1.4 Other Federal Agencies

FEMA's primary OFA logistics partners for the incident include the following.

- **Department of Defense (DOD).** The DOD has a broad range of capabilities that can be utilized to support logistical response requirements. Although availability of DOD resources can be subject to higher-priority tasking, large numbers of assets (e.g., vehicles, aircraft, ships, other support equipment) can typically be requested through the Defense Coordinating Officer. Basic DOD capabilities for the incident include the following:
 - Facilities: DOD facilities may be used as ISBs/FSAs and/or other logistics centers.
 - Aircraft: DOD can provide long-range, strategic airlift and/or airdrop capability utilizing strategic airlift assets (e.g., C-5, C-17); short-field, tactical airlift and/or airdrop capability utilizing fixed-wing assets (e.g., C-130) and medium/heavy rotary-wing assets (e.g., UH-60, CH-47); aeromedical evacuation capability; as well as maintenance crews and logistics support for air operations.
 - Sea capability: DOD can provide ships for resource transportation, movement of cargo to shore via cranes and ramps (e.g., Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore), bases for helicopter operations, support for small boat/barge operations, berthing for responders, pier-side water and electrical power generation, and medical care).
 - Land capability: DOD can provide trucks, MHE, and construction/debris clearance/debris removal equipment.
- **Department of Transportation (DOT).** The DOT is the coordinating agency for ESF #1 (Transportation). DOT will work with CNMI transportation departments and industry partners to assess any damage to transportation infrastructure and analyze the impact on transportation capability. DOT will implement response and recovery functions,

including prioritizing or allocating civil transportation capacity, funding repair of Federal Aid highways, coordinating hazardous material operations, and completing any safety or security actions relating to movement restrictions, closures, quarantines, and evacuations.

- **Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).** The FAA, which is part of the DOT, will oversee the operation and regulation of the U.S. National Airspace System, which in this case is specifically the airspace in and around CNMI. After the incident, the FAA may delegate use of specified airspace around CNMI for national defense, homeland security, law enforcement, search and rescue missions, or airdrop drop zone activity. The FAA may also implement air traffic and airspace control/management measures, such as temporary flight restrictions, aircraft ingress/egress corridors, etc., in conjunction with these missions. After the typhoon, the FAA will assess airport conditions (e.g., damage to runways, airport communications, navigation equipment, air traffic control capability) and may restrict movement of aircraft based on this assessment.
- **General Services Administration (GSA).** The GSA is the primary coordinating agency for ESF #7 (Logistics Management and Resource Support). The GSA will support any requirements for obtaining facilities, facility setup, space management, building services, general facility operations, and contracting for transportation services.
- **U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).** The USCG will maintain jurisdiction over the ports of CNMI. In the event of a typhoon, the USCG will—
 - Maintain, monitor, and report on the safety, viability, and navigability of the seaports in CNMI and associated waterways; and
 - Make and enforce decisions regarding the use of the seaports in CNMI or associated waterways, including opening or closing the port and waterways to vessel traffic.

5.1.5 CNMI Agencies

Under the National Response Framework, CNMI will be responsible for the initial response to the incident. The primary role of CNMI HSEM will be to supplement local efforts before, during, and after the incident. Other important HSEM responsibilities include:

- Standing up, staffing, and operating CNMI staging areas.
- Coordinating operation of PODs to facilitate the distribution of disaster supplies to incident survivors.
- Providing staff, as appropriate, to the JFO to partner with federal counterparts to ensure a unified response and recovery effort.
- Entering into and executing the EMAC to provide mutual assistance for required logistics resources.
- Providing effective coordination and timely requests for federal disaster assistance and aid. (Note: Efficient federal logistics support provided to CNMI for disaster response is best delivered when HSEM has pre-coordinated with its federal counterparts.)
- Collaborating with the Federal Government in disaster planning to ensure logistics supplies and services are delivered in a timely fashion to disaster survivors.

5.2 Transportation and Logistics Coordination

Throughout all phases of response and recovery, transportation and logistics support is the joint responsibility of both HSEM and FEMA. Appendix C (Operations) provides an overview of how the joint HSEM/federal operation will execute the re-establishment of CNMI's transportation systems to facilitate the effective movement of resources into and throughout CNMI from CONUS ISBs, APOEs, APODs, and FSAs. Appendix C-6 (Facilitate Recovery of the Marine Transportation System) and Appendix C-7 (Distribute Essential Commodities and Immediate Response Resources) provide a detailed description of how logistics plays a vital role in the response effort.

5.2.1 HSEM

HSEM and federal response coordination will be accomplished through the creation of a joint response organization, as described in Appendix A. The integration of territorial and federal responders working as a task force ensures unity of effort and efficient use of transportation assets to deliver required resources. As necessary, FEMA will issue MAs to other federal departments and agencies to provide additional resources and support. Situational awareness of the typhoon's impact to CNMI's transportation infrastructure will be paramount to the development and implementation of a logistics capability for delivering emergency disaster relief supplies and employing emergency response teams.

5.2.2 Issuance of Disaster Policy, Doctrine, and Procedures

FEMA (HQ and Region IX) and HSEM must collaborate in the development of disaster response and logistics doctrine, policies, and procedures in consultation with all appropriate agencies.

5.3 Communications

See Appendix E (Emergency Communications/Operational Communications) for existing on-island capabilities and anticipated level of federal response. See Appendix X (Execution Checklist) for deployment of type/kind of communication assets/capabilities by phase and priority.

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Appendix E: Emergency Communications/Operational Communications

1 *Situation*

CNMI has a total of 15 islands; however, only three islands have substantial populations: Saipan (48,000), Tinian (3,200), and Rota (2,500). Other islands in the CNMI may be inhabited seasonally or be completely uninhabited. Responsibility for incident response and recovery rests with the CNMI government. CNMI is unique because it only has one level of government.

CNMI is susceptible to devastating typhoons that can cause high ocean swells and flooding. When these hazards occur, it makes the transportation of people and supplies difficult. When coupled with the distance from Hawaii and the U.S. mainland to CNMI, it will take considerable time to obtain federal support for the islands. Storms can cause major power and communications outages, which make it difficult to meet the needs of survivors, establish both tactical and strategic communications, and provide status reports to ensure the proper personnel and supplies are sent. CNMI needs reliable backup communications with Hawaii and the mainland and a stockpile of electric generators and fuel to operate them in a location secure from typhoon and storm damage.

The north end of Saipan is home to several major tourist attractions, including a country club—Banzai Cliff—and several scuba, snorkeling, and swimming sites. The area is also susceptible to wildland fires and is largely not covered by CNMI's land-mobile radio (LMR) and cellular systems. A major response will require tactical and strategic communications to support the local incident commander and field units in reporting back to the CNMI's Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

CNMI has an adequate number of LMR radios for their personnel; however, the batteries on most portable radios are unable to maintain a charge for over 30 minutes. During emergency operations additional spare batteries and charging units will be needed.

Backup communications for the CNMI are minimal. Loss of the undersea cable from CNMI would severely limit communications with the outside entities as this is the primary backhaul route for off-island communications. The CNMI 800-Megahertz (MHz) Astro network relies on a single tower on Mt. Tapochau. Loss of the tower would create command and control (C2) communications challenges.

CNMI may rely on FEMA to assist them with C2 and interoperable communications with Tinian, Rota, and the northern CNMI islands.

1.1 **Background**

1.1.1 *Interoperability*

Interoperability with federal resources, specifically the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) assets, is limited. DOD and the USCG are relied on heavily to provide large event and disaster assistance, using their own organic equipment. HSEM operates two 800-MHz radio systems: a new 800-MHz Motorola Astro 25 system and an older 800-MHz analog Motorola SmartNet Type II trunking system (decommissioned). They also have two independent very-high frequency (VHF) conventional systems, one on Rota and one on Tinian.

The systems on Rota and Tinian are monitored at the at the Saipan dispatch center when the digital subscriber line (DSL) link is operating. Gateways are used to provide interoperability between the various systems. Most CNMI agencies with roles in emergency response and recovery operate on one or both of the 800-MHz systems or rely upon commercial landline and wireless assets. The HSEM repeater services 80 percent of the island and the current version of the equipment will not interface with additional repeaters.

1.1.2 Microwave

The undersea fiber cable, owned by IT&E, was upgraded to a microwave link to serve as a backup capability in the event the fiber is damaged. IT&E estimates the microwave link could carry 85 percent of the normal daily traffic. There was an additional backup system that was a satellite terminal; however, that has recently been deactivated and is being dismantled. There is only one undersea fiber cable that runs from Guam to CNMI providing voice and data service. This cable was severed in July 2015 and the islands experienced a near total communications blackout lasting several weeks. The fiber is backed up by a commercial microwave; however, the microwave network was damaged in a prior storm and has been functioning in a limited capacity. Damage to either the microwave system or the undersea cable can seriously degrade communications with CNMI.




Figure E-1: Public Safety Tower Locations in CNMI

1.1.3 Radio Communications – Trunked Systems

The primary CNMI emergency communications system is a Motorola Astro 800-MHz trunked network that provides coverage on Saipan. The network is P25 and digital, with one network tower on Mount Tapochau. Figure E-1 provides a map of tower locations for the system.

Two other large systems are in use in CNMI. One VHF public safety system is located on Tinian with a single tower and a second VHF system on Rota with two towers. The municipalities of Tinian and Rota require patching to interoperate with the CNMI 800-MHz network on Saipan. HSEM also maintains an HF radio at the EOC to provide off island communications capability.

Portable subscriber units on the CNMI network have aging batteries. In most cases, batteries will not support the radio for more than 30 minutes. Additionally, the number of spare and cache radio units is minimal.

Table E-1: CNMI’s 800-MHz Trunked Radio System

System Name/Agency Owner	Infrastructure Details	Coverage Area	Supported Agencies
CNMI 800-MHz Network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Single tower ▪ Motorola Astro P25 digital trunked ▪ Some encrypted channels ▪ Backup power ▪ 700 registered subscribers 	Southern three-fourths of the island of Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HSEM ▪ Police ▪ Fire ▪ CPA ▪ Mayor’s office
CNMI VHF System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ VHF ▪ Motorola MotoTurbo ▪ Unknown on backup power 	Tinian and Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CHCC ▪ Tinian and Rota

The EOC has 40 portable radios on the CNMI 800-MHz network while the CNMI Public School System has 32 800-MHz portable radios co-located with school bus drivers.

1.1.4 Radio Communications – HF

CMNI (Saipan EOC) has limited HF capabilities consisting of a 125-watt Motorola HF Micom and an Icom HF Marine Radio. Both are located in the Saipan EOC and connected to a NVIS (Near-Vertical Incident Skywave) antenna tuned to 5.205-MHz. The Micom or Icom HF radios are used to communicate with the CNMI EOC (similar setup) in the event all other communications have been rendered inoperable, as had occurred when CNMI’s only undersea fiber cable was severed in July 2015 and resulted in a near total communications blackout lasting several weeks.

1.1.5 Radio Communications – VHF/UHF

The primary CNMI emergency communications system is a Motorola Astro 800-MHz trunked network that provides coverage on Saipan. The network is P25 and digital, with one network tower on Mount Tapochau.

Two other large systems are in use in CNMI. One VHF public safety system is located on Tinian with a single tower and a second VHF system on Rota has two towers. The municipalities of Tinian and Rota require patching to interoperate with the CNMI 800-MHz network on Saipan. HSEM also maintains an HF radio at the EOC to provide off-island communications capability.

Portable radio units on the CNMI network have aging batteries. In most cases batteries will not support the radio for more than 30 minutes. Additionally, the number of spare and cache radio units is minimal.

1.1.6 Radio Communications – Satellite

CNMI has limited satellite voice and data capabilities. Should satellite communications be required, emergency managers will need to contact the various satellite vendors (Iridium and Global Star) to have service turned on. The USCG has some active satellite telephones assigned to Saipan and the American Red Cross also has satellite voice capability that can be used during emergencies.

1.1.7 Radio Communications – Amateur Radio

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) amateur radio database showed 467 licensed amateur radio operators within CNMI as of November 2015. The public safety/emergency management community knows of approximately 10 within CNMI. Of these, only one is active in providing auxiliary communications to the commonwealth government.

1.1.8 Public Notification Systems

This section includes information on public-private partnerships between the media and emergency communications support during an incident. This includes broadcast media and the Emergency Alert System (EAS), the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), non-English broadcast stations, and alerting capabilities used by CNMI.

The broadcast media play a significant role in disseminating critical information to the public in times of disaster. Television and radio stations are often leveraged to provide mass notification to citizens pre-incident, such as weather alerts from the National Weather Service (NWS), and post incident messaging to survivors from public information officers, as well as local governments through IPAWS, and the President through EAS. The national EAS network is designed to allow the President to broadcast a message to the American people anywhere in the country within 10 minutes of a national emergency. EAS is a network of broadcasters that relay the President's message (or a commonwealth message) from station to station, ensuring it reaches the maximum number of citizens. Fortunately, this system has never been leveraged for a national emergency. However, EAS is used regularly by CNMI and local governments to issue public alerts for many types of incidents, such as severe storms and flash flooding.

CNMI has one Primary Entry Point (PEP) station. The PEP receives national EAS live Presidential messages to the public and delivers them to the Territorial Primary (TP) and Territorial Relay (TR) stations for distribution. The TP is the distribution point for national-level EAS alerts as well as the origination point for Territorial-level EAS alerts. The TR stations monitor the TP station and relay national or local EAS alerts to local areas.

Other emergency infrastructure is specifically built to help notify, respond, and recover from natural and manmade disasters. Such infrastructure includes the aforementioned EAS, but

additionally, IPAWS, NWS, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Radio (NWR). In total, CNMI contains one EAS and one NWR station. Storm and typhoon information is received from the U.S. Navy Oceanographic Command Detachment in CNMI.

NOAA has introduced a highly portable, hardened, text-based emergency warning and messaging device known as the Chatty Beetle to CNMI. The device is designed to serve as a backup or supplementary notification path for emergency personnel in remote areas. The Chatty Beetle transmits and receives short message service (SMS) messages using the Iridium satellite network for connectivity.

CNMI (Police may use public address systems to provide emergency alerts to the public.

IPAWS is a new, national system for local alerting (it can also supplement EAS for national alerting). IPAWS supports local and CNMI officials during emergencies for sending alerts to local populations. IPAWS is being integrated into several means of communications including the following:

- Radio and television via EAS
- Cellular telephones through Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA)
- NWR via IPAWS-NOAA gateway
- Internet applications and websites via the IPAWS public feed

HSEM is the alerting authority for issuing IPAWS alerts in CNMI. Because CNMI is a single level of government, there are no cooperative operating groups (COGs).

WEA is a critical component of IPAWS that allows federal, state, and commonwealth governments to distribute geographically targeted, text-like messages to customers who own certain wireless phone models and other enabled mobile devices to alert them of imminent threats to safety in their area. The system uses broadcast technology that ensures alerts will not get stuck in highly congested areas, which can happen with standard mobile voice and texting services. The alerts are geographically targeted to cell towers in the location of an emergency; cell phones using the cell towers in the alert zone will receive a WEA.

Although developed during the Cold War, the National Warning System (NAWAS), a 24-hour private-line telephone system used to disseminate warning information concerning major disasters to more than 1,800 warning points across the United States, remains the primary system for emergency communications from the Federal Government to CNMI and local warning points.

The NOAA West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/ATWC) and Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) are directly connected to the FEMA Region IX and Region X NAWAS circuits. When a tsunami warning is issued, WC/ATWC and PTWC initiate conference calls via NAWAS with all potentially affected states. NAWAS uses dedicated circuits that bypass local telephone switches, protecting the system from congestion and from some outages that may affect local telephone carriers. Terminals are protected against lightning strikes. When commercial landline and cellular voice and data circuits are unavailable due to congestion, power loss, or damage to local infrastructure, NAWAS may still provide two-way connectivity for critical communications.

A NAWAS terminal/circuit has been implemented/installed in CNMI (EOC); this constitutes an in place, formal mechanism NAWAS alerts to HSEM.

When they become aware of impending threats, FEMA Region IX watch officers and other personnel attempt to contact emergency agencies, but must rely upon local commercial circuits that are subject to congestion and damage.

1.1.9 Incident Command Vehicle (ICV)

HSEM currently has a Command Vehicle. The Department of Public Health has a 26' RV Command Vehicle that uses portable radios for communications.

1.1.10 Wireline Telephones

Agencies requiring communications with the continental United States (CONUS) rely on landline telephones, cellular telephones, and the commercial Internet. The majority of CNMI's wire telephone capabilities are delivered through cable that is supported by telephone poles. It is expected that most of CNMI's wire telephone capability will be rendered nonoperational in the aftermath of a catastrophic typhoon. It is likely that many of the supporting poles will be damaged.

1.1.11 Cellular Telephones

Cellular communications capabilities in CNMI are provided by three carriers: IConnect, IT&E and NTT Docomo. Long-Term Evolution (LTE) is available on Saipan as well as GSM and CDMA; however, both Tinian and Rota are GSM only and receive Evolution Data Optimized, which is typically on par with 3G speeds. The varied elevation of the terrain leaves areas of CNMI without any cellular coverage. No coverage exists on the sparsely inhabited northern islands. CNMI's emergency managers and first responders contract with multiple cellular providers. Roaming agreements allow surge responders to roam on local cellular systems with any phone from the mainland and Hawaii. All out of CNMI calls are routed through a single undersea cable between the CNMI and Guam. Outages on the cable will affect communications between CNMI, Hawaii, and the mainland.

1.1.12 9-1-1 Capabilities

9-1-1 public safety answering points (PSAPs) in CNMI represent the first line in local response to disasters. They are responsible for answering the initial 9-1-1 service calls for police, fire, and EMS and are critical to the execution of emergency services. There is one PSAP in CNMI, which is located within the Jose M. Sablan Public Safety Building. All hazards associated with the EOC apply to the PSAP. The proper operation of dispatch centers, PSAPs, and other infrastructure rely on local exchange carriers (LEC), which provide access to the Public-Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) to successfully route calls. Each LEC within CNMI supports telecommunications services within a uniquely defined geographic area, called a serving wire center (SWC). Within each SWC, the LECs typically operate from a single facility, which houses multiple switches.

1.1.13 Internet

CNMI's Office of Administration provides the commonwealth's data network. CNMI relies on IT&E to provide data connectivity. IT&E is the only landline provider of data in CNMI. They also are the local exchange carrier on Saipan, with 2 network operations centers on Saipan and

an additional one on Guam, 150 miles away. IT&E has 8 central offices in CNMI: 5 on Saipan, 1 on Tinian, and 2 on Rota. The 14 cell sites—11 on Saipan, 1 on Tinian, and 2 on Rota—are linked with buried copper and fiber optic cable.

1.1.14 CNMI/Saipan CNMI HSEM Emergency Operations Center

The commonwealth EOC is operated by HSEM. It is located on the island of Saipan in the Capitol Hill region. The EOC is staffed during business hours, Monday through Friday, with after-hours calls being answered by the CNMI Dispatch Center, 670-237-8000 or 8003, on a 24-hour basis. The EOC is equipped with the CNMI 800-MHz trunked radio, marine VHF channel 19, a non-working NAWAS circuit, and the FEMA National Radio Network (FNARS) high-frequency radio. The FNARS radio currently is receive only, pending repairs. The EOC has some satellite voice capabilities but would need to activate the units. It is equipped with a diesel generator that also services the Saipan PSAP. Fax, email, and telephone also provide supporting communications. Backup communications, if activated for the emergency, can be provided by satellite telephone, with Iridium and Global Star being the providers.

2 Mission

Effective emergency communication capabilities (operable and interoperable communications and real-time information sharing) is a critical component of response and recovery. Time and distance considerations between CNMI and CONUS and OCONUS requires robust capability.

The purpose of this appendix is to provide CNMI-specific communications information to operators and planners responding to a catastrophic typhoon impacting CNMI.

3 Execution

3.1 Concept of Operations

The overall strategy is to deploy CONUS communications assets during Phase 1c, when the confidence and clarity regarding the typhoon's track is high. Communications assets will be part of a pre-impact push package. It is highly recommended that the majority of these assets be staged in Hawaii at the onset of Phase 1c or at the FEMA DC Guam on a permanent basis to reduce transit time to CNMI.

To develop an integrated commonwealth and federal strategy for effective communications coordination in the response to a typhoon strike in CNMI, communications must—

- Supplement existing CNMI and local communications assets;
- Ensure an accessible framework for communications and coordination during response operations immediately following typhoon impact; and
- Identify C2 entities and points of contact (POCs).

During an incident, a significant loss of fixed commercial and public safety communications infrastructure is anticipated. Existing CNMI communications infrastructure will be leveraged to the greatest extent possible and will be augmented through federal assets.

3.1.1 Response Prioritization

In response to events or incidents that cross over political jurisdictions (villages), there will be competing demands and priorities for interoperable communications assets.

Interoperable communications should be attempted with the following order of operations in mind (subject to variability based on the agencies involved and the nature of the event/incident):

1. Leverage face-to-face communications wherever appropriate. The co-location of all command and general staffs at the Incident Command Post provides the best direct communications and reduces the demand on interoperability resources.
2. Employ local communications assets until such time as either those assets become taxed or they become inadequate based on the nature and/or scope of the incident.
3. If response agencies are users of a shared system, utilize that shared system to establish interoperable communications.
4. If response agencies operate on disparate systems, utilize shared or mutual aid channels to establish interoperable communications.
5. If response agencies do not share systems or channels, utilize a gateway solution to establish interoperable communications.
6. Where interoperable communications cannot otherwise be established between response agencies, utilize swap or cache radios to establish operable communications for responders.
7. If other methods of interoperability cannot be established, relay communications through staff members.

When the same resources are requested for two or more incidents, resource assignments should be based on the priority levels listed below:

1. Disasters, large-scale incidents, or extreme emergencies requiring mutual aid or interagency communications.
2. Incidents where imminent danger exists to life or property.
3. Incidents requiring the response of multiple agencies.
4. Pre-planned events requiring mutual aid or interagency communications.
5. Incidents involving a single agency where supplemental communications are needed for agency use.
6. Drills, tests, and exercises.

In the event of multiple simultaneous incidents within the same priority level, the resources should be allocated based on the following priorities:

1. Incidents with the greatest level of exigency (e.g., greater threat to life or property or more immediate need) have priority over less exigent incidents.
2. Agencies with single/limited interoperable options have priority use of those options over agencies with multiple interoperable options.

3. When at all possible, agencies already using an interoperable asset during an event should not be redirected to another resource.

3.1.2 Critical Considerations

- Power outages will also occur for extended periods of time in some areas, thus interrupting the power supply to communications systems for both emergency responders and the public.
- In areas experiencing power outages, communications facilities may be forced to operate on backup power generators and/or battery backup systems (UPS – Uninterruptable Power Supplies, etc.); however, these backup power systems, in most cases, are designed to last for only 3 to 72 hours. Additionally, refueling and/or servicing of these systems may be a challenge due to fuel resources, local availability of parts and repair capabilities, access road conditions, and delivery vehicles.
- Landline and cellular telephone systems will also suffer degradation for at least the first day post-event and probably longer, due to system overload and damage to telephone poles and cellular tower antennas.
- Limited LMR and satellite communications capabilities for responders may still be operational; however, satellite communications channels may be overwhelmed by calls while wind damage to radio antenna structures and flooding of central switching offices responsible for radio circuit routing to communications sites may severely impact and limit first responder radio communications capabilities.
- Internet, cable TV, and off-island telephone connectivity will be severely impacted due to loss of overhead signal transport systems, such as telephone poles, as well as damage to underground/underwater cabling and/or wind-impacted satellite dish systems that are responsible for linking CNMI to global communications systems.

3.1.3 Critical Assumptions

- CNMI distributes alerts and warnings through public radio addresses and local television stations.
- Cell tower sites have backup diesel generators that are maintained and serviced.
- Overhead lines will be severed when telephone line poles structurally fail.
- When the power grid fails, cell towers equipped with emergency power will still operate.
- Operational communications capabilities are initially degraded due to storm damage.
- FEMA Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) communications coordinators will be required to facilitate communications interoperability between federal and CNMI response entities.
- It is probable that a typhoon will cause extensive damage to existing commercial and linked governmental communications infrastructure that could take several weeks or months to repair. The combined effects of typhoon associated wind, flooding, and ground water saturation will likely result in structural damage to many commercial and

governmental communications facilities, including cellular towers, radio antenna towers, and telephone switching and control centers.

- Landline and cellular telephone systems will not work for at least the first day post-impact and probably much longer, due to system overload and damage to cell phone towers and telephone poles.
- Landline-based systems (copper/fiber) may remain functional post-event, but functionality may be limited due to physical damage to connections.
- Cellular phone system coverage will not be available in many undetermined geographic areas.
- FEMA should be prepared to provide satellite voice and data capabilities for connectivity between CNMI/Saipan and CONUS.
- Cellular towers and support buildings will require structural damage assessments/repairs.
- Diversity and redundancy of public/private communications systems will enable some form of limited emergency communications.
- Wireless Priority Service may not be a useful tool if cell networks are down.
- Federal resources will be required, such as MERS, satellite phones, and radios; availability of resources will be determined based on current disaster declarations within FEMA Region IX or nationally.
- There will be high demand/low availability for qualified radio technicians and mechanics to work on backup generators.
- Additional communications equipment may be required to temporarily restore LMR networks for CNMI and local responders in remote areas and where commercial and public safety infrastructure is damaged.
- The temporary restoration of damaged communications infrastructure and fuel delivery will be inhibited by debris in mobility corridors.

3.1.4 Requirements

Based on the anticipated damage to communications infrastructure, the communications assets required to supplement existing CNMI communications resources to help save and sustain human lives during the initial response are as follows:

- Up to 25 800-MHz CNMI/Saipan trunk-capable handsets to ensure effective communications between incoming emergency responders and local counterparts in support of command and control, evacuation, sheltering, and other emergency response missions.
- Voice communications for up to 50 personnel to provide C2 with the CNMI EOC, fire command, and incoming fire and EMS units.
- Bridging equipment to link radio systems in the incident area to the nearest gateway.
- Up to 20 Iridium satellite phones for voice connectivity of first responders in the event that the island-wide 800-MHz system is rendered nonoperational.

- Satellite terminals with voice telephone, Internet, and video teleconferencing (VTC) capabilities.
- Verizon-based cellular telephones.

3.2 Tasks by Phase

3.2.1 Phase 1 (Pre-Incident)

Operational Focus: Ensure situational awareness and preparedness.

Primary Actions

CNMI HSEM

- Ensure currency of the CNMI Emergency Operations Communications Plan.
- Ensure that EOC emergency communications equipment is continuously used and exercised by conducting communications daily checks with other CNMI, federal, and/or local agencies.
- Ensure operational capability and monitor status of CNMI-wide alert and notification systems.
- Participate in training and/or exercises that support emergency communications proficiency.
- Participate in multi-jurisdictional exercises to establish working relationships.
- Maintain a list of critical POCs involved in the restoration of emergency communications equipment and/or systems after an emergency.
- Maintain a list of critical communications nodes that includes their location, capabilities, and alternate access methods.
- Ensure continuous coordination with PSTN's to ensure awareness of changes, upgrades, etc., to related equipment and systems.
- Ensure radio site generators are fueled and operational.
- Ensure continued testing of emergency and/or standby emergency communications equipment to ensure operational readiness.
- Ensure coordination of relevant communications issues with the Region IX Regional Emergency Communications Coordinator (RECC).

FEMA

- **MERS:** Maintain emergency communications equipment and system capabilities in a constant state of readiness for potential deployment in the event of a disaster.
- **Region IX RECC:** Meet regularly with CNMI emergency communications POCs to discuss, coordinate, and/or resolve communications issues; observe and/or participate in communications-related meetings and conferences to establish and maintain working relationships between CNMI and FEMA. Establish and maintain procedures

for deployment of Disaster Emergency Communications (DEC) restoration capabilities to include FEMA Headquarters DEC Disaster Emergency Group Supervisors, and Office of Emergency Communications ESF #2 representatives.

3.2.2 Phase 1c (Near Certainty)

Operational Focus: Execute preparedness and protective measures for on-island resources and capabilities.

Primary Actions

CNMI HSEM

- Activate CNMI ESF #2.
- Activate the phone bridge between CNMI HSEM EOC and all appropriate CNMI departments, local agencies, IMAT, the DCO, appropriate ESFs, the NWS, and FEMA Region IX.
- Protect and safeguard critical emergency communications resources prior to landfall in order to ensure operability and accessibility post-landfall.
- Alert and identify required communication resource providers and on-hand communication asset inventories.
- Identify and coordinate follow on fuel distribution for generators supporting critical island communications sites.

FEMA

- Activate the FEMA Region IX RRCC at Level 1 and ensure activation and deployment of ESF #2 resources.
- Begin initial identification and coordination of a federal staging area in CNMI and incident support bases in Hawaii and on the U.S. west coast in anticipation of the deployment of initial emergency communications immediate response resources to CNMI.
- Identify and prepare initial MERS coordination and communications response personnel and DEC resources for deployment to Region IX or Hawaii to meet up with the Region IX IMAT and/or IMAT-West.

3.2.3 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)

Operational Focus: Conduct initial assessments, activate supplemental resources for assistance, and prioritize restoration activities for recovery.

Primary Actions

CNMI HSEM

- Conduct initial damage assessment of DEC resources/capabilities and report to EOC the status of critical equipment and/or systems:
 - Public Warning/Notification Capabilities

- EAS
- Siren/Public Address Systems
- Cellular SMS/Text Capabilities
- 911 Telephone
- Commercial AM/FM Radio Stations
- IPAWS
- Commercial Cable TV
- Commercial Antenna/Digital TV
- NOAA Radio
- Emergency/Operational Communications Capabilities
 - LMR Interoperability
 - Tactical Support Radios
 - Tactical Satellite Capabilities
 - NAWAS
 - Pre-identified Emergency Shelter Communications
- Communications Backbone/Infrastructure Capabilities
 - Emergency Responder Communications Circuits
 - Cellular Telephone Equipment and Towers
 - Wireline Telephone
 - Internet Access
 - Central/Communications Office Support
 - Major Communications Transport – Microwave, Telephone Poles, etc.
- Re-establish and/or maintain functionality of networked island-wide communications equipment and systems.
- Ensure delivery of fuel to generators supporting emergency communications equipment and systems.
- Ensure access to emergency communications radio systems and networks.

FEMA

- Deploy FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications Group Supervisor (DEGS), RECC, and Tactical and Communications Restoration (ESF #2) Task Force Leaders to meet up with the deployed IMAT team.
- Deploy MERS Coordinator and Communications Specialist to Region IX or Hawaii to meet up with the Region IX IMAT and/or IMAT-West.
- Deploy MERS initial portable emergency communications equipment and systems capable of supporting users with VHF, UHF, satellite, and VTC capabilities.
- Ensure MERS coordination of initial frequencies with the FEMA Frequency Manager; prepare the ICS 205 for the FEMA Frequency Manager to document frequency usage among the response community.
- Coordinate use of 10 pre-identified CNMI HSEM trunked radios with the CNMI Interoperability Coordinator.

- Upon arrival, DEGS and/or RECC in coordination with CNMI HSEM will assess the status of CNMI’s DEC capabilities (above) and facilitate resolution of shortfalls for the same.
- Upon arrival, MERS, in coordination with CNMI HSEM, will access the emergency communications environment and immediately request, if necessary, additional MERS resources required to augment and resolve CNMI emergency communications capabilities and shortfalls.

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

4.1 Administration

The table below lists the key C2 agencies and facilities, including communications capabilities.

CNMI Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)	
Name	Joaquin “Kilroy” Guerrero
Title	SWIC, Communications Coordinator
Agency	Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)
Address	1313 Guguan Drive, Saipan
Office Phone	670-287-7172
Cell Phone	670-287-7173
FAX	670-664-2218
Email	joaquin.guerrero@cnmihsem.gov.mp
Primary 24/7 Phone	670-237-8000
Alternate 24/7 Phone	670-237-8003 670-433-9225 Tinian DPS
SAT Phone/MSAT	None at State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)
Satellite/MSAT Talkgroup	None at SEOC
Cellular Phone	None at SEOC
NEXTEL/SouthernLINC/Other	None
Radio – HF	5.205-MHz
Radio – Amateur Bands/Modes	None
Radio – VHF Low	None
Radio – VHF High	VHF Marine Channel 19 156.950-MHz 150.995/159.030-MHz, no tones, Rota DPS 158.3250/167.3250-MHz, no tones, Tinian DPS
Radio – UHF	None
Radio – 700-MHz	None
Radio – 800-MHz	809.2650-MHz 812.2625-MHz 813.2625-MHz
NAWAS	Yes
FNARS	Yes – 110-watt with connectivity to only CNMI at this time
EMNET	No
MARS	No
Winlink	No
WEB EOC	Yes
HSIN	No

CNMI Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)	
CWIN	No
VTC	No
STE Phone	No
Email	TBD
FAX	670-322-9500

4.2 Resources

MERS Assets

Mobile Emergency Response Support		
System	Capability	POC
Radio Frequency Assets	60 VHF and 36 UHF radios	David Hoegemeyer david.hoegemeyer@dhs.gov (425) 487-4421
	1 VHF and 2 UHF tactical repeaters	
	1 TRP-1000 for radio cross patching	
	2 portable Ku-band satellite terminals, one of which can be configured for C-band	
Other Resources		
System	Capability	POC
	12 International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) terminals	
	Portable microwave line-of-sight equipment for extending communications capabilities	
Telephone	Telephones and switch for 200 users	Scott Sweigart Scott.sweigart@dhs.gov (425) 487-4424
	16 Iridium phones	
	Secure telephone communications	
	NIPRNet capability	
	SIPRNet capability	
	Video teleconferencing capability	
	Secure VTC capability	
	1 Multi-radio Van	

Mobile Emergency Response Support		
System	Capability	POC
Mobile communication systems	1 Incident Response Vehicle	
	2 Mobile Emergency Operations Vehicles	
LMR	6 JT1000 radios	

CNMI Shared Systems

“Shared system” refers to a single radio system used to provide service to several public safety or public service agencies. The table below lists the radio system shared by more than one public safety or service agency operating in CNMI.

System Name/Agency Owner	Infrastructure Details	Coverage Area	Supported Agencies
CNMI 800-MHz Network	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Single tower ▪ Motorola Astro P25 digital trunked ▪ Some encrypted channels ▪ Backup power ▪ 700 registered subscribers 	Southern three-fourths of the Island of Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ HSEM ▪ Police ▪ Fire ▪ CPA ▪ Mayor’s office
CNMI VHF System	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ VHF ▪ Motorola MotoTurbo ▪ Unknown on backup power 	Tinian and Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ CHCC ▪ Tinian and Rota

Region-wide Shared System Policies and Procedures

HSEM operate two 800-MHz radio systems: a new 800-MHz Motorola Astro 25 system and an older 800-MHz analog Motorola SmartNet Type II trunking system (decommissioned). They also have two independent VHF conventional systems, one on Rota and one on Tinian. The systems on Rota and Tinian are monitored at the at the Saipan dispatch center when the DSL link is operating. Gateways are used to provide interoperability between the various systems. Most CNMI agencies with roles in emergency response and recovery operate on one or both of the 800-MHz systems, or rely upon commercial landline and wireless assets.

There are two primary single points of failure in the communications infrastructure in CNMI. Specifically the HSEM repeater located on Mt. Tapochau (1550’) in the central highlands of Saipan and the undersea fiber cable that runs to CNMI. The HSEM repeater services 80 percent of the island, and the current version of the equipment will not interface with additional repeaters. The fiber cable is owned by IT&E, which has upgraded a microwave link to serve as a backup capability in the event the fiber is damaged. The IT&E estimates the microwave link could carry 85 percent of the normal daily traffic. There was an additional backup system, a satellite terminal; however that has recently been deactivated and is being dismantled.

Interoperability with federal resources, specifically the USCG and DOD assets, is limited. The DOD and USCG are relied on heavily to provide large event and disaster assistance, using their own organic equipment.

Island-wide Shared System Rules of Use

National Incident Management System – The Incident Command System compliant with the National Incident Management System when using any regional interoperability resource.

Plain Language – All interoperable communications during multi-agency, multi-discipline incidents will be in plain language. Avoid using radio codes, acronyms, and abbreviations as they may cause confusion between agencies. Ensure that all verbal requests for assistance or backup specify the reason for the request.

Unit Identification – Announce your home agency prior to announcing your unit identifier during interoperable communication situations. (i.e., GPD Alpha-two calling GFD Medic-one)

Island-wide Shared System Procedures

Use the following procedures when requesting, using, or discontinuing the use of shared communication systems assets:

- When an individual responder needs to interoperate with another agency on their same shared system, the responder will notify their dispatch center. The dispatcher can then identify and designate an appropriate talk group or patch two talk groups together. Note that in cases where no dispatcher intervention is required, responders still notify dispatch that they are switching to a shared talk group to maintain responder safety. In the case of dispatchers designating the use of INTEROP one through ten, the dispatcher shall notify the Incident Command Center (ICC).
- Notify dispatch when the interoperability talk groups or patches are no longer required and announce the return to normal operations talk groups.

For extended incidents—

- The lead agency dispatcher notifies the Communications Unit Leader (COML), or designee, that interoperability talk groups or patches are in use.
- Each agency's dispatch center tells additional en route responders what interoperability talk groups are in use for the incident.
- The Incident Commander, or their designee, determines when the interoperability channels are no longer required and the COML notifies the appropriate dispatch center.

Island-wide Shared System Problem ID and Resolution

Agencies should identify and resolve problems through the ICC. Significant concerns can be brought to the Incident Command Working Group for further discussion. During an incident—

- During activation, report shared system problems to the COML, or their designee, assigned to the incident/event that will follow established agency procedures to resolve the problem.
- Following an incident, the following general problem identification and resolution processes apply to all shared systems.

- Agencies using a shared system will report any problems with that system directly to the CNMI HSEM. The CNMI HSEM ensures effective resolution to reported shared system problems.

Gateways

“Gateway” systems interconnect channels of disparate systems (whether on different frequency bands or radio operating modes), allowing first responders using their existing radios and channels to be interconnected with the channels of other users outside of their agency. Dispatch consoles that are able to create patches will also be captured as gateways. Gateways and use of the same are referenced and listed in CNMI/Saipan’s *Tactical Inoperability Communications Plan*. The fixed gateways utilized in CNMI are various models of Motorola Console Systems.

Primary Public Safety Frequencies

See the CNMI/Saipan Statewide Communications, Tactical Inoperability Communications, and Emergency Communications Plans.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

Appendix F: Public Information and Warning

1 *Situation*

A catastrophic typhoon impacting CNMI will render most conventional public messaging methods ineffective or significantly degraded. This will require the use of various other methods to convey public safety messages, evacuation instructions, sheltering information, and other information that must be reported to the public. All methods should be considered and none should be ruled out, particularly during the first 48 to 72 hours post-impact.

The typhoon may generate extensive, sustained media attention that may overwhelm CNMI's Emergency Support Function (ESF) #15 capabilities.

2 *Mission*

The mission of public information and warning is to engage, inform and educate all FEMA stakeholders in support of the Agency's programs and initiatives to achieve its mission

3 *Execution*

3.1 *Concept of Operations*

ESF #15 provides coordinated, accurate, and timely information to governments, the private sector, news media, residents, and visitors of CNMI, including important warnings and instructions for protecting lives and property.

The overall strategy is to deploy federal continental United States communications assets for ESF #15 prior to typhoon landfall when the confidence and clarity of the storm's track is high. Assets include equipment and personnel. Communications assets may be part of the pre-landfall push package. ESF #15 will work with the FEMA Logistics Management Directorate to define and update communications push package requirements.

Broadcast production cameras, still cameras, laptops, and software are part of a push package that will be provided by FEMA for social networking and public information during Phase 1b. In Phase 1c, broadcast operations teams will be supplemented by FEMA Headquarters (HQ) EA staff to begin capturing images pre- and post-landfall for commonwealth and FEMA use.

Individual Assistance and Disaster Survivor Assistance teams will need to print and distribute large quantities of tele-registration flyers in the first 72 hours following a catastrophic typhoon. Disaster Survivor Assistance staff will communicate requirements to ESF #7 so they may source printing companies and other resources pre-landfall.

Additional communications assets may need to be identified in order to supplement existing local resources, prepare for the anticipated extent of damage to the commercial communications infrastructure, and address requirements for providing lifesaving emergency public information.

3.1.1 *Incident Support*

The Governor of CNMI's Office of Communications oversees the Governor's media relations efforts through its web-based communications, social media platforms, print and video

information materials, events, and other external communications efforts. CNMI ESF #15 provides support for the following four essential functions:

- Emergency public information
- Legislative affairs
- Private sector coordination
- Local coordination

3.1.2 Incident Management

Federal ESF #15 will mobilize in Phase 1b to ensure maximum coordination on public messaging.

Federal ESF #15 supports CNMI with the following functions and resources:

- Joint Information Center (JIC)
- Planning and products
- Congressional affairs
- Intergovernmental affairs
- Private sector coordination

The Governor of CNMI (or the CNMI Governor’s Communications Director) and the Special Advisor of the CNMI Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) agency activates CNMI ESF #15 operations. The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) activates federal ESF #15 operations and appoints the External Affairs Officer (EAO). Prior to a disaster declaration, CNMI EA activities will be the responsibility of the respective departments and agencies and do not require coordination with ESF # 15. After a Presidential Disaster Declaration, ESF #15 operations will transfer from the HSEM Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to the Joint Field Office (JFO). When the JFO demobilizes, ESF #15 operations will transfer back to the Emergency Operation Center (EOC).

The EOC will establish a JIC to serve as the principal source for public information. FEMA will provide an ESF #15 representative to the JIC to provide information on FEMA response efforts and to support the CNMI in joint messaging. Messages produced by ESF #15 personnel will follow the Joint Information Systems (JIS) model, as outlined in the National Response Framework.

3.1.3 Critical Considerations

- Pre-deployment of trained media relations specialists and local JIC field officers will be critical in ensuring that accurate and timely information is distributed to the public and media throughout the event, minimizing the amount of misinformation that reaches the general population.

3.1.4 Assumptions

- Residents and visitors to CNMI will be provided with clear, concise information that is sustained, coordinated, and consistent across all levels of government. Announcements

will include information regarding shelters, medical facilities, evacuation and re-entry, hazardous materials areas, reunification programs as required, and response/recovery operations.

- Local EA staff/public information officers (PIOs) may be personally affected by the disaster and may be unable to perform emergency duties.
- Disseminating information to access and functional needs and medical needs populations will require additional services, including sign language interpreters and closed-caption message broadcasting, contracting for which will be handled by FEMA HQ multi-lingual operations.
- The Unified Coordination Group, in coordination with ESF #15, will brief CNMI legislators as necessary. The FEMA Office of Legislative Affairs may be challenged by numerous requests for information from congressional offices and committees in Washington, D.C. Accurate updates to those parties will be facilitated through consistent FEMA HQ and FEMA Region communications with field representatives.
- Press conferences will need to be conducted as soon as possible and will depend on the availability of the CNMI/federal officials responsible for providing situational information to the White House, DHS, and FEMA HQ.
- Power outages and the destruction of homes may severely limit reception of emergency transmissions.
- Cellular communications and text messaging capabilities are expected to be severely degraded or non-existent.
- The Emergency Alert System, which is designed to deliver emergency messages via broadcast stations direct from local, CNMI, or federal authorities, will be rendered only partially operable due to damaged towers and facilities.
- Journalists and media personnel in CNMI may be personally affected by the storm and may not be able to assist in emergency communications functions.

FEMA's EAO and JIC field officers deploy pre-landfall to support and provide personnel resources to facilitate the delivery of communications and emergency information to affected populations as soon as possible post-landfall. All agencies involved in disaster response will be represented in the JIC. Implementation of the JIS ensures a "one message, many voices" approach, incorporating representatives across multiple jurisdictions and entities.

The emergency public information function is an HSEM responsibility. The HSEM is responsible for developing and releasing information about emergency operations to the news media, personnel involved in the response and recovery operations, and other appropriate agencies and organizations. Additional support may be drawn from other local agencies or volunteers. The HSEM PIO activates and directs public information procedures.

Coordination with other CNMI and local entities will be necessary to ensure accuracy and consistency in the delivery of emergency public information messages.

During activations for emergencies and disasters, emergency public information functions are carried out through the EOC. FEMA will provide ESF #15 personnel to serve in the EOC and

coordinate messaging with CNMI personnel. Once a JFO is operational, emergency public information functions will be transferred from the EOC to the JIC at the JFO.

FEMA’s Private Sector Unit will coordinate with local businesses on the delivery of joint messages to private sector employees through private sector communications channels. Outreach will include coordination with ESF #15 for collaboration with the travel industry. Under most conditions, emergency information is disseminated to the public through the news media. News organizations often act as the conduit through which critical information flows from authoritative sources and decision makers to the public.

If commercial broadcasting operations remain functional post-landfall, the normal handling of media relations and media operations remains in effect, including:

- News conferences/briefings
- News releases
- CNMI/federal official participation in live programming
- News updates on social media and websites

Federal ESF #15 will provide broadcast operations teams to capture images of response operations for social media posts.

3.2 Tasks by Phase

External Affairs executes support through a phased response.

3.2.1 Phase 1a (Normal Operations)

Operational Focus: The operational focus is situational awareness and preparedness.

Primary Actions

- ESF #15 develops and actively manages a comprehensive multi-media emergency information program that places an emphasis on family preparedness through coordinated print and broadcast outlets as well as press conferences and briefings.
- ESF #15 (HSEM) provides risk communications information to the public.

3.2.2 Phase 1b (Increased Likelihood)

Operational Focus: Gather information and network with leadership for messaging.

Primary Actions

- Activate Federal ESF #15.
- Deploy ESF #15 with FEMA IMAT, FEMA’s EAO, and JIC field officers deploy pre-impact to support and provide personnel resources to facilitate the delivery of communications and emergency information to affected populations as soon as possible post-impact.
- CNMI ESF #15 coordinates with ESF #3 on pre-landfall messaging designed to encourage water storage and to provide “stockpile water” orders post-landfall. The CNMI

BECQ decides upon any “boil water” notices post-landfall and coordinates messaging with the JIC.

- CNMI ESF #15 develops emergency public information messages, in coordination with local power and water utility company operated by the CUC through ESF #12.
- The emergency public information function is a CNMI responsibility. CNMI is responsible for developing and releasing information about emergency operations to the news media, personnel involved in the response and recovery operations, and other appropriate agencies and organizations. Additional support may be drawn from other local agencies or volunteers. The CNMI PIO activates and directs public information procedures.
- All agencies involved in disaster response will have staff representatives for a JIC.
- Implementation of the JIS ensures a “one message, many voices” approach, incorporating representatives across multiple jurisdictions and entities.

3.2.3 *Phase 1c (Near Certainty)*

Operational Focus: Integrate with CNMI ESF #15 and establish a JIC.

Primary Actions

- ESF #15 is part of the Command Staff, as designated in the National Incident Management System, and provides appropriate representatives available to deploy rapidly to the incident location and other information-critical venues within the affected area. FEMA and other federal agencies will provide the necessary operational, strategic, logistical, and administrative support to carry out an effective public and governmental information campaign throughout all phases of the disaster. Federal agency communications and public affairs personnel will be assigned, when possible, to the JFO ESF #15 to coordinate territory and federal messaging.
- A broadcast operations team deploys and reports to CNMI.
- Federal and CNMI ESF #15 personnel develop and implement a joint communications strategy.
- Federal ESF #15 coordinates with HSEM and informs the public of shelter locations and their status. HSEM identifies and communicates additional shelter locations and other ESF #6 assistance as needed.
- ESF #15 releases preparedness messaging to the public in anticipation of typhoon landfall.
- ESF #15 coordinates emergency public information messages to inform visitors to CNMI during events (including coordinating with hotels, airlines, and travel agencies).
- ESF #15 coordinates messaging with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of State (DOS), and DHS Transportation Security Administration. DOS coordinates and collaborates with all foreign nationals.

- ESF #15 implements emergency public information messages to encourage the public to fill all fuel tanks. All fuel messaging will be coordinated through ESF #12, including collaboration with the private sector petroleum industry for future announcements.
- ESF #15 and ESF #1 distribute emergency information messages.
- ESF #15 releases emergency public information on the deployment status of federal assets activated in support of the anticipated needs of CNMI.
- DHS is likely to initiate a commonwealth/federal National Incident Communications Coordination Line to discuss messaging strategy and to share information on actions taken.
- Other messaging is developed, to include but not limited to the following:
 - Definition of roles/responsibilities at the CNMI/federal/local levels.
 - Multi-lingual operations at FEMA HQ, in coordination with ESF #15, to begin developing messaging products in multiple languages for distribution.

3.2.4 Phase 2 (Incident and Incident Response)

Operational Focus: ESF #15 publicizes through the media response activities that directly impact or benefit affected communities. Publicized activities may include the location of shelters and feeding stations, health and safety information, the location of comfort stations, “boil water” orders, road closure information, school and office closing information, and environmental hazards.

Primary Actions

- HSEM will be the lead entity to provide disaster information to CNMI officials.
- HSEM will coordinate with FEMA on information provided to CNMI and legislative members.
- Federal ESF #15, in coordination with CNMI ESF #15, will coordinate outreach to local leaders of CNMI on federal issues.
- The FEMA Congressional Affairs Unit will coordinate with HSEM on the exchange of information to Members of Congress, as appropriate.
- The release of joint information to the news media and any press conferences/interviews held with CNMI and federal officials will also be coordinated with HSEM.
- The FEMA Planning and Products Unit will develop all written materials, fact sheets, talking points, and briefings in coordination with HSEM.
- ESF #15 coordinates with the DOS, ESF #6, and FEMA HQ (International Affairs) to establish protocols for communications with foreign consulates and the public and provide information concerning ongoing evacuation operations. FEMA HQ coordinates all foreign requests through the DOS.
- ESF #15 conducts public messaging to manage expectations and reassure the public regarding mass care and emergency assistance operations.

- If space allows, ESF #15 begins holding daily press briefings in the JFO.
- ESF #15 coordinates and deploys additional ESF #15 staff as required.
- ESF #15 coordinates congressional delegations and other VIP visits.
- Broadcast operations teams deploy to affected areas and shelters to start capturing images (shelters, typhoon damage, logistics centers, commodity movement operations, staging areas).
- ESF #15 develops other life-safety messaging as well as messaging in CNMI/federal response priorities. Products include, but are not limited to:
 - Press releases (FEMA HQ prepares initial overall national response press release)
 - Talking points
 - Social media posts
 - Fact sheets
 - Congressional advisories

3.2.5 Phase 3 (Sustained Operations)

Operational Focus: ESF #15, working in conjunction with EOC staff, responds to media inquiries for damage assessment statistics and estimates. In coordination with FEMA, ESF #15 publicizes the status of any emergency or disaster declarations, the types of assistance available to survivors, and recovery center location information.

Primary Actions

- Provide messaging on recovery-related topics such as—
 - Information on how to access assistance from local, federal, and non-governmental entities.
 - FEMA and the U.S. Small Business Administration registration/assistance process.
 - Disaster Recovery Center capabilities/hours of operation/locations
- ESF #15 will assist CNMI in creating emergency public information messaging to encourage tourism in order to minimize economic impacts in CNMI and promote economic recovery.
- FEMA's Private Sector Unit will coordinate with local businesses on the delivery of joint messages to private sector employees through private sector communications channels. Outreach will include coordination with the travel industry. Under most conditions, emergency information is disseminated to the public through the news media. News organizations often act as the conduit through which critical information flows from authoritative sources and decision makers to the public.
- If commercial broadcasting operations remain functional post-impact, the normal handling of media relations and media operations remains in effect, including:
 - News conferences/briefings

- News releases
- Commonwealth/federal official participation in live programming
- News updates on social media and websites

4 Administration, Resources, and Funding

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5 Oversight, Coordinating Instructions, and Communications

See Base Plan of this *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan*.

5.1 Oversight

5.1.1 ESF Coordinator/Primary Agency: HSEM

- Oversee media relations, including media monitoring.
- Coordinate emergency public information activities to ensure consistency and accuracy of information released to the general public through the CNMI JIC.
- Coordinate information-sharing among all agencies involved in incident management.
- Notify Support Agencies of the need to staff ESF #15 during an incident.
- Establish and maintain the CNMI JIC and media center.

5.1.2 Primary Agency: Governor's Communications Office

- Establish priorities for external communications.
- Approve and schedule joint press conferences.

5.1.3 Support Agency: FEMA

- Support CNMI in providing critical information to the public.
- Implement the federal ESF #15 mission, as outlined in the ESF #15 Standard of Procedure.

5.1.4 Support Agency: Joint Region Marianas

- Support the JIC pre-landfall, once established.
- Support CNMI in providing critical information to the public post-landfall.

ESF 15 Organizational Chart




Figure F-1: Federal External Affairs Organization Chart

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Appendix W: Fact Sheets

List of Fact Sheets

1. Situational Assessment
2. Stabilize Water and Wastewater System
3. Fuels Coordination
4. Mass Search and Rescue
5. CAT Marinas Plan: Critical Transportation
6. Logistics Coordination
7. Public Health and Emergency Medical Services
8. Environmental Response
9. Debris Management Operations
10. Fire Management and Fire Suppression
11. Public Information and Warning
12. Operational Coordination

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Situational Assessment Fact Sheet

2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex

I. SCOPE


This fact sheet outlines facts, planning assumptions, critical considerations, resource requirements, and shortfalls for Objective 11: Situational Assessment. Situational Assessment provides all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

II. ORGANIZATION

National Level

- The Situational Awareness Section (SAS) provides information management by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating incident or related information at the National Response Coordination Staff (NRCS) level. Through its analyses, the SAS creates and provides a variety of specific products to the NRCS, the C-NRCS, the Deputy Director of Operation, and/or other internal and external senior leadership and stakeholders at the national level. The SAS facilitates effective planning, resource allocation, and overall decision-making to support an incident through its own organizational processes.

Figure 8: Organizational Chart for the NRCS Situational Awareness Section



- The Request for Information (RFI) Tracker attends to and follows RFIs from beginning to end, and is the main point of entry for all incoming RFIs. It is responsible for maintaining timely responses to, and closure of, all RFIs, which includes the following activities: (1) maintaining a general e-mail inbox, phone number, and database of RFIs; (2) accepting and assigning RFIs from incident and Regional Response Coordination Staff (RRCS) levels for adjudication at the national level; (3) identifying and preventing duplicate RFIs; and (4) coordinating with NRCS members to ensure accurate responses to RFIs.

- The Knowledge Group contains three units: the Information Collection Unit (ICU), the Information Analysis Unit (IAU), and the Documentation Unit (DOCU). The Knowledge

Group is responsible for collecting and analyzing pertinent information to develop numerous reports and briefings that aid senior leaders in decision-making. These include the ICP, the Situation Report, the Core Capabilities Report, and the Senior Leader Briefing. This group ensures the timely collection and analysis of all information relevant to the NRCS response.

- The ICU provides current situation information needed to develop the common operating picture (COP) and other products. This unit communicates

additional/emerging Critical Information Requirements (CIRs) or Essential Elements of Information (EEIs) to all internal and external stakeholders. The ICU collects, organizes, correlates, compares, processes, and filters raw data from the ICP, making the ICP readily understandable to the potential user. The unit also produces the NRCC Situation Report and monitors pertinent social media sites.

- The IAU analyzes the current situation information, as provided in the ICP. The IAU reviews incident information and related sources to determine how actual or potential incident-related issues (or subsequent incidents) will affect NRCS response capabilities. The IAU does this by applying risk analysis and intelligence data against ongoing and future NRCS-level incident support activities. The resulting analysis is critical to facilitating the development of NRCS-level plans.
- The DOCU prepares timely, accurate, and clearly written Situational Awareness Reports and presentations (senior leadership briefings, talking points, video teleconferences, etc.), as required. This unit maintains the COP by conducting staff briefings on the incident situation, the changing mission, maturing objectives, and the status of NRCS support activities. The unit maintains historical files and records pertaining to all NRCS incident support activities or operations. This unit documents, in writing, all significant decisions and facts relative to incident activities. This information ensures that an accurate record of each event is compiled and archived.
- The Geospatial and Technical Group contains two units: the Geospatial Information System (GIS) Unit and the Technical Unit. This group provides the technical and mapping expertise required to support other NRCS members and to facilitate plan development. The Geospatial and Technical Group provides specialized reports, analyses, and presentations as needed. It coordinates with other situational awareness functions to produce products for COP development. Finally, this group provides geospatial and remote sensing display and analysis, and creates and analyzes Geospatial Intelligence.
- The GIS Unit supports and facilitates NRCS-level planning and decision making through the development of products and services. Such products and services are both those remotely sensed and those developed by geospatial information systems. The unit also coordinates reconnaissance and remote-sensing activities at the NRCS level.
- The Technical Unit is comprised of subject matter experts (SMEs) who provide specialized technical expertise and information to the NRCS, senior leaders, and other internal and external stakeholders. The SMEs represent various organizations such as the Transportation Security Administration, the Office of Health Affairs, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
- The ESF #15 – External Affairs Unit facilitates the development of timely, pertinent, and accurate public messaging. This unit also assists External Affairs, developing press releases, background information, fact sheets, talking points, congressional briefings, and other external affairs products.


- The ESF #15 – External Affairs Unit also does the following: (1) coordinates messages with federal, state, tribal, and local governments, (2) monitors news media to ensure that accurate information is being reported, (3) proactively identifies potential issues that may impact or facilitate developing plans or create the need for updated messages, and (4) coordinates community relations outreach.
- Finally, the ESF # 15 – External Affairs Unit manages the private sector desk. The Private Sector Specialist serves as the liaison between FEMA and private sector partners in a communications role, not an operations role. The specialist provides situational awareness information, facilitate contact with resources on a regional and/or national level, and foster cooperation between FEMA and the private sector.

Regional Level

- In anticipation of a Stafford Act declaration, the Regional Administrator (RA) and staff contribute to situational awareness and continue incident support in preparation of a transfer authority to the federal coordinating officer. Upon receipt of a declaration request from the Declaration governor(s) of the affected State(s), the RA and staff review the request along with information regarding the incident, and prepare recommendations and requirements for federal assistance. The RA then forwards the governor's request along with a recommendation to the FEMA Administrator.

- SAS serves as the single point for FEMA incident information management at FEMA Region IX. SAS develops reports that aid leadership with decision-making by collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information. Key sources of data used by

Figure 9: Organizational Chart for the RRCS



the SAS include, but are not limited to, the EEIs and CIRs from all-hazards deliberate plans and data sources determined by the RA, C-RRCS, and the Resource Support Section Chief. The SAS also uses source information gathered during preliminary damage assessments. SAS facilitates effective planning in support of the affected State(s) and disaster survivors by developing an ICP.

- SAS compiles and analyzes information through their specific functions and produces relevant products that: (1) enable the RRCS, senior leadership, and other stakeholders (internal or external) to make informed decisions affecting their specific support to an incident and (2) provide situational understanding. The sources of this information may include incident reports, meteorological information, modeling and geospatial intelligence products, news media, and specialized or technical information. Additionally, the SAS facilitates and assists

the RRCS Planning Support Section (PSS) by providing critical documentation or information for developing plans.

III. FACTS

- The RRCS is the primary source of situational awareness and coordination support to FEMA’s incident management at the Unified Coordination Group level.
- Information must be shared among the various sections at each level and between the levels in order for: (1) resources to be effectively ordered, tracked, and delivered; (2) plans to be compiled, developed, distributed, and followed; and (3) situational awareness to be collected, analyzed, and disseminated. With each section communicating effectively internally at each level, and the sections communicating effectively between levels, resources, plans, and situational awareness will flow as intended—as shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5.

Figure 10: Communication for Planning




Figure 11: Informational Gathering for Situational Awareness





Figure 12: Requests for Resources



- The SAS derives initial CIRs and essential elements of information (EIs) from deliberate plans. The C-RRCS and the Situational Awareness Section Chief (SASC) may provide additional CIRs in conjunction with the PSS Chief and Resource Support Section Chief.
- The ICU takes the data collected from ESFs, other federal agencies, and FEMA incident- and regional-level sources, and organizes the data into easily readable information. The ICU uses the ICP to define: (1) the decisions that the NRCS is supporting; (2) what

information the ICU needs to collect; (3) who within the NRCS is responsible for collecting the information and providing it to the ICU; (4) how often the ICU needs to update the information; and (5) most importantly, the official source of the information. RFIs are answered by the RFI Tracker.

- The IAU analyzes information to determine impacts on FEMA incident or regional operations, and examines how actual or potential effects from the incident or subsequent incidents may affect other jurisdictions. The IAU sorts and filters the data collected by the ICU. The IAU also verifies the initial information and attempts to validate it against the assumptions and facts in the deliberate plans, and produces spot reports when needed. Within the IAU, the Technical Specialists provide specialized technical expertise and information based on the incident needs. The Risk Analysts provide expertise on ongoing threats, critical vulnerabilities, potential consequences, and opportunities to mitigate risks; they also develop special reports as needed.
- The IAU updates the EEs, CIRs, and the ICP, and the information collection and analysis processes continue.
- The GIS Unit within the Geospatial and Technical Group analyzes the ICP and creates geospatial computer models and map products based on incident hazards and RRCS needs.
- The DOCU disseminates, to senior leadership and to staff at all echelons, comprehensive reporting products that give an accurate assessment of the incident response to date. The DOCU develops the templates and formats for all reports and briefings within the SAS. The DOCU ensures that reports and briefs are concise, clear, and grammatically correct, and submits them to the C-NRCS and the SASC for review.
- Emergency Operations Center operational readiness is maintained by the Office of Emergency Management (EMO). Activities include planning, training and exercising, situational awareness, low level operations, and facility and equipment maintenance.
- Situational awareness is maintained by the EMO and the Department of Public Safety (DPS) twenty-four (24) hours daily.
- Reporting is done by CNMI and Federal agencies to the Shift Commander/ Supervisor on the emergency phone line, email, and agency radio communications or by other communications means.
- The Shift Commander/Supervisor conducts situation analysis and, depending on the results of this interactive process, recommends to the Deputy Special Assistant to Homeland Security/EMO with the Governors consent whether or not to activate the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Emergency Operations Center (CNMIEOC). In the absence of the EMO Director or its designate, the Shift Commander/Supervisor makes the recommendation to the DPS Commissioner or the Governor's Authorized Representative.

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

-
-

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPACITIES

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This fact sheet provides a baseline for planning for the 2016 Guam Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex, but may not be inclusive of all resources and capabilities at the local level, especially private resources available by contract.

VIII. REFERENCES

1. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Emergency Operations Plan (DRAFT-2010)
2. FEMA National Incident Support Manual, Change 1 (January, 2013)
3. FEMA Regional Incident Support Manual (January, 2013)
4. <https://coast.noaa.gov/hurricanes/>

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Stabilize the Water and Wastewater Systems Fact Sheet 2017 CNMI Catastrophic Plan

I. SCOPE

This fact sheet outlines facts, planning assumptions, critical considerations, resource requirements, and shortfalls for the Objective: Stabilize Water and Waste Water Systems.

II. ORGANIZATION

- Potable Water
 - Commonwealth Utility Corporation
 - CNMI Homeland Security and Office of Emergency Management
 - Public Safety
- Wastewater
 - Commonwealth Utility Corporation
 - Bureau of Environmental and Coastal Quality

III. FACTS

Saipan

Potable Water	
Potable Water System / Description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wells - Primary source for potable water <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 113 Operational Wells – 9-10 mgd ○ 142 Total Wells <p><small>**Although unpalatable due to high saline content, water delivered from tap is considered potable. The majority of the population uses bottled water for drinking.</small></p>
Potable Water System Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of electrical systems/generators, damage to roofs, buildings and appurtenances • Primary shortfalls/concerns are temporary power and access due vegetative debris • Particularly Vulnerable due to FAA restriction on building construction <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Obyan – 4 exposed wells next to runway at Francisco Ada International Airport • Elevated steel water storage tanks vulnerable to wind and debris damage <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Kagman, Dandan and Rapago tanks are particularly vulnerable • Power to booster pump stations is vital for continued distribution
Potable Water Distribution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Island water systems – 13 Tank Service Areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 18 booster pump stations ○ 13 tanks ○ 286 miles of transmission and distribution water lines • Following an event, each family is limited to 100 gallons per day via water filling stations. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ DPS provides security <p>Saipan’s water demand is approximately 6.5 mgd.</p>
Potable Water Priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power Plant • Hospitals and Dialysis Facilities (Saipan Health Clinic, Pacific Medical Center & Marianas Medical Center) • Shelters (Public School System) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Fire Station fills water tankers for water transportation to shelter sites (boil before use). • Highest population areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Isley Tank Service Area ○ Puerto Rico Tank Service Area

<p>Potable Water assessment strategy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Four crews <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Well/Chlorination Crew – Check all water wells, booster stations & chlorination treatment stations. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Approximately 1.5 days to assess entire system. ○ Water Watch Crew – Assess all 13 water storage tanks. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Approximately 1 day to assess. ○ Repair Crew – Assess water distribution and transmission lines and repair as necessary. ○ Logistics Crew – Coordinate movement of field crews. • Would take a full day to inspect all facilities, pumps and stations; significantly longer to repair
<p>Potable Water Restoration/ Resources</p>	<p><i>Restoration Prioritization</i> Restoration is prioritized by which wells can be brought online in the highest number with the lowest power requirement.</p> <p>These facilities require FEMA generators.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Agag – Five wells and booster pump connect to a single generator. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Generator functionality questionable. ▪ Powerlines are underground. ○ Obyan ○ Isley • Highest Population Centers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ • Calhoun Reservoir – Services the hospital. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Only facility that has a reliable functioning generator • Portable Generators (Water & Waste Water Divisions) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 40 kW Trailer Mounted ○ 25 kW • Equipment (Shared between Water and Waste Water Divisions): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 3 Backhoes ○ Mini Excavator ○ Mini Dump Truck ○ 10 Ton Boom Truck ○ 5 CY Dump Truck ○ 500 Gallon Fuel Trailer ○ 1 Small and 1 Large Boom Truck ○ 2 Bobcat Skid Loaders ○ 2 Tow Masters to mobilize Equipment • Fuel for Generators <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 1 – 500 Gallon Fuel Trailer ○ 1 Truck with 4 each 55-gallon drums • Fuel Requirement (assuming the above-mentioned 12 locations all have generators in-place)
<p>Wastewater</p>	
<p>Wastewater Facilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two Waste Water Treatment Plants <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Agingan Point (ATP) 3.5 mgd <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Has a functioning generator ○ Sadog Tasi (STP) 5 mgd ○ 36 Sewer Lift Stations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 32 Have operational generators • Gravity Sewer Line - 64 miles • Force Main Sewer - Approximately 4 miles

<p>Wastewater System Impact</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Particularly vulnerable sewer lift stations due to storm surge inundation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A16, A5, S12, S11, S1, T1 • Salt Water and flooding infiltration overloads waste water system and causes backflows. • Fueling for generators is completed using 55-gallon drums transported in pickup trucks. Transportation of fuel is the biggest challenge in a post-typhoon scenario. • STP is particularly vulnerable to vegetative debris blowing into the clarifier and jamming the sweep arm.
<p>Wastewater Priorities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Priority Lift Stations – Max of <u>2 hours</u> offline before systems back up and overflow. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A16, S3, S8, A5 • Secondary Priority Lift Stations – Max of <u>2 days</u> offline before systems back up and overflow. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ SR1, SR2, SR3, T1, S5, S9, S10, S11, S12, S4, W4, W3, A7, A6, A11, A15, A9, A8, A2, A3
<p>Wastewater Assessment Strategy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Two Groups: Approximately 1 full day to complete assessment. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Treatment Plants Group ○ Collection System Group – Sewer lift stations and main line <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ North ▪ Central ▪ South • Begin at treatment plants and work outward from nearest to farthest pumping stations.
<p>Wastewater Restoration</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clean bar screens • Check levels on wet wells • Ensure generators are operational • Begin refueling • Almost all facilities have automatic backup switchover • Setup trash pump as needed at strategic locations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ A16 and S8 • SR1 and W6 control panels are particularly vulnerable to wind damage due to their exposure
<p>Wastewater Resources</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Portable Generators (Water & Waste Water Divisions) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 40 kW Trailer Mounted ○ 25 kW • Equipment (Shared between Water and Waste Water Divisions): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 3 Backhoes ○ Mini Excavator ○ Mini Dump Truck ○ 10 Ton Boom Truck ○ 5 CY Dump Truck ○ 500 Gallon Fuel Trailer ○ 1 Small and 1 Large Boom Truck ○ 2 Bobcat Skid Loaders ○ 2 Tow Masters to mobilize Equipment • Fuel for Generators <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 1 – 500 Gallon Fuel Trailer ○ 1 Truck with 4 each 55-gallon drums

Tinian

Potable Water

Potable Water System / Description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maui Well II- Primary source for potable water 2 mgd •
Potable Water System Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of electrical systems/generators, damage to roofs, buildings, pipelines if compromised • Primary shortfalls/concerns are temporary power and access
Potable Water Distribution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Island water system services entire island population <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 2 Water Storage Tanks: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Quarter Million Tank located at Marpo Heights services West Tinian Airport and portions of Marpo Heights; - Half Million Tank located at Carolinas Heights services the rest of the island population including San Jose Village, Marpo Valley, Carolinas Heights, Marpo Heights I and II. *1 new additional water storage tank (Half Million Tank) to be completed by 2016. <p>53 miles of water lines</p>
Potable Water Priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hospitals and shelters • Highest population areas • Fire control systems • Provide “quantity rather than quality” initially
Potable Water assessment strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Would take a full day to inspect all facilities, pumps and stations; significantly longer to repair
Potable Water Restoration/ Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maui II Pump Station is the sole facility on island <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has full functioning 400kw capacity generator • No CUC equipment available but have existing and “disaster only” open purchase order for heavy equipment rental as well requesting for heavy equipment assistance with the approval of Tinian’s Department of Public Works.
Wastewater	
Wastewater Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Island of Tinian has no Wastewater infrastructure.

Rota

Potable Water	
Potable Water System / Description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Main Water Cave: 792 thousand gallons per day (tgd) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Transmission line approximately 1.6 Miles to Onan Water Cave ○ Gravity Fed • Onan Water Cave: 432 tgd <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Transmission line approximately 4.2 miles to Sinapalo Reservoir ○ Gravity Fed • Water Well 1: 216 tgd • Water Well 2: 202 tgd • Water Well 3: 130 tgd <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Wells augment water supply when water caves do not produce adequate amount of water. • Two Monitory Wells used solely for data collection and testing

<p>Potable Water System Impact</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of electrical systems/generators, damage to roofs, buildings, pipelines if compromised • Primary shortfalls/concerns are temporary power and access • Wells and booster station do not have backup power. • Main and Onan Water Caves transmission lines subject to soil erosion. Above ground water transmission lines are old and deteriorate. • No available heavy equipment • Shortage of technical personnel such as an engineer and water operators. Currently c 4 water personnel are available, which would be split 2 north and 2 south during an event. Not sufficient for catastrophic event response. • Communicating with personnel following a catastrophic event is big challenge. • Wildlife habitat at Talakhaya Conservation area requires USFW permitting for work following an event. • No safe location to store chlorine cylinder.
<p>Potable Water Distribution</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approximately 45 miles of distribution piping <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Pipe sizes ranges from 10 inches to .75 inch ○ Approximately 170 hydrants on distribution system • 12 total water sample sites • 1 Active 30 HP booster station • One 500,000-gallon water storage tank – Sinapalo Reservoir • Distribution system services approximately 2,500 people • All potable water is pumped to the Onan Chlorine Station
<p>Potable Water Priorities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hospitals and shelters • Highest population areas • Fire control systems • Provide “quantity rather than quality” initially
<p>Potable Water assessment strategy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Would take a full day to inspect all facilities, pumps and stations; significantly longer to repair
<p>Potable Water Restoration/ Resources</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •
<p>Wastewater</p>	
<p>Wastewater Facilities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Island of Rota has no Wastewater infrastructure.

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- Situational Assessment – Damage assessments post-storm assume road clearance will occur either concurrently or will have been completed. Utility and public service organizations will require at least 1-3 days for a complete assessment of damage incurred.
- Scenario Impact:
 - Potable water distribution system should not suffer significant damage, but will require power or fuel for backup generators to ensure continued delivery.
- Significant debris will limit the access to remote well / pump locations and will require assistance outside of “normal operations” resources

CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

V. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

Saipan Water Table 2: Resource Requirements

Resource (Type)	Amount Available	Resource Owner	Amount Required	Difference
Personnel – field	12 Hour Shifts 30 Field Personnel	CUC Water Division	24-hour operations	16 hours
Personnel – access		Main Roadways - Department of Public Works Facility Access – Guam Waterworks Authority		
Vehicles – field	12-hour operations	Guam Waterworks Authority	24-hour operations	12 hours
Vehicles – access		Main Roadways - Department of Public Works Facility Access – Guam Waterworks Authority		
Generators	1 ea 40 kW 1 ea 25 kW	CUC – Water Division CUC- Waste Water Division	20 at strategic locations	18
Fuel		Guam Power Authority		Primary limiting factor
Mobile water tanks with delivery vehicle	Water Tanker – 4 Water Buffalo – 2	Guam Waterworks Authority		Dependent upon extent of damage; not sufficient for island-wide water system outage

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Guam relies on natural water production from the NGLA with supplemental disinfection to supply its citizens with potable water and has developed systems to distribute potable water to residents. Unlike mainland US, Guam cannot access water sources from surrounding counties/states. There are no established desalinization plants in Guam to provide significant amounts of potable water in the event of a disaster. There is the potential for water sources and systems to become contaminated during a CAT3 or higher hurricane event. Storms with associated heavy rain events have a high probability of disrupting water treatment for hours or days at the Ugum plant due to high turbidity of the source water; this will have an effect on water delivery service to residents of Guam’s southern villages (Umatac, Merizo, Inarajan, and Talofoto).

As well, wastewater treatment and discharge comprise an equally complex system in which a portion of the population utilizes systems and processes not under the control or jurisdiction of GWA. A number of residents rely on septic systems that will be particularly vulnerable to storm surge and flooding based on distance and elevation (anything below the 20’ contour line is at risk). Residents in highly populated areas rely on much higher volume service that can be easily overwhelmed in a very short period of time under emergency conditions. With the threat of plant shut down regardless of cause (power loss, fuel shortage for backup generators, damage to facility, or intentional shut down to preserve systems), there is significant potential for spillage or “bypass” from/through wastewater facilities and/or septic systems.

Some parts of GWA's collector system have severe inflow and infiltration (I&I) issues that may overwhelm the downstream lift stations and treatment plant.

Regardless of the system and available assets, GWA identified the following priorities, concerns, and resource shortfalls:

- Assessment and repair priorities
 - Highest population areas
 - Fire control systems
 - Provide “quantity rather than quality” initially – immediate boil water order to render water “potable”
- Potential Damage
 - Loss of electrical systems/generators, damage to roofs, buildings, pipelines if compromised
 - Primary interdependencies are power, fuel for generators, and access to facilities and pumps for operation/assessment/repair
- Assessment Strategy
 - Would take at the minimum a full day to inspect all facilities, pumps and stations; significantly longer to repair
 - Begin at treatment plants and work outward from nearest to farthest pumping stations. Access is a primary limitation
- Asset requirements
 - Most facilities have back up generation capability
 - GPA is responsible for placing and maintaining backup generators at GWA facilities (currently 90% of GWA facilities have backup generators).
 - Available portable generators, major end items, and repair parts are not sufficient to cover the entire system
 - Current crews are not capable of 24-hour operations
 - Organic assets are limited to typical issues/problem sets to address “normal, day-to-day” operational requirements – a catastrophic hurricane will overwhelm capability/capacity within hours
 - Trained and qualified personnel to augment expanded and extended operations and activities; specialized equipment; access to facilities for assessment and repair; and power, fuel, and water to sustain operations
 - Water delivery via tankers may be required if damage to island power and backup generation systems at water facilities are extensive. Existing water tanker fleet is not sufficient for a catastrophic event.

VII. REFERENCES

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Fuels Coordination Fact Sheet (CNMI) 2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex

I. SCOPE

Following a severe Typhoon/Earthquake/Tsunami in the Marianas, transportation systems will be damaged. The supply chain supporting Marianas residents will be degraded. A multimodal transportation strategy for the delivery of life saving and life-sustaining resources is the center of gravity for catastrophic event response.

The concept for multi-modal access involves territory and federal actions to access impacted areas using air, marine, and surface transportation strategies. Each strategy requires staging teams and organizations involved in transportation coordination. Each strategy involves a process for deployment, arrival, reception, and in some cases, trans-loading to another form of conveyance.

This concept will provide the basis for subsequent courses of action development. The core Marianas transportation and logistics concept involves activation, assessment of the situation, and development of an initial plan for the coordinated movement of response resources to staging areas near the incident site. Support to the response requires the development of an initial transportation capability within 72 hours.

In order to provide flexibility, the overarching logistics strategy is to bring response and recovery resources to the incident area using multiple modes (air, marine, and surface transportation).

II. ORGANIZATION

- FEMA designed the response organizational structure to ensure support for the subordinate levels (i.e., the NRCS supports the RRCS; the RRCS supports the FCO/UCS). While only the FCO is managing the incident (for FEMA), the NRCS plays a key role by supporting the RRCS and then supporting the FCO/UCS once the RRCS stands down. The Regional Response Coordination Staff (RRCS) for each region is also organized into the same four functional sections. This common organizational structure across the NRCS and the RRCS enables the NRCS to coordinate closely with the RRCS(s) to provide support to the incident, and also to receive information on the status of the incident.
- The NRCS is organized into four functional sections coordinated by the C-NRCS. The functions of the organization are determined by grouping related responsibilities within a section. This functional organization enhances coordination, communications, and facilitation by focusing NRCS efforts to achieve its essential


Figure 13: Organization Chart for the National Response



functions. These sections are Situational Awareness (SA), Planning Support, Resource Support, and Center and Staff Support.

- Figure 2 depicts the top-level organization structure of the national level during activation.
- This structure is intended to be scalable based on the needs of incident(s) for which the NRCS is activated. Not all, or even most of the positions will be activated for most NRCS activations. Senior leadership and the section chiefs will determine which positions will be activated.

Figure 14: RRCS Organizational Structure



RRCS, and then supporting the FCO/UCG once the RRCS stands down.

FEMA coordinates incident response support from across the Federal government by activating ESF primary and supporting federal agencies as needed. Federal ESFs are the primary structures for coordinating the delivery of Federal resources. Each ESF is composed of a coordinator, one or more primary agencies, and a number of supporting agencies and organizations.

Figure 3 summarizes the Federal ESFs and indicates the response core capabilities each ESF most directly supports. All ESFs support the common core capabilities—Planning, Public Information and Warning, and Operational Coordination.

Figure 15: Emergency Support Functions and ESF Coordinators

<p>ESF #1—Transportation ESF Coordinator: Department of Transportation</p>
<p>Key Response Core Capability: Critical Transportation</p>
<p>Coordinates the support of management of transportation systems and infrastructure, the regulation of transportation, management of the Nation’s airspace, and ensuring the safety and security of the national transportation system. Functions include but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transportation modes management and control ▪ Transportation safety ▪ Stabilization and reestablishment of transportation infrastructure ▪ Movement restrictions ▪ Damage and impact assessment.
<p>ESF #6—Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services ESF Coordinator: DHS/FEMA</p>
<p>Key Response Core Capabilities: Mass Care Services, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Public Health Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services, Critical Transportation, Fatality Management Services</p>
<p>Coordinates the delivery of mass care and emergency assistance. Functions include but are not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mass care ▪ Emergency assistance

- Temporary housing
- Human services

ESF #7—Logistics

ESF Coordinator: General Services Administration and DHS/FEMA

Key Response Core Capabilities: Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Mass Care Services, Critical Transportation, Infrastructure Systems, Operational Communications

Coordinates comprehensive incident resource planning, management, and sustainment capability to meet the needs of disaster survivors and responders. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, management, and sustainment capability
- Resource support (e.g., facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services).

ESF #12—Energy

ESF Coordinator: Department of Energy

Key Response Core Capabilities: Infrastructure Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Situational Assessment

Facilitates the reestablishment of damaged energy systems and components and provides technical expertise during an incident involving radiological/nuclear materials. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and reestablishment
- Energy industry utilities coordination
- Energy forecast.

ESF #13—Public Safety and Security

ESF Coordinator: Department of Justice/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

Key Response Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Coordinates the integration of public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the full range of incident management activities. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Facility and resource security
- Security planning and technical resource assistance
- Public safety and security support
- Support to access, traffic, and crowd control.

The NRCC will coordinate the delivery of life-saving and life-sustaining resources to the Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR) via multi-modal transportation based on pre-existing execution schedules and confirmed requirements. This will be accomplished by activating CONUS ISBs to stage resources and ultimately transport them via DOD or Commercial Airlift and Sealift. IMATs and Pacific Area Office (PAO) in coordination with local jurisdictions will be responsible for the multi-modal distribution and allocation of these resources upon arrival on island(s).

Coordinating Structures

National Response Coordination Center

Resource Support Section

The Resource Support Section (RSS) is responsible for the following through the various subordinate groups:

- **Resource Capabilities Branch** – Responsible for processing RRCC and IMAT Resource Request Forms (RRF)
 - **Operations Support Group**

- Source commodities
 - Activate CONUS and OCONUS Distribution Centers
 - Mission assign DoD for activation of ISBs, strategic lift, and port opening
 - Determine embarkation locations in conjunction with the Movement Coordination Center (MCC)
 - Establish ISBs and deploy management teams
 - Ensure ISBs maintain adequate commodity levels
 - Activate other Regions to assist CONUS support
 - Request DDED teams
- **Ordering Processing Group**
 - Issue Mission Assignments for OFA resources as requested by Region IX RRCC and/or IMAT
 - Route DoD Mission Assignments through HQ DoD Liaison, who will then route to Region IX Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) for validation and submission into DoD Support of Civil Authorities Automated Support System (DDASS)
 - Provide ad-hoc logistics contract and acquisition support
 - **Movement Coordination Center**
 - Provide single point of entry for all strategic transportation requirements for all Federal entities.
 - Collaborate with commercial transportation providers for services and facilities.
 - Tracks commodity locations and status for national level resources during transit, arrival, and retrograde.
 - Convenes interagency transportation board to de-conflict issues or relocate resources based on allocated and/or identified transportation capabilities.
 - Activate Defense Production Act (DPA) for support services

Regional Response Coordination Center

Resource Support Section

RSS is responsible for the following through the various subordinate groups:

- **Resource Capabilities Branch** – Responsible for processing Territory and IMAT Resource Request Forms (RRF)
 - **Operations Support Group**
 - Validate commodity and transportation requirements in coordination with the IMAT/PAO/State Liaison Officer (SLO) against the execution checklist in the respective plans.
 - Request DoD for strategic lift and port opening
 - Request FAA for Field Incident Response Teams (FIRST)
 - Coordinate with IMAT/PAO/SLO to activate FSA locations
 - Determine/activate debarkation locations in conjunction with the IMAT/PAO/SLO
 - Deploy ISB management teams for FSA support
 - Request activation of Pacific commodity pre-positioning contract
 - Activate responder lodging through the General Services Administration (GSA)

- **Ordering Processing Group**
 - Responsible for issuing Mission Assignments for OFA resources as requested by the IMAT/PAO/SLO
 - Mission assign ESF-1 for Maritime Administration (MARAD) berthing capabilities
 - Mission assign ESF-4 to manage FSAs
 - Mission assign ESF-13 resources to secure FSAs
 - Submit Logistics Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS) requests for commodity and transportation requirements
 - Responsible for ad-hoc logistics contract and acquisition support

Incident Management Assistance Team / Pacific Area Office/ State Liaison Officer

Pacific Area Office / Territory Liaison Officer

- Coordinate the activation of FSAs in conjunction with the RRCC
- Coordinate FSA and transportation support requirements with the RRCC
- Review and validate intra-theater distribution plans
- Pre-position and contract staging equipment in Guam
- Coordinate billeting requirements
- Validate commodity and transportation requirements in coordination with the RRCC against the execution checklist in the respective plans.

Incident Assistance Team

- **Logistics Section Chief**
 - Review, validate, and support intra-theater distribution plans
 - Coordinate FSA and transportation support requirements with the RRCC
 - Coordinate billeting requirements
- **Operations Section Chief**
 - Incorporate Movement Control Group (MCG) and Air Operations Branch into inter- and intra-theater operations
 - Receive and validate Commonwealth/Territorial requirements
 - Maintain situational awareness of transportation infrastructure
- **Movement Control Group**
 - Coordinate all modes of transportation into the impacted area
 - Establish distribution pipeline of resources for deployment, sustainment, and redeployment
 - Manage flow of resources by synchronizing movement schedules with priorities through the use of Transportation Managers and use of Federal/State assets


CNMI

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)

- The director of CNMI Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) is authorized to represent the state in all matters relating to emergency management and to coordinate assistance/support during a major emergency or disaster event.

- The CNMI EOP includes a mutual aid agreement among the following agencies:
 - Office of the Governor
 - Office of the Lieutenant Governor
 - Office of Homeland Security
 - Mayor of Saipan
 - Mayor of Rota
 - Mayor of Tinian
 - Mayor of the Northern Islands
 - Public School System
 - Commonwealth Ports Authority
- The Governor’s Authorized Representative (GAR) is the State Coordinating Officer (SCO). As such, the SCO is the primary contact between the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and the CNMI officials. The SCO is responsible for coordination of disaster assistance activities with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on behalf of the CNMI.
- The Emergency Operations Center Commander (EOCC), assigned by the Governor, is responsible for the Direction, Control, and Coordination of the CNMIEOC. The EOCC states the general control objectives and oversees EOC operations in support of the incident response. The EOCC normally delegates functional responsibilities to command and general staff to maintain an effective span of control in achieving the objectives. The EOCC authorizes further subdivision by the use of assistants, deputies, task forces, units, groups, and branches.
- The EOC Command Staff report directly to the EOC Commander and perform the command functions of Public Information, Liaison, and Safety.

Figure 4: JFO Task Organization



III. FACTS

Petroleum Consumption

The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) has no conventional energy

resources and meets nearly all of its energy needs with petroleum received by ship at harbors on its three inhabited islands: Saipan, Tinian, and Rota. In 2010, total petroleum imported for power generation was approximately 550,000 barrels, or roughly 1,500 barrels per day (b/d) for electricity. Diesel use is also high for government use. Motor gasoline and jet fuel are also consumed on the island but consumption levels are not readily available.

CNMI Fuel Consumption, 2010	
Fuel	b/d
Diesel (for power generation)	1,500
Diesel (govt. use excl. power gen)	2,300
Gasoline (government use)	300
Jet Fuel	n/a
Total (not comprehensive)	4,100

n/a = not available Source:

Petroleum Infrastructure and Supply

Two fuel storage facilities operated by Mobil Oil and IP&E are located at the Port of Saipan in Tanapag Harbor in Puerto Rico, Saipan on the central northwest side of Saipan (the largest island). The Port of Saipan is not a deep-water port (maximum draft is 6.4 meters) and it cannot receive deep draft tankers. The Mobil Oil terminal receives shipments from the company's larger terminal on Guam, which receives bulk shipments via tanker from Singapore and other Asia-Pacific suppliers. The two Port of Saipan storage facilities have truck racks for loading tanker trucks and also have the ability to supply marine vessels at the Port's dock via pipeline.

The island of Tinian receives small shipments of transportation fuels at a facility in Tinian Harbor located south of San Jose on the southwestern side of the island. At this time information on the number of tanks, total storage capacity, and ownership are unclear. The shipping company SN Five transports cargo to and from Tinian on a daily basis.

The Saipan Airport is the largest in CNMI and has the capability to re-fuel large aircraft. Airports in Rota and Tinian did not have fuel storage facilities, commercial planes are required to re-fuel in Guam.

CNMI Petroleum Terminals				
Terminal	Location	Fuels	No. of	Capacity (Bbls)
Mobil Oil Mariana Islands	Puerto Rico, Saipan	Diesel, Gasoline, Jet Fuel	10	N/A
IP&E	Puerto Rico, Saipan	Gasoline	4	N/A
Saipan International Airport	Saipan	Jet Fuel	N/A	N/A
Tinian Harbor	San Jose, Tinian	N/A	N/A	N/A

Source: multiple sources

OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

Several organizations perform key functions to enable transportation operations, including ESF #1, ESF #7, ESF #13 and state, territory, tribal and federal agencies. Within FEMA, there are three logistics organizational echelons that conduct logistics operations: FEMA Headquarters (HQ) Logistics, FEMA Regions IX, and FEMA field activities at Joint Field Offices (JFOs).

FEMA HQ Logistics – As the National Logistics Coordinator, FEMA HQ Logistics synchronizes disaster logistics support for the response among public and private sector partners. The

FEMA HQ Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) is the primary office that coordinates support to logistics functions during all incident phases. FEMA HQ Logistics coordinates the agency logistics movement response through the NRCC and Movement Coordination Center (MCC).

The NRCC pushes federal resources to the incident area and develops a deployment and reception strategy at the incident site. The deployment strategy shifts to the Unified Coordination Group (UCG) and Movement Control Group (MCG) once the Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) takes operational control of the federal response.

FEMA Region Resource Support Section – At the RRCC, the RSS normally mobilizes required resources to ensure their availability.

(Territory or Federal) Staging Area Branch Director and Staging Area Group Supervisors –

The Staging Area Branch Director is responsible for directing staging area operations for the incident. The *Staging Area Group Supervisor* (STGS) is responsible for managing a staging area and developing a Staging Area Operations Plan and the staging area's layout.

Contract Support to Operations – Contract support includes truck, transportation, and logistics support to staging, movement, trans-loading, or distribution operations. Support includes staffing, equipment operation, transportation, and support services to conduct self-contained LSA operations to receive bulk resources, meals, bottled water, or other supplies from federal, state, or vendor sources.

DOD Support – DOD support to air, surface, and marine transportation will be requested and may include the following:

- **Staging operations** – DOD support at Travis AFB/Hickam AFB/Andersen AFB is required to conduct reception, staging, trans-shipment and rotary-wing transportation in order to facilitate resource delivery.
- **A/DACG** – Staging operations may require support from DOD (Title 10). Support may include the capability for coordinating, loading, and offloading resources and equipment by air and includes marshaling, airfield reception, and out-loading as well as receiving and disposing of resources at the offload airfield. The capability may be referred to as an arrival/departure airfield control group or A/DACG. This capability will be required at departure airports and several arrival airport or airfields.
- **Airlift** - Aviation support for the delivery of emergency teams, equipment, and commodities to impacted areas will be required. DOD rotary-wing support will be required.

EXECUTION


Activation – IOF, NRCC, and EOCs will activate.

Assessment – The EOCs and IMATs will assess the situation and identify areas of isolation.

Planning – The NRCC/RRCC will develop an initial plan for multi-modal access, staging, and transportation and communicate the plan to the Interim Operating Facility (IOF) and stakeholders.

Deployment – Staging teams and resources will deploy to select facilities.

Execution – The EOC and RRCC will execute the strategy until the UCG is operational. Execution includes transportation coordination through the assignment of resources to a particular delivery capability.



Commodity Delivery While local or federal staging operations may deliver commodities to FSAs, distribution to recipients (at PODs, feeding sites, or shelters) is the responsibility of the Territories.

Principles

The multimodal access strategy adheres to the following principles:

- **Conflict between territory and federal operations is prevented.** Local and federal operations take place at separate facilities under separate lines of authority. During an incident, locations for the hand-off or delivery of resources are defined in the Staging Area Operations Plan.
- **Needed throughput is achieved.** Following a severe Marianas disaster, when the supply chain is degraded, large amounts of teams, resources, and vehicles will be

a required.

- **Transition to recovery will occur as quickly as possible:** The transition to commercial systems will occur as soon as possible

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- A Presidential Declaration is issued under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), including response, recovery, and mitigation activities.
- Departments and agencies will coordinate and take action under their own statutory authorities and under the Stafford Act as appropriate.
- Critical transportation routes and infrastructure will be disrupted by the incident or by secondary effects.
- Upon receipt of the Presidential declaration or Presidential order to commit Federal resources, the Federal and Territory governments will establish joint operations to provide assistance to local jurisdictions.
- Department of Defense (DOD) assets on-island affected reducing initial response capability. DOD will have primary response authority for DOD assets and personnel (including dependents) in CNMI.
- CNMI Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) will be operational.
- The event warrants the execution of the plan
- Category-3 or higher hurricane
- Earthquake (Richter scale 6.0 or above)
- Tsunami
- The event will exceed the organic capabilities of Guam/CNMI
- Airports and Seaports are available in Guam/CNMI
- Region plans checklists will be executed
- Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT), ISB teams, the Movement Control Group (MCG) will be activated and/or deployed
- DC Guam and DC Hawaii will be operational
- CONUS DCs will be activated
- Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR) will be in effect
- Maritime Transportation Systems Recovery Units (MTSRU) will be operational
- Guam/CNMI will activate Regional Staging Areas (RSAs) and Points of Distribution (PODs)
- The National Guard (Joint Task Force [JTF] Guam) will be activated and provide initial support
- DOD will be the primary initial source of strategic transportation support
- Local multi-modal commercial transportation providers will be available

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- The Stafford Act authorizes the FCO to direct any executive branch department/agency to engage in lifesaving and life-sustaining activities.
- HSEM does not have sufficient staff to sustain 24-hour operations

- During incidents impacting Rota and/or Tinian, HSEM sends staff members to those islands as Liaison Officers (LNOs); if an incident impacted Saipan as well as Rota and Tinian, there would not be sufficient staff at HSEM to man the EOC and send out LNOs to the islands.
- Federal departments and agencies are permitted to deploy personnel and resources under their own authority or under the authority of the Stafford Act.
- Waivers for provision of legislation such as: the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) and the Buy American Act may be necessary in order to facilitate the movement of commodities in response to a catastrophic incident.
- Guam contains the two longest runways in the Marianas region with Andersen Air Force Base measuring 11,200' and Antonio B. Won Pat International Airport (GUM) measuring 10,015'.
- Saipan International Airport's two runways each measure 8,700'.

VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPACITIES

- Activate Distribution Center (DC) Guam and DC Hawaii to meet initial response requirements (1ea)
 - Alpha Pack: Provides meals and water for 30, 000 people for 1 day
 - Bravo Pack: Provides meals and water for 15, 000 people for 1 day
- Alert National Incident Support Base (ISB) team
- Alert (1) FEMA Corp support team
- Mission Assign Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to activate Ground Fuels Contract
- Contact local vendors to provide cross docking and shuttle fleet services
- Initiate actions with A.B Won Pat and Andersen AFB for use as APODs
- Initiate actions with Port of Guam to use as a seaport of debarkation (SPODs)
- Initiate actions with CNMI to use primary APODs and SPODs

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This fact sheet provides a baseline for planning for the 2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex, but may not be inclusive of all resources and capabilities at the local level, especially private resources available by contract.

This fact sheet supports a joint federal/territory analysis of disaster response for the Critical Transportation core capability. This fact sheet describes the impact of a catastrophic event in the CNMI and the requirements, operational coordination, capabilities, and enablers for Critical Logistics.

VIII. REFERENCES

1. FEMA National Incident Support Manual (January, 2013)
2. FEMA Region IX All Hazards Plan (January, 2013)
3. Guam All-Hazards Catastrophic Incident CONOP (May 1, 2008)
4. Guam Catastrophic All-Hazards CONPLAN (August, 2010)

5. Guam Catastrophic Typhoon OPLAN (August, 2010)
6. Guam Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (September, 2013)
7. Guam Emergency Response Plan (2005)
8. National Incident Management System
9. National Response Framework, 3rd ed. (July 2016)
10. Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan, 2nd ed. (August 2016)
11. ESF 12 Energy Information and Background CNMI

Mass Search and Rescue Operations Fact Sheet 2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex


I. SCOPE

This fact sheet outlines facts, planning assumptions, critical considerations, resource requirements, and shortfalls for Objective 3: Mass Search and Rescue Operations. Mass Search and Rescue Operations is the delivery of traditional and atypical search and rescue capabilities, including personnel, services, animals, and assets to survivors in need, with the goal of saving the greatest number of endangered lives in the shortest time possible.

II. ORGANIZATION


- The presence of government agencies in the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas islands (CNMI) is typically limited to the islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota. As a result, that is where the resources can be found as well, with the majority of personnel and resources residing on Saipan.
- The Federal ESF #9 SAR Response System is composed of four primary agencies (FEMA, USCG, DOI/National Park Service, and DOD), which provide specialized SAR operations during incidents or potential incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response. In the event that all FEMA US&R resources are activated, and an obvious need for more resources exists, FEMA may request either military support through the DoD “Military Support to FEMA US&R Concept of Operations (CONOP)” or international support through the Department of State’s, U.S. Agency for International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
- The Emergency Services Branch of the UCG Operations Section is responsible for approving all ESF #9 mobilization and demobilization activities, requisitions for accountable property to support ESF #9 activities, and coordination with senior Federal, State, and local officials.
- UCG ESF #9 activities are managed by the ESF #9 Leader who reports to the UCG Emergency Services Branch Chief. The ESF #9 Leader ensures that UCG strategic objectives are accomplished and identifies procurement limitations. UCG ESF #9 functions include, but are not limited to, providing Federal, State, and local officials with technical assistance in the acquisition and utilization of ESF #9 resources through advice, incident command assistance, management, and coordination of US&R Task Forces, and obtaining ESF #9 logistic support.¹

Figure 16: ESF #9 Organizational Structure



- UCG ESF #9 Group functions are accomplished by the IST. The IST Commander who reports to the UCG ESF #9 Leader manages the IST. When more than one IST is activated, each ESF #9 Leader and IST will manage and coordinate the ESF
- #9 resources assigned to them. The UCG will arbitrate any management and coordination issues that cannot be resolved in the field.

Figure 17: Organizational Structure for an Expanded IST



III. FACTS

Territory

- CNMI Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DFEMS) is the primary SAR coordinator.
- DFEMS is the primary resource-provider for SAR on land.
- The following agencies assume a supporting role in waterborne SAR:
 - Department of Public Safety (Boating Safety Section)
 - CNMI Department of Land and Natural Resources, Fish and Wildlife Division
 - Commonwealth Port Authority
 - United States Coast Guard
- Local authority for waterborne SAR activities extends three nautical miles from the high-water mark; any SAR activities beyond that point fall to the USCG.
- CNMI public safety agencies mobilize to full staffing and 12 hour shifts when Typhoon Condition 2 is set.

Federal

- FEMA sponsors the NRF, is the ESF Coordinator for ESF-9, is the Primary Agency for structural collapse SAR, and is responsible for the National US&R (urban SAR) Response System. FEMA can dispatch various types of specialized teams to areas affected by a catastrophic incident.ⁱⁱ

- The Coast Guard is the Primary Agency for waterborne SAR operations, which may include areas that are floodedⁱⁱⁱ.
- The USCG maintains no air assets in the Marianas Region; they request DoD assets (HSC-25) via MOU.
- There are 28 nationally certified Type 1 (Heavy) US&R task forces (TFs) staffed with 70 personnel and is supplied with all required equipment. Six are always on standby. All have equally capable CBRNE response capability. Each TF can conduct Operational Coordination, Situational Assessment, Search and Rescue, EMS (TF personnel and entrapped survivors), Detection, and Decontamination.
- FEMA activates ESF #9 when an incident that may result in a request for a unified SAR response to an affected area is either anticipated or actually occurs. As required, the primary agencies are represented at the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), Joint Field Office (JFO), and state, tribal, and local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). For each incident that requires Federal SAR support, FEMA designates the overall primary agency for that particular ESF #9 SAR response. This designation is dependent upon incident circumstances and the type of response required. The designated overall primary agency coordinates the integration of Federal SAR resources, including support agency resources, in support of the requesting Federal, state, tribal, or local SAR authority.
- The National US&R Response System is prepared to deploy and immediately initiate operations in support of ESF #9. The task forces are staffed primarily by emergency services personnel who are trained and experienced in collapsed structure SAR operations and possess specialized expertise and equipment. Upon activation under the National Response Framework, FEMA US&R task forces are considered Federal assets under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, and other applicable authorities.
- The “Military Support to FEMA US&R CONOP” provides for the augmentation of System resources with either general purpose or specially trained military personnel. Although these military augmentation forces will be integrated into US&R operations through the assigned IST, they are expected to be self-sufficient regarding life-supporting items while utilizing existing military logistical supply processes. SAR-specific logistical support may need to be fulfilled through the IST logistical support process. If international US&R teams are requested and deployed in support of a response, they will be fully supported through the assigned IST logistical support process and will be expected to operate within the same framework as System resources.
- Once the System has been activated, transportation requirements for task forces will be evaluated by the US&R Branch. Task forces will assemble and report to a pre-determined Aerial Point of Embarkation (APOE) within six hours of notification. The loaded aircraft will fly to its designated Aerial Point of Debarkation (APOD), normally a military airfield. Once the task force has reached its APOD, the IST Point of
- Arrival/Mobilization (POA/Mob) Specialist will manage off-loading and transportation to the designated mobilization center or incident location. Where facilities permit, the APOD and the mobilization center may be located at the same facility. If traveling by

ground, IST personnel and task forces will move to their designated Point of Arrival (POA) by the quickest route.^{iv}

- ISTs provide coordination and logistical support to US&R task forces during emergency operations. They also conduct needs assessments and provide technical advice and assistance to state, tribal, and local government emergency managers.^v
- Generally, the IMAT ESF #9 Group is not staffed. The IST ESF #9 Group Supervisor reports either to the IMAT/JFO Emergency Services Branch Director or to the IMAT/JFO Operations Section Chief, whichever is the lowest staffed position.^{vi}
- The IST Base of Operations is the operational area established by an IST, which includes the base and camp for the IST. It is where US&R response activities are coordinated. When possible, combining IST and task force Base of Operations may be desirable to achieve more effective coordination and logistical support.

DOD Support for Civil SAR

- Under provisions of the *National Search and Rescue Plan* (NSP) and existing Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)/Memoranda of Agreement, DOD components maintain active, reserve, and National Guard facilities, and other DOD resources that can be *immediately* used for SAR *without* the need of the Federal Request-for-Assistance process.
- SAR operations resulting from actual or potential Mass Rescue Operations (MROs) under a catastrophic event will likely result in a Presidential Disaster Declaration (PDD). Consistent with the National Response Framework (NRF) FEMA coordinates all SAR operations under the ESF-9 Annex of the NRF, and through coordination with the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for subsequent Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).^{vii}

Support Outside United States SAR Regions

- In accordance with international law, United States SAR facilities, in a position to render timely and effective assistance, may enter into or over the territorial seas or archipelagic waters of another state for the purposes of rendering assistance to a person, ship, or aircraft whose position is reasonably well known, is in danger or distress due to perils of the seas, and requires emergency assistance

Funding

- FEMA reimburses the parent Sponsoring Agencies for US&R task forces that are involved in US&R deployments. FEMA is authorized to reimburse such activities when the Stafford Act is declared or when a declaration is anticipated. For non-Stafford Act US&R deployments, the Federal department or agency requesting US&R assistance reimburses FEMA following provisions included in the Financial Management Support Annex to the NRF. FEMA uses the funding provided by the requesting Federal department or agency to reimburse the Sponsoring Agency for the task forces.

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- A storm that impacts Saipan will also impact Tinian, but not Rota and vice versa due to the geographic separation of the islands.

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- a. Territorial agencies do not have radio communications between Saipan, Tinian, and Rota; these agencies rely on telephone and digital communications.

US&R Decision Support tool

1. Operational Requirements

- a. What types of structures require search

Type III US&R ^{viii}	Type II US&R ^{ix}	Type I US&R ^x	Type I US&R ^{xi}	Type III, US&R ^{xii}	Type I US&R ^{xiii}
Single family and multi-unit residential	Multi-family residential and institutional structures	Offices, schools, apartments, hospitals, hotels	Commercial, office multi-use or multi-function	Steel Frame Construction	Steel Frame Construction
Light Frame Construction (Wood and Light Metal Stud)	Heavy Wall Construction	Heavy Floor Construction	Pre-cast Concrete Construction	Steel Frame Construction	Steel Frame Construction
Up to 4 stories for wood stud Up to 6 stories	URM up to 8 stories high, but most are 2 stories or less	single story to high-rise structures	single story to high rise structures	Low Rise, non-fireproofed buildings	High Rise, fireproofed buildings include multi-story structures

2. Situation assessment

- a. When did it happen: day, date, time?
- b. How many people are trapped or missing?
- c. Geography and topography issues
 - i. City, town, rural, industrial, agricultural
 - ii. Heavy wall construction, light frame construction
- d. Weather
- e. Likelihood of additional incidents, e.g. aftershocks, tsunami, etc.
- f. Responder Safety, including fire or hazardous materials conditions?
- g. Access routes and transportation corridors

3. Conditions:

- a. For urban search and rescue, conditions affecting the performance include the number and size of collapsed structures, number of trapped persons in collapsed structures, and any risks involved for the rescuers (including fire and potential hazardous materials (hazmat) exposure)^{xiv}.
- b. Regional response time: 2–17 hours
- c. State response time: 12–24 hours
- d. Federal response time: 24+ hours
- e. Location, distance, available transportation, and weather affect how quickly SAR resources can reach the scene.
- f. Type of SAR resources deploying will affect what type of equipment it has and how long it can conduct SAR operations without re-supply.
- g. Hazardous conditions, weather, size of area, scope, access, criminal activity (hazard) determines level of work-area access and efficiency with which areas can be searched for

- victims.
- h. Complexity and circumstances of the entrapment affects the amount of time required to safely access, stabilize, and extricate victim.
- i. Typical fire and hazmat response has PPE to extricate lightly trapped victims.
- j. US&R strike teams begin to extricate moderately trapped victims.
- k. US&R task forces extricate heavily trapped victims.
- Trapped victims have the best chance of survival if they are rescued within 72 hours. They may survive up to 14 days if provided drinking water

VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPACITIES

Figure 4: SAR Capabilities

Agency	Resource List
DFEMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6-passenger deployable SAR team <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Rope Rescue ○ Confined Space Rescue ○ Heavy Lifting/Moving ○ Structural Collapse Rescue • 1 ea. SAFE Boat (Saipan)
DPS Boating Safety Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 ea. 22' Zodiac (1 ea. on Saipan and Rota) • 2 ea. 23' Zodiac (1 ea. on Saipan and Tinian) • 1 ea. 30' Zodiac (Saipan only)
Commonwealth Port Authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 ea. 27' Boston Whaler (Saipan) • 1 ea. 18' Boston Whaler (Saipan) • 6 ea. Jet skis (Saipan) • 8 ea. Certified divers (Saipan) • 1 ea. 18' Boston Whaler (Tinian)

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

For the core capabilities associated with this objective, the 2013 State of Hawaii Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment identified gaps related planning and exercising. The Fatality Management Services capability had the overall highest rating of all of the assessed capabilities.

This fact sheet provides a baseline for planning for the 2014 Hawaii Catastrophic Hurricane Scenario Annex, but may not be inclusive of all resources and capabilities at the local level, especially private resources available by contract.

VIII. REFERENCES

CAT MARIANAS PLAN

**CRITICAL TRANSPORTATION
FACT SHEET**

(As of Sept 2016)

PURPOSE

This fact sheet supports a joint federal/state/territory/tribal analysis of disaster response for the Critical Transportation core capability. This fact sheet describes the impact of a catastrophic event on Guam/CNMI and the requirements, operational coordination, capabilities, and enablers for Critical Transportation.

SITUATION

Following a severe Typhoon/Earthquake/Tsunami in the Marianas, transportation systems will be damaged. The supply chain supporting Marianas residents will be degraded. A multimodal transportation strategy for the delivery of life saving and life-sustaining resources is the center of gravity for catastrophic event response.

The concept for multi-modal access involves territory and federal actions to access impacted areas using air, marine, and surface transportation strategies. Each strategy requires staging teams and organizations involved in transportation coordination. Each strategy involves a process for deployment, arrival, reception, and in some cases, trans-loading to another form of conveyance.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This concept will provide the basis for subsequent courses of action development. The core Marianas transportation and logistics concept involves activation, assessment of the situation, and development of an initial plan for the coordinated movement of response resources to staging areas near the incident site. Support to the response requires the development of an initial transportation capability within 72 hours.

In order to provide flexibility, overarching logistics strategy is to bring response and recovery resources to the incident area using multiple modes (air, marine, and surface transportation).

The surface strategy is based on using staging areas on the outer edge of the affected community. Staging areas are positioned on the periphery of projected incident locations in order to minimize transportation complications.

Air, surface and marine facilities have been identified (listed below) for arrival, trans-shipment, and delivery to the incident area.

Air Transportation

Air transportation is used for high priority air transportable resources moving to the incident site and may include:

- Teams and equipment arriving by fixed-wing aircraft and subsequent movement by rotary-wing (helicopter) lift to the incident site or a combination of rotary-wing and surface lift.

Air-Capable Facilities

Seven facilities are identified for the delivery of resources by air.

Travis AFB – Identified as the Primary CONUS ISB arrival location for federal resources arriving by fixed-wing aircraft and trucks. It is the departure airfield for select resources from DC Moffett and commercial vendors

Hickam AFB – Primary departure airfield for fixed-wing lift to the incident site. Primary arrival and trans-loading

Location for federal resources arriving from DC Hawaii and commercial vendors.

Guam International Airport - Primary arrival location for resources arriving from CONUS and Hawaii. Serves as the preferred ISB for incoming flights to the Marianas. Departure airfield for resources trans-loading to CNMI.



Andersen AFB – Secondary arrival and trans-loading location for flights coming from CONUS and OCONUS. Primary arrival location for military aircraft. Serves as home base for rotary-wing assets if required.

Saipan International Airport – serves as the primary arrival location/forward staging area (FSA) for resources arriving via air to Saipan

Tinian Airport – serves as the primary FSA for resources arriving via air to Tinian

Rota Airport- serves as the primary FSA for resources arriving via air to Rota

Maritime Transportation

A maritime transportation capability will be established for wheeled, containerized, and bulk/heavy resources moving to the incident site:

- Teams and equipment arriving by truck for subsequent movement by ship or barge to the incident site.
- Commodities arriving by truck or in containers.

Maritime Transportation Facilities

Two ports of embarkation and four ports of debarkation have been identified for the delivery of resources by maritime transportation. Additional facilities may be identified during the planning process.

Oakland/Alameda Port –

Embarkation site for CONUS marine Cargo break-bulk and container and vehicles

Port of Honolulu – Embarkation site for marine cargo (break-bulk and containers from Hawaii).

Port of Guam- Serves as the primary debarkation for marine cargo arriving in the disaster area. The port is the largest in the area and serves the entire region. It will be the trans-load point to other ports in the region.

Port of Saipan- The largest port in the Marianas. It serves as a trans-load point to other islands in the Marianas.

Port of Tinian- Serves as the primary point of entry for maritime cargo to the island of Tinian.

Port of Rota (West) - Serves as the primary point of entry for maritime cargo to the island of Rota.

OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

Several organizations perform key functions to enable transportation operations, including ESF #1, ESF #7, ESF #13 and state, territory, tribal and federal agencies. Within FEMA, there are three logistics organizational echelons that conduct logistics operations: FEMA Headquarters (HQ) Logistics, FEMA Regions IX, and FEMA field activities at Joint Field Offices (JFOs).

FEMA HQ Logistics – As the National Logistics Coordinator, FEMA HQ Logistics synchronizes disaster logistics support for the response among public and private sector partners. The FEMA HQ Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) is the primary office that coordinates support to logistics functions during all incident phases. FEMA HQ Logistics coordinates the agency logistics movement response through the NRCC and Movement Coordination Center (MCC).

The NRCC pushes federal resources to the incident area and develops a deployment and reception strategy at the incident site. The deployment strategy shifts to the Unified



Coordination Group (UCG) and Movement Control Group (MCG) once the Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) takes operational control of the federal response.

FEMA Region Resource Support Section – At the RRCC, the Resource Support Section (RSS) normally mobilizes required resources to ensure their availability.

(State or Federal) Staging Area Branch Director and **Staging Area Group Supervisors** – The Staging Area Branch Director is responsible for directing staging area operations for the incident. The *Staging Area Group Supervisor* (STGS) is responsible for managing a staging area and developing a Staging Area Operations Plan and the staging area’s layout.

ESF #1 – The State/Territory Department of Transportation and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) provide transportation-related information, planning, and emergency management. ESF #1 is responsible for transportation coordination, operational control of MARAD ships, and airspace control through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

ESF #7 - In the field, FEMA and the General Services Administration (GSA) support management of federal resource ordering, transportation, coordination, and delivery of equipment, supplies, and services through ESF #7.

Contract Support to Operations – Contract support includes truck, transportation, and logistics support to staging, movement, trans-loading, or distribution operations. Support includes staffing, equipment operation, transportation, and support services to conduct self-contained LSA operations to receive bulk resources, meals, bottled water, or other supplies from federal, state, or vendor sources.

DOD Support – DOD support to air, surface, and marine transportation will be requested and may include the following:

- **Staging operations** – DOD support at Travis AFB/Hickam AFB/Andersen AFB is required to conduct reception, staging, trans-shipment and rotary-wing transportation in order to facilitate resource delivery.
- **A/DACG** – Staging operations may require support from DOD (Title 10). Support may include the capability for coordinating, loading, and offloading resources and equipment by air and includes marshaling, airfield reception, and out-loading as well as receiving and disposing of resources at the offload airfield. The capability may be referred to as an arrival/departure airfield control group or A/DACG. This capability will be required at departure airports and several arrival airport or airfields.
- **Airlift** - Aviation support for the delivery of emergency teams, equipment, and commodities to impacted areas will be required. DOD rotary-wing support will be required.

EXECUTION


Activation – IOF, NRCC, and EOCs will activate.

Assessment – The EOCs and IMATs will assess the situation and identify areas of isolation.

Planning – The NRCC/RRCC will develop an initial plan for multi-modal access, staging, and transportation and communicate the plan to the Interim Operating Facility (IOF) and stakeholders.

Deployment – Staging teams and resources will deploy to select facilities.

Execution – The EOC and RRCC will execute the strategy until the UCG is operational. Execution includes transportation coordination through the assignment of resources to a particular delivery capability.



Commodity Delivery While state or federal staging operations may deliver commodities to FSAs, distribution to recipients (at PODs, feeding sites, or shelters) is the responsibility of the Territories.

Principles

The multimodal access strategy adheres to the following principles:

- **Conflict between local, state, and federal operations is prevented.** State and federal operations take place at separate facilities under separate lines of authority. During an incident, locations for the hand-off or delivery of resources are defined in the Staging Area Operations Plan.

- **Needed throughput is achieved.** Following a severe Marianas disaster, when the supply chain is degraded, large amounts of teams, resources, and vehicles will be a required.
- **Transition to recovery will occur as quickly as possible:** The transition to commercial systems will occur as soon as possible

Logistics Coordination Fact Sheet (CNMI) 2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex

I. SCOPE

Following a severe Typhoon/Earthquake/Tsunami in the Marianas, transportation systems will be damaged. The supply chain supporting Marianas residents will be degraded. A multimodal transportation strategy for the delivery of life saving and life-sustaining resources is the center of gravity for catastrophic event response.

The concept for multi-modal access involves territory and federal actions to access impacted areas using air, marine, and surface transportation strategies. Each strategy requires staging teams and organizations involved in transportation coordination. Each strategy involves a process for deployment, arrival, reception, and in some cases, cross docking to another form of conveyance.

This concept will provide the basis for subsequent courses of action development. The core Marianas transportation and logistics concept involves activation, assessment of the situation, and development of an initial plan for the coordinated movement of response resources to staging areas near the incident site. Support to the response requires the development of an initial transportation capability within 72 hours.

In order to provide flexibility, the overarching logistics strategy is to bring response and recovery resources to the incident area using multiple modes (air, marine, and surface transportation).

II. ORGANIZATION


- FEMA designed the response organizational structure to ensure support for the subordinate levels (i.e., the NRCS supports the RRCS; the RRCS supports the FCO/UCS). While only the FCO is managing the incident (for FEMA), the NRCS plays a key role by supporting the RRCS and then supporting the FCO/UCS once the RRCS stands down. The Regional Response Coordination Staff (RRCS) for each region is also organized into the same four functional sections. This common organizational structure across the NRCS and the RRCS enables the NRCS to coordinate closely with the RRCS(s) to provide support to the incident, and also to receive information on the status of the incident.
- The NRCS is organized into four functional sections coordinated by the C-NRCS. The functions of the organization are determined by grouping related responsibilities within a section. This functional organization enhances coordination, communications, and facilitation by focusing NRCS efforts to achieve its essential functions. These sections are Situational Awareness (SA), Planning Support, Resource Support, and Center and Staff Support.

Figure 18: Organization Chart for the National Response



- Figure 2 depicts the top-level organization structure of the national level during activation.
- This structure is intended to be scalable based on the needs of incident(s) for which the NRCS is activated. Not all, or even most of the positions will be activated for most NRCS activations. Senior leadership and the section chiefs will determine which positions will be activated.

Figure 19: RRCS Organizational Structure



- FEMA designed the response organizational structure to ensure support for the subordinate levels (i.e., the NRCS supports the RRCS; the RRCS supports the FCO/UCG). While only the FCO manages the incident (for FEMA), the RRCS plays a key role in supporting the FCO/UCG. The NRCS plays a key role by supporting the RRCS, and then supporting the FCO/UCG once the RRCS stands down.

FEMA coordinates incident response support from across the Federal government by activating ESF primary and supporting federal agencies as needed. Federal ESFs are the primary structures for coordinating the delivery of Federal resources. Each ESF is composed of a coordinator, one or more primary agencies, and a number of supporting agencies and organizations.

Figure 3 summarizes the Federal ESFs and indicates the response core capabilities each ESF most directly supports. All ESFs support the common core capabilities—Planning, Public Information and Warning, and Operational Coordination.

Figure 20: Emergency Support Functions and ESF Coordinators

ESF #1—Transportation
ESF Coordinator: Department of Transportation
Key Response Core Capability: Critical Transportation
Coordinates the support of management of transportation systems and infrastructure, the regulation of transportation, management of the Nation’s airspace, and ensuring the safety and security of the national transportation system. Functions include but are not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transportation modes management and control ▪ Transportation safety ▪ Stabilization and reestablishment of transportation infrastructure ▪ Movement restrictions ▪ Damage and impact assessment.
ESF #6—Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services ESF Coordinator: DHS/FEMA
Key Response Core Capabilities: Mass Care Services, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Public Health Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services, Critical Transportation, Fatality Management Services
Coordinates the delivery of mass care and emergency assistance. Functions include but are not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mass care ▪ Emergency assistance

- Temporary housing
- Human services

ESF #7—Logistics

ESF Coordinator: General Services Administration and DHS/FEMA

Key Response Core Capabilities: Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Mass Care Services, Critical Transportation, Infrastructure Systems, Operational Communications

Coordinates comprehensive incident resource planning, management, and sustainment capability to meet the needs of disaster survivors and responders. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, management, and sustainment capability
- Resource support (e.g., facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services).

ESF #12—Energy

ESF Coordinator: Department of Energy

Key Response Core Capabilities: Infrastructure Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Situational Assessment

Facilitates the reestablishment of damaged energy systems and components and provides technical expertise during an incident involving radiological/nuclear materials. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and reestablishment
- Energy industry utilities coordination
- Energy forecast.

ESF #13—Public Safety and Security

ESF Coordinator: Department of Justice/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

Key Response Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement

Coordinates the integration of public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the full range of incident management activities. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Facility and resource security
- Security planning and technical resource assistance
- Public safety and security support
- Support to access, traffic, and crowd control.

The NRCC will coordinate the delivery of life-saving and life-sustaining resources to the Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR) via multi-modal transportation based on pre-existing execution schedules and confirmed requirements. This will be accomplished by activating CONUS ISBs to stage resources and ultimately transport them via DOD or Commercial Airlift and Sealift. IMATs and Pacific Area Office (PAO) in coordination with local jurisdictions will be responsible for the multi-modal distribution and allocation of these resources upon arrival on island(s).

Coordinating Structures

National Response Coordination Center

Resource Support Section

The Resource Support Section (RSS) is responsible for the following through the various subordinate groups:

- **Resource Capabilities Branch** – Responsible for processing RRCC and IMAT Resource Request Forms (RRF)
 - **Operations Support Group**
 - Source commodities

- Activate CONUS and OCONUS Distribution Centers
- Mission assign DoD for activation of ISBs, strategic lift, and port opening
- Determine embarkation locations in conjunction with the Movement Coordination Center (MCC)
- Establish ISBs and deploy management teams
- Ensure ISBs maintain adequate commodity levels
- Activate other Regions to assist CONUS support
- Request DDED teams
- **Ordering Processing Group**
 - Issue Mission Assignments for OFA resources as requested by Region IX RRCC and/or IMAT
 - Route DoD Mission Assignments through HQ DoD Liaison, who will then route to Region IX Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) for validation and submission into DoD Support of Civil Authorities Automated Support System (DDASS)
 - Provide ad-hoc logistics contract and acquisition support
- **Movement Coordination Center**
 - Provide single point of entry for all strategic transportation requirements for all Federal entities.
 - Collaborate with commercial transportation providers for services and facilities.
 - Tracks commodity locations and status for national level resources during transit, arrival, and retrograde.
 - Convenes interagency transportation board to de-conflict issues or relocate resources based on allocated and/or identified transportation capabilities.
 - Activate Defense Production Act (DPA) for support services

Regional Response Coordination Center

Resource Support Section

RSS is responsible for the following through the various subordinate groups:

- **Resource Capabilities Branch** – Responsible for processing Territory and IMAT Resource Request Forms (RRF)
 - **Operations Support Group**
 - Validate commodity and transportation requirements in coordination with the IMAT/PAO/State Liaison Officer (SLO) against the execution checklist in the respective plans.
 - Request DoD for strategic lift and port opening
 - Request FAA for Field Incident Response Teams (FIRST)
 - Coordinate with IMAT/PAO/SLO to activate FSA locations
 - Determine/activate debarkation locations in conjunction with the IMAT/PAO/SLO
 - Deploy ISB management teams for FSA support
 - Request activation of Pacific commodity pre-positioning contract
 - Activate responder lodging through the General Services Administration (GSA)
- **Ordering Processing Group**
 - Responsible for issuing Mission Assignments for OFA resources as requested by the IMAT/PAO/SLO

- Mission assign ESF-1 for Maritime Administration (MARAD) berthing capabilities
- Mission assign ESF-4 to manage FSAs
- Mission assign ESF-13 resources to secure FSAs
- Submit Logistics Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS) requests for commodity and transportation requirements
- Responsible for ad-hoc logistics contract and acquisition support

Incident Management Assistance Team / Pacific Area Office/ State Liaison Officer

Pacific Area Office / Territory Liaison Officer

- Coordinate the activation of FSAs in conjunction with the RRCC
- Coordinate FSA and transportation support requirements with the RRCC
- Review and validate intra-theater distribution plans
- Pre-position and contract staging equipment in Guam
- Coordinate billeting requirements
- Validate commodity and transportation requirements in coordination with the RRCC against the execution checklist in the respective plans.

Incident Management Assistance Team

- **Logistics Section Chief**
 - Review, validate, and support intra-theater distribution plans
 - Coordinate FSA and transportation support requirements with the RRCC
 - Coordinate billeting requirements
- **Operations Section Chief**
 - Incorporate Movement Control Group (MCG) and Air Operations Branch into inter- and intra-theater operations
 - Receive and validate Commonwealth/Territorial requirements
 - Maintain situational awareness of transportation infrastructure
- **Movement Control Group**
 - Coordinate all modes of transportation into the impacted area
 - Establish distribution pipeline of resources for deployment, sustainment, and redeployment
 - Manage flow of resources by synchronizing movement schedules with priorities through the use of Transportation Managers and use of Federal/State assets


CNMI

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)

- The director of CNMI Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) is authorized to represent the state in all matters relating to emergency management and to coordinate assistance/support during a major emergency or disaster event.
- The CNMI EOP includes a mutual aid agreement among the following agencies:
 - Office of the Governor
 - Office of the Lieutenant Governor
 - Office of Homeland Security
 - Mayor of Saipan

- Mayor of Rota
 - Mayor of Tinian
 - Mayor of the Northern Islands
 - Public School System
 - Commonwealth Ports Authority
- The Governor’s Authorized Representative (GAR) is the State Coordinating Officer (SCO). As such, the SCO is the primary contact between the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and the CNMI officials. The SCO is responsible for coordination of disaster assistance activities with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on behalf of the CNMI.
 - The Emergency Operations Center Commander (EOCC), assigned by the Governor, is responsible for the Direction, Control, and Coordination of the CNMIEOC. The EOCC states the general control objectives and oversees EOC operations in support of the incident response. The EOCC normally delegates functional responsibilities to command and general staff to maintain an effective span of control in achieving the objectives. The EOCC authorizes further subdivision by the use of assistants, deputies, task forces, units, groups, and branches.
 - The EOC Command Staff report directly to the EOC Commander and perform the command functions of Public Information, Liaison, and Safety.

Figure 4: JFO Task Organization



III. FACTS

Concept of Operations

The surface strategy is based on using staging areas on the outer edge of the affected community. Staging areas are positioned on the periphery of projected incident locations in order to minimize transportation complications.



- Air, surface and marine facilities have been identified (listed below) for arrival, trans-shipment, and delivery to the incident area

Air Transportation

Air transportation is used for high priority air transportable resources moving to the incident site and may include:

- Teams and equipment arriving by fixed-wing aircraft and subsequent movement by rotary-wing (helicopter) lift to the incident site or a combination of rotary-wing and surface lift.

Air-Capable Facilities

Four facilities are identified for the delivery of resources by air.

Travis AFB – Identified as the Primary CONUS ISB arrival location for federal resources arriving by fixed-wing aircraft and trucks. It is the departure airfield for select resources from DC Moffett and commercial vendors

Hickam AFB – Primary departure airfield for fixed -wing lift to the incident site. Primary arrival and crossdocking location for federal resources arriving from DC Hawaii and commercial vendors.

Guam International Airport - Primary arrival location for resources arriving from CONUS and Hawaii. Serves as the preferred ISB for incoming flights to the Marianas. Departure airfield for resources trans-loading to CNMI.

Andersen AFB – Secondary arrival and trans-loading location for flights coming from CONUS and OCONUS. Primary arrival location for military aircraft. Serves as home base for rotary-wing assets if required.

Saipan International Airport – serves as the primary arrival location/forward staging area (FSA) for resources arriving via air to Saipan

Tinian Airport – serves as the primary FSA for resources arriving via air to Tinian

Rota Airport- serves as the primary FSA for resources arriving via air to Rota

Maritime Transportation

A maritime transportation capability will be established for wheeled, containerized, and bulk/heavy resources moving to the incident site:

- Teams and equipment arriving by truck for subsequent movement by ship or barge to the incident site.
- Commodities arriving by truck or in containers.



Maritime Transportation Facilities

Two ports of embarkation and one port of debarkation have been identified for the delivery of resources by maritime transportation. Additional facilities may be identified during the planning process.

Oakland/Alameda Port –

Embarkation site for CONUS marine Cargo break-bulk and container and vehicles

Port of Honolulu – Embarkation site for marine cargo (break-bulk and containers from Hawaii).

Port of Guam- Serves as the primary debarkation for marine cargo arriving in the disaster area. The port is the largest in the area and serves the entire region. It will be the trans-load point to other ports in the region.

Port of Saipan- The largest port in the Marianas. It serves as a trans-load point to other islands in the Marianas.

Port of Tinian- Serves as the primary point of entry for maritime cargo to the island of Tinian.

Port of Rota (West) - Serves as the primary point of entry for maritime cargo to the island of Rota.

OPERATIONAL COORDINATION

Several organizations perform key functions to enable transportation operations, including ESF #1, ESF #7, ESF #13 and state, territory, tribal and federal agencies. Within FEMA, there are three logistics organizational echelons that conduct logistics operations: FEMA Headquarters (HQ) Logistics, FEMA Regions IX, and FEMA field activities at Joint Field Offices (JFOs).

FEMA HQ Logistics – As the National Logistics Coordinator, FEMA HQ Logistics synchronizes disaster logistics support for the response among public and private sector partners. The FEMA HQ Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) is the primary office that coordinates support to logistics functions during all incident phases. FEMA HQ Logistics coordinates the agency logistics movement response through the NRCC and Movement Coordination Center (MCC).

The NRCC pushes federal resources to the incident area and develops a deployment and reception strategy at the incident site. The deployment strategy shifts to the Unified Coordination Group (UCG) and Movement Control Group (MCG) once the Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) takes operational control of the federal response.

FEMA Region Resource Support Section – At the RRCC, the RSS normally mobilizes required resources to ensure their availability.

(Territory or Federal) Staging Area Branch Director and Staging Area Group Supervisors – The Staging Area Branch Director is responsible for directing staging area operations for the incident. The *Staging Area Group Supervisor* (STGS) is responsible for managing a staging area and developing a Staging Area Operations Plan and the staging area's layout.

Contract Support to Operations – Contract support includes transportation and logistics support to staging, movement, trans-loading, or distribution operations. Support includes staffing, equipment operation, multi-modal transportation, and support services to conduct self-contained LSA operations to receive bulk resources, meals, bottled water, or other supplies from federal, state, or vendor sources.

DOD Support – DOD support to air, surface, and marine transportation will be requested and may include the following:

- **Staging operations** – DOD support at Travis AFB/Hickam AFB/Andersen AFB is required to conduct reception, staging, trans-shipment and rotary-wing transportation in order to facilitate resource delivery.
- **A/DACG** – Staging operations may require support from DOD (Title 10). Support may include the capability for coordinating, loading, and offloading resources and equipment by air. FEMA provides all-inclusive support by providing manned marshaling areas and airfield reception, as well as personnel capable of shipping and receiving resources at the offload airfield. This capability may be referred to as an Arrival/Departure Airfield Control group (A/DACG). This capability will be required at departure airports and several arrival airport or airfields.
- **Airlift** - Aviation support for the delivery of emergency teams, equipment, and commodities to impacted areas will be required. DOD rotary-wing support will be required.

EXECUTION


Activation – IOF, NRCC, and EOCs will activate.

Assessment – The EOCs and IMATs will assess the situation and identify areas of isolation.

Planning – The NRCC/RRCC will develop an initial plan for multi-modal access, staging, transportation and communicating the plan to the Interim Operating Facility (IOF) and stakeholders.

Deployment – Staging teams and resources will deploy to select facilities.

Execution – The EOC and RRCC will execute the strategy until the UCG is operational. Execution includes transportation coordination through the assignment of resources to a particular delivery capability.



Commodity Delivery While local or federal staging operations may deliver commodities to FSAs, distribution to recipients (at PODs, feeding sites, or shelters) is the responsibility of the Territories.

Principles

The multimodal access strategy adheres to the following principles:

- **Conflict between territory and federal operations is prevented.** Local and federal operations take place at separate facilities under separate lines of authority. During an incident, locations for the hand-off or delivery of resources are defined in the Staging Area Operations Plan.
- **Needed throughput is achieved.** Following a severe Marianas disaster, when the supply chain is degraded, large amounts of teams, resources, and vehicles will be a required.
- **Transition to recovery will occur as quickly as possible:** The transition to commercial systems will occur as soon as possible

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- A Presidential Declaration is issued under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), including response, recovery, and mitigation activities.
- Departments and agencies will coordinate and take action under their own statutory authorities and under the Stafford Act as appropriate.

- Critical transportation routes and infrastructure will be disrupted by the incident or by secondary effects.
- Upon receipt of the Presidential declaration or Presidential order to commit Federal resources, the Federal and Territory governments will establish joint operations to provide assistance to local jurisdictions.
- Department of Defense (DOD) assets on-island affected reducing initial response capability. DOD will have primary response authority for DOD assets and personnel (including dependents) in CNMI.
- CNMI Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) will be operational.
- The event warrants the execution of the plan
- Category-3 or higher hurricane
- Earthquake (Richter scale 6.0 or above)
- Tsunami
- The event will exceed the organic capabilities of Guam/CNMI
- Airports and Seaports are available in Guam/CNMI
- Region plans checklists will be executed
- Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT), ISB teams, the Movement Control Group (MCG) will be activated and/or deployed
- DC Guam and DC Hawaii will be operational
- CONUS DCs will be activated
- Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFR) will be in effect
- Maritime Transportation Systems Recovery Units (MTSRU) will be operational
- Guam/CNMI will activate Regional Staging Areas (RSAs) and Points of Distribution (PODs)
- The National Guard (Joint Task Force [JTF] Guam) will be activated and provide initial support
- DOD will be the primary initial source of strategic transportation support
- Local multi-modal commercial transportation providers will be available

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- The Stafford Act authorizes the FCO to direct any executive branch department/agency to engage in lifesaving and life-sustaining activities.
- HSEM does not have sufficient staff to sustain 24-hour operations
- During incidents impacting Rota and/or Tinian, HSEM sends staff members to those islands as Liaison Officers (LNOs); if an incident impacted Saipan as well as Rota and Tinian, there would not be sufficient staff at HSEM to man the EOC and send out LNOs to the islands.
- Federal departments and agencies are permitted to deploy personnel and resources under their own authority or under the authority of the Stafford Act.
- Waivers for provision of legislation such as: the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) and the Buy American Act may be necessary in order to facilitate the movement of commodities in response to a catastrophic incident.

- Guam contains the two longest runways in the Marianas region with Andersen Air Force Base measuring 11,200' and Antonio B. Won Pat International Airport (GUM) measuring 10,015'.
- Saipan International Airport's two runways each measure 8,700'.

VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPACITIES

- Activate Distribution Center (DC) Guam and DC Hawaii to meet initial response requirements (1ea)
 - Alpha Pack: Provides meals and water for 30, 000 people for 1 day
 - Bravo Pack: Provides meals and water for 15, 000 people for 1 day
- Alert National Incident Support Base (ISB) team
- Alert (1) FEMA Corp support team
- Mission Assign Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to activate Ground Fuels Contract
- Contact local vendors to provide cross docking and shuttle fleet services
- Initiate actions with A.B Won Pat and Andersen AFB for use as APODs
- Initiate actions with Port of Guam to use as a SPODs
- Initiate actions with CNMI to use primary APODs and SPODs

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This fact sheet provides a baseline for planning for the 2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex, but may not be inclusive of all resources and capabilities at the local level, especially private resources available by contract.

This fact sheet supports a joint federal/territory analysis of disaster response for the Critical Transportation core capability. This fact sheet describes the impact of a catastrophic event in the CNMI and the requirements, operational coordination, capabilities, and enablers for Critical Logistics.

VIII. REFERENCES

12. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands All-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) (DRAFT-2010)
13. FEMA Mobilization Support Guide (Draft 1.1) (April, 2016)
14. FEMA National Incident Support Manual (January, 2013)
15. FEMA Operational Planning Manual (June, 2014)
16. FEMA Regional Incident Support Manual (January, 2013)
17. FEMA Region IX All Hazards Plan (January, 2013)
18. National Incident Management System
19. National Response Framework, 3rd ed. (July 2016)
20. Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan, 2nd ed. (August 2016)

Public Health, Healthcare and Emergency Medical Services Fact Sheet

2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex

I. SCOPE

This fact sheet outlines facts, planning assumptions, critical considerations, resource requirements, and shortfalls for Objective 2: Public Health and Emergency Medical Services. Public Health and Emergency Medical Services are defined as the ability to provide lifesaving medical treatment via Emergency Medical Services and related operations and avoid additional disease and injury by providing targeted public health, medical, and behavioral health support, and products to all affected populations.

II. ORGANIZATION

The primary Emergency Support Functions (ESF) and Recovery Support Function are delineated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Primary ESFs/RSFs for Objective 2: Public Health and Emergency Medical Services

Primary ESFs/RSFs:

ESF #8 –CNMI Department of Public Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)

For Emergency Support Function ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services) requests typically are funneled through CNMI's Department of Homeland Security. The Hospital and Public Health Preparedness Program will send a Liaison to the Homeland Security EOC during activations. In addition, the Hospital's EOC is activated and communication is maintained with the CNMI EOC.

III. FACTS

- 5 shelters identified with maximum of 500-600 individuals (Garapan & Cagman are the largest)
- Shelter/assessment/surveillance needs fulfilled by WHO epidemiologist
- CNMI EOC has a contract for water treatment services post impact
- No blood bank in CNMI but no daily shortfalls with blood supply. Excellent relationship with Guam for requesting additional blood supply to CNMI
- Dialysis Center at CHCC and one private clinic on island. Private clinic requested water supplies during Typhoon Soudelor. Excellent coordination/communication between CHCC and private dialysis clinic with scheduling dialysis patients pre-impact
- Pharmaceutical supplies were not interrupted during Typhoon Soudelor. McKesson provided additional supplies to CNMI
- CHCC is an 86-bed hospital with the ability to surge up to 110 beds
- Consistent shortage of MDs and nurses at CHCC
- CHCC medical staff can be augmented by the clinical staff from Tinian and Rota. Americorps provided (physician assistant and 5 nurses) during Typhoon Soudelor
- CHCC has emergency procurement for fuel to the hospital boiler. 3 fuel tanks (18,000) gallons that can independently operate for 72hrs. During Typhoon Soudelor, the fuel tanks were refilled every 2-3 days.
- CHCC has an off-grid water well that has approximately 175,000-gallon capacity. The potable, purified water is enough for 5 days of operation. A backup pump to pull raw water from the wellhead onsite is a 5hp 220 volt/3.73 kw well pump. A contractor is on standby for water purification if CHCC purchases the water from an outside source as a result of disruption on the water supply from the main CUC waterline grid.
- CHCC hospital has satellite phones and two-way radios with capability to communicate directly with the acute care clinics in Tinian and Rota. No shortfalls in communication noted during typhoon Soudelor.
- CHCC has a contract in place for off Island MEDEVAC services via a private on island helicopter and ability to contact DoD resources in Guam for additional MEDEVAC support
- Medical Supply Office (MSO) is located in lower basement of the hospital. During Typhoon Soudelor, CHCC experienced no interruption of pharmaceutical supplies.
- CNMI has 6 ambulances but only 3 are operational. One private EMS company with 2 operational ambulances

- CHCC morgue has capacity of 6 and has contract for reefer truck for total capacity of 176 onsite. CNMI flies medical examiner from Guam to perform autopsies. CME can process 1-2 individuals per day. This is a potential shortfall, as the CME from Guam services Guam as a priority during a response.
- Two funeral parlors on island and one facility has cremation capability
- One Veterinary resource on island (DNLR vet).
- Mayor of Saipan has a stray dog program and has identified sites for housing pets during emergencies, noted anticipated needs for veterinary support.

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- CHCC Hospital is a hardened facility and will assume the hospital will be intact and functional
- Two clinics in Northern and Southern Saipan will also be intact and will have limited capability
- Power and water services will be affected and limited services maybe available
- Backup generators at the hospital will be functional and able to provide power for essential services at the hospital
- Water well provide emergency water supply for essential services at the hospital, it is a gravity flow system, once purified water resides in the 275,000-gallon storage tank
- EMS services will be available on limited basis
- The 5 shelters will be at maximum capacity
- Behavioral Health assets will be quickly overwhelmed
- Limited on Island Veterinary support be quickly overwhelmed and will need support
- On Island blood supply will sufficient for post impact demand
- Little to no impact to the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain
- The CME from Guam will be quickly overwhelmed and will need support in Saipan

Figure 3: Operational Impacts – 2014 Statewide Hurricane Scenario

Indicator	Estimate	Reference
In-patient capabilities post-storm	CHCC has 90% of 86 beds filled at all times	<i>CNMI Hospital & Public Health Preparedness Office</i>
Out-patient capabilities (e.g. dialysis, pharmacies) post-storm	Two Pharmacies on Island. 5-6 private outpatient clinics on island. Dialysis Center at CHCC and one private dialysis center on island.	<i>CNMI Hospital & Public Health Preparedness Office</i>
Healthcare workforce availability	Consistently short staffed with needs for MDs and Nurses. Lack of specialized medical staff at CHCC	<i>CNMI Hospital & Public Health Preparedness Office</i>
Injuries due to the hazard	Post impact injuries from cleanup efforts	<i>CNMI Hospital & Public Health Preparedness Office</i>

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- No EMAC available but rather governor to governor requests to Hawaii and Guam for assistance
- No daily shortfalls with lab/diagnostics but may need surge capability during emergencies
- Shelter assessment/surveillance needs fulfilled by WHO epidemiologist but will need HHS support for multiple shelters
- Mental Health/Behavioral Health on island assets quickly overwhelmed and will need support
- No blood bank in CNMI
- CHCC hospital census at 90% at all times
- Medical Surge augmentation required for CHCC and two clinics on Saipan
- Medical Supply Office (MSO) in lower basement of hospital and prone to flooding. Backup generator not functional.
- No specialized MDs on island. MDs not well trained on alternate standards of care during emergencies
- Only one private EMS company with total of 2 ambulances. CNMI has 6 ambulances but only 3 are operational. May need EMS augmentation during declared emergencies

- CHCC morgue has capacity of 6 and has contract for reefer truck for total capacity of 176 onsite. CNMI flies medical examiner from Guam for autopsies. CME can process 1-2 individuals/day. CME will need Federal assistance with processing
- 2 Funeral parlors on Island and one facility has cremation capability
- One Veterinary company on island (DNLR Vet). May need assistance with veterinary care during an emergency. Saipan Mayor has stray dog program and has identified sites for housing pets during emergencies

VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPACITIES

Figure 4: Resource Requirements

Capacity/Resource	County and State Resources / Owner	Resource Shortfalls
Medical Surge Capacity	Medical Surge Capacity of 110.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MDs/nurses
Medical Supplies	No shortfalls with Pharmaceutical supplies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • None
EMS Units	Potential shortfall	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 8 total ambulances on CNMI
Mortuary Surge Capacity	Surge Capacity of 176 on site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CME will need assistance with processing

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Federal ESF 8 Mission Requirements:

1. Type 1 DMAT – assist with medical surge and ER decompression at CHCC in Saipan
2. Two Type 3 DMAT – assist with medical surge in northern and southern clinics
3. One DMORT – assist CME with processing
4. CDC – assist with food inspection and environmental assessments post incident
5. Potential need for Laboratory personnel to meet surge from hospital

IRCT and LNOs: Pre- and post-landfall space shortages on Island. Buildings of opportunity located on Capitol Hill and across the street from the Hospital. Mariana Islands Housing Authority has building spaces. Islands of Tinian and Rota can accommodate an IRCT as well. Hotels in Saipan are available but maybe limited to interruption of power and water supplies.

Assistance to Rota: CNMI Homeland Security sends a pre-landfall Disaster Assistance Team to the 22-bed acute care facility.

Assistance to Tinian: Assistance is post landfall and closer to Saipan. The acute care facility has a 2-bed capability.

Both acute care facilities send patients to CHCC in Saipan. All approvals for movement are coordinated through CNMI Homeland Security.

VIII. REFERENCES

1. CNMI Homeland Security
2. Hospital and Public Health Preparedness Program

Environmental Response and Health and Safety Fact Sheet 2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Annex

I. SCOPE

This fact sheet outlines facts, planning assumptions, critical considerations, resource requirements, and shortfalls for the Core Capability of Environmental Health and Safety for the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas.

Considering this Core Capability in Response requires the Joint response organization “*conduct appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the health and safety of the public and works, as well as the environment, from all-hazards in support of responder operations and the affected communities*”^{xv}.

This fact sheet describes the organizational structure for the lead CNMI agency responsible for Environmental Response, BECQ. The information below includes both resources and capabilities that may be appropriate for other response areas and would provide atypical solutions, with a focus on permitting, response with a focus on ports, medical facilities and command/control nodes.

II. Organization

- The CNMI Bureau of Environmental and Coastal Quality (BECQ), under executive order no. 2013-24, merged with the CNMI Division of Environmental Quality and the Coastal Resources Management Office, and is an Executive Branch organization.
- Within BECQ, there are the following branches, with specific mission sets, capabilities and resources:

○ Environmental Surveillance Laboratory	○ Wastewater, earthmoving and erosion
○ Water Quality Surveillance	○ Pesticides and Storage Tank
○ Water and Air Quality Management	○ Marine monitoring Team
○ Safe Drinking Water	○ Site Assessment and Remediation

III. FACTS

1. BECQ is a regulatory agency with primary roles in inspection and enforcement.
2. BECQ initiates the suspension of permit requirements by administrative action directly with the Office of The Governor. This action results in the issuance of “Blanket Emergency Response Permits”.
3. Waivers for land clearing (grubbing, tree removal) and erosion control measures will be suspended at the discretion of BECQ during and emergency response.
4. Inspectors are uniformed, but are not sworn law enforcement officers. Inspectors have the authority to leverage enforcement actions up to and including Administrative Orders and may issue Notice of Violations.
5. While there is a Hazardous Materials Response Team, there is no Level B or Level A capability resident on CNMI. The BECQ HAZWOPER trained personnel can serve at the perimeter of any exclusion zone.
6. CNMI leverages BECQ uniformed enforcement officers, they regularly conduct post-storm damage assessments in support.
7. BECQ staff inspect facilities in remote areas of the island as well as facilities that are difficult to access.

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- Activities that require a permit will be suspended for a limited duration of time; however, permit requirements must be substantively met in the recovery phase of response.
- Marine Monitoring Teams have unique capabilities as waterborne assessment team, however, non-BECQ personnel cannot be regularly transported for that assignment.
- BECQ has the authority to conduct aerial surveillance using electronic devices such as “drones” over both private and public facilities, as long as the private facility is “permitted”.
- Drones will be purchased and available, with photographic capability by the end of 2017.
- BECQ capabilities can be accessed by HSEM on request by the Special Assistant.

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Communication – radio?
- Coordination – who goes to the EOC?
- Priorities – Assessment of their “permitted” facilities and coastal zone for damage and debris
- Operations – Using uniformed officers to conduct land based damage assessments will be supplemented by the use of drones.
- There are a number of concerns about residential PV systems and its impact on power restoration
- A number of alternative energy sources, such as wind, solar and hydro, may be available, however to use these power sources, the transmission network and distribution network must be

VI. RESOURCES and CAPABILITITES

Table 1: Resources and Capabilities

Resource (Type)	# Available/Shifts	Primary mission/ Mission in Disaster Response	Amount Required	Amount on Hand
Personnel – uniformed	12-hour operations	Utility company	24-hour operations	12 hours
Personnel –Marine Monitoring	12-hour operations	Utility company	24-hour operations	12 hours
Personnel – Boat Captains	Maintenance level	Utility company	Overhaul / restart	Significant
Personnel – Hazardous Materials Response Capable	20-30 days	Utility company	60 days	30 days
Boats, 27’ Boston whalers	3	Water quality assessment team transport/Debris and damage assessment capabilities		
Personnel – HAZWOPER Certified				
Water quality Laboratories				
Health and Safety Personnel				

VII. DISCUSSION

VIII. CONCLUSION

IX. REFERENCES

1. The Commonwealth Environmental Protection Act (PL 3-23), 1982.
2. Title 65: Division of Environmental Quality, 6/30/2013.

Debris Management Operations Fact Sheet Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

I. SCOPE

This fact sheet outlines facts, planning assumptions, critical considerations, resource requirements, and shortfalls for the Debris Operations Objective. **(ADD Core capability relationship)**

II. ORGANIZATION

- **(Identify federal ESF lead, discussion organization)**
- **Identify Activation/Mobilization/Deployment/Employment**
- **Define /provide org chart for CNMI organization and detail relationships**
- **Define responsibility of Mayors**
- Department of Public Works/Solid Waste Management Division (Saipan, Tinian and Rota)
- CNMI Homeland Security and Office of Emergency Management
- Division of Roads and Grounds (DPW) (Saipan and Rota)
- Mayor’s Offices (Saipan, Tinian and Rota)
- Bureau of Environmental and Coastal Quality

III. FACTS

Anticipated Debris Volume by Region (planning assumption)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zone 1 Saipan reference by division <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 615,631 CY • Zone 2 Tinian <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 184,689 CY • Zone 3 Rota <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 184,689 CY <p>Total Debris Volume: 985,009</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Clean Woody: 295,503 CY ○ Mixed C&D: 689,506 CY <p><small>*Debris volume estimates from Draft CNMI Debris Management Plan & the USACE Estimating Model (COEM)</small></p>
Most Severely Impacted or Vulnerable	<p>Zone 1 – Saipan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accessibility is biggest challenge • If the storm comes from the Southwest <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Beach Road, San Antonio & Kobler – Due to population density • If the storm comes from the Northeast <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Garapan & China Town – Small lots, multiple residences • Chalan Kiya <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ One-way access ○ Flash Flood Prone • As Lito Road <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Tinian & Rota Medical Referral Housing Area <p>Zone 2 – Tinian</p> <p>Zone 3 – Rota</p>
Priorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extrication of people • Major flood drainage ways • Egress for fire, police and Emergency Operations Center • Ingress to hospitals, jail and special care units • Major traffic routes • Supply distribution points and mutual aid assembly areas • Government facilities • Public safety communication towers

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public shelters • Secondary roads to neighborhood collection points • Access for utility restoration • Neighborhood streets • Private property adversely affecting public welfare <p>*Priorities are set by the Debris Manager based on reporting by Debris Assessment Teams define this resource, its activation, employment and how they provide SA to the UCG</p>
<p>Assessment strategy (Concept of Ops)</p>	<p>Zone 1 – Saipan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lower Base used as command post to coordinate with EOC. Command post by what agency? Is this something they do on their own authority? Are they taking direction from the EOC? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ DPW has representative at EOC • Field Teams: is there sufficient capability to run operations for the entire duration. What is the duration? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Roads and Grounds Division (3 assessment teams – Beach Road, Middle Road, Back Road) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Primary Routes (Paved roads) ○ Parks and Recreation Division <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assists DPW & Mayor’s Office ▪ Tourist Areas ▪ Secondary Roads (Unpaved roads) ○ Mayor’s Office <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Secondary Roads (Unpaved roads) • Parks and Recreation and the Mayor’s Office is instrumental in identifying isolated communities. Define how and who gets involved, tasked. What resources do they bring. Is it just a phone call from them. <p>Approximately 8 hours to complete assessment.</p> <p>Zone 2 – Tinian</p> <p>Zone 3 – Rota</p>
<p>Debris Operations (concept of ops)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phase 1 – Response define task lead and equipment /personnel capability. Is it sufficient? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Completed within 1-2 days following event ○ Clear debris from at least one lane on all evacuation routes and identified primary and secondary roads to expedite the movement of emergency service vehicles such as fire, police, and medical responders. ○ Debris is cut and pushed to rights-of-way for pick up and disposal during Phase 2. • Phase 2 – Recovery <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Consists of the removal and disposal of that debris which is determined necessary to ensure the orderly recovery of the community and to eliminate less immediate threats to public health and safety. ○ Mixed debris will be collected (by who) and hauled from assigned Debris Control Zones to CNMI designated debris management sites or to designated landfill locations. Clean woody debris will be hauled to the nearest designated vegetative debris management site for eventual burning or grinding. <p>Zone 1 – Saipan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Debris Staging Sites <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ As Gonno/Kobler <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • San Vicente down to Quartermaster Road • Does not accept tree stumps

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primarily utilized for vegetative debris to be chipped • Capacity ### ▪ Kagman <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capitol Hill, As Teo, Kagman • Unlimited Capacity ▪ Marpi Landfill <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quartermaster Road up to Marpi • Capacity ### ▪ Two pending permanent “Neighborhood Convenience Centers” to be located at As Gonno and Kagman. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BECQ will issue perpetual permit for waste collection and use as debris staging sites for disaster related vegetative green waste, white goods and limited C & D. ○ Vegetative Debris Reduction Strategy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Currently DPW has two (2) chippers capable of chipping up to 12 inches. ▪ Chipping takes place at the As Gonno ▪ Non-chipped vegetative debris will be taken and disposed at either the Kagman or Marpi location. ○ C & D Debris <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All C & D Debris must be taken to the Marpi Landfill ○ Hazardous Materials <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ All hazardous material must be shipped off-island. However, residential hazardous material is accepted at the lower base facility. ▪ Used oil will likely be an issue due to ongoing generator usage and maintenance. ▪ Commercial hazardous material is dealt with by the respective private entity. ▪ Asbestos is accepted at Marpi Landfill with acceptable abatement plan and BECQ approval. ○ Private Property Debris Removal (PPDR) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Generally limited to citizens residences with disabilities or extreme circumstances with proper right-of-entry and hold harmless agreements. ○ <p>Zone 2 – Tinian Zone 3 – Rota</p>
Resources	<p>Zone 1 – Saipan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel • Equipment • Fuel <p>Zone 2 – Tinian Zone 3 – Rota</p>

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- Utilities and critical facility access is contingent on Phase 1 debris ops. DPW debris equipment and supplies have been pre-staged to begin Phase 1 operations.
- Debris Management Team is identified and engaged with the Debris Manager at the EOC.
- Discussion
- Discussion
- Discussion

- Discussion.

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Communication – How will crews communicate in the field back to EOC.
- Coordination –
- Priorities –
- Accessibility
- Discussion
- Discussion

VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

Saipan Table 2: Power Resource Requirements

Resource (Type)	Amount Available	Resource Owner	Amount Required	Difference
Personnel – field	##	##	##	##
Vehicles – field	##	##	##	##
Equipment	##	##	##	##
Fuel	##	##	##	##

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

VIII. REFERENCES

1. #####

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Fire Management and Suppression Fact Sheet 2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex


I. SCOPE

This fact sheet outlines facts, planning assumptions, critical considerations, resource requirements, and shortfalls for Objective 15: Fire Management and Suppression. Fire Management and Suppression provides structural, wildland, and specialized firefighting capabilities to manage and suppress fires of all types, kinds, and complexities while protecting the lives, property, and the environment in the affected area.

II. ORGANIZATION

- For Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4 (Firefighting), the agency Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) on Saipan coordinate directly with the ESF #4 coordinator at the Territory EOC. On Tinian and Rota, the agencies are represented at the Mayor’s Operations Centers, which coordinate with the CNMI EOC.
- The CNMI Department of Fire and Emergency Services (DFEMS) is the primary ESF #4 coordinating agency.
- Commonwealth Port Authority Officers assigned to Tinian and Rota also provide those islands’ Aircraft Rescue Fire Fighter (ARFF) capability.

Figure 21: CNMI ESF #4 Structure



III. FACTS

- There are no firefighters in the Northern Islands
- There are six fire stations on Saipan (Station 6 out of service due to Typhoon Soudelor damage); and one fire station each on Tinian and Rota
- DFEMS is the primary SAR coordinator in CNMI

- There is a mutual aid agreement among the islands; the requesting island's Deputy Fire Commissioner submits forwards the request to the Mayor, which gets forwarded to the EOC for approval.
- During normal operations, there are two DFEMS personnel assigned per station
- Upon onset of Typhoon Condition 2, an additional EMT is assigned to each station and the following special units are activated:
 - SAR
 - Logistics
 - Administration
 - Fire Prevention
- DFEMS has an MOU with Airport Rescue & Firefighting (ARFF); ARFF typically provides a water tanker and manpower to assist with structure fires.
- DFEMS maintains an EOC in the Capitol Hill area on Saipan.
- DFEMS maintains a HAZMAT team on Saipan, which is a collateral duty. The HAZMAT team is activated upon request.
- Saipan International Airport ARFF department runs two 24-hour shifts (A & B) with about 15 personnel assigned to each shift with an average of 8 personnel on-duty per shift daily. A Fire Captain is in charge of each shift.
- The department's administration consists of the Fire Chief, Two Assistant Fire Chiefs, PRATC Coordinator, Fire Inspector/Logistics and two ARFF Mechanics.
- The Fire Chief reports to the Executive Director of the Commonwealth Ports Authority.
- Tinian International Airport ARFF department consist of approximately 10 personnel. Personnel have dual roles as ARFF and Ports Police officers. ARFF Operations runs three 8-hour shifts (Day, Swings, & Mid) with an average of 2-3 personnel on-duty per shift daily.
- A Fire/Police Captain runs the daily operation for both Law Enforcement and ARFF for the airport.
- The Saipan Airport Fire Chief assists the Tinian Ports Manager in ensuring that all ARFF personnel are current in training, operational, and technical requirements.
- Rota Airport ARFF department consists of approximately 10 personnel. Personnel have dual roles as ARFF and Ports Police officers. ARFF Operations runs three 8-hour shifts (Day, Swings, & Mid) with an average of 2-3 personnel on-duty per shift daily.
- A Fire/Police Captain runs the daily operation for both Law Enforcement and ARFF protection for the airport.
- The Saipan Airport Fire Chief assists the Rota Ports Manager in ensuring that all ARFF personnel are current in training, operational, and technical requirements.

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- The DFEMS Chief will serve as a member of the MAC
- DFEMS will provide EOC staffing for ESF 4
- The Fire Station at San Roque will be relocated and rebuilt in another location in San Roque
- The dispatch center at Station 2 in Garapan will be operational NLT May 2017.
- The Guam National Guard's Civil Support Team (CST) will support DFEMS HAZMAT team upon request.

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- HAZMAT and SARU members serve in these functions as collateral duties; their primary duties are as firefighters.
- On Tinian and Rota, Port Authority Police also serve as a part of the ARFF.
- There are no inter-island radio communications between public safety agencies on Saipan, Tinian and Rota; they rely upon telephone and digital communications means. Agencies co-located on an island can communicate with each other via radio.
- Approximately 10% of DPS's manpower is unavailable at any given time due to disability leave, annual leave, etc.
- Mutual aid agreements between agencies and islands are not codified in writing; agreements are worked out at the EOC on an as-needed basis. Interagency mutual aid is provided internally as agencies on Tinian and Rota fall under their parent agencies on Saipan (i.e. DPS on Tinian and DPS on Saipan are the same agency).

VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPACITIES

Figure 22: Resources

Agency	Island	Resources
Department of Fire and Emergency Services	Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 ea. Fire station • 93 ea. firefighters • 5 ea. EMTs • 6-passenger SAR Unit (Vehicle extrication, rope rescue) • 1 ea. 4x4 dually quad cab truck • 1 ea. 4x4 Nissan pickup truck • 3 ea. Ambulance • 3 ea. Pumper truck • 1 ea. SAFE Boat • 9 ea. Rescue divers (collateral duty)
	Tinian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 ea. Fire station • 16 ea. Firefighters • 1 ea. Pumper truck • 2 ea. Ambulance • 1 ea. Rescue truck (Ford F450)
	Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 ea. Fire station • 13 ea. Firefighters • 1 ea. Pumper truck • 2 ea. Ambulance • 1 ea. HAZMAT representative (collateral duty)
Commonwealth Port Authority-Aircraft Rescue Fire Fighting	Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 35 ea. Firefighters • 4 ea. Fire apparatus • 1 ea. Command vehicle • 1 ea. Tanker • 1 ea. Air compressor
	Tinian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 ea. Firefighters • 2 ea. Fire apparatus

	Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 ea. Firefighters • 2 ea. Fire apparatus
Commonwealth Port Authority-Police	Saipan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 40 sworn staff • 6 ea. SUV • 3 ea. Pickup trucks • 2 ea. Boston Whalers (27' and 18') • 6 ea. Jet skis • 8 ea. Certified divers • SWAT team (16-pasenger, collateral duty)
	Tinian	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 sworn staff • 1 ea. SUV • 1 ea. Pickup truck (Ford F150) • 1 ea. Boston Whaler, 18'
	Rota	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 sworn staff • 1 ea. SUV • 1 ea. Pickup truck (Ford F150)

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This fact sheet provides a baseline for planning for the 2016 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex, but may not be inclusive of all resources and capabilities at the local level, especially private resources available by contract.

VIII. REFERENCES

1. Interview with Captain Jesse Mesa, CNMI DFEMS
2. <http://www.cpa.gov.mp/arff.asp>

Public Information and Warning Measures Fact Sheet 2017 Northern Mariana Islands

I. SCOPE

This fact sheet outlines facts, planning assumptions, critical considerations, and shortfalls for Objective 1.3 FEMA Strategic Plan 2014-2016: Increase disaster awareness and action by improving communication. Provide clear and effective communication before, during, and after disasters. Work with whole community partners (including survivors) and communications experts to develop, refine, and disseminate accessible and actionable messages through various media platforms.

II. ORGANIZATION

Public Information and Warning

Lead: CNMI Governors Communication Director (Office of the Governor)


Strategy: The Governors Communication Director assumes the responsibility for coordinating the public information operations of all of the active emergency services during a Tier 3 Incident. During an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) activation, Tier 2 Incident, the CNMI Governors Communication Director (Office of the Governor) will deploy to CNMI Homeland Security Emergency Management (HSEM) EOC to be the official source of information about the incident to the media.

Joint Information Center

Lead: Federal Emergency Management Agency ESF 15

Strategy: At a Tier 1 Incident, considered a major or catastrophic incident, FEMA will deploy an External Affairs Officer (EAO) who serves as an advisor to the Unified Coordination Group and coordinates messages with federal, commonwealth, and local governments to establish a Federal/Commonwealth Joint Information Center (JIC) to ensure the coordinated and timely release of incident-related response and recovery to the public and provide incident-related information to the media in accessible formats and multiple languages. (ESF#15 SOP 2016).

Figure 1: ESF 15 Organization Chart (FEMA)



III. FACTS

- CNMI Public Information Director, Office of the Governor is legally responsible for Public Information and Warning to the public.

- CNMI Public Information Office, Office of the Governor will activate during Level III to disseminate safety messaging.
- CNMI Public Information Office, Office of the Governor will deploy to HSEM EOC during Level II activation and serve as the official source of information about the incident to the public, mayors and media.
- CNMI Public Information Office, Office of the Governor will assess the need for additional Public Information Officers (PIOs) through established MOUs.

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- Augmentation of territory and federal PIOs may be available to support CNMIs Public Information Office with media broadcasting.
- Transporting PIOs from the mainland or neighboring territories may be challenging if commercial transportation is affected.
- Available lodging resources is limited and serves as a challenge for incoming FEMA/PIO staff.
- Radio Stations utilizing emergency power generators will pose a challenge in obtaining fuel consumption and may seek FEMA assistance.
- Movement of staff from the mainland, State of Hawaii, or Guam may be impaired due to airport and aircraft non-availability for up to 72 hours. As a result, staff may need to stage in Hawaii or Guam.
- Family members and friends will make numerous calls and inquiries to the Joint Information Center regarding their loved ones – approximately 100 times the number of survivors – during the course of the incident.
- International delegations will donate goods through FEMA’s International Affairs Division at headquarters in Washington, DC and could delay needed resources. Public messaging on donations will need to be prepared by the U.S. State Department.

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- Communication.
- CNMI Public Information Specialist, Office of the Governor, do not have sufficient staff to sustain 24-hour operations and may be personally impacted by the incident
- Public Information Specialists are highly dependent on the sustainability of the communication infrastructure and have no other means to reach communities.
- Destruction will cause delays in broadcasting to the public regarding life-saving, life sustaining messaging.
- Complete outages or loss of power will delay communication connection, create limited internet access to internal, affect media broadcasting and external populace.
- Limited communication resources available to Public Information Specialist, hand held radios, outreach staff.

VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPACITIES

Table 1: Resources and Capabilities

Resource (Type)	# Available/Shifts	Primary mission/ Mission in Disaster Response	Amount Required	Amount on Hand
Personnel – (3) – CNMI Public Information Specialist, Office of the Governor	12-hour operations	Public Information and Warning	24-hour operations	12 hours
Personnel – (1) – Guam Homeland Security Public Information Officers	12-hour operations	Public Information and Warning	24-hour operations	12 hours

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This fact sheet provides a baseline of assumptions and core capabilities, but may not be inclusive of all resources and capabilities at the local level and MOUs with neighboring PIO resources available.

VIII. REFERENCES

1. DHS Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan (FIOP), July 2014
2. FEMA Emergency Support Function 15, Standard Operating Procedures 2016
3. FEMA Strategic Plan, 2014-2018
4. FEMA Emergency Support Function 15 – External Affairs Annex 2008
5. Basic Guidance for Public Information Officers (PIOs), National Incident Management System (NIMS), FEMA 51, November 2007
6. Guam Catastrophic Typhoon CONPLAN, August 2010
7. DHS Emergency Support Function 15 Standard Operating Procedures, August 2013
8. FEMA Region IX All Hazards Plan, January 2013
9. FEMA Region IX San Francisco Bay Area Earthquake Readiness Response: Concept of Operations Plan, September 2008
10. FEMA.gov website, <https://www.fema.gov/office-external-affairs#Disaster>, accessed online October 29, 2014
11. CNMI JIC, Joint Information Center, Standard Operation Procedures, September 2016
12. CNMI Emergency Operations Plan, January 2000
13. National Response Framework, ESF #15 – External Affairs Annex, May 2013
14. National Response Framework, Public Affairs Support Annex, May 2013

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Operational Coordination Fact Sheet

2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex

I. SCOPE

This fact sheet outlines facts, planning assumptions, critical considerations, resource requirements, and shortfalls for Objective 10: Operational Coordination. Operational Coordination is the establishment and maintenance of a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities. The National Response Framework identifies two critical tasks associated with Operational Coordination:


1. Mobilize all critical resources and establish command, control, and coordination structures within the affected community and other coordinating bodies in surrounding communities and across the Nation and maintain as needed throughout the duration of an incident.
2. Enhance and maintain command, control, and coordination structures, consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), to meet basic human needs, stabilize the incident, and facilitate the integration of restoration and recovery activities.

Response operations involve multiple partners and stakeholders. Operational coordination occurs at all government levels and consists of actions and activities that enable decision makers to determine appropriate courses of action and provide oversight for complex homeland security operations to achieve unity of effort and effective outcomes.

II. ORGANIZATION

- FEMA designed the response organizational structure to ensure support for the subordinate levels (i.e., the NRCS supports the RRCS; the RRCS supports the FCO/UCS). While only the FCO is managing the incident (for FEMA), the NRCS plays a key role by supporting the RRCS and then supporting the FCO/UCS once the RRCS stands down. The Regional Response Coordination Staff (RRCS) for each region is also organized into the same four functional sections. This common organizational structure across the NRCS and the RRCS enables the NRCS to coordinate closely with the RRCS(s) to provide support to the incident, and also to receive information on the status of the incident.
- The NRCS is organized into four functional sections coordinated by the C-NRCS. The functions of the organization are determined by grouping related responsibilities within a section. This functional organization enhances coordination, communications, and facilitation by focusing NRCS efforts to achieve its essential functions. These sections are


Figure 23: Organization Chart for the National Response



Situational Awareness (SA), Planning Support, Resource Support, and Center and Staff Support. Figure 2 depicts the top-level organization structure of the national level during activation.

- This structure is intended to be scalable based on the needs of incident(s) for which the NRCS is activated. Not all, or even most of the positions will be activated for most NRCS activations. Senior leadership and the section chiefs will determine which positions will be activated.

Figure 24: RRCS Organizational Structure



- FEMA designed the response organizational structure to ensure support for the subordinate levels (i.e., the NRCS supports the RRCS; the RRCS supports the FCO/UCG). While only the FCO manages the incident (for FEMA), the RRCS plays a key role in supporting the FCO/UCG. The NRCS

plays a key role by supporting the RRCS, and then supporting the FCO/UCG once the RRCS stands down.

FEMA coordinates incident response support from across the Federal government by activating ESF primary and supporting federal agencies as needed. Federal ESFs are the primary structures for coordinating the delivery of Federal resources. Each ESF is composed of a coordinator, one or more primary agencies, and a number of supporting agencies and organizations.

Figure 3 summarizes the Federal ESFs and indicates the response core capabilities each ESF most directly supports. All ESFs support the common core capabilities—Planning, Public Information and Warning, and Operational Coordination.

Figure 25: Emergency Support Functions and ESF Coordinators

ESF #1—Transportation
ESF Coordinator: Department of Transportation
Key Response Core Capability: Critical Transportation
Coordinates the support of management of transportation systems and infrastructure, the regulation of transportation, management of the Nation’s airspace, and ensuring the safety and security of the national transportation system. Functions include but are not limited to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transportation modes management and control ▪ Transportation safety ▪ Stabilization and reestablishment of transportation infrastructure ▪ Movement restrictions ▪ Damage and impact assessment.
ESF #2—Communications
ESF Coordinator: DHS/Cybersecurity and Communications
Key Response Core Capability: Operational Communications, Infrastructure Systems
Coordinates government and industry efforts for the reestablishment and provision of critical communications infrastructure, facilitates the stabilization of systems and applications from malicious cybe

activity, and coordinates communications support to response efforts. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Coordination with telecommunications and information technology industries
- Coordination of the reestablishment and provision of critical communications infrastructure
- Protection, reestablishment, and sustainment of national cyber and information technology resources
- Oversight of communications within the Federal response structures
- Facilitation of the stabilization of systems and applications from cyber events

ESF #3—Public Works and Engineering

ESF Coordinator: DOD/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Key Response Core Capabilities: Infrastructure Systems, Critical Transportation, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Environmental Response/Health and Safety, Fatality Management Services, Mass Care Services, Mass Search and Rescue Operations

Coordinates the capabilities and resources to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, engineering expertise, construction management, and other support to prepare for, respond to, and/or recover from a disaster or an incident. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Infrastructure protection and emergency repair
- Critical infrastructure reestablishment
- Engineering services and construction management
- Emergency contracting support for lifesaving and life-sustaining services.

ESF #4—Firefighting

ESF Coordinator: U.S. Department of Agriculture/U.S. Forest Service and DHS/FEMA/U.S. Fire Administration

Key Response Core Capabilities: Operational Communications, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Infrastructure Systems On -Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services, Fire Management and Suppression, Situational Assessment

Coordinates the support for the detection and suppression of fires. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Support to wildland, rural, and urban firefighting operations.

ESF #5—Information and Planning

ESF Coordinator: DHS/FEMA

Key Response Core Capabilities: Situational Assessment, Planning, Public Information and Warning

Supports and facilitates multiagency planning and coordination for operations involving incidents requiring Federal coordination. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Incident action planning
- Information collection, analysis, and dissemination

ESF #6—Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services ESF Coordinator: DHS/FEMA

Key Response Core Capabilities: Mass Care Services, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Public Health Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services, Critical Transportation, Fatality Management Services

Coordinates the delivery of mass care and emergency assistance. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Mass care
- Emergency assistance
- Temporary housing
- Human services

ESF #7—Logistics

ESF Coordinator: General Services Administration and DHS/FEMA

Key Response Core Capabilities: Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Mass Care Services, Critical Transportation, Infrastructure Systems, Operational Communications

Coordinates comprehensive incident resource planning, management, and sustainment capability to meet the needs of disaster survivors and responders. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Comprehensive, national incident logistics planning, management, and sustainment capability
- Resource support (e.g., facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services).

ESF #8—Public Health and Medical Services

ESF Coordinator: Department of Health and Human Services

Key Response Core Capabilities: Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services, Fatality Management Services, Mass Care Services, Critical Transportation, Public Information and Warning, Environmental Response/Health and Safety, Logistics and Supply Chain Management

Coordinates the mechanisms for assistance in response to an actual or potential public health and medical disaster or incident.

Functions include but are not limited to:

- Public health
- Medical surge support including patient movement
- Behavioral health services
- Mass fatality management.

ESF #9—Search and Rescue

ESF Coordinator: DHS/FEMA

Key Response Core Capability: Mass Search and Rescue Operations

Coordinates the rapid deployment of search and rescue resources to provide specialized lifesaving assistance. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Structural collapse (urban) search and rescue
- Maritime/coastal/waterborne search and rescue
- Land search and rescue.

ESF #10—Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

ESF Coordinator: Environmental Protection Agency

Key Response Core Capabilities: Environmental Response/Health and Safety, Critical Transportation, Infrastructure Systems, Public Information and Warning

Coordinates support in response to an actual or potential discharge and/or release of oil or hazardous materials. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Environmental assessment of the nature and extent of oil and hazardous materials contamination
- Environmental decontamination and cleanup, including buildings/structures and management of contaminated waste.

ESF #11—Agriculture and Natural Resources

ESF Coordinator: Department of Agriculture

Key Response Core Capabilities: Mass Care Services, Critical Transportation, Logistics and Supply Chain Management

Coordinates a variety of functions designed to protect the Nation's food supply, respond to plant and animal pest and disease outbreaks, and protect natural and cultural resources. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Nutrition assistance
- Animal and agricultural health issue response
- Technical expertise, coordination, and support of animal and agricultural emergency management
- Meat, poultry, and processed egg products safety and defense
- Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection.

ESF #12—Energy

ESF Coordinator: Department of Energy

Key Response Core Capabilities: Infrastructure Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Situational Assessment

Facilitates the reestablishment of damaged energy systems and components and provides technical expertise during an incident involving radiological/nuclear materials. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and reestablishment
- Energy industry utilities coordination
- Energy forecast.

ESF #13—Public Safety and Security**ESF Coordinator: Department of Justice/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives****Key Response Core Capability: On-Scene Security, Protection, and Law Enforcement**

Coordinates the integration of public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the full range of incident management activities. Functions include but are not limited to:

- Facility and resource security
- Security planning and technical resource assistance
- Public safety and security support
- Support to access, traffic, and crowd control.

ESF #14—Superseded by National Disaster Recovery Framework**ESF #15—External Affairs****ESF Coordinator: DHS****Key Response Core Capability: Public Information and Warning**

Coordinates the release of accurate, coordinated, timely, and accessible public information to affected audiences, including the government, media, NGOs, and the private sector. Works closely with state and local officials to ensure outreach to the whole community. Functions include, but are not limited to:

- Public affairs and the Joint Information Center
- Intergovernmental (local, state, tribal, and territorial) affairs
- Congressional affairs
- Private sector outreach
- All Hazards Emergency Response Operations
- Tribal.

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI)

- The director of CNMI Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) is authorized to represent the state in all matters relating to emergency management and to coordinate assistance/support during a major emergency or disaster event.
- The CNMI EOP includes a mutual aid agreement among the following agencies:
 - Office of the Governor
 - Office of the Lieutenant Governor
 - Office of Homeland Security
 - Mayor of Saipan
 - Mayor of Rota
 - Mayor of Tinian
 - Mayor of the Northern Islands
 - Public School System
 - Commonwealth Ports Authority
 - Commonwealth Utilities Corporation
 - Department of Finance
 - Department of Public Safety
 - Commonwealth Healthcare Corporation
 - Office of Attorney General
 - Department of Public Lands
 - Department of Corrections

- Department of Public Works
- Department of Commerce
- Department of Land and Natural Resources
- Department of Community and Cultural Affairs
- Department of Labor
- Office of personnel Management
- Bureau of Environmental and Coastal ‘quality
- American Red Cross, NMI Chapter
- The CNMIEOC uses a series of standard operating guidelines (SOG’s) for the effective and efficient operation of the EOC. This includes operational management elements of a command staff, operations section, planning section, logistics section, and finance/administration section utilizing the Incident Command System (ICS) structure.
- The Deputy Special Assistant to Homeland Security of the Office of Emergency Management (EMO) or its designate convenes the MAC Group (formally the Resource Agency Coordinators [RAC]) to deliberate on policy and legal issues that arise in a complex, multi-agency response to an emergency or disaster.
- The MAC Group reconciles differing policies, procedures, and authorities among agencies and, if necessary, establishes priorities for multi incidents. The MAC Group does not employ command authority by communicating directly with the field level response. It advises the Deputy Special Assistant to Homeland Security/EMO to ensure coordinated incident planning and operations occur through the CNMIEOC.
- Members of the MAC Group generally include the Governor’s cabinet staff and other response organization (e.g. American Red Cross, Salvation Army, etc.) from involved agencies, and senior officials of other involved agencies and jurisdictions, as needed. The Special Assistant to Homeland Security and the Deputy Special Assistant to Homeland Security/EMO coordinates the workings of the MAC Group. This is accomplished by periodic face-to-face meetings in the MAC room of the CNMIEOC, other established locations, or by means of remote communications.
- The Governor’s Authorized Representative (GAR) is the State Coordinating Officer (SCO). As such, the SCO is the primary contact between the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) and the CNMI officials. The SCO is responsible for coordination of disaster assistance activities with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on behalf of the CNMI.
- The Emergency Operations Center Commander (EOCC), assigned by the Governor, is responsible for the Direction, Control, and Coordination of the CNMIEOC. The EOCC states the general control objectives and oversees EOC operations in support of the incident response. The EOCC normally delegates functional responsibilities to command and general staff to maintain an effective span of control in achieving the objectives. The EOCC authorizes further subdivision by the use of assistants, deputies, task forces, units, groups, and branches.
- The EOC Command Staff report directly to the EOC Commander and perform the command functions of Public Information, Liaison, and Safety.

Figure 26: CNMI EOC Org Chart





Figure 27: CNMI Agency/ESF Crosswalk

Agency	Emergency Support Functions														
	#1 – Transportation	#2 – Communications	#3 – Public Works and Engineering	#4 – Firefighting	#5 – Emergency Management	#6 - Mass Care, Emergency Assist., Housing & Human Services	#7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support	#8 - Health & Medical Services	#9 - Search and Rescue	#10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response	#11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources	#12 – Energy	#13 – Public Safety and Security	#15 – External Affairs	
Attorney General's Office					S										
Commonwealth Ports Authority- Police				S					S				P		
Commonwealth Ports Authority- Seaport	P														
Commonwealth Ports Authority- Airport	P														
Commonwealth Ports Authority- ARFF				S	S	S	S	S	S	S					
Commonwealth Utilities Corp.- Power			S	S		S						P			
Commonwealth Utilities Corp.- Water			S			S				S		P			
Commonwealth Utilities Corp.- Sewer			S			S	S					P			

DCCA- Historic Preservation Office													S		
DCCA- Facilities						S	S						S		
Emergency Management Office	S	P	S	S	P	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Department of Finance					S			P							
CNMI Judicial Office					S										S
Department of Correction					S										S
Division of Housing, CDA						S									
Mayor of Saipan	P		S	S	S		S	S	S	S	S		S		
Mayor of Rota, Tinian & Northern Isl.	S	S	S	S	P	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	
DLNR – GIS/Technical Support			S		S								S		
Dept. of Public Health						P		P		S	S				
DPH-Bureau of Environmental Health						S		S				P			
Office of the Gov.- Gov. Authorized Rep.					S		S								P
Office of the Gov. – Public Information		S			S										S
Office of Homeland Security					S		S								S
Department of Public Safety – Police		S		S					P	S					P
Department of Public safety – Fire		S		P				S	P	P					
Public School System	S					P									
Department of Public Works	P		P	S			S		S	S			S		
DLNR Division of Agriculture													P		
Division of Environmental Quality				S	S					P	S	S			
Coastal Resources Management				S						S	S				
DLNR Division of Fish and Wildlife												S			S
American Red Cross						P	S	S							

P = Primary Agency S = Support Agency

Figure 28: JFO Task Organization



III. FACTS

Strategic

- National Operations Center (NOC). In the event of an act of terrorism, natural disaster, or other emergency, the NOC, as the principal operations center for the Department of Homeland Security, coordinates and integrates information from NOC components to provide situational awareness and a common operating picture for the entire Federal

Government, as well as for local, tribal, and state governments, as appropriate, to ensure that accurate and critical terrorism and disaster-related information reaches government decision makers in a timely manner. Additionally, the NOC serves as the national fusion center, collecting and synthesizing all-source information, including information from state and major urban area fusion centers, for all threats and hazards across the entire integrated national preparedness system.

- National Response Coordination Center (NRCC). When activated, the NRCC is a multiagency coordination center located at FEMA Headquarters. Its staff coordinates the overall Federal support for major disasters and emergencies, including catastrophic incidents and emergency management program implementation. FEMA maintains the NRCC as a functional component of the NOC for incident support operations.
- Authority to control FEMA assets flows from the FEMA Administrator through the RA to the FCO. The FEMA Administrator and RAs delegate control of FEMA-assigned resources to the FCO when he or she is mission-capable.


Operational

- Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC). When activated, RRCCs are multi-agency coordination centers generally staffed by ESFs in anticipation of or immediately following an incident. Operating under the direction of the FEMA Regional Administrator, the staff within the RRCCs coordinates Federal regional response efforts and maintains connectivity with FEMA Headquarters and with state EOCs, state and major urban area fusion centers, Federal Executive Boards, Tribal governments and other Federal, tribal, and state operations and coordination centers that potentially contribute to the development of situational awareness. The UCG assumes responsibility for coordinating Federal response activities at the incident level once Unified Coordination is established, freeing the RRCC to deal with new incidents should they occur.
- When an incident occurs or the Regional Watch Center identifies a credible threat, the RA sets conditions for a possible response by immediately: (1) determining the appropriate FEMA disaster level for the incident in consultation with the Regional Response Division Director; (2) activating the RRCS to a commensurate level; (3) ordering resources in support of anticipated incident objectives; and (4) preparing to address a governor's request for a Stafford Act declaration.
- The RA activates the RRCS by activating the FEMA personnel who comprise the core of the RRCS. The RA typically activates appropriate ESFs at the same time or shortly after FEMA personnel are activated. The RRCS may also include representatives from NGOs and private sector organizations when they are needed.
- The RRCS coordinates resource, information, and programmatic issues to support incidents and interface with the NRCS. The RRCS: (1) provides overall emergency management coordination; coordinates Federal regional response and support efforts; (2) conducts regional-level planning; (3) deploys regional resources; (4) coordinates with the NRCS for the deployment of national resources; (5) collects, analyzes, and disseminates incident information; and (6) maintains connectivity with State Emergency Operations Centers (SEOCs), State fusion centers, the NRCS, and other Federal and State operations and coordination centers.

- The RRCS develops and maintains situational awareness of incidents at the regional level. During activation, the RRCS will have a dedicated phone line that will be answered at all times.

Concept of Operations

Figure 29: Task by Phase for Typhoon Response



Phase 1: Preliminary pre-incident. Phase 1 normally encompasses pre-incident actions that shape operations. In notice incidents, early phases are associated with actions prior to the actual occurrence of the incident. These actions may include gaining situational awareness, activating coordination centers, and alerting or deploying resources including commodities and teams. The intent of this phase is to lessen the requirements for, and/or promote the success of, follow-on phases, through preparatory actions that specifically influence behaviors and foster planning synergy among partners and stakeholders.

- **Phase 1a: Normal Operations.** This sub-phase is the steady-state condition when there is no storm that poses a threat to the Commonwealth. Actions during this phase include:
 - Provide annual updates to include the exercising and socialization of the CNMI Emergency Operations Plan by HSEM and supporting partner agencies.
 - Revise OPLAN on a bi-annual basis.
 - Conduct ongoing mitigation activities, risk assessments, and hazard analysis.
 - Identify Special Needs and Special Medical Need requirements.
 - Develop mass care and sheltering plans for general population and special needs survivors.
 - Develop a Fuel Prioritization Plan.
 - Identification of debris transition site(s).
 - Set priorities for restoration of critical services.
 - Establish additional task forces as needed.

End State: The end state of Phase 1a is when the NWS detects a threat that meets the criteria for transition to Phase 1b, and residents and government agencies are adequately prepared.

- **Phase 1b: Increased Likelihood.** This sub-phase occurs when the NWS determines that CNMI is within a three-day probable track area of the storm. Actions during this phase

are focused on gaining situational awareness, alerting deployable resources and identifying available resources and capabilities. FEMA's Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) may be alerted and deployed to CNMI during this sub-phase. Actions during this sub-phase include:

- Alert key CNMI ESFs and partner agency personnel.
- Activation of the CNMI Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and CNMI Line Agency Operations Centers, as appropriate.
- Commence contingency planning efforts.
- Alert IMAT and deploy to CNMI and begin the joint planning process.
- Develop a common operating picture through the establishment of a Territory/Federal Unified Coordination Group (UCG).
- Conduct planning activities on a joint basis with HSEM, FEMA Region IX and its PAO, and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). Planning will focus on vulnerabilities and resource availability.
- Activation of the RRCC to Level 2 and of the Mission Assignment Manager, appropriate ESFs and Defense Coordinating Element to conduct incident-specific operational planning.

Actions are taken to heighten situational awareness, anticipate requirements and prepare for deployment of specific resources. The IMAT will deploy to CNMI and form a joint management team that is capable of supporting the incident and transitioning to a UCG.

End State: The end state of Phase 1b is when an assigned IMAT is operational on CNMI, and has formed a partnership with HSEM and other appropriate agencies, and is conducting joint planning in preparation for potential response operations.

- **Phase 1c: Near Certainty.** This sub-phase starts when the NWS issues a Typhoon Watch for CNMI. Actions during this phase are focused on gaining and maintaining situational awareness, deploying response teams and increasing operational readiness. During Phase 1c, the Governor will declare a State of Emergency and request a Presidential Declaration that, when approved, will designate an FCO and enable a coordinated Federal response within the authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). Actions during this sub-phase include:
 - Perform specific tasks as outlined in the execution checklist by responsible parties.
 - Activate Territory ESFs as required.
 - Establish shelters.
 - Reduce tourist population through safety warnings/advisories.
 - Transition water pumps at well locations from the power grid to emergency generators to support water supply post-landfall.
 - Provide support to fuel distribution operations for first responders, debris clearance teams, and emergency generators.
 - Protect and safeguard critical resources prior to landfall in order to ensure operability and accessibility post-landfall.
 - Establish the Seaport Unified Command to facilitate the continuity of port operations.
 - Activate the FEMA Region IX RRCC at Level 1 and activate remaining ESFs.

- Coordinate, through FEMA, to establish a Federal Staging Area (FSA) in CNMI and Incident Support Bases (ISB) in Hawaii and the U.S. west coast in anticipation of the deployment of Initial Response Resources (IRR) to CNMI.
- Develop capability to perform lifesaving and sustaining actions through the deployment of medical teams to CNMI.
- Alert follow-on response forces and identify required resource providers and on-hand inventories.

Actions taken during this sub-phase are intended to deploy incident management assistance, assessment, and lifesaving response teams to CNMI; protect critical resources; and increase operational readiness. Assessment and response teams will deploy to hardened staging areas provided by CNMI.

End State: The end state of Phase 1c is when the UCG is staffed and adequate resources are staged to accomplish the key objectives. When these preparatory actions are accomplished, the operational readiness of the response organization is increased by staging resources, positioning generators with fuel capabilities, and forming a UCG and other response and coordination organizations. Public safety is enhanced through a coordinated and aggressive public information campaign in preparation for the storm.

Phase 2: Incident Occurs. Phase 2 begins when the incident develops. This phase is characterized by seizing the initiative in response to a developing or potential incident, through the mobilization, deployment, and/or employment of appropriate capabilities required to counter or less the impacts of an incident and/or hazard. Initial efforts are normally focused on life-saving and life-sustaining actions, and systems recovery. Phase 2 is usually, but not always, post-incident.

- **Phase 2a: Activation, Situational Assessment, and Movement.** Once landfall occurs, resources are employed to save lives, protect property and the environment, and preserve the social, economic, and political structure of the impacted area. Response operations will start when tropical storm force winds have subsided. Actions include:
 - Perform lifesaving and life sustaining measures.
 - Conduct Search and Rescue Activities.
 - Maintain the FEMA Region IX RRCC at Level 1.
 - Develop Situational Awareness.
 - Mobilize follow-on responders.
 - Establish a JFO.

End State: The end state of Phase 2a occurs when the Governor cancels/lifts COR1, a JFO is established, and all Federal teams are deployed.

- **Phase 2b: Employment of Resources and Stabilization.**
 - Conduct mass care and sheltering.
 - Minimize risk to tourists.
 - Maintain functionality of the water distribution system.
 - Deliver fuel to maintain essential services.
 - Conduct debris clearance/debris removal operations.
 - Re-establish transportation systems.
 - Maintain continuity of port operations.

- Provide emergency power.
- Conduct joint (Federal, Territory, private sector, and Non-Governmental Organization) damage assessments including assessing the functionality of key infrastructure systems (seaport, airport, water, and power).
- Deploy and receive off-island response teams and resources.

End State: The end state of Phase 2a occurs when the incident is stabilized and shelters are closed; Interim housing solutions are in place; Task Forces are established and conducting operations; and critical systems such as electrical power, water, and communications are restored.

- **Phase 2c: Intermediate Operations.** The purpose of the response is supplying staging area(s) and PODs to support shelters and other critical facilities with necessary commodities. Emergency shelters, located primarily at Department of Education (DoE) facilities, maintain water storage and generator capabilities and will be a focal point of support for command and control, medical support, and special needs and special medical needs assistance. Debris clearance and fuel delivery operations will support this strategy.
 - Create an environment conducive to recovery and mitigation.
 - Develop demobilization and transition plans.
 - Repair infrastructure.
 - Deliver FEMA programs.
 - Enlist private sector support.

End State: The end state of Phase 2 is when response activities have set the conditions for recovery. The Recovery Support Strategy has been published and the Recovery Support Functions are in place. Sheltering has transitioned to transitional shelters or temporary housing, enabling the re-opening of schools. The port is operating using temporary systems and transitioning to repaired systems. Power generation and fuel distribution to essential infrastructure enables communications, water distribution, and basic sanitation.

Phase 3: Sustained Operations. Actions taken during this phase are intended to restore services, continue government operations, and promote economic recovery following the typhoon. Actions include:

- Provide Public and Individual assistance under the Stafford Act to the affected population.
- Refer individuals or entities ineligible for Stafford Act assistance to other methods of support.
- Execute the demobilization plan to transition recovery operations to long-term community recovery and mitigation.
- Create an environment for long-term community recovery and future hazard mitigation in areas of high impact.
- Conduct demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.

End State: The end state of Phase 3 is when recovery activities have set the conditions for long-term community recovery; temporary housing has transitioned to rebuilt homes or other permanent housing; schools are re-opened; tourism is re-established; and critical facilities and infrastructure are self-sustaining through normal transactions.

CNMI

- There are two Tropical Storm Conditions:

- Tropical Storm Condition 2 or "Weak Tropical Storm" has a maximum sustained winds (MSW) of 30-49 MPH (26-43 knots) with a peak gust of 40-64 MPH (33-56 knots).
- Tropical Storm Condition 1 or "Severe Tropical Storm" has a maximum sustained winds (MS) of 50-73 PH (44-63 knots) with a peak gust of 65-94 MPH (57-81 knots).
- Based on information received from the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC), Joint Region Marianas, CNMI Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Management Agency (OHS & EM) will set conditions based on the time destructive winds (50 knots) or greater are expected to reach the CNMI.

Figure 30: CNMI Typhoon Condition Levels

Condition Level 4	CNMI is in Condition 4 year-round due to its location in typhoon alley until a higher condition is set. Destructive winds could impact the islands within 72 hours.
Condition Level 3	Destructive winds are possible within 48 hours.
Condition Level 2	Destructive winds are anticipated within 24 hours.
Condition Level 1	Destructive winds are anticipated within 12 hours (or already occurring). Only emergency vehicles are allowed on the road.

- The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Governor assigns an EOC activation mission to an EOC Director (EOCD). The activation mission consists of the recommended activation level, the reason for activation, pertinent instructions, and policy considerations. There are four (4) levels of activation of the CNMIEOC ranging from 4 (lowest) to 1 (highest, most complex):

Level 4 – indicates routine operations.

Level 3 – indicates a heightened sense of awareness. Occurring or forecasted events include a potential or present threat. [Examples: weather watch/warning, volcano status changes, multiple incidents that may threaten the public, extended search and rescue, or a law enforcement action.]

Level 2 – indicates an actual event occurred or may be imminent. [Examples: Tropical Storm, moderate flooding disrupts public transportation and emergency vehicle response, extended search and rescue requires interagency support, and structural fire requires evacuation and shelter planning, or raised State Homeland Security Threat Level.] A local emergency operations center may be activated. FEMA Notified


Level 1 – operations occur in response to a major life threatening and/or property damaging event. [Examples: major flooding, sea storm surge or tsunami displaces residents and damages structures, a woodland fire requires evacuation and sheltering of residents, or a damaging earthquake occurs.] Event exceeds agency or local emergency management capability and requires significant mobilization of statewide emergency resources from agencies. FEMA Region IX is notified of the situation and may provide a liaison in the CNMIEOC.

- The recommendation to deactivate or change activation level is made by the EOC Director with the consent/advisement of the Governor or it's designate. All resource demobilization responsibilities should be completed or transferred prior to deactivation.
- Once the EOCC has received the activation mission, they establish General Control Objectives which include initiating alert and notification activities. These activities have two concurrent purposes: to activate personnel to the EOC to perform their functions and to notify entities about the event to ensure coordination.
- Alert and notification responsibilities are shared by the Office of Emergency Management, the EOC Incident Commander, the Governor's PIO, and the Operations, Planning, and Logistics Sections depending on the purpose and target of the notification. The contact and accountability of notification targets is completed to 100% and continues as a General Control Objective throughout the activation.
- When direct coordination from the CNMIEOC to the field response (Incident/Unified Command) is appropriate it will be conducted along functional lines wherever possible, e.g., EOC Incident Commander to the On-Scene Coordinator, PIO to PIO, on-scene agency response personnel to EOC Agency Representative, etc.
- The initial point of response coordination is between the CNMIEOC and the DHS/FEMA Region IX Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC).
- A catastrophic event triggers implementation of the CNMI's Catastrophic Incident Appendix (Appendix B)

Mobilization Support

- National mobilization support will generally be in response to a catastrophic or Level I event. National mobilization support will include primarily Tier 3 and Tier 4 Surge Capacity Force (SCF) personnel and will be conducted in accordance with the *DHS Surge Capacity Force Concept of Operations* (April 2010) and the draft *FEMA Standard Operating Procedure – Surge Capacity Mobilization Center Management Process* (November 2013).
- Regional mobilization support will be at the regional and/or state level and will be conducted in accordance with the *FEMA Mobilization Support Guide* and Regional Administrator (RA), RRCC RSS, FCO, and regional policies and practices.
- Incident mobilization support will be at the local (JFO) level and conducted in accordance with the *FEMA Mobilization Support Guide* and FCO/IMAT direction.

Figure 31: Mobilization Concepts of Operation



- The decision to initiate mobilization support is made at the lowest possible level whenever one of two conditions are met:
 - Prepositioning personnel and equipment prior to the opening of a JFO or designation of an FCO.
 - Receiving, staging, and deploying to specific field assignments exceed the capability of field operations. Impacted areas may be inaccessible or certain field operations not yet established and time-phased, but immediate deployments are necessary.
- Mobilization support, at its largest, includes four overarching functions: reception, staging, onward movement, and integration, as well as pre- and post- mobilization functions (e.g., setup and closeout). Within these overarching functions are discrete tasks, including training, billeting, and maintaining accountability.


Figure 32: Mobilization Center Functions and Tasks

Pre-Incident			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish funding authorities. Distribute and publicize (e.g. SharePoint site) guidance documents and plans. Determine level of effort. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement setup checklists (reference Appendix G). Scope support needs (general and scenario-specific). Begin the decision process for site selection. Appoint facility liaison (make contact with host facility). Determine cadre needs/identify personnel needed. Identify training and equipment needs (DISC packs, NIOS orders, MERS support, IMAT augmentation). Activate mission assignments for managing and operating the mobilization support operation (e.g., USFS). Activate pre-identified personnel to manage and conduct mobilization support operations. Establish reporting requirements (e.g., lines of reporting and reporting products). Identify secondary skills of personnel. Establish security for the facility. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encourage federal employees (surge capacity force personnel) to bring identification/credentials. 			
Incident			
Reception	Staging	Onward Movement	Integration
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement check-in and personnel accountability (including FEMA deployment system). Provide orientation and welcome packet. Implement personnel tracking and monitoring of individual’s readiness checklist. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Badging of personnel. Equipment, training, IT needs, etc. Provide billeting (lodging and feeding). Establish transportation. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shuttle services, rental cars, bus, or air. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct training. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Program, safety, security, travel voucher, timesheet, email, etc. Establish communications with the receiving organization. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine timing of deploying personnel. Consider special needs for responders. Provide FEMA-distinctive attire. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Validate readiness to move onward. Implement checkout and personnel accountability (including FEMA deployment system). Provide transportation for deploying personnel (shuttle services, rental cars, bus, or air). Communicate with POC at receiving organization. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acknowledgment by POC to the mobilization support facility that all personnel have arrived.
Situational Awareness		Post-Incident	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify relevant characteristics of impacted area. Maintain continual dialog between the NRCC and RSS. Determine requirements at the incident level. Prepare daily reports. Implement coordination calls, and participate on daily operational calls. Maintain daily communication with host site. Coordinate logistics with all stakeholders. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Determine phase-out schedule/end of mobilization support activity. Transfer records (archive welcome packages, intake forms, and program-specific records retention). Complete AAR and improvement plan, including best practices, and share on centralized SharePoint site. Establish a historical POC roster. Prepare final closeout report. 	

- At the National level, the director of disaster operations directs implementation of mobilization support facility operations. The resource support section chief initiates actions to establish mobilization support facilities and provides coordination between facilities and other response operations. The Office of Response and Recovery (ORR) activates mobilization support staff and establishes mobilization support facilities.
- At the Regional level, the regional administrator directs establishment of a mobilization support facility. The Regional Response Coordination Center scopes the requirement and implements actions to create a mobilization support facility. The mission support division director establishes mobilization support operations.
- Mobilization Support Function (MSF) will provide the following:
 - Reception: Check-In, orient, and account for deployed personnel

- Readiness: Assemble, hold, and organize arriving personnel and equipment
- Onward Movement Coordination: Shuttle to/from facility, transportation and tracking prior to integration into the incident workforce; may be to a specific incident assignment or to other lodging
- Phased Deployments: Receipt and confirmation of arrival at designated location, including handoff (briefings, Just-In-Time training, administrative, tracking)

Figure 33: Region IX Mobilization Support Function--Floor Plan




- At the incident level, the FCO/IMAT Team Leader/Operations Section Chief directs mobilization support facility operations.

IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

- The incident is of such magnitude that the Governor will proclaim a State of Emergency.
- A Presidential Declaration is issued under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), including response, recovery, and mitigation activities.
- Departments and agencies will coordinate and take action under their own statutory authorities and under the Stafford Act as appropriate.
- Critical transportation routes and infrastructure will be disrupted by the incident or by secondary effects.
- The CNMI Emergency Operations Center (EOC) may be overwhelmed or inoperable.
- Upon receipt of the Presidential declaration or Presidential order to commit Federal resources, the Federal and Territory governments will establish joint operations to provide assistance to local jurisdictions.
- Department of Defense (DoD) assets on-island will be significantly affected reducing initial response capability. DoD will have primary response authority for DoD assets and personnel (including dependents) in CNMI.

- The National Guard response forces will not be federalized and will not be subject to Posse Comitatus Act restrictions. For a catastrophic event, National Guard forces will be converted from Territory Active Duty to Title 32 status and their status may be retroactive to the beginning of the response.
- For operational purposes, CNMI will be divided into three geographic divisions:
 - Division A: Saipan and Northern Islands
 - Division B: Tinian
 - Division C: Rota

Figure 34: CNMI Geographic Divisions

V. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

- The Stafford Act authorizes the FCO to direct any executive branch department/agency to engage in lifesaving and life-sustaining activities.
- HSEM does not have sufficient staff to sustain 24-hour operations
- During incidents impacting Rota and/or Tinian, HSEM sends staff members to those islands as Liaison Officers (LNOs; if an incident impacted Saipan as well as Rota and Tinian, there would not be sufficient staff at HSEM to man the EOC and send out LNOs to the islands.
- Federal departments and agencies are permitted to deploy personnel and resources under their own authority or under the authority of the Stafford Act.
- Waivers for provision of legislation such as the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Jones Act) and the Buy American Act may be necessary in order to facilitate the movement of commodities in response to a catastrophic incident.
- Guam contains the two longest runways in the Marianas region with Andersen Air Force Base measuring 11,200' and Antonio B. Won Pat International Airport (GUM) measuring 10,015'.
- Saipan International Airport's two runways each measure 8,700'.

VI. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPACITIES

- Force Module needed for Mobilization Support Function
 - IT – Contingent upon decision to re-direct or Employee Type – potentially 4-6 personnel (Deploy 4 to California for equipment issue and remaining to event region for helpdesk function)
 - HR – 2 personnel
 - Forward deployed person would track arriving personnel for Program Area & coordinate Supervisor hand-off, support IMAT until operational control
 - As well, they would ensure DTS reflects duty station change upon arrival
 - Security – 2 personnel

- Logistics – 2 personnel – Contingent upon existing facility support
- Accountable Property Office – 3 personnel
- Disaster Field Training Office – 2 personnel deploy to California if pre-training is needed
- Travel Specialist – 1 to 2 personnel to support MSF, assist with TA, password resets, etc.

VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This fact sheet provides a baseline for planning for the 2016 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Scenario Annex, but may not be inclusive of all resources and capabilities at the local level, especially private resources available by contract.

VIII. REFERENCES

1. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands All-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) (DRAFT-2010)
2. FEMA Mobilization Support Guide (Draft 1.1) (April, 2016)
3. FEMA National Incident Support Manual (January, 2013)
4. FEMA Operational Planning Manual (June, 2014)
5. FEMA Regional Incident Support Manual (January, 2013)
6. FEMA Region IX All Hazards Plan (January, 2013)
7. National Incident Management System
8. National Response Framework, 3rd ed. (July 2016)
9. Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan, 2nd ed. (August 2016)

Appendix X: Execution Checklist

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	The CNMI Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) agency and the Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (CUC) coordinate on the development of a consolidated and prioritized list of critical facilities for power restoration.
1			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM and CUC identify generator requirements and map those requirements to the generator inventory.
1			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM ensures that the Geographic Information System (GIS) database is coordinated with all member agencies of the Power Restoration Task Force (PRTF).
1			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC and HSEM assess the capabilities of CUC generators at designated essential facilities and ensure that all inoperative generators are repaired/returned and are maintained in an operational status.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM develops an emergency power fuel and maintenance prioritization plan based on initial assessments and adjusts the plan accordingly as island power is restored.
1			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM conducts an assessment of any identified critical facility without backup power, determines the requirements and priority for emergency power generation post-storm, and coordinates findings with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)/ESF #3 and FEMA Operations.
1			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC assesses power infrastructure requirements and capabilities and reports the status and any shortfalls to HSEM monthly.
1			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	JFO	USACE	USACE provides for CUC use and awareness assessment data from previous temporary emergency power missions executed in CNMI.
1			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	JFO	USACE	CUC and CNMI Department of Public Works (CNMI DPW) conduct vegetation control in and around vulnerable critical infrastructure.
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	JFO	USACE	Form the PRTF.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	JFO	USACE	HSEM, CUC, and FEMA coordinate on the execution of a mission assignment (MA) with USACE and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to provide ESF #3 and ESF #12 liaisons to the PRTF and to pre-position assets to execute a temporary emergency power mission that includes a USACE Emergency Power Planning and Response Team (PRT), 249th Engineer Battalion personnel, and, if available, ACI contractor assets.
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	JFO	USACE	Federal agencies deploy initial elements from their organizations to conduct pre-landfall planning and coordination.
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF gains and reports the status of all HSEM facilities identified as critical infrastructure.
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC executes its typhoon standard operating procedures (SOPs) and preparedness checklist
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC activates and recalls essential personnel (by position) in order to perform preparedness activities
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC increases the number of crews performing tree-trimming operations around power lines.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC management stands up the CUC Operations Center.
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC tops off fuel at facilities equipped with emergency backup power generation maintained by CUC.
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC and CNMI DPW conduct vegetation control.
1			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC conducts inventory and equipment assessments.
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM coordinates the establishment of the PRTF.
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	ESF #3 coordinates a power interagency conference call with FEMA, USACE, USACE contractors, and the DOE; ESF #3 alerts the PRT, 249th Engineer Battalion, and contractors.
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM ensures all emergency power generator fuel requirements are met prior to storm landfall.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF coordinates and expedites the mobilization of generator repair parts or replacements at critical facilities that meet generator type, kind, and capability requirements.
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC, CNMI DPW, and HSEM coordinate with ESF #3 and ESF #7 on requesting federal support for additional generators to meet temporary power requirements at critical facilities.
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	Transition water pumps at well locations from the power grid to emergency generators to support water supply post-landfall.
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	ESF #3 Emergency Power PRT provides technical advice and conducts pre-installation inspections.
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC conducts inventory and equipment assessments.
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC moves critical resources to hardened U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) facilities prior to landfall to ensure that capability is maintained post-landfall.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	All deployed teams and resources shelter in place.
1			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	Additional PRT and contractor resources begin staging at the continental United States (CONUS) Incident Support Base (ISB).
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM develops an emergency power fuel and maintenance prioritization plan based on initial assessments and adjusts the plan accordingly as island power is restored.
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF monitors and supports CUC deployment of CUC/FEMA assessment teams to conduct damage assessments and perform repairs to the electrical power infrastructure at critical facilities.
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF and CUC coordinate a priority of power restoration utilizing the HSEM critical infrastructure list.
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF develops a power restoration plan based on initial assessments to the power grid during Phase 1a.
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CNMI DPW conducts priority route debris clearance operations to ensure deployment of resources and capabilities to critical facilities.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC initiates a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with American Public Power Association (APPA).
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF identifies and orders transportation options for priority transformers, wires/lines, power meters, and poles.
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF and FEMA coordinate the deployment of ESF #3, ESF #12, and FEMA Operations staff to assist in technical assessments of generator requirements and to assist in the installation of emergency generators, as needed.
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF coordinates with the CUC Operations Center to ascertain the status of ongoing CUC power restoration operations and to establish power restoration priorities with the Unified Coordination Group (UCG).
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC asset replacement ordering to enable the timely repair and restoration of emergency power capabilities until island power is restored.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF coordinates with ESF #7 and ESF #3 to source and lease available on- or off-island generator assets, as needed, to augment emergency power availability or to replace failed generators.
1			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF coordinates augmentation of CUC resources by mission assigning DOD for support, and/or executing MOUs with off-island power agencies.
1			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF develops an emergency power fuel and maintenance prioritization plan based on power grid assessments and adjusts the plan accordingly as island power is restored. PRTF communicates fuel requirements with the Fuel Task Force (FTF).
1			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF calls forward ACI contract personnel and equipment, as appropriate, based on current assessments of power grid, estimates of power restoration, and workload of the CUC and 249th Engineer Battalion.
1			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF coordinates emergency power generation installations as required and/or directed.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC’s execution of emergency services/support contracts with on-island vendors to provide generator repair, specialized equipment, and resource replacement generators, as necessary.
1			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC asset replacement ordering to enable the timely repair and restoration of emergency power capabilities until island power is restored.
1			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	ESF #7 coordinates with the PRTF to source transportation resources and provide logistical support for moving off-island assets to CNMI.
1			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM sustains and maintains an emergency power fuel and maintenance prioritization plan based on its understanding of the critical facilities that are running on temporary power and adjusts the plan accordingly as island power is restored.
1			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	As island power is restored, HSEM and the PRTF maintain situational awareness of uninstalled generators and their location in the event that repositioning is required.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC's execution of emergency services/support contracts with on-island vendors to provide generator repair, specialized equipment, and resources replacement generators as necessary.
1			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC's asset replacement ordering to enable the timely repair and restoration of emergency power capabilities until island power is restored.
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	As island power is restored, HSEM and the PRTF maintain situational awareness of uninstalled generators and their location in the event that repositioning is required.
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	UCG implements demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC coordination of the demobilization and transport of any FEMA-owned or FEMA-leased generators back to their points of origin.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC coordination of the demobilization and transport of any off-island power restoration personnel and equipment back to their points of origin.
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	As needed, the PRTF supports CUC's termination of emergency services/support contracts with on-island vendors that provided equipment and personnel for the repair of storm-damaged equipment.
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC and CNMI Bureau of Environmental and Coastal Quality (BECQ) efforts to dispose of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) debris (on- and/or off-island, as required) and restore HAZMAT staging sites to their original condition.
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	Once normal operation of CNMI's electrical power infrastructure is restored, the PRTF and CUC Operations Center stand down and all agencies will resume normal operations.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	ESF #7, in coordination with the PRTF, sources transportation resources and provides logistical support for moving any on- or off-island power assets back to their points of origin.
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	When no longer required (emergency generators have been uninstalled and transported to their points of origin), the PRTF coordinates the redeployment of USACE/ESF #3 power assets.
1			3A	TBD	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	FEMA supports CUC coordination of the demobilization and transport of any mission-assigned DOD generators and/or assets back to their points of origin.
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM and CUC coordinate on the development of a consolidated and prioritized list of critical facilities for power restoration.
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM and CUC identify generator requirements for facilities certified as critical infrastructure and map those requirements to the generator inventory.

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2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM and CUC assess the capabilities of CUC generators at designated critical infrastructure facilities and ensure a priority of repair is conducted to maintain all critical facilities in an operational status.
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC ensures required tree trimming around power lines is accomplished to mitigate the occurrence of tree branch damage to power lines during high winds.
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM conducts an assessment of any identified critical facilities without backup power capability, determines the requirement and priority for emergency power generation post-storm, and coordinates findings with USACE/ESF #3 and FEMA Operations.
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC assesses power infrastructure requirements and capabilities and reports the status and any shortfalls to HSEM monthly.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC assesses and monitors CUC typhoon stock levels to ensure that the required asset inventory is maintained as necessary for the timely restoration of the electrical power infrastructure. CUC coordinates shortfalls with HSEM.
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC assesses and maintains power restoration MOU with off-island agencies to ensure that the anticipated resource capabilities needed for recovery are available.
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM ensures that the GIS database is coordinated with all member agencies of the PRTF.
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	USACE provides for CUC use and awareness assessment data from previous emergency power missions executed in CNMI.
2			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	FEMA Logistics provides inventory of FEMA generators in CNMI to PRTF members for situational awareness and pre-event planning purposes
2			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC executes its typhoon SOPs and preparedness checklist.
2			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC activates and recalls essential personnel (by position) in order to perform preparedness activities.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
2			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC increases the number of crews performing tree-trimming operations around power lines.
2			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC management stands up the CUC Operations Center.
2			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC maintains status of emergency generators located at water wells and booster station sites and determines the water distribution system overall emergency power generation needs.
2			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM, CUC, CNMI Public School System (PSS), Commonwealth Healthcare Corporation (CHCC), and FEMA will coordinate with non-HSEM agencies whose facilities are listed as critical infrastructure to ascertain the operability of emergency power generation.
2			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM will coordinate to stand up the PRTF. The PRTF's main operational location will be the CUC Operations Center.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
2			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC will coordinate with off-island MOU signatories to establish resource availability/capability and to alert those resource agencies of the possible need for support.
2			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC and HSEM coordinate with ESF #3 and ESF #7 on identifying and preparing for movement additional generator assets from Distribution Centers (DCs).
2			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF, in coordination with ESF #7 and FEMA Logistics, begins sourcing transportation resources for the movement of power restoration assets from off-island to CNMI, as needed.
2			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF coordinates with ESF #15 and the Joint Information Center (JIC) to create and issue public service announcements (PSAs) concerning the dangers associated with downed power lines and the procedures for reporting them.
2			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC conducts inventory and equipment assessments.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
2			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	HSEM, CUC, and FEMA, through the PRTF, coordinate on the execution of an MA with USACE and the DOE to provide ESF #3 and ESF #12 liaisons to the PTRF and pre-position assets to facilitate power restoration efforts post-landfall.
2			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	The PRTF supports island power restoration by gaining power grid situational awareness, conducts operational assessments, and prioritizes power restoration based on the critical infrastructure priority list.
2			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC transportation requirements to move all power-related debris to a designated CUC site in order to facilitate reuse of salvageable parts and materials.
2			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC, ESF #3, and ESF #10 on the development of HAZMAT staging sites and the disposal of HAZMAT debris resulting from storm damage.
2			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF coordinates the augmentation of CUC resources by mission assigning DOD for any available asset and/or executing MOUs with off-island power agencies, as needed.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
2			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	ESF #7 coordinates with the PRTF to source transportation resources and provide the logistical support necessary to move off-island assets to CNMI.
2			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF, ESF #15, and the JIC will continue issuing PSAs outlining the dangers of downed power lines and the procedures for reporting them.
2			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC executes existing MOUs with the APPA to gain additional restoration capabilities in CNMI. MOU execution is based on assessments from both the CUC and PRTF.
2			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF coordinates and resources augmentation to CUC's overhead and underground line crews, as required.
2			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	ESF #7 coordinates with the PRTF for the movement of power restoration resources from CONUS to CNMI in support of the CUC.
2			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC is resourced with sufficient crews to conduct 24-hour operations.

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2			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC and PRTF coordinate on the shutdown of temporary power generation for critical infrastructure as island power is restored.
2			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF continues to monitor and report island power restoration and prioritize connection projects requiring off-island resources. As power is restored to critical facilities and existing customers are reconnected, PRTF begins the re-deployment of off-island resources and coordinates their movement back to their points of origin.
2			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	ESF #7 coordinates with the PRTF for the return of power restoration resources from CNMI to CONUS in support of the CUC.
2			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	CUC remains resourced with sufficient crews to conduct 24-hour operations and restore island power to existing customers.
2			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	UCG implements demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
2			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC coordination for the demobilization and transportation of any FEMA-owned or FEMA-leased generators back to their points of origin.
2			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC coordination for the demobilization and transportation of any off-island power restoration personnel and equipment back to their points of origin.
2			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	As needed, the PRTF supports CUC's termination of emergency services/support contracts with on-island vendors that provided equipment and personnel to repair storm-damaged equipment.
2			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	PRTF supports CUC and CNMI BECQ efforts to dispose of HAZMAT debris (on- and/or off-island, as required) and restore HAZMAT staging sites to their original condition.
2			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	Once normal operation of the electrical power infrastructure is restored, the PRTF and CUC Operations Center stand down and all agencies resume normal operations.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
2			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	ESF #7, in coordination with the PRTF, sources transportation resources and provides the logistical support necessary to move any on- or off-island power assets to their points of origin.
2			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	When no longer required, emergency generators are uninstalled and transported back to their points of origin. PRTF will coordinate on the redeployment of the USACE/ESF #3 power assets.
2			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	USACE	FEMA supports CUC coordination of the demobilization and transport of any mission-assigned DOD generators and/or assets back to their points of origin.
3			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		HSEM identifies, assesses, and coordinates with partner agencies any on-island commercial water distribution and transportation assets capable of providing potable water to designated locations pre- and post-landfall.
3			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC monitors its overall inventory of needed water supply and distribution materials maintained in the CUC warehouse.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC coordinates with the CNMI Department of Public Safety (DPS) to acquire communications/public safety assets to increase overall emergency communications and coordination capabilities.
3			1A	I-72	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC updates its emergency response asset management plan and SOPs, provides a copy of the plan and SOPs to HSEM, and ensures coordination with HSEM on any plan/SOP updates. or revisions
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		HSEM and FEMA form the Water and Wastewater Task Force (WWTF) consisting of core representations from HSEM, FEMA, CUC, BECQ, ESF #3, ESF #7, ESF #8, ESF #10, and ESF #13.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		Gain, maintain, and socialize generator serviceability.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) conducts initial planning with HSEM.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) alerts ESF #10 for possible deployment and activates ESF #10 position within the RRCC.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC coordinates on the fueling and testing of all designated emergency generators. Non-operational generators will be repaired/replaced pre-storm, if possible.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		All generators that are non-operational at the end of Phase 1b will be reported to HSEM through the WWTF.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC continues to monitor the overall inventory of needed water supply and distribution materials maintained in the CUC warehouse and shares significant shortfalls with HSEM to inform pre- and post-storm contingency planning.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC connects its main office building with an emergency generator to provide emergency power for its dispatch operations.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC executes its typhoon checklist and SOPs.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC supplements its chlorine supplies at water wells across CNMI.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC ensures chlorine availability for disinfection of water wells and booster pump sites.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC coordinates with HSEM and ESF #7 to develop contracts with identified commercial potable water bottlers and storage/ transportation, refueling, and emergency power generation assets.
3			1B	I-48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC will coordinate with HSEM and ESF #15 for the issuance of PSAs that encourage pre-storm water storage and provide advice on in-home water storage requirements, capabilities, techniques, and usage.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF	FEMA	WWTF and ESF #15 issue public messaging encouraging the public to store and conserve water.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF communicates fuel priorities with the Fuel Task Force (FTF).
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC and the WWTF conduct protective measures to prevent or mitigate loss of water pressure in systems equipped with water towers or gravity fed water storage tanks.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		RRCC coordinates an emergency discharge waiver through ESF #10 to relieve pressure on the wastewater system in Saipan and informs HSEM and BECQ.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC and WWTF monitor its overall inventory of needed water supply and distribution materials maintained in the CUC warehouse.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC inventories and safeguards stockpiles of chlorine for the disinfection of water wells and booster pump sites pre-landfall.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC and WWTF start all designated emergency generators at water wells, booster pump sites, and wastewater facilities and disconnect those locations from the main power grid. The CUC reports all non-operational generators to the WWTF and HSEM.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF and CUC conduct pre-landfall planning for deployment of personnel and equipment to designated staging locations post-landfall to conduct damage assessments.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC deploys and installs its non-permanent generators at designated, pre-prioritized locations, including water storage, distribution, and water treatment facilities, as needed.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC takes protective measures to ensure the availability of chlorine for the disinfection of water wells and booster pump sites post-landfall.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC and WWTF ensure that equipment and trucks required for post-landfall assessments are refueled and positioned for post-storm response.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC coordinates debris clearance routes and priorities with the Debris Task Force (DTF) to ensure water system assessment and restoration activities can be accessed post-storm.
3			1C	I-24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		HSEM maintains a list of failed generators and coordinates with the PRTF and the UCG for replacements.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates directly with the FTF to ensure generator fuel delivery priorities are communicated and accomplished.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		HSEM and the WWTF communicate the “boil water” order through public messaging if water contamination dictates.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		IMAT and ESF #10 assist with the assessment and emergency repair of the water and wastewater distribution system.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC extends CUC personnel labor shifts to conduct time-critical emergency repairs.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC conducts and WWTF monitors the disinfection of water wells and booster pump sites.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC deploys damage assessment teams made up of the CUC engineers. The CUC ensures damage assessment findings are coordinated with the UCG through HSEM and FEMA.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC continues to monitor its overall inventory of needed water supply and distribution materials maintained in the CUC warehouse and coordinates with CNMI HSEM, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to source, acquire, and transport the supplies and capabilities needed to restore the water supply and distribution system.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		Based on damage assessments, CUC and WWTF coordinate with HSEM, FEMA, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to source, acquire, and transport generators to augment any inoperative generators at critical water wells or booster pump sites.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates with HSEM, FEMA, and ESF #7 to provide additional security for CUC assets deployed around CNMI, as needed.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates with ESF #6 and ESF #8 to prioritize water supplies for the hospital and designated emergency shelters, which are pre-established priority locations.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates with HSEM, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to provide qualified personnel and repair assets to augment CUC capabilities.
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF and HSEM coordinate with ESF #3 and ESF #7 to execute established contracts with commercial potable water transportation vendors.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF and HSEM coordinate with CUC, ESF #3, and FEMA on prioritizing the re-establishment of the water supply and distribution system based on damage assessment results.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF continues to coordinate directly with the FTF ensuring generator fuel delivery priorities are communicated and accomplished.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		HSEM and the WWTF continue to communicate the “boil water” order through public messaging if water contamination dictates.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC completes and reports assessments of the water supply and distribution system; inventories materials maintained in the CUC warehouse; and coordinates with HSEM, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to source, acquire, and transport the supplies and capabilities needed to restore the water supply and distribution system.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC coordinates with HSEM, FEMA, the JIC, and ESF #15 to maintain a “boil water” order if water contamination dictates.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates with HSEM; FEM; ESF #3; and ESF #7 to source, acquire, and transport generators to augment any inoperative generators at critical water wells or booster pump site.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates with HSEM, FEMA, and ESF #7 to provide additional security for CUC assets deployed around CNMI, as needed.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates with ESF #6 and ESF #8 to prioritize water supplies for the hospital and designated emergency shelters, which are pre-established priority locations.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates with HSEM, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to provide qualified personnel and repair assets to augment CUC capabilities.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF and HSEM coordinate with ESF #3 and ESF #7 to execute established contracts with commercial potable water transportation vendors.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC monitors the disinfection of water wells and booster pump sites.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF and HSEM coordinate with ESF #1, ESF #3, and ESF #7 in the maintenance of current contracts with on-island commercial water vendors to provide bottled water and either increase or decrease contracts for bottled water supplies based on damage repair estimates.
3			2B	I+24	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF, ESF #1, ESF #3, and ESF #7 monitor current contracts in place for water distribution and either increase or decrease contracts for water distribution operations based on damage repair estimates.
3			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF continues to coordinate directly with the FTF to ensure that generator fuel delivery priorities are communicated and accomplished.
3			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC continues monitoring the operational status of water wells and booster pump sites.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF develops a strategy to replenish the inventory of needed water supply and distribution materials maintained in the CUC warehouse and coordinates with HSEM, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to source, acquire, and transport supplies required for response and recovery actions.
3			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates with HSEM, FEMA, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to de-install and redistribute any temporary generators used to stabilize the water and wastewater system.
3			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF coordinates with HSEM, ESF #3, and ESF #7 to relieve qualified personnel and repair assets that have augmented CUC assets in the stabilization of the water system.
3			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		When appropriate, WWTF alerts HSEM, FEMA, the JIC, and ESF #15 to lift the “boil water” order for all areas.
3			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		When appropriate, WWTF alerts HSEM and coordinates with ESF #3 and ESF #7 to terminate contracts with commercial potable water vendors as well as transportation contracts associated with the delivery of potable water.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			2C	I+36	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		When appropriate, WWTF, HSEM, ESF #3; ESF #7; and FEMA coordinate with the DCO to de-install and release previously mission-assigned DOD assets such as desalinization units, Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPUs), and water transportation and storage units, as needed.
3			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF continues to coordinate directly with the FTF to ensure that generator fuel delivery priorities are communicated and accomplished.
3			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF ensures the proper conditions exist to transition from response to recovery operations.
3			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF reports water and wastewater distribution status and makes recommendations to downgrade response efforts as the systems are restored.
3			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		WWTF makes recommendations on the redeployment of ESF #10 and off-island resources as systems are restored.
3			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		UCG will conduct demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
3			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC and the WWTF coordinates with ESF #3 to return water wells and booster pump sites to the main electrical power grid and terminate use of emergency generators.
3			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC and WWTF coordinate with HSEM, FEMA, ESF #3, ESF #7, and DOD to terminate all contracts and MAs for deployed augmentation personnel and assets and return them to their points of origin.
3			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC and WWTF coordinate with HSEM, FEMA, ESF #3, ESF #7, and DOD to disconnect, transport, and return all deployed augmentation generators to their points of origin.
3			3A	I+48	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering	IOF		CUC and WWTF coordinate with HSEM, FEMA, and ESF #15, through the JIC, to issue a “terminate boil water order” PSA when no longer needed.
4			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM partners with FEMA and develops a phased plan to meet its temporary power requirements.
4			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM develops a Fuel Prioritization Plan (FPP).

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			1A	I-72	logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM develops, validates, maintains, and exercises emergency power generators at critical infrastructure locations.
4			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM designates agencies responsible for the maintenance and functionality of generators installed at critical infrastructure facilities.
4			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM assesses refueling requirements for designated critical facility generators and emergency/disaster response vehicles.
4			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM sources temporary fuel storage containers and identifies and prioritizes possible locations for deployment.
4			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM assesses the operational readiness of critical fuel and distribution assets.
4			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM assesses and modifies any existing fuel contracts to ensure a prioritization clause is added to give CNMI facilities and emergency/disaster response assets refueling priority.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM develops a grant request to allow the purchase of, and maintenance for, additional CNMI fuel distribution assets capable of meeting the anticipated demand for sustaining essential services.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and FEMA activate the FTF.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		CNMI agencies assess and conduct immediate repairs of all temporary power generators at critical facilities.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FTF produces and socializes the FPP.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM conducts fuel delivery to pre-identified critical infrastructure not maintained by CUC.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		CNMI agencies receive contracted fuel delivery.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		IMAT conducts joint planning with HSEM and FTF.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		RRCC coordinates support through ESF #12.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF	FEMA	National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) notifies Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) of potential fuel requirements and notifies ESF #12, ESF #10, and ESF #3.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF	FEMA	NRCC initiates Transcube purchase and delivery to replace assets being employed in CNMI in support of the FTF and fuel delivery operations post-landfall.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		U. S. Coast Guard (USCG) District 14 (D14) and Commonwealth Ports Authority (CPA) contact bulk fuel suppliers to validate on-hand stocks and assess days of supply with the FTF.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM reviews and initiates the FPP and assesses the current availability and operational readiness of CNMI's fuel supply and distribution assets.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM coordinates with private vendors and contracts to assess the current availability and operational readiness of fuel supply and distribution augmentation assets.
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and IMAT mission assign fuel distribution capability for CNMI.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM alerts government agencies and private industry of approaching storm and ensures that they are prepared to execute safeguarding procedures to protect on-island fuel storage supplies.
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FTF updates and reports to the response force on the FPP.
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM safeguards fuel delivery assets pre-identified hardened structures to ensure survivability post-landfall.
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		CNMI agencies receive and report contracted fuel delivery to the FTF.
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		IMAT conducts joint planning with HSEM and FTF.
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FSA receives and issues Transcubes to HSEM pre-landfall.
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FTF validates and monitors the FPP, assesses the current availability and location of on- and off-island distribution capabilities, and safeguards these assets prior to landfall.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and contract partners coordinate with the RRCC to confirm that the Disaster Local Area Network (DLAN) Incident Status Board is operational so that fuel status can be accessed and updated in real time.
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and ESF #12 validate that the FPP has been implemented.
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and DOD (through the DCO) finalize the availability and operational status of on- and off-island fuel supply and distribution assets.
4			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #15, through the JIC, create and implement PSAs to encourage the populace to fill all fuel tanks prior to landfall.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, through the FTF, gains and maintains emergency power generation usage information and develops a fuel utilization report that details fuel consumption.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		All CNMI agencies and stakeholders with fuel storage capability as well as those agencies utilizing emergency power generators assess and report status of assets to the FTF for input into the fuel utilization report.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF	FEMA	Salvage dive teams conduct assessments of fuel docking areas.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF	FEMA	ESF #10 and ESF #12 determine additional storage and distribution capability requirements and coordinate resourcing.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF	FEMA	Additional requirements and capabilities movement coordination executed via MA; coordination with USTRANSCOM conducted.
4			2A	I+12	Infrastructure Systems	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF	FEMA	Additional fuel replenishment movement and delivery coordination executed via MA with DLA and USTRANSCOM.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, through the FTF, maintains visibility of emergency generator fuel burn rates at critical infrastructure locations and adjusts fuel delivery schedules as necessary.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and ESF #3 assess post-storm infrastructure damage, fuel supplies, and distribution capabilities and determine fuel prioritization for the response and/or the need to institute fuel rationing.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and ESF #7 establish prioritized commercial fuel stations for the refueling of emergency/disaster response vehicles.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 to activate contracts to provide additional commercial fuel assets.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 to provide additional neighbor-island commercial fuel supply and distribution assets.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 to activate contracts with tug/barge operators to transport fuel supply and distribution assets from neighboring islands to CNMI.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 to assess on-island fuel supplies and provide additional on-island bulk fuel to meet response requirements.

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4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and ESF #3 identify and deliver additional fuel to emergency generator locations at water wells.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, ESF #1, and ESF #3 maintain the operational readiness of fuel response assets and adjust operations as necessary.
4			2A	I+12	logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, ESF #10, and ESF #12 assess post-storm infrastructure damage, fuel supplies and distribution capabilities and determine fuel prioritization for the response and/or the need to institute fuel rationing.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, through the FTF, maintains visibility of emergency generator fuel burn rates at critical infrastructure locations and adjusts fuel delivery schedules as necessary.
4			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and ESF #15, through the JIC, will create and implement PSAs to outline fuel limitations, institute fuel rationing procedures, and stipulate commercial fueling stations that are available for emergency/disaster response vehicles only.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, through the FTF, gains and maintains emergency power generation usage information and develops a fuel utilization report that details fuel consumption.
4			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, ESF #1, and ESF# 3 maintain the operational readiness of fuel response assets and adjust operations as necessary.
4			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF	FEMA	ESF #10 and ESF #12 determine additional storage and distribution capability requirements and coordinate resourcing.
4			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		Additional requirements and capabilities movement coordination executed via MA; coordination with USTRANSCOM conducted.
4			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF	FEMA	Additional fuel replenishment movement and delivery coordination executed via MA with DLA and USTRANSCOM.
4			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FTF continues to coordinate with ESF #7 to assess on-island fuel supplies and provide additional on-island bulk fuel to meet response requirements.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FTF, HSEM, and ESF #3 continue to identify and deliver additional fuel to emergency generator locations at water wells.
4			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, ESF #1, and ESF #3 continue to maintain the operational readiness of fuel response assets and adjust operations as necessary.
4			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, through the FTF, gain and maintain emergency power generation usage information and develop a fuel utilization report that details fuel consumption.
4			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #10 and ESF #12 determine that storage and distribution capability requirements for CNMI are met.
4			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FTF, ESF #1, and ESF #3 maintain the operational readiness of fuel response assets and adjust operations as necessary.
4			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FTF continues to coordinate with ESF #7 to assess on-island fuel supplies and provide additional on-island bulk fuel to meet response requirements.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FTF and ESF #3 continue to identify and deliver additional fuel to emergency generator locations at water wells.
4			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		FTF is deactivated.
4			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		UCG conducts demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.
4			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM restores normal fuel supply and distribution operations when normal electrical power is restored, debris clearance/removal operations are minimized, and emergency fuel requirements are no longer required.
4			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 to terminate contracts with on- and off- island commercial fuel assets.
4			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 to terminate contracts with private bulk fuel vendors.
4			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 on terminating contracts with tug/barge operators to transport fuel assets back to their neighbor-island points of origin.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
4			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM terminates fuel rationing operations and ends private fuel station restrictions
4			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #15, through the JIC, to terminate PSAs stipulating fuel-rationing procedures and private fuel station restrictions and to issue a PSA indicating a return to normal fuel operations.
4			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and FEMA coordinate with the DCO to deactivate DOD fuel assets.
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM and PSS coordinate with the American Red Cross for shelter management team training.
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM, in coordination with PSS, develops a shelter prioritization plan.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM creates a prioritized list of alternate shelter sites (hotels, field houses, etc.) for additional general population shelter capacity.
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM establishes MOUs or contracts with designated shelters/alternate care facilities (ACFs).
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM creates and prioritizes a list of possible transitional shelter sites (hotels, vacant houses/apartments, soft-sided shelter sites, etc.) and develops MOUs/contracts to utilize these facilities as needed.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM, PSS, and the CNMI DPS coordinate a security plan to ensure law enforcement response to an incident while emergency shelters are operational.
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM and PSS coordinate with appropriate local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including Catholic Social Services, to identify survivor needs and develop a plan to assist those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs.
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM and PSS establish shelter generator fueling requirements and develop a plan for providing generators with fuel post-landfall.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM, in coordination with FEMA, develops a plan to receive incoming response resources, transport resources from a Federal Staging Area (FSA) to designated Points of Distribution (PODs), and distribute resources to the local population.
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		Coordinate with FEMA to develop a plan to receive incoming response resources; transport resources from an FSA (if activated), designated shelter locations, and/or designated PODs; and distribute resources to the local population.
5			1A	I-72	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		CNMI DPW is prepared to transport persons seeking shelter from village mayor offices to designated emergency shelters.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1B	I-48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM and FEMA form the Mass Care Task Force (MCTF), with representatives from the PSS, CNMI civic leaders, CNMI DPW, ESF #6, ESF #7, ESF #8, ESF #11, and ESF #15.
5			1B	I-48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM alerts PSS of the approaching storm, and PSS executes pre-storm checks in accordance with the emergency shelter plan. PSS reports operability to HSEM in terms of locations and personnel supporting situational awareness.
5			1B	I-48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		ESF #15, through the JIC and in coordination with ESF #6 and ESF #11, develops and broadcasts PSA information regarding shelter locations (and their status)—including those for the general population, individuals with access and functional needs or medical needs, and pets—and the resources/commodities individuals should bring with them to shelters.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1B	I-48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs) assess on-island inventories, identify potential shortfalls, submit requests to parent agencies for delivery, and alert/notify volunteer staff.
5			1B	I-48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		PSS and CNMI DPW ensure that a sufficient number of buses and bus drivers are rostered and available to transport persons seeking shelter from village mayor offices to designated emergency shelter locations, using assigned buses.
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM and FEMA establish the MCTF.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		MCTF receives reports from PSS on shelter operability and coordinates delivery of required resources to bring all locations to 100 percent operational capacity.
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		PSS opens emergency shelters.
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		MCTF reports operability to HSEM of opened emergency shelter locations and the number of persons each shelter is supporting pre-landfall.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		VOADs identify and coordinate the delivery of off-island resources. If delivery of resources is requested pre-landfall, VOADs ensure that they have the proper facilities to protect resource delivery from typhoon impacts.
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		ESF #15, through the JIC and in coordination with ESF #6 and ESF #11, develops and broadcasts PSA information on shelter locations (and their status)—including those for the general population, individuals with access and functional needs or medical needs, and pets—and the resources/commodities individuals should bring with them to shelters
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		FEMA and ESF #6 coordinate with ESF #15 to establish procedures for communications with foreign consulates and the tourist population to provide information concerning tourists.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		PSS and CNMI DPW begins transporting persons seeking shelter from village mayor offices to designated emergency shelter locations using assigned buses.
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		VOADs assess on-island inventories, identify potential shortfalls, submit requests to parent agencies for delivery, and alert/notify volunteer staff.
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM ensures that PSS conducts shelter opening procedures in accordance with the shelter plan. The procedures include emergency power generation final testing and fuel top-off procedures at all emergency shelter locations.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #15 to inform the public of shelter locations and their status.
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #6 to implement the plan developed in Phase 1a to accommodate individuals with access and functional needs and those with medical needs.
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM coordinates with PSS, ESF #6, and ESF #11 to activate shelters, as needed, and initiate reception procedures for the general population and household pets. Service animals will shelter with their owners.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM coordinates with ESF #6 and ESF #7 to execute contracts for additional mass shelter locations as needed (hotel ballrooms, community centers, shopping malls, field houses, etc.).
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM determines availability and maintains accountability of designated point of distribution (POD) personnel and alerts POD teams to prepare for possible deployment to POD sites post-landfall.
5			1C	I-24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF	FEMA	HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 to alert the FSA for possible deployment of select resources to shelter sites.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		Gain situational awareness.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		MCTF and ESF #6 coordinate mass care and temporary housing support to an estimated displaced population of roughly 27,000 people.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF	FEMA	MCTF coordinates the movement of initial federal push of tents, tent kits, and tarps for distribution directly to PODs as required.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF	FEMA	MCTF gains and maintains situational awareness of displaced populations. Conduct joint (federal, commonwealth, private sector, and NGO) damage assessments, including assessments of the functionality of shelters.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		Civic leader offices report damage assessments of their facilities and assess ability to provide Tier 2 sheltering.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		VOADs conduct donation management.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		Red Cross begins case management and direct assistance to survivors.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		MCTF coordinates with ESF #8 to provide behavioral health/emotional/spiritual support as needed.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		MCTF coordinates with ESF #8 to provide triage/first aid at community health centers, as needed.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		CNMI DPW conducts debris clearance operations and ensures that access to emergency shelters is achieved.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		PSS conducts closing procedures in accordance with the shelter plan.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		The UCG and ESF #6 coordinate mass care and temporary housing support to an estimated population of roughly 1,400 people.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM and ESF #6 develop a transitional sheltering strategy.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM and ESF #6 coordinate on-island non-essential CNMI, Community CERT, CAPE, and/or off-island personnel to augment existing shelter staff.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		FEMA Operations and ESF #6 provide for the immediate needs of individuals and families beyond the scope of traditional mass care services (food, water, and shelter), as needed. These activities include but are not limited to the following: reunification of families; registration and tracking of evacuees; and provision of services to access and functional needs/medical needs populations.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		ESF #6 coordinates with ESF #11 and ESF #7 for the delivery of bulk commodities to shelters and staging areas from food wholesalers.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF	FEMA	ESF #6 coordinates with ESF #7 for the delivery of response resources to support shelters, PODs, and shelter-in-place populations.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		ESF #6 coordinates with ESF #7 on the activation of MOUs and contracts for water distribution to shelters and PODs.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		FEMA Operations and ESF #7 coordinate with civic leaders for the activation of designated PODs.
5			2A	I+12	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		ESF #15, through the JIC, develops and broadcasts PSAs to manage expectations and reassure the public regarding mass care and emergency assistance operations.
5			2B	I+24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		FEMA Operations and ESF #7 coordinate with civic leaders on the activation of designated PODs.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2B	I+24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		ESF #15, through the JIC, develops and broadcasts PSAs to manage expectations and reassure the public regarding mass care and emergency assistance operations
5			2B	I+24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		MCTF coordinates the movement of relief supplies to PODs; any unfulfilled movement requirements are coordinated through ESF #7.
5			2B	I+24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		ESF #7 ensures the continued delivery of emergency relief supplies (to include fuel for generators) to Tier 2 shelters and PODs.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2B	I+24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		FEMA and ESF #6 coordinate with ESF #7 to ensure that individuals at ACFs and access and functional needs/medical needs shelter site(s) receive the appropriate commodities, hygiene items, and durable medical equipment (DME) (e.g., wheelchairs, scooters, hospital beds, walkers, canes).
5			2B	I+24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF	FEMA	FEMA and ESF #6, together with ESF #1, ESF #7, and ESF #11, coordinate the delivery of essential supplies (food, water, first aid kits) to isolated populations.
5			2B	I+24	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF	FEMA	Maintain situational awareness.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2C	I+36	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		MCTF coordinates with civic leaders on the deactivation of designated PODs.
5			2C	I+36	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		MCTF confirms or coordinates PSS generators for servicing, if required.
5			2C	I+36	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		ESF #15, through the JIC, develops and broadcasts PSAs to manage expectations and reassure the public regarding mass care and emergency assistance operations

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			2C	I+36	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		ESF #7 adjusts requirements in providing relief supplies to PODs as they close and backhauls any unused resources for redistribution.
5			2C	I+36	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM confirms that all populations that previously received relief supplies no longer have a requirement to receive essential supplies or services.
5			3A	I+48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		UCG coordinates the establishment and opening of a Disaster Recovery Center(s) (DRC).

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			3A	I+48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		UCG implements demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.
5			3A	I+48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF		HSEM, FEMA, and ESF #6 execute the transitional housing strategy.
5			3A	I+48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF	FEMA	ESF #6 coordinates with ESF #11, and ESF #14 to support long-term recovery efforts for residents of CNMI whose homes were destroyed.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
5			3A	I+48	Mass Care Services	ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing and Human Services	IOF	FEMA	FEMA coordinates the following Individual Assistance (IA) program support to survivors: financial assistance for home repairs, personal property loss assistance, disaster loans, Disaster-Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (D-SNAP) support when requested by the Commonwealth of CNMI and in coordination with ESF #11, crisis counseling, disaster unemployment assistance, disaster legal services, support and services to access and functional needs/medical needs populations, and other federal and state agency disaster benefits.
5			1A	I-72	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM, CPA, and the CNMI DPW establish Route 30 and Middle Road as a priority routes for debris clearance.
6			1A	I-72	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM, CNMI DPW, and CPA establish Route 35, from Isla Drive to Saipan International Airport, as a priority route for debris clearance.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			1A	I-72	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		The Captain of the Port (COTP) and the Harbor Master review typhoon evacuation plans and maintain constant situational awareness on vessels berthed/moored in the seaport in order to effectively direct an evacuation, if necessary.
6			1A	I-72	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		CPA coordinates with BECQ on the assessment of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) requirements, protective measures, and response capabilities.
6			1A	I-72	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) maintains a list of personnel that possess Transportation Workers Identity Cards (TWICs).
6			1A	I-72	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG and Saipan International Airport Operations Division update and maintain their respective response plans.
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM maintains situational awareness on all ongoing typhoon preparatory activities at the port.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		The COTP coordinates the establishment of the PRTF, which is aligned with priorities of the Seaport Unified Command. The PRTF consists of the USCG, DOD (U.S. Navy), CPA, USACE, HSEM, and applicable industry partners.
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division executes its Typhoon Annex Checklist; CPA and the USCG execute the <i>Heavy Weather Plan</i> .
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		PRTF issues Broadcast Notice to Mariners (BNTM) to alert incoming vessels of potential seaport closures due to the approaching typhoon.
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		The Harbor Master, in consultation with the COTP, begins to sortie vessels greater than 200 gross tons out of the seaport.
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		RRCC develops an MA to move USCG D14 capabilities to CNMI in support of the PRTF. Specifically, the RRCC requests mobilization of the District Response Advisory Team (DRAT) and the Pacific Strike Team (PST).

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		CPA moves HAZMAT sources from the seaport to an approved pre-determined storage site(s).
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		CPA reduces containers remaining in port to no more than two high and lashes all containers together to minimize effects of damaging winds and inundation.
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issue Notices to Airman (NOTAM) to provide information to commercial airlines and private aircraft regarding any airport, flight operations, air traffic control, and/or navigational aid (NAVAID) activity resulting from the approaching typhoon.
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM formalizes airport reports received directly from the CPA, which account for the airfields at Tinian and Rota in addition to Saipan International Airport.
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG initiates harbor patrols to determine the state of readiness and progress of seaport typhoon preparatory activity.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			1B	I-48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division, FAA, and CPA ensure that generators and required response operation equipment are fueled and tested.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM maintains situational awareness on port operability through direct reporting by the CPA and PRTF on all typhoon preparatory activities.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		PRTF continues to issue BNTMs.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		The Harbor Master, in consultation with the COTP, begins to sortie vessels greater than 200 gross tons out of CNMI waters.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		RRCC coordinates the deployment of D14 DRAT and PST capabilities to CNMI in support of the PRTF.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		PRTF ensures completion of all pier-side assessments and underwater surveys.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM continues to monitor all ongoing typhoon preparatory activity at the ports and coordinates any actions as required/requested.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		COTP directs the closure of the seaport to all non-essential vessel movement and broadcasts a BNTM stipulating the seaport closure.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG continues to conduct harbor patrols to establish the state of readiness of the seaport and coordinates the information shared with the Seaport Unified Command and HSEM.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		The Seaport Unified Command completes actions to protect critical transportation and cargo movement resources.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division continues to coordinate with the FAA, DOD (Andersen AFB), commercial airlines, and private aviation resources regarding ongoing preparatory activity and the potential ceasing of airport/flight operations due to the approaching typhoon.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF	FEMA	Saipan International Airport Operations Division ceases all airport operations, directs support vehicles to be placed in maintenance bays, and directs the retraction and securing of all jetways.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG, CPA, CNMI DPS, CNMI Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (DFEMS), and the Department of Customs remove small emergency response craft and move them to designated shelter locations.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF	USCG	COTP closes CNMI seaports.
6			1C	I-24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF	USCG	Saipan International Airport Operations Division and FAA coordinate on the issuance of any final NOTAMs regarding the ceasing of airport/flight operations and status of air traffic control radar and/or NAVAIDs.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM monitors all ongoing port restoration activity and coordinates any necessary actions as required/requested.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Seaport Unified Command coordinates and provides oversight on underwater surveys of channels, ship berthing/mooring areas, and the harbor in order to identify hazards to navigation and determine port accessibility based on post-storm damage assessments.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG and CPA conduct an assessment of port facilities to determine shore-side damage and capabilities.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		CNMI DPW conducts Route 30 and 35 clearance operations.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		In the event port access is restricted or destroyed, PRTF coordinates the resourcing of on-island assets.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		RRCC coordinates additional resources in support of the PRTF pre-landfall using Field Operations Support (FOS) funds. Once a Presidential Disaster Declaration is formalized, such assets are mission assigned and funded under the disaster response.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		COTP directs the reopening of the seaport based on operational capability.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG and CPA conduct a HAZMAT survey of the seaport to determine the ability to operate in and around the seaport environment.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division coordinates and directs the clearing of debris from the airport environment (runway, taxiways, aircraft parking areas, etc.).
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		JIC and ESF #15 provide visitor information on arriving and departing flight schedules and any special airport procedures.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM, CNMI DPW, and CPA coordinate on the clearing of debris from Route 30 and Route 35 to ensure that access to the seaport and airport is available.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM, CPA, and the DFEMS coordinate with the TSA for issuance of temporary TWICs to any augmenting seaport workforce personnel.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG coordinates and provides oversight for the restoration of seaport NAVAIDs, channel markers, etc. and requests deployment of the USCG Aids to Navigation Team if Coast Guard Cutter (CGC) Sequoia is unavailable.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG broadcasts a BNTM stipulating seaport status and any operational restrictions.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Seaport Unified Command, through the Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit (MTSRU), establishes a priority for ships returning to the port, if necessary.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division and FAA coordinate on assessments of airport perimeter security, airport runways and taxiways, air traffic control facilities, airport radar capability, NAVAIDs, and airport support equipment; ESF #1 supports reporting requirements.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		ESF #15, through the JIC, coordinates with the Tourist Planning Task Force (TPTF), commercial airlines, and HSEM on creating and broadcasting PSAs that provide visitor information on airline flight schedules and procedures.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division and FAA coordinate on the resumption of airport and flight operations, as airport operational capability, air traffic control radar, and NAVAID status allows.
6			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Operations Division and FAA coordinate on the issuance of NOTAMs relaying airport and navigational facility status information.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM monitors all ongoing port restoration activity and coordinates any necessary actions as required/requested.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Seaport Unified Command coordinates and provides oversight on underwater surveys of channels, ship berthing/mooring areas, and the harbor in order to identify hazards to navigation and determine port accessibility based on post-storm damage assessments.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG and CPA conduct an assessment of port facilities to determine shore-side damage and capabilities.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		RRCC coordinates additional resources in support of the PRTF pre-landfall using FOS funds. Once a Presidential Disaster Declaration is formalized, such assets are mission assigned and funded under the disaster response.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		COTP directs the reopening of the seaport based on operational capability.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG and CPA conduct a HAZMAT survey of the seaport to determine the ability to operate in and around the seaport environment.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division coordinates and directs the clearing of debris from the airport environment (runway, taxiways, aircraft parking areas, etc.).
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM, CPA, and CPA police coordinate with the TSA for issuance of temporary TWICs to any augmenting seaport workforce personnel.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG broadcasts a BNTM stipulating seaport status and any operational restrictions.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Seaport Unified Command, through the MTSRU, establishes a priority for ships returning to the port.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division and FAA coordinate on assessments of airport perimeter security, airport runways and taxiways, air traffic control facilities, airport radar capability, NAVAIDs, and airport support equipment; ESF #1 supports reporting requirements.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division and FAA coordinate on the resumption of airport and flight operations, as airport operational capability, air traffic control radar, and NAVAID status allows.
6			2B	I+24	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Operations Division and FAA coordinate on the issuance of NOTAMs relaying airport and navigational facility status information.
6			2C	I+36	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM monitors all ongoing port restoration activity and coordinates any necessary actions as required/requested.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			2C	I+36	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		As port throughput capabilities and power are restored, the PRTF coordinates the release and return of on-island assets supporting the restoration effort.
6			2C	I+36	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		RRCC coordinates the release of additional resources in support of the PRTF pre-landfall as port capabilities are restored.
6			2C	I+36	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		COTP directs the reopening of the seaport based on operational capability.
6			2C	I+36	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG and CPA conduct a HAZMAT survey of the seaport to determine the ability to operate in and around the seaport environment
6			2C	I+36	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		HSEM, CPA, and DPS coordinate with the TSA for issuance of temporary TWICs to any augmenting seaport workforce personnel.
6			2C	I+36	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		USCG will broadcast a BNTM stipulating seaport status and any operational restrictions.
6			3A	I+48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		PRTF is deactivated with the announcement of resumption of normal operations at all CNMI ports.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
6			3A	I+48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		UCG conducts demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.
6			3A	I+48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Seaport Unified Command, HSEM, DOD (U.S. Navy), and FEMA, in coordination with ESF #1, continue to take actions and coordinate any support required to ensure the operation, long-term recovery, and continued viability of the seaports.
6			3A	I+48	Critical Transportation	ESF #1: Transportation	IOF		Saipan International Airport Operations Division, FAA, HSEM, and FEMA, in coordination with ESF #1, continue to take actions and coordinate any support required to ensure the operation, long-term recovery, and continued viability of the airports.
7			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM/FEMA Logistics, in coordination with HSEM partner agencies, assess commodity supply requirements for supporting populations affected by the typhoon as well as Immediate response resources (IRR) needs for conducting response and recovery operations.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM/FEMA Logistics and the General Services Administration (GSA) coordinate with partner agencies and private vendors to source available on-island commodity supplies and immediate response resources (IRR) and to identify and prioritize possible locations for distribution and deployment.
7			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM/FEMA Logistics, in coordination with GSA, source and establish contracts with private vendors for available on-island commercial commodity supplies and IRR as well as distribution assets. Contracts must be de-conflicted to minimize resource competition.
7			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM/FEMA Logistics, in coordination with GSA, assess and modify any existing commodity supply/IRR resource or distribution contracts to ensure a clause is added to prioritize HSEM and emergency/disaster response operations.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			1A	I-72	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM/FEMA Logistics, in coordination with other HSEM partner agencies, maintain awareness of any established Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreement to augment current HSEM commodity supplies/IRR or distribution capabilities.
7			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and partner agencies, continues to assess on- and off-island public and private commodity supplies and IRR as well as distribution and storage capabilities.
7			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7 initiates and coordinates preparatory commodity and IRR distribution and storage activities to ensure the conduct of effective response and recovery operations and the continuation of essential services for the population of CNMI.
7			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 establish awareness on the current availability and operational readiness of on- and off-island public and private commodity supplies, IRR, and storage and distribution assets that can augment existing capabilities.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), establishes awareness on the availability and operational readiness of on-island DOD supply and resource distribution and storage assets.
7			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, attempts to establish “first priority” use of private vendor distribution and storage assets for commodities and IRR post-landfall.
7			1B	I-48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7 verifies that the FSA location(s) in CNMI is available for activation and capable of providing secure storage as well as loading capabilities for further distribution of commodities by truck to PODs and other identified locations.
7			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM ensures transportation and distribution asset protection measures are taken to ensure asset survivability once the typhoon strikes.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, HSEM partner agencies, private vendors, EMAC partners, and the DOD (through the Defense Coordinating Officer [DCO]), finalizes the availability and operational status of on- and off-island public and private commodity supplies/IRR as well as distribution and storage capabilities.
7			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7 confirms that the FSA location(s) in CNMI is activated on a limited basis to ensure that sufficient assets are staged and the appropriate number of personnel are able to staff the FSA post-landfall.
7			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and FEMA Logistics ensure that the FSA in CNMI is stocked with an initial 96-hour supply of commodities to enable 4 days of distribution of emergency supplies to roughly 1,500 citizens per day.
7			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 ensure that sufficient storage exists to safeguard resources at the FSA(s) during a Category 4 typhoon.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			1C	I-24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM confirms that the POD location(s) on each island are prepared to activate post-landfall and the appropriate number of personnel are able to staff the POD once activated.
7			2A	I+12	Critical Transportation	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs required on each island.
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and the UCG ensure that the FSA(s) remains stocked with a pre-landfall quantity of commodities to allow for distribution to 1,500 affected citizens on multiple islands per day for 4 days.
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and the UCG confirm that the FSA location(s) in CNMI is resourced with sufficient equipment and personnel to meet the demands of receiving, storing, and issuing enough commodities to distribute to 1,500 affected citizens per day for 4 days.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs activated post-landfall and anticipate differing commodity demands at each POD based on damage assessments.
7			2A	I+12	logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM confirms that the POD location(s) identified on each island remains suitable post-landfall.
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM ensures that activated PODs submit and validate 48-hour needs forecasts on a daily basis.
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM partner agencies, establishes awareness of post-storm commodity and IRR requirements, commodity supply and IRR availability, and available distribution capabilities to support operational PODs.
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, establishes awareness of mission-assigned DOD distribution assets and integrates them into the overall distribution and storage effort.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF 7: Logistics	IOF		As needed, ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, executes contracts with private vendors to augment existing capabilities through the use of commercial commodities, IRR, and distribution assets.
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, establishes awareness of any EMAC agreement executed with a neighboring island for additional commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets/capabilities.
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, as directed by HSEM and FEMA Logistics, sources and contracts for additional neighbor-island commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets/capabilities.
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, as directed by HSEM and FEMA Logistics, sources and contracts with private on-island commodity vendors for additional commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets to meet commodity and response resource requirements.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			2A	I+12	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM agencies, maintains awareness of the operational readiness of potential on- or off-island distribution assets in order to augment existing capabilities if response requirements exceed initial capabilities.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs required on each island.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and the UCG ensure that the FSA remains stocked with a pre-landfall quantity of commodities to allow for distribution to 1,500 affected citizens on multiple islands per day for 4 days.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and the UCG confirm that the FSA location in CNMI is resourced with sufficient equipment and personnel to meet the demands of receiving, storing, and issuing enough commodities to distribute to 1,500 affected citizens per day for 4 days.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs activated post-landfall and anticipate differing commodity demands at each POD based on damage assessments.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM confirms that the POD location(s) identified on each island remains suitable post-landfall.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM ensures that activated PODs submit and validate 48-hour needs forecasts on a daily basis.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM partner agencies, establishes awareness of post-storm commodity and IRR requirements, commodity supply and IRR availability, and available distribution capabilities to support operational PODs.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, establishes awareness of any mobilized CNMI National Guard or mission-assigned DOD distribution assets and integrates them into the overall distribution and storage effort.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		As needed, ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, executes contracts with private vendors to augment existing capabilities through the use of commercial commodities, IRR, and distribution assets.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, as directed by HSEM and FEMA Logistics, sources and contracts for additional neighbor-island commodity supplies, IRR, and distribution assets/capabilities.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM agencies, maintains awareness of the operational readiness of potential on- or off-island distribution assets in order to augment existing capabilities if response requirements exceed initial capabilities.
7			2B	I+24	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7 and HSEM maintain visibility of all off-island and contract assets performing distribution missions and prepare to release assets as demand decreases.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and ESF #7 gain and maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs required on each island.
7			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and the UCG ensure that the FSA(s) remains stocked using demand analysis and anticipates steady decline in requests as the situation stabilizes.
7			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM and ESF #7 maintain situational awareness regarding the number of PODs activated post-landfall and anticipate reductions or increases in demand based on response efforts on each island.
7			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		HSEM validates the need for remaining PODs as the response stabilizes.
7			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7 and HSEM maintain visibility of all off-island and contract assets performing distribution missions and prepare to release assets as demand decreases.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		As required, ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, ends contracts with private vendors providing support to distribution operations.
7			2C	I+36	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		As required, ESF #7 and HSEM release off-island and contract assets performing distribution missions as demand decreases.
7			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM, FEMA Logistics, and other HSEM partner agencies, maintains awareness regarding the transition from emergency commodities distribution operations to steady-state commercial supply chain operations and adjusts logistics support actions as necessary.
7			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, maintains awareness regarding the demobilization of all GUNG and DOD commodities distribution support assets as well as the termination of related DOD MAs and adjusts operations accordingly.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
7			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, in coordination with HSEM and FEMA Logistics, maintains awareness regarding the deactivation of EMACs for neighbor-island commodity supply and distribution assets and IRR.
7			3A	I+48	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	ESF #7: Logistics	IOF		ESF #7, as directed by HSEM and FEMA Logistics, terminates contracts for on- and off-island public and private emergency commodity supply and distribution assets and IRR.
8			1A	I-72	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HSEM coordinates with other territorial agencies and private organizations to identify viable hardened facilities to support the safe sheltering of IMATs, medical teams, and their assets prior to landfall.
8			1A	I-72	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HSEM identifies possible locations to be utilized as alternate care facilities (ACFs).
8			1A	I-72	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HSEM develops and maintains a list of hardened facilities that can be used to shelter emergency personnel and assets arriving from Hawaii and CONUS.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			1A	I-72	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HSEM coordinates with other territorial agencies and private organizations to identify viable hardened facilities to serve as shelters for incident management teams and medical teams, and their assets, prior to landfall.
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Activate/deploy ESF #8 to RRCC.
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Activate three Regional Emergency Coordinators (RECs) to deploy with FEMA IMAT in Phase 1c.
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Deploy Incident Response Coordination Team-Advanced (IRCT-A) cache from California to the HSEM Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Deploy very small aperture terminal (VSAT) capability.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Deploy required hospital staff augmentation to CNMI.
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #15, through the JIC, disseminates PSAs, informing CNMI residents and tourists about emergency procedures.
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	FEMA deploys the IMAT.
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HHS alerts/activates the Hawaii Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT), Incident Support Team (IST), and IRCT.
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HHS alerts/activates one CONUS DMAT for deployment to Hawaii.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			1B	I-48	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	FEMA executes select pre-scripted mission assignments (PSMAs).
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	IMAT deploys to CNMI.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	DMAT deploys to CNMI.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Deploy two (2) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Medical Task Forces (MTFs) to support community health clinics located in Rota and Tinian.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Deploy two (2) Logistics Response Assistance Teams (LRATs) from Hawaii to CNMI.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Vulnerable populations surge to the hospital or clinics in Saipan and clinics in Tinian and Rota for sheltering and care pre-landfall.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HSEM coordinates transportation and shelter for pre-positioned teams and assets.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Commonwealth Health Center (CHC) transfers non-critical patients to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) to create capacity.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 and coordinates and resources hardened facilities in CNMI to receive Hawaii DMAT, IST, and IRCT.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HSEM and ESF #8 verifies the availability of Humanitarian Assistance Rapid Response Team personnel to assist at ACFs, as needed.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Commonwealth Health Care Corporation (CHCC) coordinates with HSEM and the DOD to notify/alert medical staff identified for possible recall.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	CHCC and ESF #8 coordinate with HSEM to alert and coordinate with Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) to determine availability of resources and deploy ESAR-VHP personnel to ACFs, as needed.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #8 deploys an IST and an IRCT to a hardened facility in CNMI prior to typhoon landfall
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #8 deploys Hawaii DMAT to a hardened facility in CNMI prior to typhoon landfall.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I -/+ x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #8 deploys a CONUS DMAT to Hawaii to stand by for deployment to CNMI.
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #8 alerts CONUS DMATs and coordinates for deployment a Federal Medical Station (FMS).
8			1C	I-24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #11 provides animal medical services and support to household pets/service animals.
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	As appropriate, CHC transfers or releases non-critical patients to SNFs or has patients return to their homes post-landfall to preserve capacity.
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	CHCC and ESF #8 utilize the ESAR-VHP to activate regional medical personnel for deployment, as required.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #8 coordinates with ESF #6 to provide medical support to shelters upon request.
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #8 deploys alerted DMATs and FMSs, as needed.
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Based on initial assessments post-landfall, ESF #8 alerts and deploys additional medical needs shelter teams, additional medical staff, and veterinary, surgical, radiological, and dialysis support, as needed.
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Based on initial assessments post-landfall, ESF #8 increases, as needed, casualty care space through the use of a DMAT/FMS and/or additional ACFs for patients requiring acute medical treatment and 24-hour care.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #8 assesses and initiates resource procurement of additional medical supplies and pharmacological support.
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Based on initial assessments post-landfall, ESF #8 deploys the NVRT to provide medical services and support to pets/service animals in designated shelters.
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	Based on initial assessments post-landfall, ESF #11 deploys pet care supplies from the National Veterinary Supply (NVS) cache.
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #15, through the JIC, disseminates PSAs to residents and visitors regarding ongoing and planned medical response activities.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	The DOD, through the DCO, provides support to response and medical teams as mission assigned and as defined in National Response Framework Annex or through Inter-Agency Agreements. This effort may include rotary- and fixed-wing support.
8			2A	I+12	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HSEM coordinates with ESF #8 to request Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) and mortuary support assets, as needed.
8			2B	I+24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	CNMI healthcare system discharges non-critical patients from hospitals and SNFs to restore capacity.
8			2B	I+24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	CNMI healthcare system returns to pre-storm staffing levels.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			2B	I+24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	HSEM coordinates with ESF #7 and ESF #13 to demobilize additional security personnel providing oversight at healthcare facilities.
8			2B	I+24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #8 prepares to redeploy DMATs and FMSs, deployed medical needs shelter teams, additional medical staff, and veterinary, surgical, radiological, and dialysis support as needs decrease.
8			2B	I+24	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #15, through the JIC, disseminates PSAs to residents and visitors regarding ongoing and planned medical response activities.
8			2C	I+36	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	CNMI healthcare system returns to pre-storm staffing levels.
8			2C	I+36	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #8 redeploys all federal surge resources from CNMI back to their home stations.

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			2C	I+36	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	UCG demobilizes DMAT(s), the IST, and the IRCT.
8			2C	I+36	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	UCG demobilizes any regional medical personnel brought in for the medical response.
8			2C	I+36	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	UCG demobilizes and redeploys the FMS(s) back to its place of origin.
8			2C	I+36	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	UCG coordinates the return of any patients and patient support personnel evacuated from CNMI pre-landfall.
8			2C	I+36	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	UCG stands down security personnel at ACF(s)/medical needs shelter(s).

Section	Status	Task #	Phase	I +/- x hours (Initiated)	Core Capability	ESF/RSF	Responsible Team	Lead Agency	Task
8			2C	I+36	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	UCG conducts demobilization procedures in accordance with the demobilization plan.
8			2C	I+36	Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services	ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services	IOF	HHS	ESF #15, through the JIC, disseminates PSAs to residents and tourists regarding the standing down of all ACFs.

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Appendix Y: Acronyms

Acronyms	
ACF	Alternate Care Facility
ADA	Americans with Disabilities Act
AFB	Air Force Base
AFO	Area Field Office
APL	American President's Line
APOD	Airport of Debarkation
APOE	Airport of Embarkation
ARES	Amateur Radio Emergency Services
ARFF	Airport Rescue & Firefighting
ASPR	Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
BECQ	Bureau of Environmental and Coastal Quality
BNTM	Broadcast Notice to Mariners
CAP	Civil Air Patrol
CAPE	Community Assistance Policing Effort
CERT	Community Emergency Response Team
CHC	Commonwealth Health Center
CHCC	Commonwealth Healthcare Corporation
CIR	Critical Information Requirements
CNMI	Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands
COML	Communications Unit Leader
CONUS	continental United States
COP	common operating picture
COTP	Captain of the Port
CPA	Commonwealth Port Authority
CUC	Commonwealth Utility Corporation
DC	Distribution Center
DCCA	Department of Community and Cultural Affairs
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DEC	Disaster Emergency Communications
DFA	Direct Federal Assistance
DFEMS	CNMI Department of Fire and Emergency Services
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DLNR	Department of Land and Natural Resources
DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DME	durable medical equipment
DMORT	Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team
DOCU	Documentation Unit
DOD	U.S. Department of Defense
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOI	U.S. Department of the Interior
DOJ	U.S. Department of Justice

Acronyms	
DOS	U.S. Department of State
DOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
DPS	CNMI Department of Public Safety
DPW	Department of Public Works
DRAT	Disaster Response Assistance Team
DRC	Disaster Recovery Center
D-SNAP	Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
DSL	digital subscriber line
DTF	Debris Task Force
EA	External Affairs
EAO	External Affairs Officer
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
EMAC	Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMO	CNMI Office of Emergency Management
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ESAR-VHP	Emergency system for advance registration of volunteer health professionals
ESF	Emergency Support Function
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIOP	Federal Interagency Operational Plan
FLEO	Federal Law Enforcement Officer
FMS	Federal Medical Station
FMV	full-motion video
FNARS	FEMA National Radio Network
FOS	Field Operations Support
FPP	Fuel Prioritization Plan
FSA	Federal Staging Area
FSM	Federated States of Micronesia
FTF	Fuel Task Force
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GSX	Guam Saipan Express
HAM	Amateur Radio
HAZMAT	hazardous materials
HF	High Frequency
HHS	United States Department of Health & Human Services
HQ	FEMA Headquarters
HSC	Homeland Security Council
HSEM	Homeland Security Emergency Management

Acronyms	
IA	Individual Assistance
IAA	Inter-Agency Agreement
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IAU	Information Analysis Unit
ICC	Incident Command Center
ICP	Information Collection Plan
ICS	Incident Command System
ICU	Information Collection Unit
IMARSAT	Integrated Maritime Satellite Terminals
IMAT	Incident Management Assistance Team
IOF	Initial Operating Facility
IPAWS	Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
IRCT	Incident Response Coordination Team
IRR	immediate response resources
ISB	Incident Support Base
IST	Incident Support Team
JFO	Joint Field Office
JIC	Joint Information Center
JIS	Joint Information System
JTWC	Joint Typhoon Warning Center
LEC	local exchange carrier
LMC	Logistics Management Center
LMD	Logistics Management Directorate
LMR	Land or mobile radio
LNO	Liaison Officer
LRAT	Logistics Response Assistance Team
MA	Mission assignment
MAC	multi-agency coordination
MACC	Multi-Agency Coordination Center
MCG	Movement Control Group
MCTF	Mass Care Task Force
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MERS	Mobile Emergency Response Support
MHE	material handling equipment
MOG	maximum on ground
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MRE	Meal Ready to Eat
MTF	Medical Task Force
NAVAID	Navigational Aid
NAWAS	National Warning System
NEMIS	National Emergency Management Information System
NFIP	National Flood Insurance Program
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NLC	National Logistics Coordinator
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Acronyms	
NOC	National Operations Center
NOTAM	Notice to Airman
NPG	National Preparedness Goal
NRCC	National Response Coordination Center
NRCS	National Response Coordination Staff
NRF	National Response Framework
NVOAD	National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
NVRT	National Veterinary Response Team
NVS	National Veterinary Stockpile
NWR	NOAA Weather Radio
NWS	National Weather Service
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OFA	other federal agency
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PDA	Preliminary Damage Assessment
PEP	Primary entry point
PFO	Principal Federal Officer
PIO	Public Information Officer
POC	point of contact
POD	point of distribution
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
PRT	Planning and Response Team
PRTF	Power Restoration Task Force
PSA	Public Service Announcement
PSAP	public safety answering point
PSMA	Pre-Scripted Mission Assignment
PSS	Public School System
PST	Pacific Strike Team
PSTN	Public-Switched Telephone Network
PTWC	Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
RA	Regional Administrator
RAC	Response Activity Coordinator
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
RECC	Regional Emergency Communications Coordinator
Red Cross	American Red Cross
RFI	request for information
RMI	Republic of the Marshall Islands
RRCC	Regional Response Coordination Center
RRCS	Regional Response Coordination Staff
RSF	Recovery Support Function
RSS	Resource Support Section
SA	Situational Awareness
SAR	search and rescue
SASC	Situational Assessment Section Chief
SBA	Small Business Administration
SCO	State Coordinating Officer

Acronyms	
SEOC	State Emergency Operations Center
SIST	SAR Incident Support Team
SLSC	Senior Leadership Steering Committee
SME	subject matter expert
SMS	short message service
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SPSMY	Guam Special Weather Station
SWC	serving wire center
SWEAT-M	sewage, water, energy, accessibility, telecommunications, and medical
TC	threat condition
TEU	twenty-foot equivalent unit
TF	Task Force
THIRA	Threat Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment
TLT	Typhoon Liaison Team
TP	Territorial Primary
TPFDL	Time-Phased Force Deployment List
TSA	Transportation Safety Administration
TWIC	Transportation Worker Identity Cards
UCG	Unified Coordination Group
UCS	Unified Coordination Staff
UHF	ultra-high frequency
UPS	Uninterrupted Power Supply
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
US&R/USAR	Urban Search & Rescue
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USGS	United States Geological Survey
VA	Veterans Administration
VAL	Voluntary Agency Liaison
VHF	Very High Frequency
VHS	very-high frequency
VOAD	Voluntary Organization Active in Disasters
VOST	Virtual Operations Support Team
VSAT	Very Small Aperture Terminal
WC/ATWC	West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center
WFO	Weather Field Office
WWTF	Water and Wastewater Task Force

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Appendix Z: Distribution

1 Purpose

This plan will be distributed to the following entities:

- Senior Leadership Steering Committee (SLSC)
- CNMI Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)
- FEMA Region IX
- FEMA Region IX Pacific Area Office (PAO)
- FEMA Region IX CNMI Defense Coordinating Officer/Element (DCO/DCE)
- Federal Emergency Support Function (ESF) Region IX coordinators
- FEMA Headquarters
- Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector partners

A complete copy of the plan consists of the *2017 CNMI Catastrophic Typhoon Plan* and includes the Base Plan, Appendices A, B (with 1 appendix), C (with 12 appendices), D, E, F, X, Y, and Z.

2 Distribution Table

Entity	Email
SLSC	Distribution List
CNMI HSEM	Distribution List
FEMA Region IX	Distribution List
FEMA Region IX PAO	Distribution List
CNMI DCO/DCE	Distribution List
ESF Region IX Coordinators	Distribution List
FEMA Headquarters	Distribution List
NGOs and Private Sector Partners	Distribution List

- Emailed and other electronic dissemination of the plan and appendices will be in a pdf format.

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- ⁱ FEMA Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Incident Support Team (IST), *Operations Manual*, January 2000, p. IV-1
- ⁱⁱ Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Manual, 2008 p.18
- ⁱⁱⁱ Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue Addendum to the National Search and Rescue Manual, 2008 p.18
- ^{iv} FEMA Operations Manual, National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Response System. September 2012, p.37
- ^v FEMA Operations Manual, National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Response System. September 2012, p.7
- ^{vi} FEMA Operations Manual, National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Response System. September 2012, p.11
- ^{vii} Department of Defense Instruction DoD Support to Civil Search and Rescue (SAR), Number 3003.01, 2011 p.1
- ^{viii} California Fire Service and Rescue Emergency Mutual Aid System, Urban Search & Rescue Program, 2004 P. 23
- ^{ix} California Fire Service and Rescue Emergency Mutual Aid System, Urban Search & Rescue Program, 2004 P. 25
- ^x California Fire Service and Rescue Emergency Mutual Aid System, Urban Search & Rescue Program, 2004 P. 27
- ^{xi} California Fire Service and Rescue Emergency Mutual Aid System, Urban Search & Rescue Program, 2004 P. 27
- ^{xii} California Fire Service and Rescue Emergency Mutual Aid System, Urban Search & Rescue Program, 2004 P. 23
- ^{xiii} California Fire Service and Rescue Emergency Mutual Aid System, Urban Search & Rescue Program, 2004 P. 27
- ^{xiv} Target Capabilities List U.S. Department of Homeland Security, September 2007 pages 407-17
- ^{xv} National Preparedness Goal, 2015, Core Capabilities, Response.